The Missouri Supreme Court, in in Mint Properties v. Centene Plaza Redev. Corp. (SC88487, Jun. 12, 2007), clarified that state’s meaning of the term “blight” as a justification for taking property by eminent domain:
(1) The evidence presented was insufficient to showthe social liability necessary to support a finding of blight. Section353.020 defines “blighted area” in part as consisting of those portionsof a city that, “by reason of age obsolescence, inadequate or outmodeddesign or physical deterioration have become economic and social liabilities, and that such conditions are conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, crime or inability to pay reasonabletaxes” (emphasis by italics added). The statute does not define “socialliability,” but its historical context suggests its definition focuseson the health, safety and welfare of the public.
(2) The city failed to provide evidencesupporting a finding of social liability. Although the city managerhere expressed some potential concerns in his testimony regardingsafety, crime, fire hazards and vandalism in the area, the informationhe received from the fire and police departments did not validate theseconcerns, nor was there any evidence of any public health concerns inthe area. Further, while the blighting study concluded the area was aneconomic liability due to age, obsolescence, inadequate or outmodeddesign, and physical deterioration of some of the affected properties,it did not find that any of these conditions were injurious to publichealth or safety, nor did it make any conclusions regarding the area’ssocial liability. Rather, one of the firm’s employees testified thatthe area was a social liability only to the extent its inability to payreasonable taxes made it an economic liability.
Declaring a property as “blighted” has long been a tactic used by condemnors to take what may appear to be perfectly good property by eminent domain, at least since the US Supreme Court decision in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), which keyed off blight designations. Since that time, however, how “blight” is defined has gone from classic nuisance-like use to nearly anything. The nadir of such reasoning was 2005’s Kelo v. City of New London case, where the Supreme Court relied upon Berman to support its holding that less intensive economic use by a homeonwer was somehow the equivalent to maintaining a public nuisance.
While the Missouri court’s decision does not affect property outside of that state, it is good to see some reality setting in. Hopefully, it will spread. The St Louis Post-Dispatch reports on the case here.