inversecondemnation.com

Statute Allowing Public To Access Formerly Private Portions Of Rhode Island Beaches Is A Taking

Check out this decision, entered by a Rhode Island Superior Court (a general jurisdiction trial court) denying the State's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that a recently-adopted statute shifting the boundary between public and private property on RI's beaches is a taking.

We won't be commenting in too much detail because this is one of ours (PLF colleague Dave Breemer represents the plaintiffs). But here's what you need to know:

• Until recently, RI law used the high water mark (mean high-tide line) as the boundary between the public beach and private property.
• In 2023, the RI Assembly adopted a statute that redefined that boundary, and moved it shorewards to where "the land held in trust by the state for the enjoyment of all of its people ends and private property belonging to littoral owners begins."
• As a consequence, the public may enter and use "where shore exists, on wet and or dry sand or rocky beach, up to ten feet (10') landward of the recognizable high tide line."
• Takings claim under both RI and U.S. Constitutions followed. The State moved to dismiss, and the court converted it to a motion for summary judgment.
• The court first recognized that the public trust doctrine preserves the public's ability to engage in certain activities in state waters and to access the shoreline.
• In 1982, consistent with longstanding U.S. Supreme Court precedent, RI established the mean high tide line as the boundary between private property, and the area in which the public can exercise those rights.
• The court rejected the State's argument that the public trust and custom have rendered public access on this part of a beach a "background principle" that effectively removed the right to exclude stick from littoral owners' bundle.
• Not so, held the court: "The General Assembly, in enacting The Act, appropriated a public right of access onto private property when it designated up to 10' landward of the recognizable high tide line as the access point for the public's rights and privileges." Slip op. at 10-11.
• "Therefore, The Act, in disposing of the MHT line, extended the point of public access over the Plaintiff’s private property. Furthermore, rather than restraining the Plaintiff’s use of their own property, The Act extends permanently a right of access to the public and inhibits Plaintiff’s right to exclude. The extension of the access point clearly results in the taking of 'an interest in property.'" Slip op. at 11.
• "The Act reduced the Plaintiff’s “bundle of rights” inherent in the ownership of property by expanding the preexisting boundary line to ten feet landward of the recognizable high tide line and confiscated the Plaintiff’s property resulting in an unconstitutional taking." Id.

More on the decision here:

• R.I. Superior Court judge sides with property owners in shoreline access law dispute" (Rhode Island Current)
• "RI judge sides with beachfront homeowner in court fight. What does it mean for public beach access?" (The Providence Journal)
• "Initial Court Ruling Tosses Sand on R.I.'s Year-Old Beach Access Law" (ecoRI News)

According to these stories, the State indicates it is going to appeal to the RI Supreme Court, so stay tuned.

Decision, Stilts, LLC v. State of Rhode Island, No. SC-2023-0481 (R.I. Super. July 12, 2024)

Can The California Coastal Commission Be Reined In?

The California Coastal Commission is infamous for being the most out-of-control governmental agency in the nation. This regulatory leviathan fancies itself the undisputed czar of land use and other activities in its fiefdom, the California coastal zone.

Created in 1976 as an agency with regulatory authority across California's 1,000+ miles of coast (and land in a defined shoreward zone), it has since expanded to its current role as a government-outside-the-government, whose main role it often seems is more about wielding an iron fist over anything that happens in the coastal area, than protecting coastal access and resources while also respecting property rights as its governing statutes require.

The Commission has been blessed with procedures that appear insanely unfair to anyone not familiar with how things work in California. For example, any two Commissioners may file an administrative appeal of a municipalilty granting a development permit to get it overturned; and to whom do the Commissioners appeal? To the very Commission on which they sit, of course! Yeah, that seems fair.

For decades, the Commission has enjoyed unprecedented power and a legislature and judiciary unwilling to place or enforce any realistic limits on its power. For example, the courts have interpreted a statute that bars the Commission from taking property without compensation to give the Commission the discretion to waive, overrule, or ignore any restrictive state or local coastal law, if the Commission believes to apply it would result in a taking (the Coastal Act are full of these type of restrictions on use). This is tantamount to the Commission exercising legislative power to rewrite the law ad hoc.

OK, enough editorializing. (Strong letter to follow!)

But of late, there may be cracks in the edifice. In large part because of the YIMBY movement, the Commission has become subject to public criticism for being an impediment to reasonable development, something it is not all that used to. Why should Bakersfield, Fresno, and non-coastal communities bear the burden of absorbing the new housing needed to address California's housing shortage, while the while I-got-mine elite coastal enclaves maintain their exclusivity?

A group called "Circulate San Diego" has studied this phenomenon and published this report ("A Better Coastal Commission"):

This report documents numerous examples where the Coastal Commission has resisted, opposed, and delayed the construction of deed-restricted affordable homes that use programs like Density Bonus Law. This is even true for projects on land that is already zoned for multi-family housing, in plans already approved by the Coastal Commission itself.

Similarly, this report documents examples where the Coastal Commission opposes projects that the Legislature encourages as a part of California’s efforts to combat climate change. Crosswalks, bicycle lanes, and infill development near transit are all goals of recent statewide legislation, yet the Coastal Commission opposes or delays many of these projects. Their decisions to prioritize car travel above all other modes is inconsistent with modern climate goals, as adopted by the Legislature.

The report makes some modest recommendations for reform:

• Amend Density Bonus Law to require its implementation by the Coastal Commission, as proposed in AB 2560 (2024).
• Remove or narrow the special exemptions that keep housing reforms from applying to the coast.
• Mandate procedural reforms at the Coastal Commission.
• Apply transportation and climate policy to the Coastal Zone.
• Avoid creating, or narrowly draw, coastal exemptions to new housing legislation.
• Look skeptically on Coastal Commission requests for more authority.

Reacting as you might expect (with affront), the Commission is "offended at even the suggestion" it gets in the way of housing in the coastal zone. See this story from the San Diego Union-Tribune ("Has the Coastal Commission made housing and climate crises worse? It's offended at even the suggestion"). 

But this seems to be one of those "moments." After all, even the Commission's usual allies are asking questions and proposing reforms. When you've lost San Francisco democrats, and the California Supreme Court agrees to take up the first case in a decade which may call your power into question, Coastal Commission, you are missing the cultural zeitgeist. 

Will anything come of this report, and the reform movement generally? Will there be a reckoning for the California Coastal Commission?

If one is in the cards it won't be easy because we know that when there's a threat to its power, it pulls out all the stops and fights like hell. Stay tuned. 

California SCT To Review Major Challenge To Coastal Commission's Claimed Power To Overrule Local Govt's Housing Approvals

Disclosure: this one is one of ours, so we're not going to do a deep dive or do much commentary (must resist!).

Yesterday, the California Supreme Court granted a Los Osos property owner's petition, and agreed to review an (unpublished) Court of Appeal opinion which held that the California Coastal Commission has the authority to appeal (to itself!) the County of San Luis Obispo's decision to grant Shear a Coastal Development Permit to build a handful of homes in the coastal zone.

The County has adopted a Local Coastal Program ordinance regulating development in the coastal zone in the County. Under the California Coastal Act, a municipal government adopting a LCP delegates to the municipality to authority to make these type of land-use permitting decisions, with a very limited window for the Commission to inject itself. The point of the Coastal Act is to maintain a high degree of local control if a municipality has taken the effort to adopt an LCP to reflect its understanding of its obligation to protect public coastal resources when it is making land-use decisions.

In 2003, Shear began the process of building homes on its eight lots zoned by the County for residential development. In 2004, the County approved Shear building eight homes in two stages. In 2017, after Shear completed the first four homes, it sought the County’s approval to complete the balance. After consideration of Shear’s plans under the LCP, the County granted a Coastal Development Permit.

That should have been the end of it. But after the County’s approval, the Commission appealed the County's decision. And to whom did the Commission appeal? In one of the weirdest procedures we've ever heard of, California law allows two members of the Commission to institute an appeal these kind of things...to the very Commission on which they serve. Seems fair (must resist!). Despite the Coastal Act delegating exclusive land use decision-making to local governments that have adopted an LCP, the Commission's appeal claimed that it has the power to overrule all local permitting decisions.

The lower courts agreed. With the County's support, Shear sought discretionary review, and the California Supreme Court said yes.

This case is important for a few reasons beyond the legal questions presented. First, it is the first case in a decade where the California Supreme Court has agreed to review a challenge to the Commission's claimed coastal fiefdom, which appears nearly armor-clad in California's courts (although the Commission's excesses don't play all that well when courts beyond California bother to look).

Second, not only is this a home rule issue about the Commission's lack of respect for local LCP municipalities, but one where coastal property owners need to understand clearly who they need to deal with when seeing government approvals to make presumptively reasonable use of their land (remember, this property is zoned for residential uses); the Commission's position that it is the final czar on all this stuff often puts landowners in the middle of these type of intra-government jurisdiction fights where the only loser at the end is the landowner (flashback to two wolves and a lamb voting on what's for dinner). 

Finally and maybe most importantly, this case brings into sharp focus the ongoing public realization that the Commission has been a substantial impediment to coastal communities carrying their fair share of addressing the housing crisis in California. For example:

• California coastal protections versus housing: The battle is on (SF Chronicle)
• My house of my beach? How California's housing crisis could weaken its coastal protections (Cal Matters)

Will the California Supreme Court bring the Commission back in conformity with the law?

Congratulations to our colleague Jeremy Talcott (who chairs our Coastal Initiative) for the petition grant. Stay tuned here for more. Or follow along on your own on the court's docket. 

Petition for Review, Shear Dev. Co., LLC v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No. S284378 (Cal. Apr. 2, 2024)

Pass A Good Time: Our Report From The 41st ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Feb 1-3, 2024, New Orleans

When it comes to the longstanding ALI-CLE American Law Institute-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation Conferences, we're always ready to go. You know that. But this year's version -- the 41st -- was buzzing like no other in recent memory.

Maybe it was the New Orleans venue with its atmo, food, and music for our after-class activities, or even the timing (the second-to-last week on the Mardi Gras parade season, and our conference hotel was right on the routes). It might have been the nice weather (oh, it rained buckets one evening, but there wasn't an ice storm like we experienced in Austin in 2023). Or maybe it was the capacity crowd, and new topics and speakers on the agenda. Or maybe it was just the prospect of seeing our friends and colleagues again after a year.

Here's a photo essay of some of the Conference highlights.

And if you missed out, the webcast was recorded and is available for viewing. Or, better yet, hold on your calendar January 30 through February 1, 2025 for the 42d Conference, to be held at the Westin Bayside San Diego.

Excitement this way...

The view from the podium.
Say "hello" to our opening plenary session in wide-angle.

Prepping the space.
The finished stage that Conference attendees
see isn't how the room starts off.
It takes a lot of work by the ALI-CLE staff
to get the place camera-ready.

The live webcasting of the sessions also takes a lot of
set-up and a ton of equipment. This is just some of it. 

Here's more. 

The badges were arranged on the table with care...

...in trust that our faculty and registrants would soon be there.

No conference would be complete without swag.
Here is but a sampling.

As always, a huge thank you to our generous sponsors.
Without your support, this Conference would not be as
good as it is, year after year.


The Conference site was right on the routes of several parades.
It was difficult to keep focusing on severance damages and larger parcel
when the music and excitement was just outside.
But we tried.


The opening plenary session -- on the U.S. Supreme Court's
big takings case -- got us off to a solid start.


Thanks to Christina Martin and Steve Silva for speaking
on Tyler v Hennepin County.

The view from the podium as Amy Boulris speaks about the most
significant eminent domain decisions of 2023.

The speakers are a mix of practicing lawyers, judges, other eminent domain
professionals, and legal academics. Here, two property scholars --
Timothy Harris and Jessica Asbridge --
discuss how state property law and state courts
can drive the constitutional issues.

Kinnon Williams, Esq. and Christina Thoreson, SR-WA, MAI, CRE 
present on "Valuation of Wasting Assets."

