An interesting one from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
The Modern Sportsman, LLC v. United States, No. 19-449 (June 5, 2026), is the latest in a string of decisions on the “bump stock” issue. You remember the issue: a “bump stock” is a device you can attach to a semi-automatic rifle to make it fire rapidly like a fully-automatic rifle.
Continue Reading CFC: Govt Ordering Destruction Of Bump Stocks Could Be A Physical Taking, But Not Exactly An Exaction
The salient features of New Mexico’s elk management program, including the state’s introduction and efforts to build up the population of elk, the EPLUS (“elk private lands use system”), the mitigation assistance program, and the introduced elk becoming a nuisance, to private property owners are common in these type of things. But like a lot of what we call “wildlife” takings (like this and this, for example), the decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Kiehne v. New Mexico Dep’t of Game and Fish, No. A-1-CA-42309 (June 3, 2026), does not go well for the owners.
Continue Reading Even Though They Have A “Relationship,” Those Elk The State Introduced Are Wildlife Not State Elk, So No Physical Taking When They Invade And Damage Private Property
As the caption of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Reynolds, No. 25-1750 (Apr. 23, 2026), might indicate, this is a case about animal-rights activists coming onto property to video the goings-on.
Iowa had already criminalized certain trespasses: entering or
Here’s a just-filed cert petition, which poses a question that has been around since at least 1980: when third parties enter private property under color of state law against the wishes of the owner, is this a taking? That’s right, the issue decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). (And yes, the above photo is from a visit to The Pruneyard shopping center in Campbell, California a while back.)
Continue Reading New Cert Petition: Time For PruneYard To Go
Yes, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Banks v. Charter Twp. of Bloomfield, No. 25-1833 (Apr. 28, 2026) is unpublished, and we usually don’t cover unpublished opinions. But we put aside our usual reluctance to discuss unpublished work because the decision raises an important point: are the rules in “regulatory” takings only applicable when the government has adopted a regulation?
Continue Reading CA6: To Be A Regulatory Taking, There Must Be A Regulation
We’re deep in the throes of winter, and spring training won’t start for another month, but for those of you who are fans of the National Pastime — particularly if you are like us and a child of 1970’s baseball — then be sure to check out the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s recent opinion in Clemente Properties, Inc. v. Pierluisi-Urrutia, No. 23-1922 (Jan. 16, 2026).
Continue Reading CA1: Government’s Use Of Roberto Clemente Trademark Isn’t A Categorical Physical Invasion Taking
Here’s the latest in an issue we’ve been following.
In Alban v. United States, No. 23-1363 (Dec. 22, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’s judgment concluding that the failure of the Corps of Engineers to properly operate two dams, which resulted in upstream
In Gould v. Interface, Inc., No. 23-12883 (Oct. 2, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was dealing with a claim for wrongful termination of a tech CEO.
So what’s the case doing here? Skip forward to page 12 of the slip opinion, where the court deals with an oft-occurring argument:
Check this out: a significant and important decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in an issue we’ve been following.
In Alford v. Walton County, No. 2021-13999 (Nov. 17, 2025), the unanimous panel concluded that the county’s Co-19 restrictions, which closed all beaches (public and private) in the county
In State ex rel. Boggs v. City of Cleveland, No. 2025-Ohio-5094 (Nov. 13, 2025), the Ohio Supreme Court held that the City of Cleveland could be liable for inversely condemning land, even though that land is not in the City of Cleveland.
The city claimed that in order to be liable for inverse condemnation