The local government does stuff that local governments do. Things like improve nearby roads. In doing so, they often interfere with the ingress and egress that nearby landowners enjoy. 

In Clark v. City of Pembroke Pines, No. 4D18-3549 (Feb. 26, 2020), the city had many reasons for erecting concrete barriers (among them the closure of nearby roads). But the end result was that access to Clark’s parcel (which happened to be over the city line, in an adjacent town) was partially (but not totally) cut off:

Before the City’s road construction, Clark had unrestricted access to SW 54th Place in front of his home. Afterwards, he said the barriers significantly impeded his travel because with them in place, Old SW 54th Place effectively became a “one-way, ten-foot-wide road” with no room for vehicles to turn around. Additionally, Clark’s only direct means of east and southbound travel—via SW 199th Ave—was eliminated. Further, his access to his property was limited to the now ten-foot east-west right-of-way that was Old SW 54th Place. While Clark’s ease of travel was impeded, at no point was he unable to get on and off his property with his personal vehicle.

Slip op. at 2. 

He sued for inverse condemnation, but after a bench trial, the court concluded that his loss of access was not “substantial,” noting “that Clark’s access was ‘substantially the same as it was prior’ to the improvements, ‘and that he failed to show that the City’s action destroyed or substantially diminished access to his property.'” Slip op. at 3.

The court of appeals reversed, and held the facts proved a taking as a matter of law. Although not every loss of access is compensable — even the loss of the most convenient access — under Florida law, a “substantial” impairment of access is a taking.

Here, Clark’s lost access was pretty severe:

As an initial matter, Clark lost more than just the “most convenient access” to his property: the City’s barriers “substantially diminished” his access. The City constructed the barriers within Clark’s twenty-foot right-of-way, which was referenced in his deed. Thus, Clark had a property interest in this right-of-way easement, and it was integral to his ingress and egress. The barriers obstructed that ingress and egress and turned Old SW 54th Place into a “one-way, ten-foot-wide road” with no room for vehicles to turn around. Accordingly, the City’s destruction of Clark’s access to SW 54th Place resulted in a compensable taking.

In addition to disrupting his property access, the City’s barriers also impeded Clark’s use and enjoyment of his property in two material ways. First, Clark could not utilize his truck, boat, and trailer anymore. Second, and more importantly, the barriers disrupted some of Clark’s municipal services. Clark’s mail was not delivered regularly until he moved his mailbox up against the barrier. Even after moving his mailbox, Clark’s mail delivery continued to be sporadic. Clark was also forced to transport his garbage to a point away from his property where the garbage truck could retrieve it. Additionally, his emergency medical access was impacted. There were two instances in which emergency medical personnel had to scale the barriers because they obstructed direct access to Clark’s property. Even though the City did not completely deprive Clark of all access to his property, Clark is only required to prove a “substantial loss of access” to succeed on a claim of inverse condemnation. 

Slip op. at 6-7 (citations omitted). 

The court remanded the case for a calculation of the “full compensation” owed to the owner.  

Clark v. City of Pembroke Pines, No. 4D18-3549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2020)