In this post — the third in a series of deeper dives that we’ll be posting about last week’s U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, No. 20-107 (June 23, 2021) — we’ll be discussing whether the “right to exclude” is absolute, what exceptions the Court laid out, and how it
We Pay A Return Visit To The Eminent Domain Podcast To Talk Takings
In which we pay a return visit to Clint Schumacher’s Eminent Domain Podcast to catch up with Clint about our new gig, Cedar Point (briefly, since the opinion came down the day we recorded the podcast), just compensation and attorneys’ fees, assessing severance damages in appraisals supporting jurisdictional offers, public use
Another SCOTUS Property Rights Win, This Time On Williamson County’s “Final Decision” Requirement
Another day, another property rights decision from SCOTUS. This time, the unanimous per curiam opinion in a case we’ve been following, Pakdel v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 20-1212 (June 28, 2021).
[Disclosure: our PLF colleague Jeff McCoy is lead counsel on this case, and we pitched in with help on
11th Circuit Affirms Penn Central Jury Verdict For Rezoning Resulting In 86% Loss Of Value
More good takings news, hot off the press.
Before Cedar Point came down last week, we were all set to let you know about the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in South Grande View Dev. Co., Inc. v City of Alabaster, No. 18-14044 (June 21, 2021), in which the court affirmed a jury verdict that
Euclid Lives! Mass SJC: “Short-Term” Rental Is Not A Permissible Primary Use In A Residential Zone Because Not Of “Residential Character”
A short, land-usey one today, from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. In Styller v. Zoning Board of Appeals, No. SJC-12901 (June 7, 2021), the court held that the plaintiff’s “occasional” use of a home to rent to others short-term is not a legal primary use of property in a “single residence’ zoning district.
The
Euclid Lives! Mass SJC: “Short-Term” Rentals Is Not A Permissible Primary Use In A Residential Zone Because Not Of “Residential Character”
A short, land-usey one today, from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. In Styller v. Zoning Board of Appeals, No. SJC-12901 (June 7, 2021), the court held that the plaintiff’s “occasional” use of a home to rent to others short-term is not a legal primary use of property in a “single residence’ zoning district.
The
Mark Your Calendars: 2021 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference, Williamsburg, Virginia, Sept 30-Oct 1 (in-person)
Mark your calendars for September 30 – October 1, 2021, and join us at the William and Mary Law School in Williamsburg, Virginia for the 18th Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference. It’s planned to be in-person, so when we mean “join us” we really mean join us.
This year the Conference will recognize the lifetime
Fla App Doubles Down On That Weird Property Isn’t “Property” Thing
We’re hoping that someone can explain the Florida District Court of Appeal’s recent opinion in Bondar v. Town of Jupiter Inlet Colony, No. 4D19-2118 (May 5, 2021) in a way that makes sense other than the old apocryphal tale of “I don’t know why we do things this way, except that we’ve always done
A Federal Court’s Extraordinary Shot Across The Bow: LA’s Massive Homeless Problem Is Caused (In Part) By Eminent Domain
This In Chambers Order recently issued by a federal district judge may just be the most unusual, flat-out wild judicial opinion we have ever read.
Citing the Gettysburg Address, Brown v. Board of Education, systemic racism (including eminent domain) systemic sexism, and a slew of newspaper articles, the Central District of California (without even
Cal App: Taking Verdict Affirmed – When City Asserts That Its No-Development Law “trumps whatever you might submit,” It Would Have Been Futile For Property Owner To Submit Development Application
We suggest you take a read through the California Court of Appeal’s opinion in Felkay v. City of Santa Barbara, No. B304964 (Mar. 18, 2021). It’s all there: Lucas wipeout takings, futility and exhaustion, coastal zone property rights.
This is an inverse condemnation case, seeing compensation for the city denying the owner any economically