Here's one with a somewhat unusual twist: the condemnee objecting to the taking by a public utility district was the state.
In Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Okanogan Cnty. v. State of Washington, No. 88949-0 (Jan. 29, 2015), the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the power of the county utility district to take an easement over "school trust lands" for the construction of an high-voltage, high-capacity transmission line and corridor. The land was owned by the public and held in trust for schools, was "a portion of the largest publicly owned tract of shrub-steppe habitat in the Methow Valley," and was being used for cattle grazing. The grazing leases generated $3,000 per year for the state's public schools, and also acknowledged that the land may be subject to easements and condemnation.
The court first concluded that an environmental organization could intervene to address the power of the utility district to take the land. Although not an adjoining landowner (who, under prior decisions, have standing to intervene to challenge the power to take), the interest of the environmental organization was like that of an adjoining landowner, and the state might not adequately protect that interest -- the state was there to protect the lands as school lands, while the organization's interest was in protecting "wildlife sanctuaries and shrub steppe lands." Slip op. at 12. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the environmental organization to intervene to challenge the power to take.
On that issue, however, the court sided with the utility-condemnor, and held that the state land was not immune from being taken. The utility has been delegated the power of eminent domain by statute, so the court viewed this issue as the scope of the delegation to a municipal corporation under the statute, which provides:
A district may take, condemn and purchase, purchase and acquire any public and private property, franchises and property rights, including state, county, and school lands, and property and littoral and water rights, for any of the purposes aforesaid, and for railroads, tunnels, pipe lines, aqueducts, transmission lines, and all other facilities necessary or convenient, . . .
Rev. Code Wash. 54.16.050 (emphasis added).
The state asserted that as trust land, its property was exempt, and that transfer to land would violate its fiduciary duties. When the state owns land in its "proprietary" capacity, it's enough that the enabling statute authorizes confers the power to take this type of land. By contrast, when the state owns land it its "governmental" capacity" (in trust), it can only be condemned when the statute authorizes condemnation of the land in that specific capacity. The court agreed with the state that it "indisputably" held the school lands in its trust capacity, meaning the question was "whether [the utility] is expressly authorized to condemn the subject school and turns on whether the term 'school lands' provided in RCW 54.16.050 refers to school trust land." Slip op. at 17.
We'll let you go through the court's statutory analysis (see pp. 16-19), but suffice it to say the opinion concluded that yes, "school lands" in the statute includes school trust lands: the legislature directed the courts to "liberally" construe the statute, and other, similar grants of power include the condemnation of trust lands.
As for the state's prior public use argument -- that the land was already being used to graze cattle -- the court held that the utility's proposed use was not incompatible with the state's use, and therefore the doctrine did not prohibit the taking. The court also rejected the state's constitutional argument:
PUD's condemnation of a right of way through school lands is consistent with these constitutional provisions because condemnation of an easement does not involve the sale of land in fee and requires payment of full market value. The plain language of section 2, when contrasted with that of section 1, strongly indicates that the drafters did not intend the sale of lesser land interests (e.g., easements) be subject to the public auction requirements of section 2. Had they so intended, they would have included similar "estate or interest" language in section 2 as appears in section 1. Because PUD is not attempting to condemn a fee interest, we need not consider whether the public auction requirements of section 2 would prohibit condemnation of a fee interest.Slip op. at 27-28.
Finally, the court rejected the state's argument that condemnation of school trust lands violated the state's fiduciary duties as trustee . The fact that condemnation requires the payment of just compensation was not incompatible with the state constitution's prohibition on disposal of trust land, because that limitation is subject to the proviso that "unless the full market value of the estate or interest disposed of" is paid to the state.
