April 2015

The Virginia Supreme Court today came back with an opinion in Ramsey v. Commissioner of Highways, No, 140929 (Apr. 16, 2015), a eminent domain case in which we filed an amicus brief in support of the property owner. 

Under Virginia’s condemnation procedures, as a prerequisite to a court exercising jurisdiction over an eminent domain action, a state condemning agency must as an initial step present to the property owner a statement of “the amount which [the condemnor] believes to be just compensation,” and must include an appraisal if an appraisal is required:

The state agency concerned shall provide the owner of real property to be acquired with a written statement of, and summary of the basis for, the amount it established as just compensation, and, if an appraisal is required or obtained, such written statement and summary shall include a complete copy of all appraisals of the real property…

Continue Reading Virginia: Jury Gets To Hear About Appraisal Bait-And-Switch

Here’s the latest from the Hawaii Supreme Court on the joinder of parties under Rule 19, where there’s a claim that an absent party is “indispensable” and thus the case should be dismissed. Bottom line is that an absentee should be joined if its presence is needed, and the “indispensable” determination only needs to be undertaken if the party can’t be joined. In other words, dismissal is the last resort. 

We won’t go into the details of Kellberg v. Yuen, No. SCWC-12-0000266 (Apr. 15, 2015), because we represent the plaintiff-respondent. So we will leave it to others to dissect the opinion for any civil procedure gems and practical tips. But read the opinion if you want to understand the details for yourself. 

This is the second time that this case has gone to the Supreme Court, the first trip resulting in a published opinion clarifying when an order…

Continue Reading HAWSCT Clarifies Joinder Of Indispensable Parties

In 2011, Missouri adopted a statute that looks to us like a slightly modified “right to farm” law:

The statute supplants the common law of private nuisance in actions in which the “alleged nuisance emanates from property primarily used for crop or animal production purposes.” Unlike a common law private nuisance action, section 537.296 precludes recovery of non-economic damages for items such as loss of use and enjoyment, inconvenience, or discomfort caused by the nuisance. Instead, the statute only authorizes the recovery of economic damages in the form of diminution in the market value of the affected property as well as documented medical costs caused by the nuisance.

Under Missouri common law, nuisance claims arising from farming activities are considered temporary nuisances. A few days after the statute went live in 2011, Bohr Farms fired up what is known in the business as a “CAFO” (Concentrated Animal…

Continue Reading Missouri: Statute Which Supplants Common Law Farm Nuisance Claim Is Not A Taking

Not too long ago — December 2013 to be exact — the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the 30-day appeal window under Haw. R. App. P. 4, (which also specifies that the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration under Haw. R. Civ. P. 59 tolls the time when a notice of appeal must be filed to “until 30 days after entry of an order disposing of the motion”) only opens once the trial court actually enters a written order disposing of the motion for recon, even where the motion is deemed denied 90 days after filing by operation of Rule 4. So even if you lose a recon motion automatically because the trial court just ignores you, an appeal is not ripe until the trial court actually enters an order memorializing that. Ass’n of Condominium Homeowners of Tropics at Waikele v. Sakuma, 318 P.3d 94 (Haw. 2013). 

Justice Nakayama filed a…

Continue Reading Appellate Procedure Nerd Alert: Hawaii Supreme Court Justices Still Disagree About When You Must Appeal A Denial Of A Motion For Recon

Here’s the property owners’ brief in opposition to the DOT’s request for the North Carolina Supreme Court to review the court of appeals’ opinion in Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transportation, No. OA14-184 (Feb. 17, 2015).

The court concluded that the Map Act — which gives the DOT the ability to designate hundreds of parcels for future highway use and prevent their development in the meantime for the avowed purpose of keeping the future acquisition price low — effected a taking. The court remanded the case for a calculation of the compensation owed to each property owner.    

