May 2025

One of the frustrations of challenging the power to take is … let’s say you win. Yay! You’ve stopped the taking!

So now what? Go back to your life safe in the belief that your property rights are secure? Maybe. If the government has had enough and says “no mas,” your win may be the end of it.

But what if the government really really wants your property? Can it come at you again, armed with with the blueprint your successful public use challenge just provided for how to do it right this time? Probably. There are few situations where the usual “one shot” principle in civil cases — also known as claim preclusion (res judicata to you traditionalists) — ties a condemnor’s hands and prevents it from taking a second, or third, or more shot.

So what about settling your public use challenge? If you

Continue Reading CA8: You Believed The County When It Promised In The Settlement Agreement To Not Take Your Land In The Future? Shame On You!

In this order, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois temporarily enjoined enforcement of Chicago suburb Glen Ellyn‘s prohibition on renting property for less than 30 days.

Blakelick owns a five-bedroom single family home that when purchased was not located in Glen Ellyn. Since 2022, it has been offering the home for short-term rental on platforms like Airbnb. But in 2024, the property was annexed by the Village of Glen Ellyn. Blakelick continued to rent the property for less than 30 days. 

The dispute apparently began six months earlier when a neighbor began complaining about noise, culminating in the threat to “do everything in [his] capability to see to it that such use of property is banned in this area.” Slip op. at 2. Apparently he was successful, because in 2025, the Village, now having jurisdiction over the property, adopted an ordinance prohibiting owners from

Continue Reading Property Owner Likely To Succeed On Claim That Prohibition Of Short-Term Rentals Is A Penn Central Taking

The opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in Myers-Woodward, LLC v. Underground Services Markham, LLC, No. 22-0878 (May 16, 20205), doesn’t involve eminent domain, takings, land use, or any of our usual topics. 

But we’re posting it here because at bottom, students of these topics must be conversant in plain old property law, what we affectionately refer to as “dirt law.” And this case is pretty dirty.

Short story: “A” owned the surface and conveyed the subsurface mineral estate to another. A portion of that mineral estate — the right to mine salt — was conveyed, in turn, to “B,” who exercised that right. The extraction of the salt resulted in large caverns, which could be used to store (you guessed it) oil and gas storage. As a consequence, a dispute arose about who owned that cavern space, the surface owner, or the owner of the salt deed.

Here’s

Continue Reading Dirt Law Wednesday: Absent Agreement Otherwise, Empty Space Remaining After Salt Mining Belongs To Surface Owner

Here’s a recently-filed cert petition raising questions in a challenge to Los Angeles’ County’s imposition of ban on commercial evictions during Co-19. A lot of other jurisdictions around the country imposed eviction restrictions or prohibitions on residential properties, but LA County stood alone in restricting commercial evictions.

This one asks whether a party is categorically barred from asserting a claim that a local government impaired a contract solely because other jurisdictions had adopted or were adopting similar restrictions (although here, those restrictions affected only residential leases), and thus had no expectation of having his contract unimpaired.  

This is out of our shop, so we’re not going to say much more about it except to post the Question Presented:

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the County of Los Angeles enacted a moratorium that prohibited commercial landlords from, among other things, evicting defaulting tenants and demanding immediate payment of overdue rent.

Continue Reading New Cert Petition: To Assert A Contracts Clause Claim, Must You Predict Futurelaw?

Programming note: On the weekend we’ve set aside to remember our nation’s war dead, we thought we’d repost this one, about how Arlington National Cemetery came to be, and how yes, there’s a takings story there.

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LastbattlebookYou know how we’re always saying that the provisions in the Takings Clause are “self-executing,” that even in the absence of a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Tucker Act, and section 1983, property owners would still be able to maintain a claim for compensation? Well here’s an article that explains that how that rule was first articulated, and not in a dry academic way, but with a fascinating historical story.

It’s the tale of United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). We knew the land that is now Arlington National Cemetery was once owned by Robert E. Lee, but we can’t say that we gave much thought to how it became


Continue Reading Memorial Day 2025: Arlington National Cemetery And Takings

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Be sure to check this out. The Practical Real Estate Lawyer has published an article by colleague Matthew Ackerman (who has since become a Michigan Court of Appeals judge). 

