Shands Key, with the City of Marathon in the background
This just in: in Shands v. City of Marathon, No. 3D21-1987 (Fed. 5, 2025), Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals sitting en banc held that the city’s downzoning of property (Shands Key, shown above in an exhibit from the Key West trial we participated
Register now and plan on joining us on Thursday, February 27, 2025 at the U.C. Berkeley Law School for a one-day conference: “Property Rights and the Roberts Court: 2005-2025.”
Here’s the agenda. Here’s a description of the program:
For much of the past century, property rights were relegated to second-class status compared
Check out this article, forthcoming in the George Mason Journal of Law, Economics, and Policy from lawprof Eric Claeys, “Takings and Choice of Law After Tyler v. Hennepin County.”
This is one of the pieces coming out of the recent symposium “Imaging the Future of Regulatory Takings” at George Mason Law School.
Here’s the Abstract:
This Essay contributes to a symposium on the future of regulatory takings. It focuses on choice of law in eminent domain disputes. When claimants bring eminent domain claims in federal courts, the courts must determine whether the claimants have constitutional “private property” in the entitlements allegedly taken. Should that determination be made with federal law, with the law of the state allegedly taking property, or law from some other source?
The 2023 Supreme Court decision Tyler v. Hennepin County addressed that issue. Under Tyler, it is a federal question whether an eminent domain claimant has constitutional private property. To answer the question, federal courts usually consult the law of the state where the alleged taking took place. But that presumption applies only if state law seems to secure and not to circumvent the federal right. And if that reservation is not satisfied, federal courts may consult a wider pattern of legal sources—Anglo-American history, the general law of the several United States, federal court precedents, and a broader cross-section of law from the state allegedly taking property. That approach resembles the approach taken generally for federal constitutional rights—especially in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand (1938)—but varies from the general approach in the sources it makes relevant to settle what counts as private property under the Fifth Amendment. This Essay interprets Tyler, and it offers a normative justification for Tyler’s approach to choice of law in eminent domain.
Don’t miss this one.Continue Reading New Article (Eric Claeys): “Takings and Choice of Law After Tyler v. Hennepin County”
What to say about the Colorado Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nonhuman Rights Project v. Cheyenne Mountain Zoo, No. 24SA21 (Jan. 21, 2025), wherein the court resolved the momentous and highly controversial question of whether an elephant is a person?
Our first temptation is to see this through the takings lens (surprise), and snark
You remember 1977, don’t you? No? Well surely you must know the soundtrack. Sublime and deeply resonant music, accompanied by complex-yet-meaningful lyrics like these:
I’m your boogie man, that’s what I am.
I’m here to do whatever I can.
Be it early morning, late afternoon.
Or at midnight, it’s never too soon.
To wanna please
If you thought the issue of whether it is a Fifth Amendment taking for a state or local government to “keep the change” after satisfying a tax debt was settled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023), you’d be right.
Then what was there left for the
With our tongues firmly planted in cheeks, the Planning Chairs for the upcoming 42d edition of this popular and venerable Conference bring you this “breaking news” report from San Diego!
As you know, in addition to being the best nationally-focused conference on the subjects that we love and a venue that is nearly certain to
It’s been a couple of weeks, but we’re still trying to wrap our head around the Iowa Supreme Court’s opinion in Singer v. City of Orange City, No. 23-1600 (Dec. 20, 2024).
The court rejected a facial challenge under the Iowa Constitution’s search-and-seizure clause to a city ordinance requiring the owner of rental units
We’re starting off the new year with some eminent domain goodness. Tim Sandefur has published “Eminent Domain in the Constitutions of Arizona, Washington, and Other States,” 18 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 167 (2024).
There’s a lot in the piece that will keep you reading, but what we found particularly insightful was how public use/purpose limitations “should operate in practice.” In our opinion, it’s fairly easy to say that the Fifth Amendment (and state constitutions) operate as a robust check on the sovereign power to take property for public use, but a lot more difficult to apply that broad notion to particular circumstances in a way that is both uniform and predictable. Right now, we seem to be operating on a know-it-when-I-see-it basis, but that doesn’t get us to a general rule. This piece goes a long way to getting us to a general rule.
Highly recommended.
Here’s the Abstract:
The nineteenth century was an extraordinarily prolific age of constitution-making. One of the greatest concerns of constitution-makers during this period—particularly in the western states—was the protection of private property against threats such as the use of eminent domain and the damage to property resulting from public works projects. This Article takes the eminent domain provisions of the Arizona and Washington constitutions as a point of departure to examine the innovative ways in which constitution-makers sought to limit government’s power to deprive people of their property. These constitutions—which until the admission of Alaska and Hawaii were the most up-to-date constitutions in America—contain four such innovations: (1) an explicit ban on takings for “private use,” reinforced by prohibitions on judicial deference regarding the definition of “public use”; (2) a compensation requirement for the “damaging” of property; (3) a requirement that payment precede a taking, and (4) a ban on deducting from just compensation awards the amount of purported “benefit” resulting from a taking. The Article traces the origins of these four protections, with reflections on how they should operate in practice.
The latest edition of the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Journal (William & Mary Law School) is out, with intriguing Dirt Law scholarship from the luminaries in the field.
Check out the Table of Contents above, and then go here to download each piece or the entire issue. We will note, with a small bit of pride
