I commented upon the decision in Hui Kakoo Aina Hoopulapula v. Bd. of Land and Nat. Res.,112 Haw. 28, 143 P.3d 1230 (Sep. 21, 2006) earlier in this post.
This opinion, detailing when and how a contested case may be demanded, should be read together with Aha Hui Malama O Kaniakapupu v. Land …
The “public trust” doctrine got a further boost in Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 111 Haw. 205, 140 P.3d 985 (July 28, 2006).
The public trust doctrine in its original form under Hawaii law was that the Crown or government owns title to all land below the high water mark, which is held in…
Just in case you were wondering whether Hawaii water rights issues were matters of federal or state law, the Hawaii Supreme Court has provided the answer.
In Maui Tomorrow v. State of Hawaii, 110 Haw. 234, 131 P.3d 517 (Apr. 5, 2006), the court held that prevailing on a state law water rights claim in state court does not entitle the victor to federal civil rights attorneys fees.
That conclusion may seem a touch obvious, one might think, but despite a rather clever and “tenuous” argument by the party seeking to fee-shift, the court correctly determined that issues of water rights and the common law public trust were matters of state law. Disclosure: I represented the Hawaii Farm Bureau Federation, one of the prevailing parties in this appeal.
The appeal arose when the owner of a private water transport system on Maui sought a long term lease from the State Board of Land and Natural Resources, allowing the use of surface water originating in state-owned land. Several individuals and organizations intervened in the administrative process, alleging that the lease would interfere with their preexisting water rights, rights as Native Hawaiians, and rights under Hawaii’s public trust in water, and that before entering into a lease, the agency must undertake an environmental assessment under the Hawaii Environmental Policy Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 343.
The agency rejected the claims, and the intervenors appealed to state court, adding a claim for due process violations. The trial court ruled against the intervenors and in favor of the state on the due process claims, for the intervenors on the EA and public trust claims, and remanded the case back to the agency. After judgment was entered, the intervenors sought nearly a quarter of a million dollars in attorneys fee under the federal fee-shifting statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. That statute allows a party who prevails on a federal civil rights claim (42 U.S.C. § 1983) to make the loser pay attorneys fees. The trial court denied the motion and the intervenors appealed.
The Supreme Court held that despite characterizing their water rights and public trust claims as claims under the law admitting Hawaii as the 50th state (the Admission Act), the claims made by the intervenors were, in reality, arguments under state law. The court compared the claims actually made by the intervenors to the claims theintervenors said they made, and found no federal civil rights claim was present, much less a federal claim on which the intervenors prevailed. The court characterized the request for attorneys fees as “tenuous,”but refused to impose Rule 11 sanctions for a frivolous argument.
Continue Reading ▪ 2006 Land Use in Review: Hawaii Water Law is Not a Federal Case
The Hawaii Supreme Court recently decided a case that provides some guidance to those who practice in the often ill-defined space between executive agencies and the courts, a place land use lawyers and their clients frequently find themselves.
In Hui Kakoo Aina Hoopulapula v. Board of Land and Natural Resources (Sep. 21, 2006), the court confirmed that in order to properly demand a “contested case” (a trial-like administrative hearing) and thus preserve a right to judicial review of agency action, the party demanding the hearing must follow the agency’s rules to request it, even if it appears futile to do so.
In that case, the electric company asked the State Board of Land and Natural Resources for a long-term lease of brackish water from a Big Island aquifer for “industrial use and fire suppression” for a generating plant.
Parties who have long objected to the generating plant objected to the proposed lease and orally asked the Board for a contested case at a public hearing the Board scheduled on the electric company’s request. The Board rejected the oral request for a contested case and issued the lease after a public auction. The objectors did not file a written request for a contested case with the Board, as required by the Board’s rules of procedure.
The objectors then sought judicial review in circuit court of the issuance of the lease, and the denial of the contested case. Circuit court review of administrative agency action is limited to appellate review of the administrative record produced after a contested case. Thus, if no contested case is held in the agency, the circuit courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.
The circuit court, finding that no contested case was conducted by the Board, determined it lacked jurisdiction, and the supreme court affirmed, never reaching the substantive issues raised by the objectors. Lack of jurisdiction prevented the courts from considering the case at all.
The key holding of the case is that a proper written demand for a contested case is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review. Even when the agency has denied an oral demand. The court held that the agency’s “no” may not have really meant “no,” and the objectors may have been able to change the agency’s mind with a written demand for a contested case.
No demand for a contested case means no contested case is conducted, and no contested case means that a party disappointed with the result of agency action cannot run to court and seek reversal.