Lawprof Emilio Longoria and attorney Tony Francois
on "What Condemnation Lawyers Need to Understand
About the Clean Water Act After Sackett"
(hint: it goes to highest and best use).

Matthew Ackerman, Marianna Baggett, and Kenneth Haywood
on "The Pitfalls of Objectively Measured Just Compensation:
When Market Value Isn't Enough."

It was not all work and no play.
Again, a big thanks to our generous sponsors.

Our speakers take questions, of course.
We solicit them the old-fashioned way (thanks, James Masterman).

William and Mary Law School Professor
Emerita Lynda Butler (and her former student, North Carolina's
Jeremy Hopkins" discuss property rights in an age of coastal retreat.

Luis Gallardo-Rivera, Dana Berliner, and (off-camera)
Sophia Holley on "Proving and Defending Pretext,
Public Use, and Necessity."

James Masterman and Martye Kendrick on "Preparing Your Witness
to Overcome Obstacles to Highest and Best Use."

Jeff McCoy, Robert McNamara, and Kristen Renfro on
"Getting to Federal Court and Staying There:
Navigating Procedural Mazes in Federal Takings Claims."

Sean Metherell and Nathan Farris zero in on
"How to Win a Future Highest and Best Use Claim: Proving Reasonable
Probability of Rezoning and Other Issues."

Michael Berger is Watching You:
SCOTUS Property Rights Maven Michael Berger zooms in with his
annual "Regulatory Takings Update."

We always hold a spot for Jim Burling on Saturday.
Why? Because his tours-de-force always are interesting
and put people in seats, even on a Saturday morning.

More Big Michael.
Here, sharing his memories of Professor Gideon Kanner.

See you in San Diego!
January 30 - February 1, 2025
Westin San Diego Bayside

The Downside Of Seeking Injunctive Relief In Takings Cases

A fairly short one from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

In Sheffield v. Buckingham, No. 22-40350 (July 31, 2023), the court affirmed the district court's declining to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining State of Texas officials from enforcing the Open Beaches Act.

The presumptive public/private boundary on beaches in Texas is the mean high tide line, although the public may obtain an easement to access the beach landward of the MHTL through prescription or dedication. But as the Texas Supreme Court held, abrupt shifts in the topography of a beach caused by hurricanes and tropical storms does not automatically "roll" the line landward under the state's Open Beaches Act. 

After the Texas court issued that ruling, the legislature amended the statute to permit the State to "suspend action on conducting a line of vegetation determination for a period of up to three years from the date the order is issued if the Commissioner determines that the line of vegetation was obliterated as a result of a meteorological event." Slip op. at 2. 

Well, that happened and after Hurricane Laura and Tropical storm Beta hit the area, the state ordered determination of the vege line suspended for two years. This had the effect of the public/private line being 200 feet inland of where it was prior to the storms.

Owners who own that 200 feet filed a takings lawsuit in federal court against the State, alleging that that "the public can now stand, sit, and otherwise station themselves on" the plaintiffs' private beaches. Because this is a federal court action against state officials, the only remedy sought was prospective injunctive relief: an order prohibiting the officials from enforcing the Act.

The district court declined to enter a preliminary injunction, and the property owners appealed to the Fifth Circuit. On the same day the owners filed their Opening Brief, the State rescinded the order suspending the vege line determination, concluding the beach was stabilized, and thus the suspension no longer needed.

You know what happened next: the state argued to the Fifth Circuit that the appeal was moot. We no longer doing anything that the court can enjoin, Your Honors!

But come on man, we know that the process isn't so easily manipulable. A party cannot automatically moot a case by voluntarily ceasing to do the very thing the plaintiff claims is illegal, and then perhaps starting right back up once the lawsuit is gone. The Fifth Circuit rejected the owners' arguments that this one is capable of repetition, concluding that the temporary order is unlikely to recur and any future harms are speculative.  

Yes, as littoral property owners, their properties could be subject to a similar action in the future. "But this is not unique to these Owners. All properties near the beachfront in Texas could theoretically be subject to similar actions." Slip op. at 6. Thus, this is a generalized grievance, not a specific harm.

Nor was the State suspending the suspension "litigation posturing" according to the Fifth Circuit. Yes, the State affirmatively rescinded the order a few months before it was set to automatically expire, but the court took the State at its word that the reason for the rescission was not to moot the appeal, but because it had served its purpose. The court was willing to presume this, in the absence of contrary evidence:

It would make little sense to have Texas leave the temporary order in place beyond its usefulness and purpose—laid out explicitly in the order—simply so a court could find that the case is moot. In effect, this order ended by its own terms when Texas determined that it achieved its written purpose.

The presumption of truth to Texas’ statements that the temporary order served its usefulness—and did not end because of litigation posturing—is warranted. This is because “[g]overnment officials ‘in their sovereign capacity and in the exercise of their official duties are accorded a presumption of good faith because they are public servants, not self-interested private parties.’”

Slip op. at 7 (citations omitted).

Not only did the Fifth Circuit decline to reverse the turning down of the PI, it dismissed the case as moot.

Why can't the owner seek just compensation for the (alleged) temporary taking? You know the answer to that question.

Sheffield v. Buckingham, No. 22-40350 (5th Cir. July 31, 2023)

Tuesday Property Round-Up (International Edition)

Here's what we're reading today:

• Timothy Harris, Backwards Federalism: The Withering Importance of State Property Law in Modern Takings Jurisprudence, 75 Rutgers L. Rev. ___ (2023) ("Modern Supreme Court Fifth Amendment takings cases have – paradoxically -- diminished the role and importance of state law. Doing so creates uncertainty and unpredictability in determining where private property rights begin and where government’s authority ends.").
• Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, What happens when the Expropriation Bill is passed? (July 19, 2023) (if you want to find out what is going on in South Africa in property rights, here's a good piece to get you up to speed).
• Meina Cai, The Art of Negotiations: Legal Discrimination, Contention Pyramid, and Land-Taking Compensation Policy in China (June 2023) ("How do land-dispossessed villagers protect their interests in a context where the legal framework discriminates against them? Contradictory to the existing research that pays much attention to protests, this research identifies negotiations as a strategy of the dispossessed to engage with local governments and improve their compensation arrangement.").
• Nicole Stelle Garnett, Can Property Law Protect Indigenous Sacred Sites? (Jotwell, July 24, 2023) (a review of a forthcoming article in the Virginia Law Review).
• Frontier Centre for Public Policy, Frontier Centre for Public Policy Releases Canadian Property Rights Index, Marking Tenth Anniversary (July 17, 2023) (what is the state of property rights in Canada - find out one view here). 
• Sharon Udasin, Debate rages over California coastal development amid housing crisis (The Hill, July 15, 2023) ("Among the most divisive elements in SB 423, however, is its deletion of a provision in SB 35 that had prohibited the streamlining of multifamily housing projects in coastal zones.").

Enjoy your Tuesday. 

New Takings Ripeness Cert Petition (Ours): Knowing The Permissible Uses "to a reasonable degree of certainty" Is All You Need For A Claim To Be Ripe

Here's the cert petition, filed last week, in a case we've posted about. See here (Ninth Circuit arguments) and here (en banc petition).

The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a takings claim because (it held) the claim isn't ripe. The government hasn't made up its mind, and just might allow the owners to make some use of their residentially-zoned land (even though the property is also subject to an overlay zone that expressly prohibits residential development). More background here. 

This is one of ours, so we're not going to be saying too much more about it. The petition also lays out the situation.

Here are the Questions Presented:

Randy Ralston and Linda Mendiola (Ralstons) wish to build a retirement home on their residentially-zoned land in San Mateo County, California. However, their property sits entirely within an overlay zone, the Montecito Riparian Corridor (Corridor), which categorically bans residential development. The County nonetheless instructs landowners who wish to build a home to submit their “intention” to the Community Development (Planning) Director and County Counsel, who must undertake a “takings analysis” to decide whether to “override” the Corridor’s absolute ban to prevent a taking. When the Ralstons followed this procedure, the Planning Director and County Counsel responded that there was no justification “to override the Local Coastal Plan limitations on development within wetland and riparian areas in order to accommodate a reasonable economic use.” No procedure exists to challenge this decision. In short, the answer was an unambiguous and unappealable “no.” The Ninth Circuit held that the Planning Director and County Counsel’s response, though they were speaking for the County, was “informal,” and that the Ralstons’ takings claim is ripe only if they submit—and the County formally denies—a Coastal Development Permit application.

The questions presented are:

1. Is a takings claim ripe when the government establishes a mandatory process requiring property owners to ask whether any development on their land is possible, and responds with a definitive and unappealable denial?

2. Are takings complaints subject to a higher pleading standard than other civil rights complaints?

Stay tuned.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ralston v. County of San Mateo, No. ____ (U.S. June 16, 2023)

This Just In - Florida Appeals Court: TDRs, Beekeeping, And Camping Are Not Economically-Beneficial Uses, So Downzoning Is A Lucas Taking

Shands Key, with the City of Marathon in the background

This just in: in Shands v. City of Marathon, No. 3D21-1987 (May 3, 2023), Florida's Third District Court of Appeals held that the city's downzoning the property (Shands Key, shown above in an exhibit from the Key West trial we participated in in June 2021) from General Use (density: one home per acre) to Conservation Offshore Island (one home per 10 acres; Shands Key is just under 8 acres) effected a Lucas taking.

We're not going to go into too much detail, because this case is one of ours. Our Pacific Legal Foundation colleague Jeremy Talcott was the lead trial and appellate counsel, backed by Kady Valois.

Trial (and appeal) team after closing arguments in Key West:
Valois, inversecondemnation.com, Talcott

But we're not going to let you go without noting a few highlights from the Court of Appeal opinion:

• "This inverse condemnation appeal presents a novel issue regarding the role that transferred development rights (“TDRs”) occupy in adjudicating a per se as-applied regulatory taking claim advanced under the landmark case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)." Slip op. at 1.
• "Finding that an award of TDRs and Building Permit Allocation System (“BPAS”) points, considered in tandem with the residual land value derived from personal recreation and beekeeping, precluded a per se as-applied claim, the trial court denied the motion. The primary issue on appeal is the propriety of that ruling." Slip op. at 1-2.
• "In the aftermath of Penn Central, Lucas, and their progeny, TDRs have emerged as a popular and effective tool for local governments to promote conservation efforts and urban growth management. Such rights typically benefit the landowner by allowing for expanded “development beyond the restricted level on [another] piece of land.” Ralph A. DeMeo, Transfer Development Rights, in II Florida Environmental and Land Use Law ch. 23 (1996)." Slip op. at 10.
• "The significance of TDRs in the regulatory takings matrix has been sharply debated. Some legal experts have opined that TDRs are irrelevant to the takings side of the equation because they do nothing to impact the nature and extent of the property interest taken by the government. Others have espoused the belief that TDRs necessarily mitigate the economic impact of regulation by infusing the property with value; therefore, they should be considered before determining whether the government has effectuated a taking." Slip op. at 10-11 (footnotes omitted).
• "Appellants established that regulation deprived them of any use of the property, other than for beekeeping or personal camping. These do not constitute economically beneficial uses, as 'a State may not evade the duty to compensate on the premise that the landowner is left with a token interest.' Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001). As Justice Scalia observed in his Suitum concurrence, any income associated with TDRs does not flow from the cultivation or development of the property in the traditional framework of ownership. Instead, the potential revenue is generated from the non-use of the property." Slip op. at 13-14.
• "Consistent with this logic, while “[p]utting TDRs on the taking rather than the just compensation side of the equation . . . is a clever, albeit transparent, device that seeks to take advantage of a peculiarity of our Takings Clause jurisprudence,” doing so allows the government to provide some compensation without the constitutional stricture of just compensation. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 748–49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)." Slip op. at 14.
• "To reason otherwise would render Lucas nugatory." Id.
• "In accord with the foregoing analysis, we conclude that appellants established overly burdensome government regulation deprived them of “all economically beneficial uses” of their property. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. Consequently, they were entitled to an award of partial summary judgment on their per se as-applied Lucas claim. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to vacate the final judgment, enter partial summary judgment in favor of appellants, and conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion." Slip op. at 17.

