What happens when a religious institution claims that local land use regulations impermissibly burden its First Amendment rights to freedom of religion? A recent case decided by the Ninth Circuit, Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (Aug. 1, 2006), illustrates the conflict.
After its proposal to develop a temple on one parcel was denied, a Sikh group sought a conditional use permit (CUP) from Sutter County, California, to construct a temple on another parcel designated for agricultural use. The County planning department recommended approval, with a series of conditions designed to mitigate the proposed temple’s impact, such as limiting the number of people attending the temple to 75, and several design modifications to the building. The Sikhs accepted the conditions.
After a public hearing at which members of the public opposed the CUP, mainly on the basis of noise, traffic, interference with neighboring agriculture operations, and predicted lowering of property values in the area, the county planning commission narrowly approved the application, subject to the conditions. Several neighbors appealed to the county Board of Supervisors which denied the CUP.
The Ninth Circuit first held that the denial of the CUP was a “substantial burden” on the temple’s free exercise of religion. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) thus applied, and required the government to show that the burden on religion was outweighed by a “compelling governmental interest.” In other words, before the government may deny a religious institution a specific land use permission, it must have a very good reason, and be able to prove it. In this instance, the court found that the County’s denial of the temple’s first request, combined with the County’s denial of the CUP even after conditions to mitigate impacts had been accepted by the Sikhs, was a substantial burden on their religious freedom:
Because the County’s actions have to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of Guru Nanak being able to construct a temple in the future, the County has imposed a substantial burden on Guru Nanak’s religious exercise.
The County did not offer any countervailing “compelling interests,” and did not even attempt to meet the burden of persuasion imposed on it by RLUIPA. The Ninth Circuit also determined that RLUIPA was a valid exercise of Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and its power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
This case shows that RLUIPA continues to be a powerful tool to prevent land use authorities from undue interference with a religious use of property.
