Justice Souter: Dismissal Under Williamson County Is So Easy, A Caveman Could Do It

How hard is it for the government to obtain a Williamson County dismissal that a federal takings claim is not ripe for federal court reivew? Not too hard, says Justice Souter.

Justice Souter? But wait, didn't he retire, you ask? Recall that Supreme Court justices who retire from the Court don't really "retire" in the sense that they may continue to sit and hear cases in the federal courts of appeals. Justice O'Connor has done so, and Justice Souter did so in Efron v. Mora Dev. Corp., No. 11-1347 (Mar. 26, 2012, a case from the First Circuit involving a claim for a regulatory taking in Puerto Rico.

The Puerto Rico highway department condemned Efron's land, and although he objected, the Commonwealth court transferred ownership and possession to the department. Efron then went to federal court on civil rights claims against the department and Mora Development, alleging that they conspired to take his land. He also brought a state law tort claim for "unlawful deprivation of the use and quiet enjoyment of property." Slip op. at 2.

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants because Efron had not first brought his federal takings claim to a Puerto Rico court, as required by Williamson County. The court dismissed Efron's supplemental state law tort claim without prejudice. The court awarded Mora $92,000 in attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, concluding the federal claim was frivolous. The court awarded that amount because it concluded that much of the cost associated with discovery on the state tort claim was "inextricably irrelated" with Efron's federal claim.

The First Circuit, in an opinion by Justice Souter, vacated the decision and sent the case back to the district court. The Williamson County dismissal was based only on the fact that Efron had not first sought relief under Puerto Rico law,and

there is no basis in the record brought to our attention that suggests that these facts are inextricably associated with the tortious conduct alleged in the supplementary action, or that any effort was required to unearth the elementary basis for dismissing the Fifth Amendment claim. The Commonwealth officials must have known of Efron’s failure to resort to local process, and Mora’s principal could presumably have found this out with nothing more than a phone call. A few pages of pleadings and affidavits would have sufficed to place the law and facts before the court. Perhaps there is a more supportive basis for the amount of the fee order than meets the appellate eye, but on the record as cited for our consideration, the need for over $90,000 in fees for discovery and summary judgment in Mora’s favor on the SFW Arecibo issue is inexplicable.

Slip op. at 6. 

Efron v. Mora Development Co., No. 11-1347 (Mar. 26, 2012)