As the caption of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Reynolds, No. 25-1750 (Apr. 23, 2026), might indicate, this is a case about animal-rights activists coming onto property to video the goings-on.
Iowa had already criminalized certain trespasses: entering or remaining on private property after being notified to keep out or get out. But “[i]n 2021, Iowa decided its general trespass statute was not deterring trespassers from unlawfully entering private property to record their trespasses.” So it adopted a new statute:
[a] person committing a trespass as defined in section 716.7 who knowingly places or uses a camera or electronic device that transmits or records images or data while the device is on the trespassed property commits an aggravated misdemeanor for a first offense and a class “D” felony for a second or subsequent offense.
Federal litigation ensued and the district court held the statute was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Eighth Circuit reversed, and on remand some of the plaintiffs alleged the statute was similarly unconstitutional as applied to them. They argued “the statute’s prohibition against using cameras while trespassing chills their members’ speech when applied to prevent them from recording on private property that is otherwise open to the public after being asked to leave but not to stop recording.” Slip op. at 3-4. The district court dismissed.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, first concluding that the plaintiffs have standing because their right to record themselves which protesting disruptively in public spaces is chilled by the threat of criminal prosecution under the statute. See slip op. at 6. It next concluded the claims are ripe even though this is a pre-enforcement challenge, because the adoption of the statute is what causes the injury, not its enforcement. Slip op. at 7.
The next part of the opinion — about speech rights on private property — is why we’re posting this one here. The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has never recognized that a trespasser “may exercise general rights of free speech on property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes[.]” Slip op. at 8 (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972)).
Applying intermediate scrutiny (because the statute is content-neutral), the court held that “protecting its citizens’ property and privacy rights” are important government interests. Slip op. at 9. The court also concluded that the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve that goal, because it avoids “exacerbating the harm ordinary trespassers cause to property and privacy rights[.]” Slip op. at 10.
And here’s the money quote from the case, rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that by allowing the public on the property, the owners have surrendered their right to tell videotapers to get out:
Second, ICCI suggests Iowa’s interests in protecting property and privacy rights are not implicated when the locations at issue are otherwise open to the public. But property owners forfeit neither their right to exclude nor to control their property by opening it to the public for a certain purpose. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993) (“There is no question . . . the private owner of property[] may legally preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is dedicated.”); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 (noting property owners have the right to “control the use of the[ir] property”).
Slip op. at 11-12.
That is a direct repudiation of the conclusions by other courts in other contexts (physical takings claims by property owners dealing with non-paying or otherwise excludable tenants), which hold in essence that there’s no taking of the right to exclude because “you let ’em in when you rented to them.” That’s right, the (supposed) Yee rationale.
Maybe this result isn’t too surprising, given this is the Eighth Circuit (one of the circuits which does not adhere to this view of Yee).
The opinion summed up thusly:
In sum, we conclude the officials can apply § 727.8A to proscribe the conduct ICCI contends its members engage in. Its members’ recordings implicate Iowa’s important state interest in protecting owner’s property and privacy rights, these interests would be served less effectively without the statute, and the statute does not proscribe substantially more speech than necessary to achieve Iowa’s legitimate ends. See TikTok, 604 U.S. at 76 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
Slip op. at 12.
Check this one out for sure.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Reynolds, No. 25-1750 (8th Cir. Apr. 23, 2026)