In Betts v Boone County, No. 25-1685 (June 15, 2026), the big question facing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was whether qualified immunity kept next-of-kin from prevailing on a section 1983 due process claim after the county coroner kept the skull of a murder victim as a “trophy” for forty years (yikes!) after turning over the rest of the body to the family for burial.

The court held the county was entitled to qualified immunity because the coroner’s bad acts were those of the coroner, and not county policy:

Here, a state statute unequivocally prohibited Hyland’s actions: “That as soon as may be consistent with the performance of his duties under this [statute] the coroner shall release the body of the decedent to the decedent’s next of kin.” 55 ILCS 5/3-3021. Hyland, after his investigation, kept Louise’s skull; he did not “release the body of the decedent.” Hyland acted contrary to this unequivocal statutory command, just like the police superintendent in Auriemma and the mayor in Killinger. Hyland “frustrated,” rather than “implemented,” the government’s policy. Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 400. Responsibility thus falls on him, not Boone County.

Slip op. at 8.

But that’s not what drove us to post the opinion here. Rather, it is the foundational issue the court considered: whether the decedent’s brothers possess a due process property interest in their kin’s remains. The court held yes, because Illinois law “recognizes that family members have a property right to a next of kin’s remains[.]” Slip op. at 4. (We note that this is a due process property right, not a Fifth Amendment “private property” right.) Here’s the key part of the opinion:

Illinois recognizes that family members have a property right to a next of kin’s remains, as the district court concluded, and on appeal the County does not appear to disagree. As the Supreme Court of Illinois has held, “while in the ordinary sense, there is no property right in a dead body, a right of possession of a decedent’s remains devolves upon the next of kin in order to make appropriate disposition thereof, whether by burial or otherwise.” Cochran v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 419 Ill. Dec. 374, 93 N.E.3d 493, 497 (Ill. 2017) (quoting Leno v. St. Joseph Hosp., 55 Ill.2d 114, 302 N.E.2d 58, 59–60 (Ill. 1973)).

The district court also cited Mensinger v. O’Hara, 189 Ill. App. 48 (Ill. App. 1914). There, the plaintiff’s wife died, and the defendants were entrusted to bury her body. Id. at 49. But before burying her, they cut the hair from her head, and plaintiff sued. Id. The state court reasoned, “while a dead body is not considered as property, in the ordinary, technical sense in which that word is usually employed, yet the law does recognize a right, somewhat akin, perhaps, to a property right, arising out of the duty of the nearest relatives of the deceased to bury their dead.” Id. at 53. Other states have also recognized a property right in a deceased family member’s remains. See Martinez v. Wayne County, 142 F.4th 828, 837–38 (6th Cir. 2025) (Ohio and Michigan).

We see no reason to disagree with the district court[.]

Slip op. at 4.

Betts v. Boone County, No. 25-1685 (7th Cir. June 15, 2026)