Lawyers all know of the canons of statutory construction that usually cause us run for our Latin dictionaries. They provide courts with the means to interpret the words in a statute or apply the code to a particular case, and supposedly are guideposts to guide us through the often-byzantine language of statutes and ordinances. The "plain meaning" rule, the rule of "in pari materia," and the like. We admit to thinking at times that courts apply these rules sort of willy-nilly, but others assure us that there is a methodical approach that helps in the resolution of cases.
In that vein, in Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, No. 20090796 (July 12, 2011), the Utah Supreme Court applied the canons of statutory construction, along with a rule of construction specific to eminent domain cases to conclude that the term "mineral deposits" in a statute allowing mining companies to take land for "roads ... to facilitate .. the working of .. mineral deposits" did not include the power to take an easement to access an oil and gas deposit.
The Ranch owns land and leases oil and gas deposits to Marion. It wanted to construct new wells on the Ranch's property, and after failed attempts to negotiate an access easement, instituted a condemnation action to take road. It relied on a Utah statute that authorizes the exercise of eminent domain to taking of property for "roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in solution." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(a) (2008).
The Ranch challenged Marion's power to take, arguing that the statute does not authorize takings in order to access oil and gas deposits because they are not "mineral deposits." The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed. Most of the majority opinion is devoted to applying the canons of statutory construction: did the legislature define the term "mineral deposits?" Is the term subject to the plain meaning rule or is it ambiguous? The court concluded that the term was ambiguous, and that the "unique rules" that apply to eminent domain cases mean that ambiguous questions are resolved against the power:
For instance, because the exercise of eminent domain results in the derogation of a property owner’s right to use and enjoy his land, we have stated that any ambiguity in statutory language purporting to grant the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed in favor of the property owner and against the condemning party. In that context, we stated in Bertagnoli that "the extent to which the power [of eminent domain] may be exercised is limited to the express terms and clear implication of the statute." Not only is this rule of strict construction supported by our precedent, it is also consistent with the "majority rule" for interpreting eminent domain statutes expressed in numerous authorities on this topic.
Slip op. at 6-7 (quoting Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626, 627 (Utah 1950) (emphasis original) (footnotes omitted). Include Hawaii among the majority jurisdictions that adhere to this rule. In Marks v. Ackerman, 39 Haw. 53, 58-59 (1951), the Territorial Supreme Court held:
The manifest legislative intent underlying the provisions [of our eminent domain code] is not only to insure due process of law for any taking of property before final judgment in an action of eminent domain but to give the landowner in possession a perfectly fair and adequate remedy for the full protection of his rights of property against any arbitrary and unjust appropriation under an existing order of possession. To effectuate that intent, those provisions should be construed liberally in favor of the landowner as to remedy in so far as they are in harmony with the common-law principles and constitutional guarantees protecting private property. But they should be construed strictly against the condemnor as to right to enter the land of the landowner without his consent in so far as they are in derogation of such principles and guarantees.
Id. at 58-59.
The Utah court concluded that it must construe the statute narrowly and strictly in favor of the landowner, and could not say that the term "mineral desposits" was meant to include oil and gas deposits, and would not create an absurd result.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Lee argued that "we should not interpret eminent domain statutes 'narrowly' with a thumb on the scale in favor of private property owners or 'liberally' in favor of the condemning authority (as courts have also sometimes suggested). We should interpret them fairly and reasonably in an attempt to find the precise balance of these competing interests that was adopted by the legislature." Slip op. at 14 (Lee, J., dissenting).
