The majority opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in State of Texas v. JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC, No. 24-0447 (June 12, 2026), starts off pretty good:

The right to own property is “fundamental, natural, inherent, inalienable, not derived from the legislature and . . . preexist[s] even constitutions.”

Slip op. at 1-2 (citation omitted).

And it gets better from there. At issue was one of those “buyback” statutes — property taken for a public use that isn’t used for that public use within a defined time frame can be repurchased by its former owner. In this case, Texas’s (as the caption indicates).

Texas’ “Landowner’s Bill of Rights” provides that “[i]f private property was condemned” and within 10 years the property isn’t used for the stated public use, becomes unnecessary for the public use, or “no actual progress is made toward the public use,” the prior owner “may have the right to repurchase the property for the price paid to the owner[.]”

Back in 2013, the state was in the process of developing a highway project and sent an offer letter to the property owners to the effect that if the DOT’s offer was not accepted within two weeks, “eminent domain proceedings will be initiated by the State.” Slip op. at 4. The owners did not respond positively, so the State pulled the trigger and “petitioned for condemnation in April 2014 with a suit in a Harris County civil court at law.” Id. Three weeks later, a compromise: the parties settled the condemnation case in return for $681k. The trial court dismissed the State’s condemnation case.

But then “[g]overnment official decided to reroute the highway project, leaving a portion of the condemned land unused.” Slip op. at 5. Owners pinged DOT about whether the State would be willing to sell back the surplus land. When the State declined, the owners assigned their statutory repurchase claim to JRJ Pusok (the current real party in interest).

When JRJ sued, the trial court dismissed the claim because the State had not waived sovereign immunity. The court of appeals, however, reversed.

The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that in 2003, when the state legislature created the first statutory repurchase right (and then responded to Kelo two years later), the people of Texas wanted more substantial limits on government’s power to interfere with property right. Thus, the court concluded, “the State is not immune from repurchase claims.” The court rejected the State’s somewhat bizarre argument that although the statute conferred jurisdiction over a repurchase claim, the State nonetheless remained immune because the legislature had not expressly waived sovereign immunity. Slip op. at 11. The court held no, conferring jurisdiction is pretty much a waiver. For details, see pages 14-16 of the slip opinion (“The 2011 statutory amendments make clear that the Legislature
anticipated the State as a defendant in suits to vindicate repurchase rights.”).

Next, the court turned to the most interesting issue: did the State’s purchase under the threat of eminent domain constitute acquisition “through eminent domain” as the statute requires? The court held yes:

A right of repurchase belongs to “[a] person from whom a real property interest is acquired by an entity through eminent domain for a public use.” The State concedes that it acquired the property for public use, and it does not dispute that JRJ meets one of the five predicates for seeking repurchase. The State argues, however, that its acquisition was not “through eminent domain,” as Chapter 21 requires, because the Landowners settled with the State on a value for the land after the State filed suit.

Slip op. at 21. The court held that the “logical reading of ‘through eminent domain’ is ‘by means of the State’s power to take private property for public use.'” Slip op. at 21-22 (footnote omitted). You don’t need a final judgment adjudicating value for an acquisition to be “through” eminent domain, and it is enough that the acquisition was in the course of an eminent domain lawsuit, even if the parties ultimately compromised and settled before reaching final judgment:

A settlement as to the property’s value does not alter the State’s acquisition of it “through eminent domain.” The deed in this case acknowledges the Landowners conveyed the property as a result of “ED proceedings.” The Landowners did not sell the property in an arm’s length transaction on the open market; rather, the Landowners surrendered their property in concession to the State’s coercive power.

Once the State invokes its eminent domain power, landowners need not proceed to a judgment as to adequate compensation to preserve their repurchase right. The State’s forced transfer via a condemnation suit is an exercise of its power to obtain the property “through eminent domain.”

Slip op. at 22-23 (footnote omitted).

The court also concluded that the buyback provision applies even where only a portion of the property isn’t used for the designated public use, mostly because the statute uses the term “the property” and not “the entire property.” Slip op. at 23.

We think the majority got it right when it employed a plain language interpretation of the statute, and construed it to effect its purpose. You know, like eminent domain statutes are supposed to be applied and interpreted.

State of Texas v. JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC, No. 24-0447 (Texas June 12, 2026)