Commonwealth v. Allen, No. J-68-2014 (Dec. 29, 2014), the latest from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is not an eminent domain or an inverse condemnation case, but we're posting it here because the dissenting opinions contain some neat language about the importance of property rights.
The case involved a guy who beat a criminal charge many years earlier, and then sought return of the money that was in his car when it was seized during his arrest. Eight years earlier, to be precise. The time gap between the seizure and his petition for the money's return was the key to the majority's ruling that he couldn't get the property back under Pennsylvania's rules of criminal procedure, but not because the statute of limitations had expired, as you might expect. The lower appellate court concluded that the rule did not expressly set out a limitations or repose period, but the general 6 year statute of limitations period applied, and Allen's claim was barred because he sought return well outside this period.
Although it prevailed on appeal, the government sought further review in the Supreme Court. For you appellate law nerds, the part of the opinion where the court sets out how a prevailing party can appeal a favorable ruling is of particular interest. In short, the government argued it won below, but for the wrong reasons. The 6 year period was too long, and created unreasonable burdens on government to hold on to the seized property. The Commonwealth argued that such claims must be pursued during the pendency of the criminal action, or immediately thereafter.
The Supreme Court agreed. Because Allen could have sought return of the money before the charges against him were dropped, or could have filed a post-trial motion within 30 days of the dismissal, his 8-year-later petition failed. Thus, even though the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's you-snooze-you-lose theory, it opted for a really short time limit, theorizing that he had "waived" the claim by not bringing it quickly.
That didn't sit well with two members of the court. Justice Saylor's dissent argued that 30 days to automatically transfer title to the state is too short. Read his short dissenting opinion for more about his view of Pennsylvania's constitutional protections of property, including that "[o]ur statutory law also reflects the primacy of guaranteering to citizens the secure ownership of their property."
Justice Todd also dissented, arguing:
the right of property ownership is an important constitutional right which cannot be deprived by the government without the owner being afforded due process of law. The legislature, to augment the protections against unlawful taking of personal property by the government enshrined in our state and federal constitutions, has crafted a substantive legal framework in the Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6801 (“Forfeiture Act”), and the Disposition of Abandoned and Unclaimed Property Act, 72 P.S. § 1301.1, et. seq. (“Unclaimed Property Act”), to limit the circumstances under which the Commonwealth may terminate a person’s ownership interest in property in its possession. These protections, in my view, are undermined by the majority’s interpretation of Rule 588.Also a short opinion worth reading.
Our thought is that this seemed like a case for laches, not waiver (as Allen didn't knowingly forfeit his right to seek return of the cash), but for practical reasons, the court needed to apply an analysis that would make it as easy for the government as possible in these type of cases. A laches analysis would result in the same inconveniences to the government as a statute of limitations argument, and here, it seems that the majority chose finality and repose over administrative burdens.
Commonwealth v. Allen, No. J-68-2014 (Dec. 29, 2014)
Commonwealth v. Allen, No. J-68-2014 (Dec. 29, 2014) (Saylor, J., dissenting)
Commonwealth v. Allen, No. J-68-2014 (Dec. 29, 2014) (Todd, J., dissenting)
