We’re back to bump stocks. Indeed, we have covered cases raising similar issues so we’re not going into too much detail on the U.S. Court of Federal Claims’ recent decision in The Modern Sportsman, LLC v. United States, No. 19-449 (May 8, 2025), and we’ll just assume you, like us, have been following along with this issue.

Suffice it to say that the federal government adopted regulations defining these devices as prohibited machine guns and gave those in possession 90 days to either turn them over to the government, or to destroy them. The plaintiffs destroyed their bump stocks and then sued the federal government for a taking.

The CFC dismissed the complaint under the government’s “police power” authority to prohibit contraband and noxious items. As we noted in this post, the line between uncompensated destruction and compensated takings was not as clear at the CFC saw it (the Armstrong rationale cannot be ignored, even where a taking may be for a very good public reason), and thus the Federal Circuit affirmed, but shifted the rationale from police power to a lack of a private property interest. After the Supreme Court denied cert, “that was that.” Slip op. at 2.

Meanwhile, other bump stock owners challenged the validity of the administrative rule declaring these things machine guns. And there, the owners found more success, with the Supreme Court eventually concluding that the agency lacked the authority to adopt the bump stock rule. The owners here “then asked this Court to revive this lawsuit, which the Court did … [t]he next day, plaintiffs amended their pleadings to add an illegal exaction claim in addition to their takings claim.” Slip op. at 3. 

The government sought dismissal, arguing that the bump stock owners alleged a physical taking but the government hadn’t physically seized anything. It merely required the owners to destroy the bump stocks: as the CFC put it, the government “acknowledges that plaintiffs alleged that ‘the Rule required bump stock owners to destroy or surrender the devices to ATF.’ Reply 2. That does not pass muster for the government, however, because the government ‘did not seize any devices or otherwise physically invade plaintiffs’ property.’ Id. at 3.” Slip op. at 4. In short, we didn’t actually seize anything of yours, plaintiffs; we merely required you to destroy your property. Really. 

The CFC wasn’t having any of that, and rejected this too-clever-by-half argument:

The Court cannot agree. Let us be clear that the government need not literally force private persons to turn over their property for a taking to occur; a legal requirement is sufficient. For example, in Horne, the Supreme Court held that an administrative order requiring raisin croppers to “give a percentage of their crop to the Government, free of charge” effected a compensable appropriation. 576 U.S. at 355. The government did not literally oust the farmers from possession of the raisins, yet a taking occurred because the order made a “formal demand” backed by fines and penalties. Id. at 362, 367–68. It is the same here. The Rule plainly states: “This final rule requires the destruction of existing bump-stock-type devices.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 66,549. It then instructs: “Individuals who have purchased bump-stock-type devices prior to the implementation of this rule must destroy the devices themselves prior to the effective date of the rule or abandon them at their local ATF office.” Id. Finally, it makes clear that “individuals are subject to criminal liability . . . for possessing bump-stock- type devices after the effective date of regulation.” Id. at 66,525. These statements undoubtedly constitute a formal demand to destroy or transfer possession of bump stocks, satisfying the standard under Horne.

Slip op. at 4-5.

If this argument strikes you as nonsense, welcome to our world, where arguments like this are put forth with a straight face on a regular basis. 

And if that wasn’t enough, the government next argued that the regulations didn’t actually require the owners to destroy their bump stocks, “but ‘merely clarified’ the ‘longstanding statutory law’ banning machineguns.” Slip op. at 5. “Put plainly, the government essentially argues that the Rule is an informational document apprising the public of pre-existing legal obligations.” Id. The CFC held “[t]hat too is incorrect.” Id. That seems to be putting it mildly. What do you think would have happened to bump stock owners who didn’t comply with this “informational” rule and held on to their bump stocks?

Short story: the complaint alleged a physical taking.

Next, however, the CFC rejected the exaction claim, based on the remedy sought. As we know, the CFC is limited to awarding monetary damages in these kind of cases. The CFC held that an “exaction” generally “involves money that was ‘improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the claimant.'” Slip op. at 7 (quotations omitted). Here, the CFC held, no money changed hands and there’s no statute otherwise authorizing a claim for money damages:

In sum, plaintiffs cannot be said to have paid money, directly or “in effect,” for a very straightforward reason: They lost personal property, not money. Indeed, plaintiffs have not alleged that they spent any money for any purpose; or paid any money to any In sum, plaintiffs cannot be said to have paid money, directly or “in effect,” for a very straightforward reason: They lost personal property, not money. Indeed, plaintiffs have not alleged that they spent any money for any purpose; or paid any money to any

Slip op. at 8-9.

The CFC wrapped up by — get this — calling out the property owners’ lawyers for failing to expressly clarify that one of the cases they cited and relied on didn’t actually hold that an exaction could be a demand for “money or property,” only money. Slip op. at 9. The court acknowledged that the citation didn’t actually misquote the case, but that the lawyers should have been more candid that they were arguing for an extension of the law, and that the case limited exactions to money.

We’re fine with that (especially in the AI era), and requiring advocates to be candid. 

But where’s the call-out of the government’s horse hockey arguments, noted above? Dead silence, of course. In our view, the borderline frivolous, time-and-expense wasting, divorced-from-reality arguments the government made are equally if not more deserving of censure. 

Call us if that ever happens. We’ll wait.

The Modern Sportsman, LLC v. United States, No. 19-449 (Fed. Cl. May 8, 2025)