Here are the briefs of the parties, so you can see the arguments:

• Initial Brief On Merits (property owners)
• Appellee's Answer Brief (City)
• Appellant's Reply Brief (property owners)

Watch the court of appeal oral arguments (YouTube) here.

A hearty well done to our PLF team for this big win.

Shands v. City of Marathon, No. 3D21-1987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 3, 2023)

New Article: Alex Boone, "The Tide's Coming In: A New Case for Beachfront Property Rights in South Carolina" (Wm & Mary Envt' L & Pol'y Rev)

Check this out, a new student-authored note from William and Mary third-year law student Alex Boone, "The Tide's Coming In: A New Case for Beachfront Property Rights in South Carolina," 47 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 383 (2023).

Here's the Abstract:

Part I of this Note explores the scientific data as it relates to the impending consequences of climate change on South Carolina’s coast and will introduce the disastrous scenarios that are predicted to arise as a result of rising sea levels and the accelerating strength and severity of extreme weather events. Part II compares the effectiveness of various coastal resiliency tools and highlights the regulatory framework that prohibits their use by beachfront property owners. Part III explores the topic of regulatory takings and their indirect prophylactic nature of protecting citizens from regulatory overreach and offers a case for a South Carolina court to find that the state’s regulations create an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation. Lastly, Part IV recommends a policy change designed to mitigate the consequences of the CTWA [Coastal Tidelands and Wetlands Act] on South Carolinians in the absence of a judicial finding that the CTWA constitutes a regulatory taking.

It's really rewarding to see this kind of writing and analysis from a law student. Yes, we appreciate the subject-matter and the conclusion (naturally), but that aside, it is a good day when a soon-to-be colleague does this kind of work and lays it all out there for the world to see. Congratulations to the ELPR editors, and especially to Mr. Boone!

April 27, 2023, 5-7pm, Honolulu: Join Us To Celebrate The Work And Career Of Professor David Callies

Come join us on Thursday, April 27, 2023, from 5-7pm, downtown Honolulu, to celebrate the retirement of Professor David L. Callies from the University of Hawaii Law School.

Join U.H. Law School Dean Camille Nelson, Professor Callies' colleagues, his students (present and former), the Hawaii legal community, and family and friends as we honor 43 years of scholarship, teaching, service, and practice.

Professor Callies is a prolific scholar and author, and has mentored generations of lawyers. Known especially for his work in property, land use, takings, administrative law, and state and local government law, he has also been presented with numerous awards including William and Mary's Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize, and the Owner's Counsel of America's Crystal Eagle. 

Invitation and how to RSVP (or click below). Space is limited, so please let us know you are attending as soon as you can.

Details:

Thursday, April 27, 2023
5:00-7:00 p.m.

Second Floor Gallery
Pauahi Tower
1003 Bishop Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

Validated parking: Bishop Square garage (entrance on Alakea Street)

RSVP: [email protected]

See you there!

Professor David Callies - Retirement Celebration Invitation Apr. 27, 2023

New Construction In California's Coastal Zone Must Be Designed For Future Removal

You already know what the Court of Appeal held, don't you?

Hurst v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No. D079549 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2023) (unpub.)

(Nearly) Last Call: There's Still Time To Join Us For The 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Feb 1-4, Austin

We really want you there...

One (nearly) last reminder that there's still time to register for your space at the 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, February 1-4, 2023, in Austin. In the past several years, we have sold out due to the conference room capacity and the conference hotel block. But there's still space, although we are nearly full. So register now - don't delay any further! 

Here's the brochure with the complete agenda, schedule, and faculty listing. But to tempt you, here are some of the highlights of the program:

• Everything Old is New Again: Why Today’s Practitioners Need to Understand the Original Meaning of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses
  
• When the SWAT Team Comes (No) Knocking: Police Power Takings

• Private Utility Takeovers – Lessons From a 67 Day Trial

• "Contraband": How Property Rights Helped Pave the Way for Civil Rights

• Valuation Issues When Billboards and Signs are Condemned

• Setting Client Expectations and Identifying Red Flags

• Preparing Your Expert Witness to Shine in Virtual Proceedings: Tools and Tips for Trial Lawyers

• Developing Property Right Issues in Texas - Questions and Answers from the Bench (with Texas Supreme Court Justice Jimmy Blacklock)

• Eminent Domain and Regulatory Takings Updates: Important Decisions You Need to Know

• Ethics: Building Your Practice by Mentoring the Next Generation of Eminent Domain Lawyers

• the Condemnation 101 program (a one-day course for those new to the practice, or for experienced practitioners wanting a refresher)
• ...and much more!

To register, go here.

Looking forward to seeing everyone in Austin for the 40th edition of the Conference.

Program Brochure, 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Austin, Texas, Feb 1-...

Law Of The Lava - Who Owns New "Accreted" Land? (And Other Questions)

Due to our 808 roots, we've been fielding a lot of questions related to the ongoing eruption of Mauna Loa on the Big Island.

It's big, it's spectacular (see video above), and (for us) it's law.

The questions (who owns "accreted" lava?, how does the NPS let the public out to see this?, what uses can be made of property covered by lava?) made us realize that we had addressed some of those issues in prior posts. So we're reposting:

• Visitors At The Volcano: Is The NPS Nuts?
• "Accretion," Hawaii Style
• What Constitutes a Loss? - Bridge Aina Lea and takings

Hope you find useful these things that make Hawaii property law pretty interesting at times.

Here's The Program For The 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Feb 1-4, 2023, Austin

Here it is, the official agenda and program for the 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, February 2-4, 2023 (with a special event the evening of Wednesday, February 1, 2023 to entice you to arrive early).

Here's the brochure with the complete agenda, schedule, and faculty listing. But to tempt you, here are some of the highlights of the program:

• Everything Old is New Again: Why Today’s Practitioners Need to Understand the Original Meaning of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses

• Private Utility Takeovers – Lessons From a 67 Day Trial

• Valuation Issues When Billboards and Signs are Condemned

• Setting Client Expectations and Identifying Red Flags

• Developing Property Right Issues in Texas - Questions and Answers from the Bench: A View From the Bench (with Texas Supreme Court Justice Jimmy Blacklock)

• Eminent Domain and Regulatory Takings Updates: Important Decisions You Need to Know

• Ethics: Building Your Practice by Mentoring the Next Generation of Eminent Domain Lawyers

• ...and much more!

To register, go here.

Register now and hold your space. In the past several years, we have sold out due to the conference room capacity, and the conference hotel block. So don't delay. 

Looking forward to seeing everyone in Austin for the 40th edition of the Conference.

Program Brochure, 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Austin, Texas, Feb 1-...

Let's Take A Deeper Look At Takings Ripeness, Ninth Circuit

Well, that was quick. As we noted here, we recently argued a case in the Ninth Circuit (October 20, 2022) about whether a regulatory takings claim is ripe. 

Not long after we posted the argument recording, the Ninth Circuit panel issued a short memorandum opinion rejecting our arguments wholesale (November 1, 2022).

So earlier this week, we asked the entire Ninth Circuit to take a look. Here's our en banc petition.

We'll leave it to you to read it and see why we think this one is ripe.

Appellants' Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Ralston v. San Mateo Cnty., No 21-16489 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2022...

Hawaii Land Use Law Conference, May 25-26, 2022, Honolulu - Join Us!

It's back! After a hiatus on the in-person program, the bi-annual Hawaii Land Use Conference is back in-person (see here for a sample of one of our prior presentations at this conference).

May 25 and 26, 2022, downtown Honolulu.

The full agenda and speaker list has not yet been published, but here's a summary of the program:

Sponsored by the Hawaii State Bar Association and the Real Property and Financial Services Section. Coordinated by David Callies and Benjamin Kudo, his 2-day conference is a must attend for any attorney or professional whose practice involves land use and development. Distinguished land-use practitioners, scholars, planners, and regulators from Hawaii and the Mainland will discuss timely and relevant issues, including:

• Takings 

• Transit Oriented Development (TOD) 

• Seawalls and Shoreline Access 

• Climate Change 

• Affordable/Workforce Housing 

• Ethical Considerations for Real Property Practitioners and Other Professionals

We'll be speaking during the session on Takings, along with our colleagues Greg Kugle, Brad Saito, and Ellen Ashford.

Register here (limited to 70 registrants, no walk-ins, so be sure to get your spot now). Travel to and from Hawaii is back open and no more Co-19 hassles at the airport, so take advantage of the opportunity for a little R&R and CLE. 

As Jack Lord would say, "be there, aloha!"

New Article: "Takings, PASH, and the Changing Coastal Environment," 43 U. Haw. L. Rev. 525 (2021)

Back in February, we were honored to be part of the University of Hawaii Law Review's symposium "25 Years of PASH," a retrospective of one of the Hawaii Supreme Court's most famous (or infamous) decisions, Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cnty. Plan. Comm’n, 79 Haw. 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1993), cert. denied sub nom., Nansay Haw. v. Pub. Access Shoreline Haw., 517 U.S. 1163 (1996) (PASH).

At the conference, we spoke on the panel about "PASH and the Changing Coastal Environment" (see video here at the 2:02:25 mark if you want to watch our panel's summations). The Law Review has now published the symposium, and here's our contribution, Takings PASH and the Changing Coastal Environment, 43 U. Haw. L. Rev. 525 (2021).

For those of you not totally tuned in, in the PASH case the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that subject to certain qualifications, the Hawaii Constitution allows native Hawaiians to exercise traditional practices, even on private property, and that "[o]ur examination of the relevant legal developments in Hawaiian history leads us to the conclusion that the western concept of exclusivity is not universally applicable in Hawaii." Yes, the right to exclude is not "universally applicable" in the 808. Let that one sink in. (The U.S. Supreme Court denied the takings cert petition.)

Here's our piece's Introduction:

The topic of this portion of the Symposium is “Takings and the Changing Coastal Environment” and in this comment I focus on the “takings” part of that title, as well as offer some thoughts on our guiding subject, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s decision from a quarter-century ago in PASH, which most famously noted “that the western concept of exclusivity is not universally applicable in Hawaii.” How might this statement be considered today through the lens of property law and property rights, especially if we account for the changes in the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to takings in the time since PASH was decided? And what implications does PASH have, if any, for property rights in the coastal zone?

This comment is in three parts. Section I summarizes the PASH opinion, and concludes that the jurisdictional questions presented in the case should have resolved the case, and the court should have avoided the takings questions, and the court reached out to resolve an issue it need not have. Next, Sections II, II, and IV offer up my three main criticisms of PASH, the first on the court’s seemingly incomplete view of how Hawai‘i property law treated the right to exclude, the second on whether defining “property” for purposes of federal takings analysis is only a matter of state law, and the third on separation of powers. Finally, Section V concludes with some thoughts about how courts should consider property rights in a changing coastal environment in light of these criticisms of PASH.

Check out the symposium issue, which has similar articles from a variety of perspectives.

Takings, PASH, and the Changing Coastal Environment, 43 U Haw L Rev 525 (2021)

New Cert Petition: The Self-Executing Fifth Amendment Abrogates 11th Amendment Immunity

Here's the latest in a case we've been following (one in which we guessed from the beginning was headed where it is today).

The Zitos claim that their property was taken without compensation. They sued for compensation in federal court. Knick tells us that this is okay, right? Well, the problem for the Zitos is that they claim the State of North Carolina did the taking. And you know what that means: 11th Amendment "immunity." You can't sue a State for money in federal court without its consent. And North Carolina didn't consent.

The District Court dismissed. It concluded that it might have allowed the takings claim for compensation to proceed in federal court except that the Fourth Circuit already concluded that a federal court is barred from considering a takings claim against a state if state law recognizes a takings claim. See Hutto v. South Carolina Retirement System, 773 F.3d 536, 552 (4th Cir. 20914) ("'the Eleventh Amendment bars Fifth Amendment taking claims against States in federal court where the State's courts remain open to adjudicate such claims.").

