In the latest chapter is the Skyland Shopping Center saga, Rumber v. District of Columbia, No. 09-7035 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 26, 2010) (per curiam), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit got rid of most of the 17 plaintiffs by determining they did not have standing to object to a condemnation, and then dismissed the claims of the remaining four plaintiffs on Younger abstention grounds.
The case arose from the attempt to condemn the Skyland Shopping Center,which is alleged to be a “blighting factor” to the surrounding area,and redevelop the property. The Washington Post reported on the situation here:
A powerful group of affluent Hillcrest residents has succeeded ingetting the city to declare eminent domain at Skyland — a controversialmove seen in no other commercial land deal in the District except thenew baseball stadium. Skyland will be demolished, under the plan, and ahigher-quality shopping center built in its place. Target may be itsanchor. There could even be a white-tablecloth restaurant.
The Hillcrest activists say they are sick and tired of Skyland’sdowntrodden look, its lack of what they call quality products, its olddiscount stores and liquor stores and sidewalk vendors and assortedillegal or undesirable activity. The folks of Hillcrest say both theyand the broader community, prosperous and poor alike, deserve farbetter.
Several current and former owners of Skyland property, tenants, andemployees filed suit in federal court seeing an injunction prohibitingthe District from exercising eminent domain. The case has already resulted in one reporteddecision in which the court of appeal reversed the district court’sholding that the plaintiffs’ public use challenge was subject to Williamson County‘s ripeness requirements. See Rumber v. District of Columbia, 487 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 2007), a case we discussed here.The facts also gave rise to Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160 (D.C. 2007), a decision which established standards for how to plead and prove a claim for pretext. We detailed Franco here.
On remand, the district court dismissed the complaint and granted thedefendants’ motions for summary judgment because the taking was for avalid public purpose. The district court based its conclusion onseveral factors. First, the city council issued “specific conclusions”about the shopping center and the surrounding area, noting the area haslagged behind other areas in economic development, and the shoppingcenter is “poorly maintained.” Second, the public testimony before thecouncil was in support of the taking. See Rumber v. District of Columbia, 598 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2009). The district court’s opinion is available here.
In an unsigned per curiam opinion, the D.C. Circuit affirmed. It first determined that a majority of the 17 plaintiffs have no interest in the case because they have “nothing to gain” from an injunction seeking to stop the District’s exercise of eminent domain. They are former owners who sold their property to the District, or are lessees whose leases expired or were terminated, and were not condemned. Another group of plaintiffs are employees, and have no standing to object to a taking: “[t]he property-owning businesses, not their employees or stakeholders, are the proper parties to bring suit opposing condemnation.” Slip op. at 4-5.
Having made short work of the bulk of the plaintiffs on jurisdictional grounds, the court eliminated the claims of the remaining four plaintiffs by applying prudential abstention under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger abstention — in which a federal court with jurisdiction declines to exercise it — embodies “a strong federal policy againstfederal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedingsabsent extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). Under Younger and its progeny, “abstention isappropriate…if (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) theproceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the stateproceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise federalquestions.” Fresh Int’l Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 805F.2d 1353, 1357-58 (9th Cir.1986).
Here, the District instituted condemnation proceedings after the plaintiffs filed their federal action. The District then argued that the federal action should be dismissed in favor of the condemnation actions. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument that Younger abstention was inapplicable because they did not have a fair opportunity to litigate their claims in the condemnation action in D.C. court, and that the D.C. action was instituted in “bad faith.” Slip op. at 5-6.
Here are the briefs of the parties:
We linked to a report about the October 2009 oral arguments here.