Here’s one worth reviewing. In Dickard v. Jackson & Jackson, LLC, No. CA2025-07-072 (Ohio App. Nov. 16, 2026), the Ohio Court of Appeals held held that a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment takings claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Ohio state court without first pursuing Ohio’s somewhat-unique mandamus procedure to compel an appropriation action. Seems about right.
The owner purchased nine acres that, despite residential zoning, had historically hosted several nonresidential uses. When the owner began using the property for an electrical and emergency-response business, the County ordered it to stop. The BZA denied a use variance, and when the County later sought an injunction, the owner counterclaimed, alleging among other things a regulatory taking under both Penn Central and Lucas.
The trial court dismissed, reasoning that recourse to Ohio’s mandamus process was required to obtain compensation. Remember that in Ohio, one cannot assert a classic “inverse condemnation” claim where the owner is the plaintiff and sues the alleged inverse condemnor, claiming a de facto taking has occurred. Instead, where there’s been a de facto taking, the owner brings a mandamus claim asking the court to order the government to institute a straight taking by eminent domain. Different, yes, but a sound approach and perhaps more consistent with the de facto theory and the idea that government cannot be compelled to exercise eminent domain, except by a court. The trial court held that recourse to the mandamus process was required before making an argument that the county’s actions worked a de facto taking without compensation.
If that analysis sounds familiar to you, it certainly did to the court of appeals.
The court held that Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019), did away with Williamson County‘s state-litigation requirement, whether you call it inverse condemnation or mandamus. And that doesn’t change simply because Ohio state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over section 1983 claims. You don’t need to exhaust before asserting a 1983 claim, and you don’t need to exhaust before alleging a federal de facto taking. Thus, the court concluded there’s no basis for requiring an owner who asserts a federal takings claim (or argument) in state court to first exhaust Ohio’s mandamus remedy:
Knick has changed the legal landscape and the exhaustion of state remedies, including pursuit of mandamus in Ohio, is no longer a predicate to commencing a Section 1983 takings claim.
Slip op. at 22 (footnote omitted).
Just so.
The court also rejected the county’s argument that Ohio’s ordinary two-year personal-injury limitations period governs merely because the claim travels under section 1983. Ohio has a statute providing a four-year period specifically for claims seeking relief on the grounds of a physical or regulatory taking of real property. Substance over form, held the court. A takings claim brought under section 1983 is still, at heart, a takings claim.
Finally, the court held that once the BZA denied the variance, the owner had the final decision needed to pursue its as-applied constitutional challenge. It was not also required to appeal the BZA decision before seeking declaratory relief.
The regulatory takings and as-applied claims therefore live to fight another day. And in these kind of cases, often that’s enough. Count this as a win.
Worth a read, particularly for the court’s straightforward application of the post-Knick rule: a federal takings claim is actionable when property is taken without compensation. A State can’t put its own procedural prerequisite back in front of section 1983 after Knick removed it.
Dickard v. Jackson & Jackson, LLC, No. CA2025-07-072 (Ohio App. Nov. 16, 2026).

