
One from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims that is worth your time at least to skim. And the opinion is worth reading if only for the court's conclusion which we've reproduced above.
Hyatt v. United States, No. 23-399 (Jan. 16, 2025) is, as the court described it, "a typical rails-to-trails action[.]" The issue resolved here was how much the property owners were entitled to recover in attorneys fees and expenses, now that they prevailed on the merits.
Under the Uniform Relocation Act, a property owner who obtains compensation for a regulatory taking may recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs. The opinion noted:
Specifically, in actions brought under the Tucker Act or the Little Tucker Act in which a plaintiff is compensated for the taking of property, the URA provides for the recovery of “such sum as will in the opinion of the court or the Attorney General reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney . . . fees, actually incurred because of such proceeding.” [42 U.S.C.] § 4654(c).
Slip op. at 6. The court awarding the owners their fees and costs is not why we suggest you read this opinion.
As we noted above, you can skim for the reasons why, and then go to the last page. Because in the Conclusion, the court lays out the reasons why shifting fees and costs to the government is merited:
The spirit of the URA is intended to hold the United States accountable in takings cases by deterring unnecessary litigation. The prospect of paying substantial attorney’s fees incentivizes the government to negotiate fairly, minimize delays, and avoid frivolous takings. Moreover, URA fees compensate property owners for the expenses incurred in defending their rights and securing just compensation. This helps level the playing field, as the government possesses significant resources. By requiring the government to pay reasonable attorney’s fees, the URA helps enforce the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of just compensation and promotes transparency and accountability in government acquisition processes. The government’s characterization of this litigation as “straightforward” is inapposite given its unwillingness to even respond to the Claim’s Book process and insistence on contesting liability. (Def.’s Resp. at 16). In this case, Plaintiffs have shown that they are entitled to their requested fees.
While this case places the court's reasons in the URA context, the same vibe seems equally true when you think of fees and costs being part of the notion of just compensation. We know that under the Fifth Amendment, and most (but not all) state constitutions, fees and costs in a takings case (whether direct or inverse) are not considered part of just compensation. But if the purpose of fee-shifting is to prevent unnecessary litigation, fair negotiation by the government, minimizing delays in providing compensation, and avoiding frivolous takings, shouldn't the same vibe control?
Hyatt v. United States, No. 23-499 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 16, 2025)