The DOT’s brief argues the Map Act is just a police power regulation, and to force it to actually buy the properties now would make it, you know, just too expensive to build highways. The property owners’ brief responds:

While the NCDOT certainly has police powers to regulate its right of way…

Continue Reading Property Owners’ Brief In NC “Map Act” Takings Case: Depressing Acquisition Price Precondemnation Is An Exercise Of The Eminent Domain Power

Grasping_hand After Berman v. Parker and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, observers of the law could not be faulted for opining that “the public use limitation is a dead letter.” See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 61 (1986). Those two decisions, after all, seemed to leave nothing

TEXT

TEXT

NEXT

NEXT

NEXT

NEXT

NEXT 

NEXT

Continue Reading Book Review: “The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London & The Limits Of Eminent Domain” by Ilya Somin

Grasping_hand

To put on your to-buy, to-read list: lawprof Ilya Somin‘s forthcoming book about the Kelo case and the aftermath, available on June 5, 2015. (We’re in the process of organizing some book talk events with Prof Somin in the fall, and if you have suggestions for venues or want to host one, let us know.) 

Pre-order from Amazon here. The reviews are very good:

“Somin’s thorough rebuttal of the constitutional reasoning and philosophical implications of the Supreme Court’s Kelo decision demonstrates why that ruling was a constructive disaster: It was so dreadful it has provoked robust defenses of the role of private property in sustaining Americans’ liberty.”
 

(George F. Will, journalist and Pulitzer Prize winner)

“By dint of his uncommon thoroughness, Ilya Somin has become the leading and most persuasive critic of the Supreme Court’s ill-fated 2005 Kelo decision.  His close examination of the case’s factual backdrop…

Continue Reading New Book Forthcoming: “The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London & The Limits Of Eminent Domain” by Ilya Somin

Last week, the California Supreme Court heard oral arguments in California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose, No. S212072, the case which challenges San Jose’s “inclusionary housing” requirement.

The Court of Appeal held that under rational basis review (and not heightend scrutiny) San Jose’s affordable housing exaction might survive because it was designed to promote the development of affordable housing, and not to mitigate the impacts of market priced housing. California Building Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 216 Cal.App.4th 137 (6th District June 6, 2013). The California Supreme Court agreed to hear the following issues:

What standard of judicial review applies to a facial constitutional challenge to inclusionary housing ordinances that re quire set asides or in – lieu fees as a condition of approving a development permit? (See San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco (2002) 27 Cal.4th 643…

Continue Reading California Supreme Court Considering “Inclusionary Housing” Fee

Here’s one that just rolled in, from the Iowa Supreme Court. In Clarke County Reservoir Comm’n v. Edwin D. & Deloris A. Robins Revocable Trust, No. 14-0774 (Apr. 10, 2015), the court held that the Commission did not have the power of eminent domain because several of its members were private actors. The court also concluded that the post-judgment withdrawal of those members did not moot the property owner’s appeal.

Property owners are entitled to strict compliance with legal requirements when a government entity wields the power of eminent domain. These legal requirements help protect against abuse of the eminent domain power. We strictly construe statutes delegating the power of eminent domain and note the absence of a clear legislative authorization for a joint public-private entity to condemn private property.

For the reasons elaborated below, we hold a 28E commission with members lacking the power of eminent domain cannot…

Continue Reading Iowa: “Liberty Requires Accountability” – Delegation Of Eminent Domain Power Strictly Construed, And Commission With Private Members Could Not Take Property

In AFT Michigan v. State of Michigan, No. 148748 (Apr. 8, 2015), the Michigan Supreme Court upheld a state statute which mandated a 3% reduction in public school employees’ salaries (to fund a failing school employee retiree health care system), and concluded it was not a taking because it was a voluntary giving by the employees. They were not required after all, to provide the 3% contribution, and could avoid the reduction and maintain their present salary levels by opting out of their own publicly-funded retirement health care.

There’s a lot more to the statute and the unanimous opinion of course — including a rejection of a Contracts Clause claim — but the heart of the takings analysis starts on page 21:

Voluntary healthcare contributions do not violate Const 1963, art 10, § 2 and US Const, Ams V and XIV because, as a general proposition, the government does…

Continue Reading Michigan: Voluntary “Giving” By Public School Employees To Fund Failing Retiree Health Benefits Is Not A Taking