June 2024

The line between negligence torts and inverse condemnation can be a fine one. In Roman Realty, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 220587 (June 11, 2024), the West Virginia Supreme Court came down on the tort side.

Now before we go on, a caution: technically speaking the claimant did not assert an inverse condemnation claim. Rather, after the city removed trees and altered the slope of land such that surface water increased on the owner’s land, it brought a petition for mandamus to compel the city to institute eminent domain proceedings. There are places that approach it that way.

Here’s the gravamen of the petition:

In its verified petition for writ of mandamus to compel eminent domain proceedings, Petitioner alleged that during project construction, eleven trees were removed from its property and “approximately 1,000 square feet of Petitioner’s property was excavated and used as a dump site.” Additionally…

Continue Reading WVa: Tort, Not Inverse (At Least Where Municipalities Are Involved)

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If you know, you know.

Sad birthday wishes to our most un-favorite decision ever, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), which turns 45 today.

Time has not treated the opinion well. Practitioners, judges, and legal scholars across the spectrum have called the three-factor Penn Central test for an ad hoc regulatory taking “demanding,” “fuzzy,” a four-part test, “neither defensible as a matter of theory nor mandated as a matter of precedent,” and “problematic” and “mysterious.” Courts mess up the basic meaning of the factors, treat what is supposed to be a fact-centric “ad hoc” test as a legal question decided on the pleadings, and gatekeep most of these cases from juries.

The definitive deconstruction of the case was Professor Gideon Kanner’s “Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century …

Continue Reading Unhappy 45th Birthday, Penn Central

Today at 10am Hawaii Time (1pm PT/4pm ET), the Hawaii Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in a case asking whether a 1922 deed restriction imposed by the Territory of Hawaii on a land patent conveying fee simple title to a private owner, subject to the land always being used for “church purposes” (i.e., a fee simple determinable) void under either the Hawaii Constitution’s Establishment Clause, the U.S. Constitution’s Establishment Clause, or a Hawaii statute declaring that “[e]very provision in … a written instrument relating to real property that purports to forbid or restrict the conveyance … to individuals because of .. religion” is void? 

Here’s how the Judiciary’s web site describes the case:

In 1922, the Territory of Hawai‘i sold property to Heber J. Grant, trustee for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, pursuant to a Land Patent.  The Land Patent contained a restriction requiring…

Continue Reading Argument Preview: Is Gov’t Imposed “Church Purposes” Deed Restriction Void?

A short one (for us takings types) from the Hawaii Supreme Court.

In In re Surface Water Use Permit Applications, No. SCOT-21-0000581 (June 20, 2024), the court considered a challenge to the State of Hawaii Commission on Water Resource Management’s authority to impose conditions on a water permit. The applicant asserted that the nexus and proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan must have been complied with.

No, the court concluded, those standards only apply where there’s a takings claim present. And there’s no takings claims here:

WWC relies on Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), to argue that any conditions the Commission attaches to its SWUP for system losses must relate to those losses. WWC attempts to frame Nollan and Dolan as providing a “clear statement of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,” but fails to…

Continue Reading Hawaii: Permit Conditions Not Subject To Nollan/Dolan When There’s No Taking Claim

This is a short one, and the title of this post pretty much sums up the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in State of Minnesota v. Schaffer, No. A23-0036 (June 20, 2024).

The case addressed a frequently-occurring issue in jurisdictions which permit some kind of fee recovery in eminent domain cases. Where a statute permits a property owner to recover “reasonable” attorney fees, how is the recovery calculated? By the usual “lodestar” formula (reasonable time x reasonable fee), or is it limited by the actual contractual arrangement between the property owner and her lawyer (in this case a contingency fee that resulted in a fee less than a lodestar-determined fee). 