Wait...you can't come to federal court with a takings claim if there are available state procedures for obtaining just compensation? Sounds familiar, no? Not to the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed. Read this detailed analysis of the Fourth Circuit's opinion here: "4th Circuit: State Sovereign Immunity Bars a Takings Claim in Federal Court when Remedies are Still Available in State Court." 

The court held that Knick's throwing back open the federal court door to takings claims did not address or otherwise undermine the usual 11th Amendment rule. Nor does the "self-executing nature" of the 5th Amendment's Just Compensation requirement alter that. See Zito, slip op. at 11 ("So Knick did nothing new with respect to the self-executing nature of the Takings Clause in federal court.") (footnote omitted). Yes, Knick made Fifth Amendment private property rights equal with other rights (under Williamson County, these rights were definitely treated as second-class right), but it didn't elevate private property rights and merely subjected them to the same 11th Amendment limitations on other constitutional rights. There's an exception to the usual 11th Amendment immunity states enjoy in federal court if there isn't a "reasonable, certain, and adequate" means to obtain compensation in state court. But such remedies exist, the Fourth Circuit concluded.

So now we have the cert petition, which asserts this Question Presented:

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of the “self-executing” Just Compensation Clause abrogates state sovereign immunity from federal takings claims?

Disclosure: the Zitos are represented by our law firm, Pacific Legal Foundation. So we're not going to say much more about this, except to note the Summary of Argument:

The Eleventh Amendment and the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause express two of the most venerable constitutional principles in existence: sovereign immunity for states and just compensation for citizens whose property is taken for public use. These principles function independently and adequately in most cases. However, when a state takes property without compensation, sovereign immunity and the Just Compensation Clause—applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment—come into conflict. While the former bars a damages award, the latter positively requires it.

The Fourth Circuit’s holding that sovereign immunity is superior to the right of compensation for a taking conflicts with this Court’s jurisprudence, diminishes the Just Compensation Clause, and conflicts with the decisions of other courts, all of which justifies review.

Pet. at 12-13.

Check it out, and stay tuned.

CA11: No Summary Judgment For You On Takings Claim When Town Provided Some Evidence Of Public Customary Use Of Beach

On one hand, the U.S. Court of Appeals' opinion in Buending v. Town of Redington Beach, No. 20-11354 (Aug. 20, 2021) is not a big deal, at least in terms of the issue in the case: did the Town take the plaintiffs' private beach property when it adopted an ordinance allowing the public to use it? Maybe it did, maybe it didn't. The opinion simply vacates the district court's grant of summary judgment to the property owners because there are disputed issues of fact on the Town's affirmative defense of customary use. The district court concluded the Town could not raise the customary use defense.

The Eleventh Circuit, however, held that the Town was not precluded from raising the defense that the property the plaintiffs claimed was exclusively private was also subject to the public's use under longstanding custom, and that the Town's opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment "provided a range of evidence supporting its customary use defense." Slip op. at 16. The Town submitted evidence showing actual use of the disputed beach area by the public: the Town holds a hotdog cookout on Independence Day each year, it spends public money to rake the beach (apparently including the private parts). That doesn't seem all that controversial. No facts in contention means summary judgment is ok. Conversely, any beef about the facts relevant to a material issue -- here, the Town's affirmative defense of custom -- means that the trier of fact gets to resolve the beef by looking at credibility and the other things that triers of fact get to weigh. 

But on the other hand, some of the Town's evidence the opinion points to is decidedly odd. Like "evidence that the Town was designed to accommodate visitors, who may not want to come if they could not access the beaches[.]" Slip op. at 16. That properties in the Town have been rented to visitors. Slip op.at 16-17. Evidence of "the longstanding perception that the Town's beaches are available for public use." Slip op.at 17 (emphasis added). The Mayor testifying about what other people felt. Id. ("The mayor, who moved to the Town as a child in 1955, testified that people 'just felt like the beach was there for us to enjoy and use.'").

While we're not sure that this type of evidence alone would suffice to make summary judgment appropriate, there seems to be enough other evidence of actual public use to get to the trier of fact. We hope on remand that there's a better filtering of what comes in and what stays out. 

Buending v. Town of Redington Beach, No. 20-11354 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2021)

Registration Open Now: ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Jan 26-29, 2022, Scottsdale

All the topics you want to know about, presented by top-notch faculty from across the nation. Sessions include:

• Keynote: Do Animals Have Property Rights?
• Did the Supreme Court Signal a New Direction in Property Rights in Cedar Point Nursery?
• Maximizing Relocation Benefits: Understanding the Law and Regulations to Ensure Fairness
• Challenging Public Use: Lessons From a 67-Day Trial
• COVID Takings
• Property Rights as Civil Rights
• Eminent Domain National Update
• Federal Court and the Daubert Challenge: How to Prepare
• How to Position Your Client for the Fallout When Projects Don't Get Built
• Rural Broadband and the Emerging Constitutional Challenges
• Are Precondemnation Entry Statutes Still Valid After Cedar Point Nursery?
• How Condemnor and Property Owners' Counsel Prepare the Battlefield
• How Will the Trillion Dollar Infrastructure Bill Impact Your Practice?
• Ethics
• ...and more, including a full slate of networking and social events!

We've sold out the last few years, so don't miss out. Room block now taking reservations. Registration and agenda information here.

Join us in Scottsdale in January!

We Already Have An Express Easement Allowing Public Foot Traffic On Private Beach. Walton County: Hold My Beer!

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's recent opinion in A Flock of Seagirls LLC v. Walton County, No. 20-12584 (Aug. 5, 2021) isn't about judicial takings, or even about eminent domain (even though a straight condemnation turned up in the factual background).

But this blog's frequently flyers might want to take a read anyhow because it involves public and private rights of use in the dry-sand beach along the Florida coast. We know those issues are closely related to our faves like public trust, judicial takings and the like, so read on.

Here are the facts. The county holds an express easement along two beachfront lots for "a way of passage, on or by foot only" that the State of Florida earlier had exacted from the owners in the course of eminent domain proceedings. But if the county tries to use the easement for some other purpose, the easement is deemed abandoned by its express terms.

So what did the County do? Was it satisfied that it has, on behalf of the public, an express easement allowing people to walk over what is admittedly private property in Florida? Everything good, right?

No, not good enough. It adopted an ordinance "purporting to establish the public’s right to use the dry-sand area of all beaches for 'recreational' purposes—including, among others, 'sunbathing,' 'picnicking,' 'fishing,' 'swimming or surfing off the beach,' and 'building sand creations.'" Slip op. at 2.

Two of the owners of the servient estates sued, claiming that the easements had been abandoned. The District Court agreed with the county that this didn't qualify and granted summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit reversed.

Applying the "ordinary contract-construction principles," the court held that under their ordinary and common meaning, the abandonment clause limited the use, and that the county ordinance allowed the property to be used for some other purposes. The abandonment clause applied if the county "attempted" to make more use, not only if it actually made the use. You can't sunbathe, picnic, fish, swim and surf off the beach if you are limited to using it as "a way of passage." Slip op. at 9. Locomotive purpose isn't the "recreational purpose" set out in the ordinance.

Yes, walkers may incidentally stop while they are making their way of passage and thus some of the uses noted in the ordinance may not offend the uses allowed by the easement, but others "go so far beyond incidental stopping that they can't fairly be deemed 'reasonably necessary for the full enjoyment of the easement itself.'" Slip op. at 10.

The court also rejected the county's argument that the abandonment clause could not limit the public's right to full recreational use of the dry-sand beach. It held that Florida's common law customary-use doctrine right of the public to full use of the beach "is not absolute or boundless," and did not independent of the easement allow the public to use the dry-sand beach. Slip op. at 12. 

Nor did the "perpetual" clause in the easement itself mean that it could not be abandoned. That's kind of a silly reading of an instrument that also contains an abandonment clause. In other words, yes, the easement was perpetual ... unless you abandon it, county! Maybe that ordinance wasn't such a good idea after all.

Finally, the court rejected the county's argument that the eminent domain consent judgment by which the easement was created back in the day did not make the abandonment clause inapplicable. The judgment used the term "permanent public pedestrian access," but like the perpetual clause noted above, the easement was only permanent as long as the county didn't do anything to abandon it.

So now, instead of having the right to walk on private beaches, the public gets nothing, good day Sir!. Like this recent case, we're filing this one under the "sure you want to do that?" department. Or maybe the "give 'em an inch and they'll take a mile" department. Maybe both.

[Any finally - yes, we know the appellant is A Flock of Seagirls LLC, and the song is by A Flock of Seagulls, but the minute we read the caption the song just popped in our head and never left. Sorry about the Ohrwurm.]

A Flock of Seagirls LLC v. Walton County, No. 20-12584 (11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2021)

Join Us For The 39th Annual ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Jan 26-29, 2022 (Scottsdale, AZ)

All the topics you want to know about, presented by top-notch faculty from across the nation. Sessions include:

• Property Rights as Civil Rights
• Eminent Domain National Update
• Just Relocation: Understanding the Law and Regulations to Ensure Fairness
• Challenging Public Use: Lessons From a 67-Day Trial
• COVID Takings
• Federal Court and the Daubert Challenge: How to Prepare
• Did the Supreme Court Signal a New Direction in Property Rights in Cedar Point Nursery?
• How to Position Your Client for the Fallout When Projects Don't Get Built
• Rural Broadband and the Emerging Constitutional Challenges
• Are Precondemnation Entry Statutes Still Valid After Cedar Point Nursery?
• How Condemnor and Property Owners' Counsel Prepare the Battlefield
• How Will the Trillion Dollar Infrastructure Bill Impact Your Practice?
• Ethics
• ...and more, including a full slate of networking and social events!

We've sold out the last few years, so don't miss out. Room block now taking reservations. Registration and agenda information here.

Join us in Scottsdale in January!

HAWSCT: Anyone Claiming That An Affordable Housing Project Might Impact Their Property Interests In A "Clean And Healthful Environment" Has Standing To Object

In Protect and Preserve Kahoma Ahupuaa Ass'n v. Maui Planning Comm'n, No. SCWC-15-0000478 (June 16, 2021), the Hawaii Supreme Court reaffirmed the idea that all members of the public have a right under the Hawaii Constitution to a "clean and healthful environment," and that this is a "property" right entitled to due process protection under the state constitution. We say "reaffirmed" because this is merely the latest case so holding (see here for the first).

Like a lot of important Hawaii cases, this one came up in the context of standing to participate in the administrative review process. A Maui developer sought a permit under the Hawaii Coastal Zone Management Act from the Maui Planning Commission for an affordable housing project near Lahaina. Members of the Association, all of whom asserted they owned property adjacent to the project, asked the Planning Commission to intervene in the admin proceeding to object to the issuance of a  CZMA permit. The Association itself also sought intervention, asserting it had a stake in the outcome because the project might impact its environmental interests (things like local traffic, beach access, tsunami evacuation congestion, the cultural and historic importance of the land, storm water drainage, scenic views), and the sale and rental values of its members' properties. Slip op. at 8-9. The Commission declined, concluding the proposed intervenors did not have standing. 

The Association appealed to the circuit (trial) court under the Administrative Procedures Act, which affirmed. On secondary appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Association that its members had standing because their environmental interests were threatened by the project. The developer sought discretionary review by the Supreme Court.

The court affirmed. The Association's members have standing to assert their constitutional due process property right to a clean and healthful environment. As we noted above, the court's conclusion that the Association's members had standing and that the Commission therefore wrongly denied its request to intervene -- as radical as that may be -- is not really a new one. In In re Maui Electric Co., 141 Haw. 249, 408 P.3d 1 (2017), the court already held the same. The only extension here is that the court put it in context of a shoreline development permit.

