I’ve been reading some noteworthy law journal articles on the subject of eminent domain — two on the issue of pretext, and one on just compensation. Worth reviewing.
- Daniel S. Hafetz, Ferreting Out Favoritism: Bringing Pretext Claims After Kelo, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 3095 (2009).
The plaintiffs in Goldstein based their pretext claims on both Justice John Paul Stevens’s brief discussion of pretext in the majority opinion of Kelo and Justice Anthony Kennedy’s more lengthy discussion in his concurrence. Acknowledging that “[t]here may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption . . . of invalidity is warranted,” Kennedy’s fifth-vote concurrence identified the possibility of “a more stringent standard of review than [rational basis review] for a more narrowly drawn category of takings.” Although the Second Circuit rejected the application of this heightened pretext standard in Goldstein, it acknowledged that “Kelo opened up a separate avenue for a takings challenge” where the plaintiff alleges the asserted public purpose is a pretext for bestowing a private benefit.
Article available here from the Fordham Law Review. (In the section on Goldstein and Twombly, this inversecondemnation.com post is cited.)
- Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments, and Impermissible Favoritism, 17 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. (forthcoming Summer 2009).
Since Kelo v. City of New London, the preferred litigation strategy for challenging a condemnation that benefits a private party is to allege that the taking is “pretextual.” This Article contends that, although pretextual takings are socially undesirable, the current judicial test for identifying such takings is problematic. Yet an alternative, intent-based test might be impracticable, as well as underinclusive: condemnors often have mixed motives, particularly when confronted with a firm’s credible threat to relocate. Instead, the Article develops a framework that emphasizes informational differences between local governments and private developers. When the government lacks information regarding the optimal site for an assembly, the government may need to rely on a private party to identify, as well as develop, a particular site. However, when the government itself possesses information regarding the site, precondemnation private involvement, as well as post-condemnation involvement by a preferred developer, is generally unnecessary. Such involvement increases the likelihood of a pretextual transfer without any corresponding public benefit. The Article concludes that a burden-shifting framework, analogous to Title VII’s test for identifying pretext, can be adopted in the takings context. The new framework is then applied to several situations in which allegations of pretext are likely to arise.
Available here from SSRN.
- Matthew Cory Williams, Restitution, Eminent Domain, and Economic Development: Moving to a Gains-Based Conception of the Takings Clause, 41 Urban Lawyer 183 (Winter 2009) (25th Smith-Babcock-Williams Student Writing Competition Winner).
Post-Kelo, those recognizing the value of eminent domain to aggregate property for redevelopment have suggested that the real focus should not be on whether economic development is a public purpose, but on the amount of compensation given to the takees. Indeed, assuming takees werec compensated at the takee’s subjective value, the problem of forcing takees to “sell” their property to the government would be a much less divisive issue. However, current measures of “just compensation” are based on the “fair market value” of the property. In response to this “under compensation,” several suggestions have been made on how to raise the level of compensation, and some states have enacted measures aimed at increasing compensation levels. Proposed solutions seek to award some of the benefit of the reaggregation and development of the land, called “after value,” to the takees. This article examines whether awarding after value to takees complies with the major purposes of the Takings Clause. While it examines a few of the many proposed ways to award takees a portion of this after value, this article focuses more on whether the general idea of after value complies with the philosophies underlying the Takings Clause.
Article available here for ABA members.
