
Property lawyers, dust off your Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and federal judges your long vacay from dealing with regulatory takings and inverse condemnation cases is over, because this just in: by a 5-4 margin (Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, with Justice Kagan writing the dissent), the U.S. Supreme Court today finally (finally!) overruled the state-litigation prong of the Williamson County ripeness doctrine. Knick v. Township of Scott, No. 17-647 (June 21, 2019).
Yes, overruled. Not trimmed around the edges. Overruled.
Here's what our quick skim turns up as a critical passage:
The Court in Williamson County relied on statements in our prior opinions that the Clause “does not provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken. But the owner is entitled to reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation” after a taking. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 659 (1890). Respondents rely on the same cases in contending that uncompensated takings for which compensation is subsequently available do not violate the Fifth Amendment at the time of the taking. But respondents read those statements too broadly. They concerned requests for injunctive relief, and the availability of subsequent compensation meant that such an equitable remedy was not available. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 107, 149 (1974) (reversing a decision “enjoin[ing]” the enforcement of a federal statute because “the availability of the Tucker Act guarantees an adequate remedy at law for any taking which might occur”); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 99, 105 (1932) (rejecting a request to “enjoin the carrying out of any work” on a flood control project because the Tucker Act provided the plaintiff with “a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law”). Simply because the property owner was not entitled to injunctive relief at the time of the taking does not mean there was no violation of the Takings Clause at that time.
Slip op. at 16.
More to come after we've had a chance for a deeper dive on the opinions, but here's one more critical passage:
We conclude that a government violates the Takings Clause when it takes property without compensation, and claim under §1983 at that time. That does not as a practical matter mean that government action or regulation may not proceed in the absence of contemporaneous compensation. Given the availability of post-taking compensation, barring the government from acting will ordinarily not be appropriate. But because the violation is complete at the time of the taking, pursuit of a remedy in federal court need not await any subsequent state action. Takings claims against local governments should be handled the same as other claims under the Bill of Rights. Williamson County erred in holding otherwise.
Slip op. at 19-20.
Knick v. Township of Scott, No. 17-647 (U.S. June 21, 2019)