The court was careful to (supposedly) curb the extent of its ruling by noting that the property right in a clean and healthful environment is "defined by" the CZMA. See slip op. at 18. But this isn't really any kind of real limitation, since all it requires a potential intervenor do is connect the environmental right alleged to some statute, rule, or ordinance that might conceivably involve that right. As the opinion itself demonstrates, that task is an awfully simple one. The court easily made the connection by noting that the CZMA is a "law relating to environmental quality" (a very broad category under Hawaii law). And in administrative proceedings implementing these statutes, rules, or ordinances, the connection is even more facile, because by definition, the proceeding meets the "defined by" test.  

Several thoughts:

• The decision seems like an unnecessary reach. Long ago, in Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 55 Haw. 538, 524 P.2d 84 (1974), the Supreme Court concluded that neighboring property owners have a property interest (a real and distinct property interest) in administrative proceedings that might impact those rights. Here, the Association members alleged Town standing. Seems like that should have resolved the standing issue without going further.
• Environmental standing is so broad, it has effectively swallowed up all "lesser" bases for standing, such as Town. The connection between a potential intervenor's environmental property rights, and some statute, rule, or ordinance is beyond easy to make, so why would any intervenor allege anything else but environmental standing?
• Is there a limiting principle on the scope of environmental standing? If there is, we can't see any.
• On the other hand, Hawaii's standing bar is already so notoriously low, it has little substantive consequence. Standing, as you know, is designed to keep courts away from cases that are more policy than legal disputes. Not being subject to Article III case and controversy requirements as are federal courts, the Hawaii courts have crafted their own standing doctrines, primarily to avoid advisory opinions. But that bar is already very low in original jurisdiction actions, and even lower in administrative proceedings that the doctrine fails to serve its purported function. Standing is simply a pleading game that no competent lawyer should fail: come on in, the water's fine!
• One word of caution: the court's holding that environmental interests are "property" places the rationale squarely within the "legitimate claim of entitlement" type of government-created property for purposes only of procedural due process (the type of interest that gets your some kind of pre-deprivation notice and some opportunity to be heard), and to that extent, the ruling is limited. This case and its progeny do not signal that the Hawaii Supreme Court is expanding property rights (and by those we mean actual property rights) in any way. That may come in other cases, but not this one.

Will this be the last case which concludes that generalized environmental interests are property under Hawaii law? We doubt it, so stay tuned.

Protect and Preserve Kahoma Ahupuaa Ass'n v. Maui Planning Comm'n, No. SCWC-15-0000478 (Haw. June 16, 2021)

New Article: "Takings, PASH, and The Changing Coastal Environment" (U. Haw. L. Rev., forthcoming)

Back in February, we were honored to be part of the University of Hawaii Law Review's symposium "25 Years of PASH," a retrospective of one of the Hawaii Supreme Court's most famous (or infamous) decisions, Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cnty. Plan. Comm’n, 79 Haw. 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1993), cert. denied sub nom., Nansay Haw. v. Pub. Access Shoreline Haw., 517 U.S. 1163 (1996) (PASH). 

At the conference, we spoke on the panel about "PASH and the Changing Coastal Environment" (see video here at the 2:02:25 mark if you want to watch our panel's summations).

The speakers also produced short written comments for the Law Review's upcoming issue, and ours is finally in a shape where we think it is OK for public consumption, so we've posted it on SSRN here (or you can download the pdf "Takings, PASH, and the Changing Coastal Environment").

For those of you not totally tuned in, in the PASH case the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that subject to certain qualifications, the Hawaii Constitution allows native Hawaiians to exercise traditional practices, even on private property, and that "[o]ur examination of the relevant legal developments in Hawaiian history leads us to the conclusion that the western concept of exclusivity is not universally applicable in Hawaii." Yes, the right to exclude is not "universally applicable" in the 808. Let that one sink in. (The U.S. Supreme Court denied the takings cert petition.)

From the Introduction:

The topic of this portion of the Symposium is “Takings and the Changing Coastal Environment” and in this comment I focus on the “takings” part of that title, as well as offer some thoughts on our guiding subject, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s decision from a quarter-century ago in PASH, which most famously noted “that the western concept of exclusivity is not universally applicable in Hawaii.” How might this statement be considered today through the lens of property law and property rights, especially if we account for the changes in the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to takings in the time since PASH was decided? And what implications does PASH have, if any, for property rights in the coastal zone?

This comment is in three parts. Section I summarizes the PASH opinion, and concludes that the jurisdictional questions presented in the case should have resolved the case, and the court should have avoided the takings questions, and the court reached out to resolve an issue it need not have. Next, Sections II, II, and IV offer up my three main criticisms of PASH, the first on the court’s seemingly incomplete view of how Hawai‘i property law treated the right to exclude, the second on whether defining “property” for purposes of federal takings analysis is only a matter of state law, and the third on separation of powers. Finally, Section V concludes with some thoughts about how courts should consider property rights in a changing coastal environment in light of these criticisms of PASH.

The entire symposium issue should be pretty worthwhile reading, if the conference itself is any indication. Good stuff.

Cal App: Taking Verdict Affirmed - When City Asserts That Its No-Development Law "trumps whatever you might submit," It Would Have Been Futile For Property Owner To Submit Development Application

We suggest you take a read through the California Court of Appeal's opinion in Felkay v. City of Santa Barbara, No. B304964 (Mar. 18, 2021). It's all there: Lucas wipeout takings, futility and exhaustion, coastal zone property rights.

This is an inverse condemnation case, seeing compensation for the city denying the owner any economically beneficial use of his property, because it was on a bluff face. Under the city's ordinances, bluff faces can't be built on. The planning commission staff said so, but they also recommended to the commission that this would be a taking, and the commission should therefore employ the takings safety-valve provision in the ordinance which allows the city to approve development if denial would be a taking (to paraphrase that old lung-dart commercial, "it's better to switch than to fight").

"No deal" the commission said, rejecting staff's recommendation, "we'll show 'em who is boss! We'd rather fight. Our law says there's no building on land we think is on a bluff face." City council concluded the same.

Property owner then filed both a writ of administrative mandate (APA appeal for all you non-Californians) and an inverse condemnation complaint, collectively asking the court to allow development and require compensation. Responding to the writ request, the city argued that substantial evidence supported its conclusion that the owner's land fit within the definition of "bluff," and the court agreed. But the court allowed the inverse claim to go to trial to test the city's claim that the takings/inverse claim wasn't ripe (hey, there may be other uses that can be made on that bluff!), and to determine compensation. 

The city's project planner (Kennedy) testified, and when asked by the trial judge whether anything could be built on property deemed to be on a bluff, she responded:

“I would say that they received a denial for that, so that’s the case.” The court later asked Kennedy why the city did not just tell Felkay at the beginning that “8.2 trumps whatever you might submit. We’re not going to allow anything on the bluff face. Don’t submit anything. . . .

Slip op. at 6. The court concluded that it would be futile for the owner to seek further denials of development, and that there was a taking. After the court concluded there was a taking, it gave the city a choice: pay up for the taking or back off. The court convened a jury to determine compensation. The jury awarded compensation of $2.4 million.

The court of appeal affirmed both the ripeness conclusion and the (unappealed) jury verdict:

The city contends that the inverse condemnation claim was not ripe because after the city denied his permit application, Felkay did not submit a revised application. We disagree.

...

The trial court found the city’s expert, Kennedy, to be “a defining witness in the case” who “convinced [the court] that there would be NO POINT in going back to seek mitigation.” The court did not err in crediting her testimony. (Cf. Benson v. California Coastal Com. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 348 [commission not estopped by staff member’s telephone call that applicant need not attend hearing].) Felkay was not required to submit a second proposal because the city “made plain” it would not allow any development below the 127-foot elevation, and because the area above that elevation was “not buildable.”

Slip op. at 9, 11.

In short, when the law itself prohibits any development, and that is confirmed both by the city's own actions and the testimony of its expert that the law "trumps" any application, an owner doesn't need to ask to get denied again.

Check it out.

Felkay v. City of Santa Barbara, No. B304964 (Cal. App. Mar. 18, 2021)

PASH Bash: U. Hawaii Law Review Symposium - "25 Years of PASH" (Feb. 5, 2021)

Mention the term "PASH" to any dirt lawyer in the 50th State, and they'll nod in understanding. It's an 808 shibboleth -- a kind of local property password -- that signals that you've been around the block and know your stuff.

On one hand, it is simply an acronym for Public Access Shoreline Hawaii, the plaintiff/petitioner in the (in)famous case Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995). On the other, however, it has evolved into shorthand for a number of things: from the technically accurate - native Hawaiian customary and traditional rights and practices under the Hawaii Constitution ("I was chasing a pua'a on private property, so I cannot be convicted of trespass because I was exercising my PASH rights"); to generically and cheekily - the ability to access the beach and shoreline ("Surf's up today, let's go practice some PASH rights!"); and with irony - judicial activism ("The Supreme Court sure PASH'ed that case!").

For those of you not totally tuned in, in the PASH case the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that subject to certain qualifications, the Hawaii Constitution allows native Hawaiians to exercise traditional practices, even on private property, and that "[o]ur examination of the relevant legal developments in Hawaiian history leads us to the conclusion that the western concept of exclusivity is not universally applicable in Hawaii." Yes, the right to exclude is not "universally applicable" in the 808. Let that one sink in. (The U.S. Supreme Court denied the takings cert petition.)

Soon after PASH, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that this right only applied on less-than-developed land. Why, the court has never really told us. After all, the right as set out in the text of the Hawaii Constitution doesn't distinguish between developed and undeveloped land, and as far as we can tell, neither did Hawaiian custom and practice. Maybe the court realized that the practical implications of a strict application of PASH in the absence of such a judicially-created limitation were enormous. We're not sure.

Who'd have thought that it has been a quarter century since the decision came out? (Probably not the editors of the University of Hawaii Law Review, many of whom, we'd imagine, were keiki at the time; but we digress.) But it has. But no matter, PASH rights have been a part of the conversation for more than two decades.

In February, the Law Review is putting together a retrospective and is devoting an issue of the upcoming volume to a discussion of the PASH case and how the last 25 years have gone.

We're going to be a part of the (online) Symposium on February 5, 2021, speaking about "Takings and the Changing Coastal Environment" (11am - 1pm Hawaii Time). We'll be joined by Colin Lee (a UH student who has authored an intriguing piece on PASH), Sam Lemmo (Admistrator of the State of Hawaii Office of Conservation and Coastal Lands), and Bill Wynhoff (Supervising Deputy AG, who in our opinion, is the most knowledgeable career public-service lawyer on these issues). Our discussion is sure to be lively, and will be moderated by UH lawprof David Callies.

Register for the entire program here (no cost). Our Damon Key colleague Mark M. Murakami is presenting on "The Proper Role of the Court: Restoring Justice Through the Public Trust Doctrine." The entire program is worth attending.

We hope you sign up, whether you are an old hand at PASH or a newcomer.

U. Haw. L. Rev. Symposium: 25 Years of PASH (Feb. 5, 2021)

 

Your 2021 ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference (Jan 28-29, Remote) BINGO Card

If you "get" this, you should be registered for the 38th Annual Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, to be held remotely on Thursday and Friday, January 28-29, 2021.

The list is growing rapidly, and you need to join us!

This is the "big one" where the nation's best practitioners, scholars, jurists, and other industry professionals gather to talk shop about the subjects we know and love. We're having programs with intriguing subjects such as "Planning to Win: Practical Strategies for a Successful Inverse Condemnation Case," "How Do I Keep My Firm’s Doors Open When the Courthouse Doors Are Closed? Making Your Practice More Efficient When You Can’t Try Cases," "Where Is the Supreme Court Headed on Takings Cases? Regulatory Takings Update and Cedar Point Preview," "No Show and All Tell: Breaking News in Property Rights and Takings," "More Than the Fifth Amendment: Other Tools for Upholding Property Rights," and "Evaluating Lockdown, Moratorium, and Emergency Claims."

Details here (ALI-CLE's page with faculty, agenda, and times), or here (the latest episode of Clint Schumacher's Eminent Domain Podcast, where we preview the Conference). Here's your chance to be a part of what is the best conference on these topics.

