In Grand v. City of University Heights, No. 24-3876 (Nov. 13, 2026), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a complaint alleging a RLUIPA claim and others was not ripe because they are “land use” claims subject to Williamson County‘s final decision requirement.

A neighbor was “displeased” that Grand was using his home to hold a “shul,” which “in Hebrew refers to a synagogue or a house where prayers are held.” Slip op. at 2. The city told him to stop because his use as “a place of religious assembly” violated the zoning code (his home is zoned U-1, which doesn’t allow such uses).

Grand applied for a Special Use Permit, which would allow him to make the use as a “house of worship.” The Planning Commission had a hearing, but didn’t make a decision. It “tabled the discussion, requesting more details from Grand.” Slip op. at 3. Apparently, there was some question about whether Grand’s use would indeed be considered operating a “house of worship,” and eventually he withdrew the SUP application, stating that he did “not wish to operate a house of worship.” Slip op. at 4.

The Planning Commission never acted.

Flash forward 18 months, and Grand filed a civil rights lawsuit in federal court under RLUIPA. The complaint also alleged other claims under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments (although no takings claim). The district court dismissed the complaint as unripe.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. This is a “land use” case, and “[i]n the land-use context, one important factor in a dispute’s fitness for judicial decision is a ‘finality’ requirement–a concrete and final decision by local authorities.” Slip op. at 4. Thus, the ripeness requirement applicable to takings claims are also applicable to RLUIPA claims because this “approach ensures that municipal land-use policy begins in local, politically accountable hands.”

This approach ensures that municipal land-use policy begins in local, politically accountable hands. And it prevents us from swinging at a moving target. See Miles Christi, 629 F.3d at 537–38. We have applied this requirement to a variety of constitutional and statutory challenges to land-use policy. See id. at 536–37 (RLUIPA); Bannum, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 958 F.2d 1354, 1362 (6th Cir. 1992) (Equal Protection Clause); Insomnia Inc. v. City of Memphis, 278 F. App’x 609, 613 (6th Cir. 2008) (Speech Clause).

Slip op. at 6.

What is so special about “land use” situations that have caused the federal courts to give local governments more deference than in others? We can’t figure out a good reason. But there it is.

We’re not convinced there’s a one-to-one analogy between takings’ “goes too far” theory of liability, and the theory in RLUIPA cases. In takings case, knowing what the government will allow and what it won’t allow at least seems to be related to the impact of the regulations on the owner’s use. As we understand it, RLUIPA cases focus on whether a zoning restriction places a “substantial burden” on religious exercise. So maybe there’s a similar vibe to takings claims.

But the Sixth Circuit doesn’t undertake that analysis, but simply says in essence that, “these are land use cases, and all land use cases require a final decision.” Mind you, we’re not necessarily quibbling with the result here (Grand abandoned his quest for a SUP, so there’s no hardship caused by a without prejudice ripeness dismissal). Instead, we wish that instead of applying a rule developed in takings to RLUIPA and due process claims.

We think the better option is to evaluate a complaint’s ripeness not on whether it involves land use, but what constitutional or statutory right is alleged to have been violated.

Grand v. City of University Heights, No. 24-3876 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 2025)