Hawaii Supreme Court Justice Acoba, joined by Justice Duffy, filed an extensive dissenting opinion in yesterday’s decision in County of Kauai ex rel. Nakazawa v. Baptiste (or, as it should now be called Kauai County Council v. County of Kauai), on the issue of standing that’s worth reading:
DISSENTING OPINION BY ACOBA, J.,
WITH WHOM DUFFY, J., JOINS
With all due respect, our role is to protect the judicial process, not to subvert it.
In sua sponte deleting Defendant-Appellee Kauai County Council (County Council) as a defendant in this case and adding it back as the putative plaintiff in order to create a supposed controversy between the County Council and Defendant-Appellee Mayor of Kauai (Mayor) and Defendant-Appellee Finance Director of Kauai (Finance Director), the majority does exactly that, manipulating the lawsuit so as to create a controversy that did not in fact exist when the suit was filed, when it was decided by the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit (the court), when it was appealed to this court, and when it was argued by the parties before us.
In accomplishing the alteration of this lawsuit, the majority misconstrues the amended complaint, in effect substituting the County Council in place of Plaintiff-Appellee County of Kauai (County) as the plaintiff, and misapplies the rules of court, in this case Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 21, in order to drop the County Council as a named defendant. HRCP Rule 21 was never intended to authorize a realignment of the parties in order to birth a controversy, but is applied in the cases when an underlying controversy exists in the first place. But most tellingly, there cannot be a controversy between two sides of a lawsuit where, as in this case, “both [sides] desire precisely the same result.” Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971) (per curiam).
Under these circumstances, there are no manageable limits to the approach employed by the majority — moving a party from one position to another position in the same lawsuit allows this court to decide what case will be deemed justiciable at its own behest. If it can do that in this case, then the majority can do the same in any case. The only way the merits in this case are reached by the majority is through the manipulation of the parties and the lawsuit — a course that, in my view, fosters unwise and dangerous precedent.
(Emphasis added). And that’s just the first page-and-a-half of thirty-one total pages.
The complete dissenting opinion is published here.