Always wanted to join in, but didn't like the travel? Here's your chance to try us out with reduced tuition. A long-timer coming back? Look for the special deal which includes a discount on the 2022 conference.

Recording Now Available In Virginia Supreme Court Oral Arguments In Takings, Property, And Public Trust Case

We listened live last week, but the court has now made the recording available in Johnson v. City of Suffolk.

This is what we call the "oyster takings" case in which Nansemond River oystermen claim that their property was taken when the City of Suffolk and the Sanitation District dumped sewage into the river and declared a "condemnation zone" (i.e., no oyster harvesting).

This is a case at the intersection of property and takings law, and environmental protection. And the public trust concept of jus publicum. The oystermen own a lease from the State of Virginia for the riverbed, which among other things, allows them to harvest some of the oysters that Virginia is so well known for. But they were forced to bring an inverse condemnation claim in state court, asserting that the City's dumping of wastewater in the river -- and prohibiting the harvesting of oysters during those times -- was a taking under the Virginia Constitution's taking or damaging clause (article I, § 11).

Very interesting arguments that focused in large part on the "stick" question. What is the nature of the property right? Do the oystermen have a property right to useable, unpolluted oysters? Does the City have a duty to not put sewage into the river? Does it matter that the City lacks the power to condemn oysters by using its power of eminent domain. What is the effect of statutes which the Virginia General Assembly adopted after Darling, which limit the ability of municipalities to pollute? Virginia's inverse condemnation doctrine -- set out most recently in Livingston v. VDOT and AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Arlington County -- is also a big question.

Stay tuned.

Condemnor Protip From Florida: Choose Wisely (Make Clear What You Want To Take)

In Altman v. Brevard County, No. 5D19-1839 (July 10, 2020), the Florida District Court of Appeal considered a host of owner objections to a taking of easements over five beachfront lots:

(1) the County was required to obtain separate resolutions for each taking; (2) the County’s petition in eminent domain did not strictly comply with the Florida Statutes; (3) the resolution on which the County based its petition was nullified by an amended resolution; (4) the trial court crafted takings outside of the pleadings; (5) the County failed to establish a reasonable necessity for the takings; and (6) the County failed to present a good faith estimate of value for each easement.

Slip op. at 2.

The court rejected most of the objections, but agreed with three: "[w]e find that the County’s petition failed because it did not provide clear legal descriptions of the properties to be acquired and that the County failed to establish a reasonable necessity for the public use aspect of the takings. Additionally, the trial court crafted takings outside of the pleadings." Id.

The court's analysis turned on the way the land was described. The project was to take easements to allow the placement of sand on county beaches "in order to maintain safe and sufficient hurricane evacuation routes, protect upland structures and infrastructures, preserve nesting habitats for sea turtles, and to preserve areas for public recreation." Slip op. at 2. The County's project engineer testified that the County's partnership with the Corps of Engineers required that the County ensured the "continued public use of such shores compatible with the authorized purposes of the project ...." Slip op. at 6. Otherwise, no federal dollars.

The resolutions described the western boundaries of properties by the "14 foot elevation contour" defined by either the vegetation line or the seawall at the 14 foot contour. The metes-and-bounds descriptions described the boundary as the 14 foot elevation contour. 

The County did a survey, but looked only at the 14 foot contour line and not vegetation line. The surveyor testified that he wasn't aware of the alternative descriptions of the boundary lines as the vegetation line. The County also had reasons for choosing the 14 foot line.

Sensing trouble, the County asked to amend its complaint to clarify the western boundary of the easements to be acquired. We really think it should be the 14 foot line, Your Honor. Attached to the proposed amended complaint was an amended resolution which also clarified the 14 foot line as the boundary. This is just clarification, and no-harm-no-foul, argued the County.

The trial court denied amendment. You can't change the description in the complaint to be different than the original resolution. After the trial judge informed the County that it was its choice about what to do next--"With that, you’ve got some tough choices. You can proceed. You can take a voluntary dismissal. You've got to figure out strategically what you want to do."-- the County "elected to go forward with its original Petition." Slip op. at 9. After a hearing, the trial court was satisfied: the necessity of the easements was "obvious," and the County had clarified the boundary. Go ahead and take, County, subject to certain conditions the court imposed about the easements' descriptions. See slip op. at 11.

Not so fast, held the Court of Appeal. The condemnor must make clear what it is taking:

However, we find that although the County technically included legal descriptions of the easements, the County’s Petition was defective because the legal descriptions provided two potential easement boundaries, rendering them unclear. The original Resolution authorized an easement on each property, with a western boundary at either the 14-foot elevation contour line or the seaward edge of the eroded dune bluff, depending on which was further seaward. Thus, for each property, the County should have determined which potential boundary line was further seaward and petitioned for an easement with that boundary line.

Slip op.at 14 (footnote omitted). That "depending" language wasn't giving the County the choice of choosing which it preferred (such that it was free to choose the 14 foot line), but was commanding the County to go figure out whether the vegetation line of the 14 foot line was further seaward. Whichever it was, choose that.

And what of necessity? As we know, these type of challenges are tough. Courts may defer to the condemnor's claim that a taking is for public use, but when it comes to necessity challenges, the judiciary's deference goes through the roof. Courts are super-reluctant to examine the ends-means fit between the asserted public use, and whether the property is being taken for that public use.

The court concluded that there wasn't enough of a fit because the public purposes of the project exceeded the scope of what the Corps of Engineers required for federal funding:

Even the witnesses for the County recognized that the County sought a greater public use than was required by the Corps. Bodge recognized that while the Agreement required the County to ensure “continued public use” of the shore, the proposed easements did not limit the use to “continued” or “existing” use because they stated, “[t]ogether with the right of public use only on the property.” Likewise, McGarry testified that in order to receive federal grant money for the Project, only the “open sandy beach” portion of each condemned parcel had to be publicly accessible. Accordingly, pursuant to Cordones, the County failed to establish a reasonable necessity for the public use aspect of the easements.

Slip op. at 19. 

So what lessons can we draft from the decision? Stick to the resolution. If the resolution is bad, the remedy is a new resolution, not amendment. These type of things are not to be approached loosely, and then fixed on the fly. And there may not be a lot in the necessity doctrine on which to hang your hat -- but in the right case, it does have meaning.

Thus, condemnors the choice is solely yours: choose wisely.  

Altman v. Brevard County, No. 5D19-1839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 10, 2020)

Land Use Also On The Fall Semester Agenda At William And Mary Law

This fall, we'll be back at the William and Mary Law School (hopefully in-person, depending on the circumstances and the yet-to-be-announced approach to be taken by the College of William and Mary), teaching two of our favorite subjects.

Not only will this be the third time leading Eminent Domain and Property Rights (Law 608), but we'll also be undertaking another subject, Land Use Control (Law 425). This semester, we're stepping into the (big, figuratively speaking) shoes of Professor Lynda Butler who recently retired after a stellar and trailblazing career. Thankfully, Lynda is continuing to lead the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Project and is underway with planning October's Brigham-Kanner Conference, honoring Harvard lawprof Henry Smith.

Land Use is, of course, related to Eminent Domain and Property Rights, but the law school understands that they are each worthy of separate study, and they should not be folded into a single course (or, worse yet, treated only as part of the introductory first-year Property course). We're developing the syllabus now, but we're going to be covering topics such as:

• zoning
• vested rights
• who decides - agencies or courts?
• RLUIPA and other religious land uses
• First Amendment and land use law
• land use as a means of social control
• Acronym Central: TIFs, PUD's, NIMBYs and YIMBYs
• "In accordance with a comprehensive plan..."
• the uneasy relationship between land use and environmental law
• ...and more!

If you are a student, the course is now available on the law school system. It is a full three-credits, and we'll be meeting Mondays and Wednesdays at 10am. We're not sure whether the final will be a paper or an exam, but if you have thoughts about that subject or topics you'd like to cover, please let me know.

Virginia Supreme Court To Consider Whether City Has The Right To Pollute Chesapeake Bay

A development in the "oyster takings" case that we've been following as it has worked its way up to the Virginia Supreme court: that court today issued this Order, in which it awarded an appeal by Nansemond River oystermen (and the City of Suffolk's cross-appeal) who claim that their property was taken when the City dumped sewage into the river and declared a "condemnation zone" (i.e., no oyster harvesting). Along with our William and Mary Law class, we took a field trip to the site last year (video above).

Some background, since this is a case at the intersection of property and takings law, and environmental protection. The oystermen own a lease from the state for the riverbed, which among other things, allows them to harvest some of the oysters that Virginia is so well known for. But they were forced to bring an inverse condemnation claim in state court, asserting that the City's dumping of wastewater in the river -- and prohibiting the harvesting of oysters during those times -- was a taking under the Virginia Constitution's taking or damaging clause (article I, § 11).

The trial court sustained the City's demurrer, accepting the City's argument that it has the right to pollute the river, based in part on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Darling v. City of Newport News, 249 U.S. 540 (1919). The court acknowledged that the oystermen's lease is property, but concluded that the city and sanitation district possess a superior right to pollute the river with sewage. So the oystermen asked the Virginia Supreme Court for discretionary review. Virginia's inverse condemnation doctrine -- set out most recently in Livingston v. VDOT and AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Arlington County -- is also a big question.

Now that the court has accepted the discretionary appeal, we shall see what this case brings.

Here are our prior posts on the case:

• We Join IJ's "Short Circuit" Podcast To Talk Virginia Oyster Takings, Colorado Wild Eminent Domain Abuse Cert Petition, And Berman International
• SCOVA Oral Argument: Does A City Have The Right To Pollute Chesapeake Bay?
• Videos: Oyster Takings On The Nansemond River
• City: We Have The Right To Pollute - Virginia Oystemen's Petition Asserting A Taking

Stay tuned, we'll post more when available.

Order Awarding Appeal, Johnson v. City of Suffolk, No, 191563 (Va. May 18, 2020)

No TRO In Private Beach Taking-By-Shutdown Case

Unlike a sibling federal court in a similar case (see that court's TRO order below), a Florida court has declined an emergency motion challenging government officials' coronavirus-related shut-down and stay away orders.

This is the case we've been following in which property owners challenge the local government's order that they stay off beaches. The difference between this and other cases ordering people to keep away from beaches and parks is that in this case, the beaches are alleged to be private. The complaint is posted here. 

Although we do not yet have a written order denying the TRO, the court's minute order notes, "the Court orally denies the Emergency Motion." See also "Judge rules against Walton beach property owners who sought exemption from closure order" from the local newspaper, which reported on the hearing:

During the hearing Vinson delved, at times, into the overriding issues that Walton County has faced for years now with its beaches and ongoing battles over what white sand coastline can be construed as public or private property.

“This case boils down to the definition of what is the beach,” he said, asking an attorney for the Sheriff’s Office if, under the existing ordinance, sanctions could be levied for someone sitting in a chair in the sand outside their back door.

“You can’t have the sheriff saying you can’t go out into your back door, five or 10 feet from your back door,” Vinson said. “To anyone looking at the beach, sometimes you can’t tell where the beach really ends. Where does the beach end? That is the gray area I think we are really concerned with.”

In order to have won the emergency injunction, Safriet’s team was required to convince Judge Vinson that the property owners would have been likely to win at trial. He ruled Monday he did not believe that to be the case.

He also debunked the property owners’ argument that they would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted and that granting it serves the public good.

Vinson also expressed concern with the way the county’s amended ordinance is “construed and applied.”

He postulated an arbitrary distance of 10 yards from a permanent structure should be considered a safe space on a beach property from which the county emergency ordinance could not be applied.

“Public beach on the Gulf of Mexico is not defined by legal ownership, but by what is the beach,” Vinson said.

If you want to get a sense of what arguments are in play, here are the briefs of the parties (as well as one defendant's motion to dismiss, which is not yet scheduled for a hearing):

• Property Owners' Memorandum in Support of the Present Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
• Walton County's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction
• Motion to Dismiss by Sheriff Michael A. Adkinson, Jr.

