The owner’s land is a peninsula most of the time, but when Flathead Lake, Montana, rises a few months each year, it needed a bridge to access. So it asked the County “How about a bridge? We will only use it when the water rises.” County said yes, issued a permit.
NIMBY neighbors, however, had
We’re starting off the new year with some eminent domain goodness. Tim Sandefur has published “Eminent Domain in the Constitutions of Arizona, Washington, and Other States,” 18 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 167 (2024).
There’s a lot in the piece that will keep you reading, but what we found particularly insightful was how public use/purpose limitations “should operate in practice.” In our opinion, it’s fairly easy to say that the Fifth Amendment (and state constitutions) operate as a robust check on the sovereign power to take property for public use, but a lot more difficult to apply that broad notion to particular circumstances in a way that is both uniform and predictable. Right now, we seem to be operating on a know-it-when-I-see-it basis, but that doesn’t get us to a general rule. This piece goes a long way to getting us to a general rule.
Highly recommended.
Here’s the Abstract:
The nineteenth century was an extraordinarily prolific age of constitution-making. One of the greatest concerns of constitution-makers during this period—particularly in the western states—was the protection of private property against threats such as the use of eminent domain and the damage to property resulting from public works projects. This Article takes the eminent domain provisions of the Arizona and Washington constitutions as a point of departure to examine the innovative ways in which constitution-makers sought to limit government’s power to deprive people of their property. These constitutions—which until the admission of Alaska and Hawaii were the most up-to-date constitutions in America—contain four such innovations: (1) an explicit ban on takings for “private use,” reinforced by prohibitions on judicial deference regarding the definition of “public use”; (2) a compensation requirement for the “damaging” of property; (3) a requirement that payment precede a taking, and (4) a ban on deducting from just compensation awards the amount of purported “benefit” resulting from a taking. The Article traces the origins of these four protections, with reflections on how they should operate in practice.