In “The Pitfalls of Objectively Measured Just Compensation: When Market Value Isn’t Enough” (pdf here), he writes about the ways that “just compensation” isn’t truly just. Those of you who have been around even a short time know how this works (or doesn’t). Market value as the measure when, by definition, eminent domain isn’t a free market transaction. The refusal to include fees and costs in the concept of just compensation (indemnity only for the property, not the property owner). Lack of relocation and business losses. 

He also suggests some ways to deal with this. Here’s his summary of the piece:

This article explains why a subjective approach to just compensation would lead to more just

Continue Reading New Article: “The Pitfalls of Objectively Measured Just Compensation: When Market Value Isn’t Enough,” ALI Practical Real Estate Lawyer (2024)

In the wake of Kelo, the people of Virginia overwhelmingly amended their state constitution (the vote was 75% in favor) to make it much clearer about what qualifies as a public use supporting an exercise of eminent domain, what doesn’t qualify, and how public use is proven:

That the General Assembly shall pass no law whereby private property, the right to which is fundamental, shall be damaged or taken except for public use. No private property shall be damaged or taken for public use without just compensation to the owner thereof. No more private property may be taken than necessary to achieve the stated public use. Just compensation shall be no less than the value of the property taken, lost profits and lost access, and damages to the residue caused by the taking. The terms “lost profits” and “lost access” are to be defined by the General Assembly.

Continue Reading Statute Authorizing Fiber Optic Installation On Railroad Property Authorizes Takings For Nonpublic Use, Violating Virginia’s Post-Kelo Constitutional Amendment

We’re back to bump stocks. Indeed, we have covered cases raising similar issues so we’re not going into too much detail on the U.S. Court of Federal Claims’ recent decision in The Modern Sportsman, LLC v. United States, No. 19-449 (May 8, 2025), and we’ll just assume you, like us, have been following along with this issue.

Suffice it to say that the federal government adopted regulations defining these devices as prohibited machine guns and gave those in possession 90 days to either turn them over to the government, or to destroy them. The plaintiffs destroyed their bump stocks and then sued the federal government for a taking.

The CFC dismissed the complaint under the government’s “police power” authority to prohibit contraband and noxious items. As we noted in this post, the line between uncompensated destruction and compensated takings was not as clear at the CFC saw it (the Armstrong rationale cannot be ignored, even where a taking may be for a very good public reason), and thus the Federal Circuit affirmed, but shifted the rationale from police power to a lack of a private property interest. After the Supreme Court denied cert, “that was that.” Slip op. at 2.

Meanwhile, other bump stock owners challenged the validity of the administrative rule declaring these things machine guns. And there, the owners found more success, with the Supreme Court eventually concluding that the agency lacked the authority to adopt the bump stock rule. The owners here “then asked this Court to revive this lawsuit, which the Court did … [t]he next day, plaintiffs amended their pleadings to add an illegal exaction claim in addition to their takings claim.” Slip op. at 3. 

The government sought dismissal, arguing that the bump stock owners alleged a physical taking but the government hadn’t physically seized anything. It merely required the owners to destroy the bump stocks: as the CFC put it, the government “acknowledges that plaintiffs alleged that ‘the Rule required bump stock owners to destroy or surrender the devices to ATF.’ Reply 2. That does not pass muster for the government, however, because the government ‘did not seize any devices or otherwise physically invade plaintiffs’ property.’ Id. at 3.” Slip op. at 4. In short, we didn’t actually seize anything of yours, plaintiffs; we merely required you to destroy your property. Really. 

The CFC wasn’t having any of that, and rejected this too-clever-by-half argument:

The Court cannot agree. Let us be clear that the government need not literally force private persons to turn over their property for a taking to occur; a legal requirement is sufficient. For example, in Horne, the Supreme Court held that an administrative order requiring raisin croppers to “give a percentage of their crop to the Government, free of charge” effected a compensable appropriation. 576 U.S. at 355. The government did not literally oust the farmers from possession of the raisins, yet a taking occurred because the order made a “formal demand” backed by fines and penalties. Id. at 362, 367–68. It is the same here. The Rule plainly states: “This final rule requires the destruction of existing bump-stock-type devices.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 66,549. It then instructs: “Individuals who have purchased bump-stock-type devices prior to the implementation of this rule must destroy the devices themselves prior to the effective date of the rule or abandon them at their local ATF office.” Id. Finally, it makes clear that “individuals are subject to criminal liability . . . for possessing bump-stock- type devices after the effective date of regulation.” Id. at 66,525. These statements undoubtedly constitute a formal demand to destroy or transfer possession of bump stocks, satisfying the standard under Horne.

