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Here’s the latest in a case we’ve been following closely. (We won’t be commenting much, because it is one of ours.)

In The Coalition for Fairness in Soho and Noho, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 112 (Jan. 13, 2026), the New York Court of Appeals (dun-dun) held that

New York City wants to save space so artists can live there. If an owner wants to covert a SoHo or NoHo artist live/work space into plain old residential (because artists ain’t living in SoHo or NoHo), she better get ready to pay to the City’s Arts Fund a non-refundable fee of $100 per square foot as a precondition of even filing a building permit. When owners challenged this fee as unconstitutional under Nollan/Dolan/Koontz/Sheetz, the trial division said no.

But the Appellate Division held otherwise, concluding that the imposition of the

Continue Reading NY Court Of Appeals Tees Up A Certworthy Exactions Case

This is going to be a short post, mostly because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in KOGAP Ent., Inc. v. City of Medford, No 24-5268 (Nov. 13, 2025) is itself short.

Before we go further, this disclosure: this is one of ours, and our Pacific Legal Foundation colleague Brian Hodges argued the case.

It’s a three-page memorandum opinion so there’s not a lot there to sink our teeth into, and it would be faster for you to just read it yourself, rather than us explaining what it said. Short story is that the city imposed an exaction requiring KOGAP to extend a city street. The court affirmed the exaction has an “essential nexus” to KOGAP’s proposed development project, holding that the street extension was justified because the development would likely result in “more auto-oriented uses.”

But the court held that there’s no evidence that

Continue Reading CA9: No Evidence That Exaction Was Proportional

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The room where it happened.

We’re not going to say much about the California Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, No. C093682 (July 29, 2025), which is back in the California court system after remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, because it is one of ours.  

Here’s the bottom line:

Upon further analysis as directed by the Supreme Court, we now conclude that the challenged permit condition (TIM fee) does not constitute an unlawful monetary exaction under the Nollan/Dolan test. The legislatively formulated generally applicable impact fee is not an unconstitutional condition imposed on land use in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause. Accordingly, we again affirm the judgment.

Slip op. at 5.

We don’t necessarily agree 100% with our colleague Ben Rubin’s assessment, but do urge you to read his piece, “California Court of Appeal Confirms Legislatively Enacted

Continue Reading Sheetz On Remand: “The legislatively formulated generally applicable impact fee is not an unconstitutional condition imposed on land use in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause.”

Euclidsymposium

With the 100th anniversary of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. nearly upon us in 2026, we’ve put together a series of events designed to reexamine the case that set the stage for a century’s-worth of intense land use regulations and restrictions.

Are Euclid‘s assumptions and conclusions still valid? If the original separation-of-uses and nuisance-prevention rationale of zoning made sense, does that rationale apply when “zoning” has become the shorthand for extremely granular regulation of property’s uses? What of the role of judicial review and a return to Nectowian review? 

Our Euclid series begins with a call for papers, and a follow-up conference at which these articles will be presented and discussed. For more, see the call for papers: “Euclid Turns 100: Rethinking an Antiquated Case and Reimagining Euclidean Zoning for the Century Ahead.” The link also has a few suggestions about

Continue Reading Call For Papers: “Euclid Turns 100: Rethinking an Antiquated Case and Reimagining Zoning for the Century Ahead”

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Last year, we attended a conference devoted to the future of regulatory takings, hosted by the Antonin Scalia School of Law (George Mason U), and Pacific Legal Foundation.

The publisher, the Journal of Law, Economics, and Policy has released the articles and essays from that conference, and made them available here

Here’s the list of articles:

  • Michael M. Berger, Juries for Takings Liability: Treating Litigants Alike
  • Ethan W. Blevins, Cyber Takings: A Preliminary Study of Regulating Takings of Virtual Spaces
  • Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Choice of Law After Tyler v. Hennepin County
  • Emily Cruikshank Bayonne and Wesley M. Davenport, Counting Costs: the Institutional Effects of Regulatory Takings
  • Emily Hamilton and Charles Gardner, Legislative Responses to the Regulatory Takings Conundrum
  • Brian T. Hodges and Deborah J. La Fetra, Sheetz v. County of El Dorado: Legislatures Must Comply With the Takings Clause
  • Donald J. Kochan, Involuntary Regulatory Servitudes:


Continue Reading New Property Rights Symposium Published – “Too Far: Imagining the Future of Regulatory Takings”

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Here’s news we’ve been waiting for.