The reason we posted the order granting a TRO in the other challenge (a case in which the plaintiffs do not assert a taking, but focus on their First Amendment rights to practice their religion), is that the plaintiffs in the Florida beach case argued that it was instructive about how the Florida court should consider the issue. In addition, it is an interesting read for any of you keeping up on the multiple challenges to shut-down orders nationwide. 

Temporary Restraining Order, On Fire Christian Center, Inc. v. Fischer, No. 3:20-cv-264-JRW (W.D. Ky.... 

Private Beach Owners: Closing All Beaches Is A Physical Taking

Here's yet another complaint alleging that a virus-related order is a taking, this time with an interesting twist (other complaints here, here and here). 

The twist is that the plaintiff/property owners (who include former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee) assert that they are being prevented from using their own residential property. The complaint asserts that sheriffs and code enforcement officers have trespassed on the owners' private beaches by "patrolling," and that the officers "have physically prevented Plaintiffs from being able to use or even set foot in their own backyards." Complaint at 11. 

The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and just compensation. They also assert due process and search-and-seizure claims, that the emergency orders were preempted by other orders allowing the plaintiffs' uses, and a claim under the Florida Constitution for breach of the right of privacy.

Will there be more of these? Bien sûr. 

Complaint, Dodero v. Walton County, No. 3:30-cv-05358-RV-HTC (N.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2020) 

Backing Back Into Williamson County: Federal Court Case Tees Up 11th Amendment Immunity For Takings

We don't usually post trial court decisions, but when one comes along that tees up some interesting issues and is likely to get pushed further up the food chain, we're all ears.

That's the case with the Eastern District of North Carolina's order in Zito v. North Carolina Coastal Res. Comm'n, No. 2:19-CV-11-D (Mar. 27, 2020). A North Carolina property owner alleged that the application of the Commission's shoreline setback rules are a taking, and filed a suit in federal court. Yes, this is a federal court deciding a regulatory takings claim (yay, Knick). 

The property owners did all of the right things to ripen their claim. They obtained a final agency decision (helpfully labeled the "Final Agency Decision") and were denied a variance. And although the owners filed their federal lawsuit before Knick, by the time the District Court was considering the Commission's motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court had issued its opinion, so there was no need to pursue state procedures for compensation. 

So the case was ripe, right? Not really: the District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because North Carolina courts remain open to consider the owners' takings claim. What alchemy is this?

Relying on Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court concluded that the owners could not pursue a federal takings claim for just compensation in federal court because the state courts of North Carolina could adjudicate the claim. Sounds like Williamson County's "state procedures" requirement, doesn't it?

But before you go ballistic, realize the District Court didn't just make this up. It was bound by the Fourth Circuit's ruling from a few years ago (Hutto v. South Carolina Retirement System, 773 F.3d 536 (4th Cir. 20914)) which held that "'the Eleventh Amendment bars Fifth Amendment taking claims against States in federal court where the State's courts remain open to adjudicate such claims." Slip op. at 9 (quoting Hutto, 773 F.3d at 552). 

The District Court rejected the owners' argument that the self-executing nature of the Just Compensation Clause:

This court cannot ignore binding Fourth Circuit precedent, even if the Zitos offer a persuasive rationale for doing so. ... Hutto controls the disposition of this case, and this court must follow it until either the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc or the Supreme Court instructs otherwise.

Slip op. at 9. 

Additionally, the District Court held that the big "self-executing" footnote in First English that we like to rely on isn't as controlling as a "tight analogy" that Hutto relied on to support its Williamson-County-by-another-name rationale:

As for footnote nine in First English, footnote nine cannot bear the weight that the Zitos place on it. See First English, 482 U.S. at 316 n.9. First, footnote nine is dicta in that the Court was responding not to a principal argument of the parties, but rather to the United States' amicus brief. See id. Second, footnote nine was not essential to deciding First English. See id. Indeed, First English did not concern the Eleventh Amendment or even mention it. Rather, in First English, the Supreme Court reversed the California First District Court of Appeal and held that a landowner who claimed that his property has been ''taken" in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by a "land-use regulation may [] recover damages for the time before it is finally determined that the regulation constitutes a 'taking' of his property." Id. at 306---07.

Slip op. at 11.

The District Court concluded, "[j]ust as states can invoke sovereign immunity for tax disputes in federal court so long as a state forum remains open, so too states can invoke sovereign immunity for takings claims in federal court so long as a state forum remains open." Slip op. at 10 (emphasis original).   

The court determined that a suit against the Commission for just compensation was in fact, a suit against the state treasury and thus subject to the Eleventh Amendment. finally, the court held that the property owners could pursue claims for compensation in North Carolina's courts. Williamson County's state procedures requirement lives!

In addition to the District Court's earlier note that it it up to the Fourth Circuit en banc to resolve whether Hutto's rule is still good, the order also teed up the conflict between Knick and the Eleventh Amendment:

Of course, the Court in Knick did not consider sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because Knick involved a suit between a private property owner and a locality that was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167-71; Bay Point Properties, Inc. v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 937 F.3d 454, 456-57 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-798 (2019); Williams v. Utah Dep't of Corr., 928 F.3d 1209, 1214 (10th Cir. 2019). But in reiterating the self-executing nature of the Just Compensation Clause, the Court in Knick foreshadows the day when the Court will have to address the interplay between the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause and the Eleventh Amendment. Cf. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2171; Lumbard v. City of Ann Arbor, 913 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir.) (Kethledge, J., concurring) ("But the Takings Clause does not say that private property shall not 'be taken for public use, without just compensation, and without remedy in state court.' Instead the Clause says that private property shall not 'be taken for public use, without just compensation' period."), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 267 (2019). Although Hutto binds this court, the court recognizes the force of the Zitos' arguments, notes the significant constitutional issues that the Zitos raise, and acknowledges that ''the guarantee of a federal forum rings hollow for takings plaintiffs, who are forced to litigate their claims in state court." Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.

Slip op. at 19-20.

Finally, we leave you with this thought: instead of suing under section 1983 for damages, how about either raising the claim directly under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, or seeking a 1983 injunction that compels the state to fulfill its obligation to provide compensation? We know that is a sharp distinction, but to us it is one that is consistent with the approach taken in some jurisdictions that the remedy for an inverse condemnation or regulatory taking isn't to sue for compensation, but to seek mandamus to compel the government to institute a condemnation case to pay for what it has taken. At least one federal court recently accepted that approach (see the Ninth Circuit's "no 11th Amendment immunity rationale" for a federal takings claim seeking an injunction to compel a state to return wrongly withheld interest).

Next up: Fourth Circuit.  

Order, Zito v. North Carolina Coastal Res. Comm'n, No. 2:19-CV-11-D (E.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2020) 

SCOVA Oral Argument: Does A City Have The Right To Pollute Chesapeake Bay?

Here's the latest in a case we've been following. We even visited the site with our class last year. 

Today, the Virginia Supreme Court heard argument on the petition for appeal (streaming above from the webstream, or download the mp3 here) in what we call the oyster case because it involves the property rights of Nansemond River oystermen, whose oyster beds were polluted by sewage from the City of Suffolk.

Bottom line from today's argument: no decision yet. These arguments are short (10 minutes), only the petitioner is allowed to argue, and today's argument did not elicit any questions from the three-Justice panel. So we wait. 

Some background, since this is a case at the intersection of property and takings law, and environmental protection. The oystermen own a lease from the state for the riverbed, which among other things, allows them to harvest some of the oysters that Virginia is so well known for. But they were forced to bring an inverse condemnation claim in state court, asserting that the City's dumping of wastewater in the river -- and prohibiting the harvesting of oysters during those times -- was a taking under both the U.S. Constitution, and Virginia's taking or damaging clause. 

The trial court sustained the City's demurrer, accepting the City's argument that it has the right to pollute the river, based in part on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Darling v. City of Newport News, 249 U.S. 540 (1919) and a. The court acknowledged that the oystermen's lease is property, but concluded that the city and sanitation district possess a superior right to pollute the river with sewage.

So now the oystermen are asking the Virginia Supreme Court for discretionary review. Virginia's inverse condemnation doctrine -- set out most recently in Livingston v. VDOT and AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Arlington County -- is also a big question

Will this case be resolved by a century-old precedent that recognizes a local government's ability to pollute a public river with sewage? Have our notions of private property evolved since then? Will Virginia's greater recognition of property rights make a difference?

All questions that could be answered if the court accepts review. Stay tuned.  

Complaint: Honolulu Sues Gas Companies (For Nuisance) To Recover The Cost Of Sea-Level Rise

Make what you will of this 205-paragraph, 114 page (including 128 footnotes) Complaint, filed yesterday by the Acting Corporation Counsel for the City and County of Honolulu and a battery of outside lawyers against gasoline producers, alleging that they are responsible to pay the costs of sea-level rise and other symptoms of what the complaint calls the "climate crisis."  

It's a challenging read, but the fun part is in the claims for relief (fast forward to page 99), which include (for you property mavens) nuisance, private nuisance, and trespass (by flooding), as well as affirmative and negligent failure to warn of the dangers of fossil fuel products. 

Will this lawsuit go anywhere? Is a big municipal payday in the cards? Will it get to a local jury? Your guess is as good as ours. But we'll be following along, for sure.  

Complaint, City and County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 1CCV-20-0000380 (Haw. 1st Cir. Mar. 9, 2020) 

Record Attendance (But There's Still Time For You Last-Minute Filers) At Nashville ALI-CLE Eminent Domain Conference

Picture 1: how normal people see pie.

Picture 2: how you see pie if you're coming to the
ALI-CLE Eminent Domain Conference. 

If you get the above, you probably are already set to join us next week for the 37th Annual ALI-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation Conference in Nashville. (If not, shame on you!).

And having just reviewed the latest registration list, I can report that we have an all-time record attendance.  But there's still room for those of you still not committed. Register here. Don't miss out. There will be pie. 

The Circle Is Now Complete: A Sampling Of Final Paper Topics From William and Mary Law's Eminent Domain & Property Rights Course

If there's one downside to the law school experience from the teacher's side of the lectern, it's grading. Especially at a law school like William and Mary that has a pretty strict mandatory curve.

In an upper-division course like "Eminent Domain and Property Rights Law," where we're dealing with some very high-level stuff and the quality of the students is uniformly excellent, that makes for some hard choices at this time of year. But we've wrapped up grading, and have submitted the official scores.

Although I cannot share with you all the papers themselves, I don't think my students would mind if I give you a sampling of the topics and titles, just so you can see how the next generation of lawyers is thinking about this area of law: 

• One Man's Castle is Another Man's Parking Lot: A Homeowner's Theory of Eminent Domain
• Native Title: Concept and Compensation
• May the Forest Be With You: John Does in Trees Fight Pipelines Using the Right to Include
• Apportioning "A Chicken Which Is Really Not Big Enough to Go Around": Why Courts Should Abandon the Undivided Fee Rule for the Aggregate of Interests Approach
• Madisonian Musings on Judicial Takings
• Why Knick v. Township of Scott Returned Takings Jurisprudence to the Values Behind the Fourteenth Amendment
• In the Aftermath of Arkansas Game & Fish Commission and Livingston v. Virginia Department of Transportation: Virginia Localities Need to Plan for Great Liability Risks From Flooding
• The Veterans of Foreign Wars Case and the Undivided Fee Rule: Just Compensation for More Than One Owner
• Up-Zoning: A New American Dream and Shifting Property Paradigm
• I Believe I Can (Maybe) Fly: A Survey of Proper Law Interaction With Drones
• EPA's Takings Liability for Climate Change Inaction
• Are Pipelines Public Uses? 
• In States We Trust: The Limits, and Lack Thereof, on the States' Power to Modify the Public Trust Doctrine
• The Public Use Requirement: Changes Over Time

I don't know about you, but I feel pretty good about this. I will be encouraging several of them to consider beefing up their papers and submitting them for publication somewhere. 