Slip op. at 4-5.

If this argument strikes you as nonsense, welcome to our world, where arguments like this are put forth with a straight face on a regular basis. 

And if that wasn’t enough, the government next argued that the regulations didn’t actually require the owners to destroy their bump stocks, “but ‘merely clarified’ the ‘longstanding statutory law’ banning machineguns.” Slip op. at 5. “Put plainly, the government essentially argues that the Rule is an informational document apprising the public of pre-existing legal obligations.” Id. The CFC held “[t]hat too is incorrect.” Id. That seems to be putting it mildly. What do you think would have happened to bump stock owners who didn’t comply with this “informational” rule and held on to their bump stocks?

Short story: the complaint alleged a physical taking.

Next, however, the CFC rejected the exaction claim, based on the remedy sought. As we know, the CFC is limited to awarding monetary damages in these kind of cases. The CFC held that an “exaction” generally “involves money that was ‘improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the claimant.’” Slip op. at 7 (quotations omitted). Here, the CFC held, no money changed hands and there’s no statute otherwise authorizing a claim for money damages:

In sum, plaintiffs cannot be said to have paid money, directly or “in effect,” for a very straightforward reason: They lost personal property, not money. Indeed, plaintiffs have not alleged that they spent any money for any purpose; or paid any money to any In sum, plaintiffs cannot be said to have paid money, directly or “in effect,” for a very straightforward reason: They lost personal property, not money. Indeed, plaintiffs have not alleged that they spent any money for any purpose; or paid any money to any

Slip op. at 8-9.

The CFC wrapped up by — get this — calling out the property owners’ lawyers for failing to expressly clarify that one of the cases they cited and relied on didn’t actually hold that an exaction could be a demand for “money or property,” only money. Slip op. at 9. The court acknowledged that the citation didn’t actually misquote the case, but that the lawyers should have been more candid that they were arguing for an extension of the law, and that the case limited exactions to money.

We’re fine with that (especially in the AI era), and requiring advocates to be candid. 

But where’s the call-out of the government’s horse hockey arguments, noted above? Dead silence, of course. In our view, the borderline frivolous, time-and-expense wasting, divorced-from-reality arguments the government made are equally if not more deserving of censure. 

Call us if that ever happens. We’ll wait.

The Modern Sportsman, LLC v. United States, No. 19-449 (Fed. Cl. May 8, 2025)

Continue Reading CFC: Allegation That Gov’t Ordered Destruction Of Bump Stocks Pleaded Physical Takings Claim

In Brady v. City of Myrtle Beach, No. 23-1847 (May 16, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit made short work of the takings claims brought by several business owners who claimed the city directly or indirectly shut them down because their businesses contributed to a rise in crime in the area.

Myrtle Beach’s “Superblock,” was one of those problem areas. As the Fourth Circuit put it:

In 2015 and 2016 alone, eleven people were shot in the Superblock. Dozens more were sexually assaulted, battered, or robbed. Because most of these crimes occurred in or around a small cluster of bars, the City increased its police presence in the area and began closely investigating the establishments for compliance with state and local safety regulations. Despite these measures, crime continued unabated.

Slip op. at 2.

Some of the details of those incidents:

The crime in

Continue Reading CA4: No Property Right To Conduct A Business, So No Taking For Police Response To Area Crime Surge

Florida, like a lot of other jurisdictions, has an unclaimed property program whereby if an owner is deemed to have abandoned property (remember that old bank account you had in college years ago with a $2.50 balance?), the holder of that property may transfer it to the State, which keeps it until you come get it. In the meantime, however, under Florida’s scheme if that property is money (or is reduced to money), any interest which accrues is used by the State to pay for public schools. (That may not be constitutional, but at least funding schools with someone else’s money seems a better use of the interest than funding the State Fair.)

Florida had some of Maron’s money in its unclaimed property fund, a whopping $26.24. State law allowed her to get that money back, but as noted above, also prohibited her from getting the interest, so she

Continue Reading CA11: State Can Be Ordered To Stop Withholding Just Compensation