In City of Chicago v. Eychaner, No. 1-19-1053 (May 11, 2020), the Illinois court of appeals revisited a case that it ruled on once before.
Five years ago, in City of Chicago v. Eychaner, 26 N.E.3d 501 (Ill. Ct. App. 2015), the same court held that a redevelopment taking of Eychaner's property qualified as a public use. We won't go into the details of facts or that opinion's reasoning. Instead, we'll refer you to our summary, analysis (and criticism) of the opinion here ("The Chicago Way: City Taking Non-Blighted Property For Economic Development Was Not Pretextual Because ... Studies"). After approving the taking, the court remanded the case for a determination of the compensation owed.
Flash forward. On remand, the jury determined just compensation was $7.1 million. Also while the case was remanded, the City changed its redevelopment plans. You know, the basis for the court of appeals' public use ruling. But the court prior public use determination seems to have still bothered Eychaner, because he challenged it again:
[Eychaner] asserted the taking no longer served a permissible public use since the City had changed its plans for the area surrounding Eychaner’s property. Specifically, Eychaner argued, “without the River West TIF Plan, there is no valid conservation plan—or any plan—on which the Blommer redevelopment project and the taking of defendant’s property is based. It’s a naked transfer of private property through the power of eminent domain to benefit a private party— now Fuji Oil Holdings, Inc. It is a taking for private, not public use, and is thus barred in Illinois.”
Slip op. at 9.
Wait a minute, the city objected, same issue, you lost, done. Eychaner claimed the circumstances changed, so he could raise the argument again. But apparently, he did not bring in evidence of these new circumstances, or file a motion. The trial court agreed with the city, and first concluded that this new claim was outside the scope of the appellate court's remand, and second, that Eychaner should have objected earlier. So he appealed again.
Eychaner raises two arguments. First, he asserts the City has no right to take his property and that our ruling allowing the taking to prevent future blight was wrong and in conflict with supreme court precedent in SWIDA. Eychaner asks that we reverse that judgment and dismiss the eminent domain proceeding with prejudice. Alternatively, Eychaner contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider its denial of his traverse in light of the City’s new North Branch Framework and asks that we reverse that denial and remand so the trial court can reconsider in light of changed circumstances.
Slip op. at 10.
Nope, sorry, the court held (again) law of the case. We're stuck with our 2015 public use decision, and so are you, property owner. But what about those alleged changed circumstances? Again, no deal. The owner should have raised it before trial and not after. The rule about a post-trial motion for a new trial requires a showing that the new evidence was not discoverable before trial. "He knew of the “changed circumstances” — the North Branch Framework — before the second just compensation trial and had ample opportunity to bring the evidence to the court’s attention." Slip op. at 12.
But even if timely, the changed circumstances did not change the public use determination. The prior plans were not "superseded," but rather the new plans (and the old not-superseded plan) is part of a bigger plan that "together carry out the purpose of promoting the economic revitalization of the conservation area." Slip op. at 15. The city, after all, has the public purpose of "prevent[ing] future blight." Id. Yes, that's right. Take now to avoid future blight. But is that any kind of meaningful standard? After all, we're all potentially blighted in the future. As long as the condemnor has a study that says that (which the city did), no problem. We suggest you read this part of the opinion, especially.
Is this the end of the story? Given Eychaner's doggedness, we suspect not.
City of Chicago v. Eychaner, No. 1-19-1053 (Ill. App. May 11, 2020)
