Due process

Newly released: the Federalist Society’s “Courthouse Steps” series covers Pung v. Isabella County, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that “just compensation” for Tyler takings is usually measured by the surplus after a tax sale and not fair market value of the property, unless the tax sale process is unfair or skewed. Here’s

In Betts v Boone County, No. 25-1685 (June 15, 2026), the big question facing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was whether qualified immunity kept next-of-kin from prevailing on a section 1983 due process claim after the county coroner kept the skull of a murder victim as a “trophy” for forty years (yikes!) after turning over the rest of the body to the family for burial.
Continue Reading CA7: Illinois Recognizes Due Process Property In Kin’s Remains

The setup in Article 13 LLC v. New York Attorney General, No. 23-7247 (May 13, 2026) is very “Second Circuity,” and is bit convoluted, so hang on while we get through it. But we shall start with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s conclusion that a New York statute known as the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act did not result in a taking because the challenger does not have a property interest in “collaterally challeng[ing] the invalidity of a prior foreclosure action years after the limitations period expired[.]” Slip op. at 25. And even if that were a property right, this was not a Penn Central taking because any “negative economic impact … was the result of [the challenger]’s own inaction.” Id.
Continue Reading You Snooze You Lose In The Second Circuit: No Property Interest In Challenging A Statute When You Let The Statute Of Limitations Expire

It was on this day in 1928 when the U.S. Supreme Court issued its second most famous decision about zoning, Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). We say “second” because everyone knows that the first is the Court’s decision issued just two years earlier which generally upheld comprehensive use, height, and density regulations as a valid exercise of the government’s police power to regulate property uses to further the public health, safety, welfare, or morals. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U S. 365 (1926).
Continue Reading You Don’t Look A Day Over 98, Nectow v. City of Cambridge

Hawaii has a unique status among American states. It is the only state that once was a separate sovereign nation, the Kingdom of Hawaii and then its short-lived successor, the Republic of Hawaii. Yes, we know that Texas may lay claim to the whole six-flags thing, so maybe the more accurate statement would be that Hawaii is the only state that was a sovereign kingdom, ruled by royalty.
Continue Reading If A King Must Comply With “Every Form And Particular” In Eminent Domain, Then Today’s Condemnors Also Surely Must

The latest from the lawyers who brought you Knick v. Township of Scott. A new cert petition challenging the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that a property owner asserting a due process violation must effectively exhaust state judicial remedies.
Continue Reading New Cert Petition (Ours): Must A Due Process Claimant Exhaust State Remedies?

Sometimes when you read a court opinion you imagine there’s a big gap between the objective, sterile words on the page and the reality of the situation.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in O’Donnell v. City of Chicago, No. 24-2946 (Dec. 22, 2025) is one of those.

The words

Check out this new (ish) cert petition which asks whether the “final decision” ripeness rule that currently governs regulatory takings cases is also applicable when the right alleged to have been violated is procedural due process.

The petition sets out how the lower federal courts have dealt with the question:

This case presents an important

The latest cert petition from Michael Berger, this time involving procedural due process and takings.

Here are the Questions Presented:

The City of Dana Point “red tagged” Petitioner’s motel and then had a receiver appointed to oversee its rehabilitation without ever providing notice of the hearing. Thereafter, it set the property for a