The court held rejected MDOT’s argument fee recovery under the statute “cannot exceed the amount owed to the landowner’s attorney in a contingency fee agreement[.]” Slip op. at 2. The court held:

We reiterate what we held in Cameron: the…

Continue Reading Statutory Fee Recovery In Minnesota Condemnations Not Limited By Contingency Fee Agreement

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The California Coastal Commission is infamous for being the most out-of-control governmental agency in the nation. This regulatory leviathan fancies itself the undisputed czar of land use and other activities in its fiefdom, the California coastal zone.

Created in 1976 as an agency with regulatory authority across California’s 1,000+ miles of coast (and land in a defined shoreward zone), it has since expanded to its current role as a government-outside-the-government, whose main role it often seems is more about wielding an iron fist over anything that happens in the coastal area, than protecting coastal access and resources while also respecting property rights as its governing statutes require.

The Commission has been blessed with procedures that appear insanely unfair to anyone not familiar with how things work in California. For example, any two Commissioners may file an administrative appeal of a municipalilty granting a development permit to get it…

Continue Reading Can The California Coastal Commission Be Reined In?

Today is a good day to remember that legal emancipation had its roots in the “contraband” property theory. Here’s a post from a few years ago where we visited what we called “The Birthplace of a More Perfect Union” (Fort Monroe, Virginia).

The contraband property theory was itself very imperfect, and a compromise theory driven by practicality and politics. But it was a legal theory that laid the foundation for a general acceptance of emancipation, and led inexorably to the Emancipation Proclamation, and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 

A good reminder that property law and property rights are not primarily about land, or dirt, or “development,” but about freedom and human rights.

Continue Reading Juneteenth Reminder: Emancipation Had Its Roots In The Property-Based “Contraband” Legal Theory

A short one (per curiam is one two-sentence paragraph), with an interesting concurring opinions from the Florida District Court of Appeals (4th District).

In Vazquez v. City of Hallandale Beach, No. 4D2023-0833 (June 12, 2024), the court held that a restrictive covenant that ran with Vazquez’ land (and others in his subdivision, including the city, which had agreed to be bound by the covenant in the settlement of a 1969 lawsuit) is not a compensable real property interest that must be compensated when wiped out by what otherwise would be a regulatory taking.

Vazquez sued the city, asserting that its marina and parking lot violated a buffer zone which had been created by the 1969 settlement. The city was a party to that lawsuit and settlement agreement. The city agreed that yes, the buffer zone indeed had that effect. But we’re the government and even though we agreed to…

Continue Reading Fla App: Govt Agreed To Be Bound By Restrictive Covenant, But So What!

DJK was adding a bedroom to an existing residence and needed a wastewater permit from Vermont’s environmental agency. The agency has a “presumptive isolation zone” around potable water supplies and septic systems in which a property owner is presumed to be barred from doing anything sewage related. In this case, the isolation zone for DJK’s property crossed over onto the property of their neighbors, the Crowleys.

The agency granted DJK the permit, which contained a provision that not only no sewage-related construction could take place in the isolation zone, but that “[n]o buildings” could be construction which “might interfere with the operation of a wastewater system or potable water supply[.]” Remember, the isolation zone was located partially on the Crowley property.

The Crowleys were not very appreciative, so appealed (to a Vermont trial court sitting as the Environmental court). They argued that the permit was invalid because it worked a…

Continue Reading Vermont: Environmental Court Doesn’t Have Jurisdiction To Determine Property Rights, But We’re Going To Find No Cedar Point Taking Anyway

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Our annual reminder that 809 years ago tomorrow (June 15), the “great charter” (Magna Carta) was executed at Runnymeade. (And yes, we know that due to the change in calendars in the interim it wasn’t necessarily this very day, and also that King John didn’t sign the document, but rather sealed several copies of it.)

We naturally focus on Article XXVIII as the foundation for the limitations on the sovereign’s power to forcibly acquire private property, but let’s not forget the other bits as well.

So Happy Birthday, Magna Carta! You don’t look a day over 800.Continue Reading King John: Sure, I’ll Affix My Seal To This Charter…What Could Go Wrong?