The William and Mary Law School announced that Professor William Fischel will be awarded the 2025 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize at the annual conference in Williamsburg in October 2025. 

The Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize is presented annually to a scholar, practitioner, or jurist whose work affirms the fundamental importance of property rights. It is named in honor of the late Toby Prince Brigham, a leading property rights attorney, and the late Gideon Kanner, a devoted scholar of property rights who was Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles.

Professor Fischel taught in the Economics Department at Dartmouth from 1973 until his retirement in 2019. His scholarship focuses on the law and economics of local government, and his expertise includes local government law, school finance, zoning and land use controls, property taxation, and regulatory takings law. He is the author of five

Continue Reading And The 2025 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize Goes To…Professor William Fischel

We’re back to bump stocks. Indeed, we have covered cases raising similar issues so we’re not going into too much detail on the U.S. Court of Federal Claims’ recent decision in The Modern Sportsman, LLC v. United States, No. 19-449 (May 8, 2025), and we’ll just assume you, like us, have been following along with this issue.

Suffice it to say that the federal government adopted regulations defining these devices as prohibited machine guns and gave those in possession 90 days to either turn them over to the government, or to destroy them. The plaintiffs destroyed their bump stocks and then sued the federal government for a taking.

The CFC dismissed the complaint under the government’s “police power” authority to prohibit contraband and noxious items. As we noted in this post, the line between uncompensated destruction and compensated takings was not as clear at the CFC saw it (the Armstrong rationale cannot be ignored, even where a taking may be for a very good public reason), and thus the Federal Circuit affirmed, but shifted the rationale from police power to a lack of a private property interest. After the Supreme Court denied cert, “that was that.” Slip op. at 2.

Meanwhile, other bump stock owners challenged the validity of the administrative rule declaring these things machine guns. And there, the owners found more success, with the Supreme Court eventually concluding that the agency lacked the authority to adopt the bump stock rule. The owners here “then asked this Court to revive this lawsuit, which the Court did … [t]he next day, plaintiffs amended their pleadings to add an illegal exaction claim in addition to their takings claim.” Slip op. at 3. 

The government sought dismissal, arguing that the bump stock owners alleged a physical taking but the government hadn’t physically seized anything. It merely required the owners to destroy the bump stocks: as the CFC put it, the government “acknowledges that plaintiffs alleged that ‘the Rule required bump stock owners to destroy or surrender the devices to ATF.’ Reply 2. That does not pass muster for the government, however, because the government ‘did not seize any devices or otherwise physically invade plaintiffs’ property.’ Id. at 3.” Slip op. at 4. In short, we didn’t actually seize anything of yours, plaintiffs; we merely required you to destroy your property. Really. 

The CFC wasn’t having any of that, and rejected this too-clever-by-half argument:

The Court cannot agree. Let us be clear that the government need not literally force private persons to turn over their property for a taking to occur; a legal requirement is sufficient. For example, in Horne, the Supreme Court held that an administrative order requiring raisin croppers to “give a percentage of their crop to the Government, free of charge” effected a compensable appropriation. 576 U.S. at 355. The government did not literally oust the farmers from possession of the raisins, yet a taking occurred because the order made a “formal demand” backed by fines and penalties. Id. at 362, 367–68. It is the same here. The Rule plainly states: “This final rule requires the destruction of existing bump-stock-type devices.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 66,549. It then instructs: “Individuals who have purchased bump-stock-type devices prior to the implementation of this rule must destroy the devices themselves prior to the effective date of the rule or abandon them at their local ATF office.” Id. Finally, it makes clear that “individuals are subject to criminal liability . . . for possessing bump-stock- type devices after the effective date of regulation.” Id. at 66,525. These statements undoubtedly constitute a formal demand to destroy or transfer possession of bump stocks, satisfying the standard under Horne.

Slip op. at 4-5.

If this argument strikes you as nonsense, welcome to our world, where arguments like this are put forth with a straight face on a regular basis. 

