Reading through the opinion of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in City of Manila v. Roces Prieto, No. 221366 (Aug. 29, 2019), there is a lot there that will look familiar to U.S. lawyers, specifically U.S. eminent domain lawyers.
Viz.: It is up before the Court on a petition for certiorari, there was an effort to voluntarily acquire the properties, an "expropriation" lawsuit gets filed when that didn't work, and the City deposited estimated compensation and sought a writ of immediate possession from the trial court. That court balked because the deposit amount didn't comply with the requirements of the statute, but once the City fixed that problem, the court allowed immediate possession. Sounds very familiar.
The takings were in furtherance of something called the Land-for-the-Landless program, which this article describes as a process by which "[t]hrough expropriation, the city government buys private properties that are then distributed to qualified applicants." Also sounds familiar, somewhat like the Hawaii Land Reform Act which our Supreme Court upheld in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), and the takings for redevelopment in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Well, in this case, it wasn't just the landless who wanted land, the landed wanted to keep theirs. Although the trial court allowed the taking and issued a writ of possession, the appeals court held that the expropriation was not supported by the factual record the statute requires:
the records lack[] any evidence to support petitioner's claim that an on-site development program is the most practicable and advantageous for the beneficiaries, to justify the nonapplicability of the list of priorities in land acquisition under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7279.
Slip op. at 4.
The statute requires that the expropriated land be "blighted," meaning that structures are "dilapidated, obsolete and unsantiary," but the City didn't do more than assert the lands to be taken were in such condition. Instead, because the City made "bare and unsupported assertions" of blight, the court invalidated the taking. Slip op. at 4.
The Supreme Court took up the case. As background, the law of the Republic of the Philippines regarding expropriation looks a lot like US law (at least US law in theory):
In resolving expropriation cases, this Court has always been reminded that the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of fundamental right. "The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowner's right to private property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty."
Slip op. at 6 (footnote omitted). Again, sounds very familiar.
But here's where the Court took a different turn. Instead of the conceivable basis (well-nigh conclusive) standard of judicial review, the Court held that because the power to deprive someone of their property involuntarily is a drastic power, "Therefore, the exercise of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny." Slip op. at 6 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
And that's not all: "Such scrutiny is especially necessary when eminent domain is
exercised by a local government considering that it merely has a delegated
power of eminent domain." Id.
Now that's a long way from the way we do things here, at least in our Supreme Court.
The Philippines Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals ("The petition is bereft of merit."), concluding that the enabling statute for the Land-for-the-Landless program imposed several requirements, including a provision that mandates that private property can only be taken as a last resort after other available properties and modes of acquisition are exhausted. The trial court took a "facile approach" and "took hook, line, and sinker" the City's "assertion that an on-site development is the most practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, allowing the resort to the acquisition of private lands despite the same being last in the list of priorities[.]" Slip op. at 8. The city's "bare allegations and unsupported generalizations do not suffice, considering the drastic effect of the exercise of such power to constitutionally-protected rights."
The courts, the Court held, "have a duty to judiciously scrutinize and determine whether the local government's exercise of the delegated power of eminent domain is in accordance with the delegating law." Slip op. at 6 (footnote omitted). If only US courts would take the same approach. Boy howdy!
Yes, this is a case about the requirements of a statute, and doesn't directly deal with the issue in cases like Berman and Midkiff where there was a direct challenge to to power to take. But read the entire opinion. The Philippines Supreme Court viewed the statute through a property rights lens, not the usual judicial deference where US courts mostly accept whatever the condemnor says -- hook, line, and sinker -- even where a statue may be involved.
City of Manila v. Roces Prieto, No. 221366 (S. Ct. Philippines Aug. 29, 2019)
