Not a lot that’s earthshaking from the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Sablan v. Commonwealth Utilities Corp., No. 2024-SCC-0023 (June 20, 2026), but we’re posting it because its holding — an entity lacking the power of eminent domain may nonetheless be liable for inverse condemnation — is important because it rightly concludes that the focus of the calculus in these cases is on the infringement of the property owner’s rights, not the technicalities of the government’s power.

This was a case where in 1991, the Commonwealth Utilities Corporation (a legislatively-created public corporation that is a part of the Commonwealth’s government) began constructing a public water project on land that turned out to be Sablan’s property, although the CUC believed at the time the construction was on an adjacent public right of way. But “[a]t that time no survey had been conducted to determine whether the structure lay within the boundaries of the 1991 co-owners’ land or on an adjacent public right-of-way.” Slip op. at 2. The project was completed in 1992. “In the Commonwealth, parcel boundaries are often not ascertainable through visual observation alone.” Slip op. at 7.

Flash forward a few decades to 2013 and when a survey was completed, it was discovered the project had been partially built on what was by then Sablan’s land and not in the right of way. In 2015, Sablan’s successors-in-title sued for a physical invasion taking.

The CUC claimed it could not be liable for just compensation for a taking because only the Commonwealth, and not the CUC, possesses the power of eminent domain. The court rejected the argument, holding “[t]he constitutional duty to provide just compensation arises from the act of taking private property for public use, not from the formal possession of eminent domain authority.” Slip op. at 9. The court rejected a formalist approach, concluding that it is the invasion that triggers the obligation to provide compensation, not the status of the defendant:

When the government physically appropriates or occupies private land for a public purpose, the constitutional obligation to compensate attaches to the occupation itself, regardless of whether formal condemnation procedures were invoked. Were it otherwise, the government could avoid constitutional accountability simply by carrying out public projects through entities to which it has delegated operational authority while withholding formal eminent domain power.

Id. (citing Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 147–48 (2021)).

The court rejected the CUC’s argument that two prior decisions which held that the Commonwealth courts could not be liable for a taking merely by “reallocating estate assets among private heirs” in the course of litigation. The CUC seized on the part of these opinions which noted that courts don’t have eminent domain power: ah ha … the defendant must possess the eminent domain power in order to be held liable for a taking! The court held no, these cases were more about the owners there not stating a judicial takings claim. As long as the court is applying law and not radically changing it, deciding cases (including those case which ownership of property is at issue) is a core function of courts, not a judicial taking. In short, those two cases didn’t solve the question.

Next, the court noted that the CUC is a governmental entity, and when an arm of the government invades and occupies property, the obligation to provide compensation is triggered:

The Legislature created CUC as a public corporation within the Commonwealth government to develop and operate public utility infrastructure. 4 CMC § 8121(a), 8122. Acting under the CNMI’s Capital Improvements Program, CUC selected the site on Tract 22654, broke ground in March or April 1991, and completed the Maui IV facility by mid-1992, funded through federal grants channeled through the CNMI Office of the Governor and Legislature. App. 1425; Tr. 818–19. Where a governmental entity physically occupies private land to carry out such a purpose, inverse condemnation supplies the mechanism through which the constitutional guarantee of just compensation is enforced. The absence of formal eminent domain authority does not alter the constitutional character of the occupation.

Slip op at 9.

Store that one in your databanks.

The other interesting holding is the court’s conclusion that a complaint filed in 2015 which objected to a physical invasion that was complete not later than 1992 was not barred by the statute of limitations. The CUC argued that the owners knew (or should have known) that the CUC had invaded and occupied the land a long time ago (when the project was complete), and should not have waited until the 2013 survey. The court rejected the argument:

A landowner’s awareness of a nearby government structure therefore does not establish knowledge that the structure crosses his property line. In the Commonwealth, that determination often cannot reasonably be made without a formal survey or some other form of actual notice.

Slip op. at 8.

This decision conflicts with the Oregon Supreme Court’s adoption of a categorical rule that the statute of limitations begins to accrue in physical invasion takings cases when the invasion begins, not when the owner knows the invasion is contrary to his or her interests.

So there it is. Yes, the CNMI is way out there in the Pacific. But the opinion is well worth your time.

Sablan v. Commonwealth Utilities Corp., No. 2024-SCC-0023-CIV (C.N.M.I June 30, 2026)