And if that wasn’t enough, the government next argued that the regulations didn’t actually require the owners to destroy their bump stocks, “but ‘merely clarified’ the ‘longstanding statutory law’ banning machineguns.” Slip op. at 5. “Put plainly, the government essentially argues that the Rule is an informational document apprising the public of pre-existing legal obligations.” Id. The CFC held “[t]hat too is incorrect.” Id. That seems to be putting it mildly. What do you think would have happened to bump stock owners who didn’t comply with this “informational” rule and held on to their bump stocks?

Short story: the complaint alleged a physical taking.

Next, however, the CFC rejected the exaction claim, based on the remedy sought. As we know, the CFC is limited to awarding monetary damages in these kind of cases. The CFC held that an “exaction” generally “involves money that was ‘improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the claimant.’” Slip op. at 7 (quotations omitted). Here, the CFC held, no money changed hands and there’s no statute otherwise authorizing a claim for money damages:

In sum, plaintiffs cannot be said to have paid money, directly or “in effect,” for a very straightforward reason: They lost personal property, not money. Indeed, plaintiffs have not alleged that they spent any money for any purpose; or paid any money to any In sum, plaintiffs cannot be said to have paid money, directly or “in effect,” for a very straightforward reason: They lost personal property, not money. Indeed, plaintiffs have not alleged that they spent any money for any purpose; or paid any money to any

Slip op. at 8-9.

The CFC wrapped up by — get this — calling out the property owners’ lawyers for failing to expressly clarify that one of the cases they cited and relied on didn’t actually hold that an exaction could be a demand for “money or property,” only money. Slip op. at 9. The court acknowledged that the citation didn’t actually misquote the case, but that the lawyers should have been more candid that they were arguing for an extension of the law, and that the case limited exactions to money.

We’re fine with that (especially in the AI era), and requiring advocates to be candid. 

But where’s the call-out of the government’s horse hockey arguments, noted above? Dead silence, of course. In our view, the borderline frivolous, time-and-expense wasting, divorced-from-reality arguments the government made are equally if not more deserving of censure. 

Call us if that ever happens. We’ll wait.

The Modern Sportsman, LLC v. United States, No. 19-449 (Fed. Cl. May 8, 2025)

Continue Reading CFC: Allegation That Gov’t Ordered Destruction Of Bump Stocks Pleaded Physical Takings Claim

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Check out the new report by our Pacific Legal Foundation colleagues Kyle Sweetland and Brian Hodges, “How to Protect Property Rights from Improperly Assessed Exactions” (Apr. 2025).

This research in brief shows how exactions grew and increased home construction costs over a 16-year period. It provides a history of exactions, showing how they have frequently moved away from their original impact-mitigation purpose and how that shift in purpose risks violating the Constitution. It illustrates an improperly assessed exaction and provides examples of how exactions have hampered construction during the present housing crisis. It concludes by examining how state legislatures can help set boundaries on local exactions and protect property rights.

It’s short, its sweet, it’s straightforward and understandable. What more could you want? Oh yeah, unlike exactions … it’s free. No strings attached. Check it out.

Sweetland & Hodges, How to Protect Property Rights from Improperly Assessed Continue Reading New Report: “How to Protect Property Rights from Improperly Assessed Exactions” (Sweetland & Hodges)

Today we have a guest post by New York colleague Jennifer Polovetsky, who writes about an exactions case that is headed for the New York Court of Appeals. Disclosure: our firm represents the property owners in that court. 

Thanks to Jennifer (and to the New York Law Journal) for allowing us to republish her intriguing piece.

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NY Zoning Law Mandating Contributions Deemed an Unconstitutional Taking

by Jennifer Polovetsky

A few years ago, on December 15, 2021, the City of New York (the City) amended §143–13 of the City Zoning Resolution (the ZR Amendment). A portion of this ZR Amendment required property owners to pay a mandatory, nonrefundable contribution to the SoHo–NoHo Arts Fund (Arts Fund), as a precondition to filing for a permit to convert joint living-work quarters for artists (JLWQA) to unlimited residential use.

What is the problem with the ZR Amendment, you may ask? Well, according


Continue Reading Guest Post (Jennifer Polovetsky): “NY Zoning Law Mandating Contributions Deemed an Unconstitutional Taking”