Finally, I can't resist cutting and pasting from one of the paper's footnotes: "For more on 'exclusionary vibes' and the power of eminent domain, see The Castle (Debra Choate 1997)." 

Obi-Wan has taught you well. 

California Coastal Comm'n: We're Suing Evil Rich Guy Who Is Blocking Access To The Forbidden Zone (Even Though Court Just Ruled The Other Way On The Same Issues In A Similar Case)

We gave up long ago expecting rationality and straight-up-the-middle narratives when it comes to cases about beaches and beach access. People get kind of nuts about that for some reason. We get why. Who doesn't love a beach? Even a beach that could serve as the location if Planet of the Apes is re-made again. Don't believe us? See this recent video. Or this story with a picture from the 1980s. 

But we overcame our usual reluctance to dive into these stories for the latest in a case we've been following, as it wound the way from California's trial and appeals courts, to the U.S. Supreme Court on a (denied) judicial takings cert petition, to the California legislature which was threatening to condemn and buy the property, to a recent unreported California appellate decision affirming a finding of no public easement, and now this, a recently-filed complaint against the owner by the State. 

The State of California Lands Commission and the Coastal Commission have sued the Silicon Valley billionaire owner, claiming that the access path over his private property is, in reality, publicly-owned property due to frequent historical use of the trail by the public. Who needs to condemn something "we" already own!

The owner of course contests that, and points to the recent unpublished court of appeal decision that affirmed a finding that the plaintiffs in that suit (Friends of Martin Beach) did not prove that any public access was adverse to the owner. The State has now raised what looks to us like very similar claims, so we shall see if that has any impact on this case.

We shall follow along. Stay tuned.

Complaint for Quiet Title, Declaratory Relief, and Injunctive Relief, California State Lands Comm'n v. Mart... 

(Nearly) Last Chance To Join Us In Nashville For ALI-CLE's Eminent Domain Conference

You can also fly, drive, or bike to the upcoming 37th Annual ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference. in Nashville. Limited space still available, so don't delay further and register now. We're on track to record attendance, so you don't want to miss the best nationally-focused three-day program on our area of law.

Takings, Knick, compensation, appraisals ... and a bit of fun thrown in. We have many new attendees, and many new speakers, too.  

Brigham-Kanner Video: The "New New" Property, Judicial Takings, And More

Here's the video of our October panel at the 2019 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights conference during which we spoke about "The New New Property: Public Resources and Private Rights."

Our panel also discussed judicial takings, Stop the Beach, (a case in which speaker Ken Bell -- then a Justice on the Florida Supreme Court) ruled on), and Professor Henry Smith's work. 

As the law school's YouTube channel describes it: Panelists include Ken Bell, Robert H. Thomas and Henry E. Smith. Katherine Mims Crocker of William & Mary Law School serves as moderator. The Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference is hosted each year by the William & Mary Property Rights Project at William & Mary Law School. Recorded at the Law School on October 4, 2019.

Check it out. The videos of the other panels are posted here. 

Space Still Available For ALI-CLE Eminent Domain Conference, Nashville Jan 23-25, 2020

If you get this, you need to attend the 37th Annual ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, January 23-25, 2020, in Nashville.

And if you don't get this, you need to attend more. 

Register here. 

New Fed Ct Judicial Takings Complaint: Indiana Supreme Court "Transformed Established Law" Of Shoreline Ownership

Here's the Complaint filed earlier this month in an Indiana federal court, which alleges that the State of Indiana is liable for a judicial taking in a case we've been following. Yes, a judicial taking! 

You recall that in Gunderson v. Indiana, 90 N.E.3d 171 (Ind. 2018), the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the public owns up to the ordinary high water mark on Lake Michigan and had done so all the way back to statehood in 1816. Problem is, according to the plaintiffs here, "undisputed local, state, and federal acknowledgement over the years" was otherwise - the law said that the property was private, not public. Thus (again, according to the Complaint), "the Gunderson judgment changed the law of the State of Indiana, as recognized by prior Indiana court precedent as well as federal, state, and local authorities." Complaint at 2.

We suggest you read the entire Complaint. It isn't that long, there are photos, and there is but a single count:

71. Gunderson transformed the established law by moving Plaintiffs’—and all other Indiana lakefront property owners’—property lines to the OHWM [Ordinary High Water Mark], irrespective of their deeds or titles. This change in established state law effected a taking of Plaintiffs’ property, particularly their previously private dry beach.

72. Because Indiana is immune from suits for damages in federal court, and Plaintiffs allege that Indiana’s highest court changed the law to effect a taking of their property, Plaintiffs lack a remedy at law against the State defendants and therefore may seek declaratory and injunctive relief.

Complaint at 25. 

It's been a while since a really big judicial takings case was in the pipeline, so we'll keep following along. Stay tuned. 

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pavlock v. Holcomb, No. 2:19-cv-00466 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 5,

What's At 712 4th Street, S.W., Washington DC? Your Invite To The 2020 ALI-CLE Eminent Domain Conference (Jan 23-25, Nashville)

We Join IJ's "Short Circuit" Podcast To Talk Virginia Oyster Takings, Colorado Wild Eminent Domain Abuse Cert Petition, And Berman International

Yesterday, our friends and colleagues at the Institute for Justice (Diana Simpson and Bob McNamara) welcomed us to their studios to record an episode of the "Short Circuit" podcast.

We talked property, takings, Virginia oysters, the cert petition about Colorado eminent domain abuse, and how the Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines would handle cases like Berman v. Parker and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. 

Listen in, and subscribe to the podcast (we don't miss an ep). 

And yes, we really did write up yesterday's blog post from the Supreme Court steps. Proof:

Videos: Oyster Takings On The Nansemond River

Following up on the petition, filed last Friday, asking the Virginia Supreme Court to review a trial court's demurrer which failed to recognize that the owners of a state lease to harvest oysters in the Nansemond River have a property interest . The court concluded that the city and santitation district possess a superior right to pollute the river with sewage.

The case arose when the city and sanitation district declared the oysterbeds "condemned" during certain times of the year because they put sewage into the river. They denied compensation, and the trial court held that Darling v. City of Newport News, 249 U.S. 540 (1919) subjected the lease owners to the city's superior right to pollute.

We paid a visit to the site a couple of weeks ago to see the pollution source, and how the oysters are harvested in the river. The above video is from that trip. The below is from WAVY 10's report on the case.

City: We Have The Right To Pollute - Virginia Oystermen's Petition Asserting A Taking

Just filed: this Petition for Appeal in a case which our William and Mary Law class has a special interest in.

The above photo was taken a couple of weeks ago, when we paid a visit to the property owner/plaintiffs, the owners of a long-standing oyster business operating out of the City of Suffolk, Virginia. The oystermen own a lease from the state for the riverbed, which among other things, allows them to harvest some of the oysters that Virginia is so well known for. But they were forced to bring an inverse condemnation claim in state court, asserting that the City's dumping of wastewater in the river -- and prohibiting the harvesting of oysters during those times -- was a taking under both the U.S. Constitution, and Virginia's taking or damaging clause.

The trial court sustained the City's demurrer, accepting the City's argument that it has the right to pollute the river, based in part on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Darling v. City of Newport News, 249 U.S. 540 (1919).  So now the oystermen have sought discretionary review in the Virginia Supreme Court.

Will this case be resolved by a century-old precedent that recognizes a local government's ability to pollute a public river with sewage? Have our notions of private property evolved since then? Will Virginia's greater recognition of property rights make a difference?

All good questions. So stay tuned. We shall follow this one closely, as we already have been doing.   

Petition for Appeal, Johnson v. City of Suffolk, No. ___ (Va. Nov. 22, 2019) 

Hot Take On The Maui Clean Water Act Arguments (Protip: ARRIVE EARLY)

Protip for the public line for SCOTUS arguments: you have to get there really early. As in really early. Before 5 am early. Because that's the time that we, along with some of our William and Mary Law students (pictured above, after the arguments), arrived at 1 First Street NE to take up our place in line yesterday for the arguments in the Maui Clean Water Act case. And we were -- literally -- the very last allowed in for the full arguments. We roadtripped it from Williamsburg (more on that in a future post), meaning that we awoke long before 5am, leaving the law school at an ungodly hour. It would have been a shame to have taken all that effort, only to not get in. So heads-up line standers: get there early.

Why all this effort, you may ask? After all, you can read the transcript the same day, or listen to the recording at the end of the week. Why bother being there in person? To us, there's nothing like witnessing it firsthand to catch some of the nuances. And the spectacle of U.S. Supreme Court arguments. The protests, the media scrum, the big-time lawyering. It is especially critical for soon-to-be-lawyers to see great advocates (all three who argued were, in our opinion, excellent), and observe the very jurists whose opinions they have been reading and analyzing during law school live and in-person (especially in this age of Celebrity Justices). I sure wish I had the chance to do this during my law education. Williamsburg is just within reasonable striking range of DC, so we figured we should make the effort. This is the second time we've done this (Knick was the first), and we're convinced the effort is worth it. 

As for impressions of the substance of the arguments, we think its going to be a very close one. Even though it is not bold to predict a split Court in nearly any Supreme Court case, we think this one merits it. It all turns on the language of the Clean Water Act, and what does the term "from" mean. Really. The advocates proposed various analogies about what the term means, using whiskey flasks, punchbowls, groceries. And there were all sorts of probable and improbable hypotheticals from the bench.  

In the end, the conclusion we reached is that the statute isn't all that clear one way or the other about what it means in the situation presented here: is the pollutant in the Pacific Ocean "from" the County of Maui's treated effluent injection well even though it was transported from the well to the ocean by groundwater? Several Justices pretty clearly thought yes, while others thought no. Reasonable minds apparently can differ. Which to us means that this case may be resolved more on policy grounds than by classic statutory interpretation (if there is even such a thing).

Thus, some of the Justices were looking for middle ground (see Justice Breyer's suggestion of a new "functional equivalent" test), while others (the Chief Justice, and Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh) probing about "limiting principles" on the Respondent's argument that any after-the-fact traceability from a point source to a jurisdictional water was enough to trigger CWA liability. That's a tough hill to die on, given the nearly unfettered liability that is triggered, so we're thinking the inability to articulate a viable limitation on liability may push several Justices to reject the argument. With several Justices appearing to have their minds set (Kagan, Sotomayor, Alito, and (presumably) Thomas), we think Justice Kavanaugh is going to be the fulcrum on this one. 

Finally, what's interesting about this case is the ongoing state court dispute about whether it has been settled. Most of the time, courts are not made aware of ongoing settlement efforts. Here, however, the Court was told about the settlement (a letter that, interestingly, no longer appears on the docket). A Justice might reasonably think to themselves: how strong is the Respondent's argument if it is so desperate to settle, especially at this stage of the game? 

So although the case was submitted yesterday, this one isn't over. It might be settled. It might not. The Court may rule by June, or it might not. 

Transcript, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, No. 18-260 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2019) 

Cal App: Agency Has Power To Adjudicate Whether The Agency Itself Is Taking Property (Really)

Update 10/25/2019: an astute and seasoned correspondent writes that the issue of whether a property owner must raise constitutional issues in the administrative proceedings was settled in a published opinion that involved the same agency, the California Coastal Commission. See Healing v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n (1994) 22 Cal. App. 4th 1158 (we put in in California citation style just because) ("These [the takings questions] are questions for a court of law to decide at an evidentiary trial, not by mandamus review of an administrative record of proceedings where the parties' right to present evidence was limited by the very nature of the administrative process.").

Why the Coastal Commission doesn't know its own law, escapes us.  

++++++

Hat tip to Benjamin Rubin at the California Eminent Domain Report for writing up a recent opinion issued by the California Court of Appeal, Greene v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. B293301 (Oct. 9, 2019).  

We won't repeat his detailed analysis, but are posting the opinion here only to point out what we think is a critical flaw in the court's ruling.  In sum, the court concluded that the California Coastal Commission was within its authority when it imposed a truncated setback as a condition of beachfront homeowners building an addition to their home. With what it concluded was substantial evidence to support the condition, the court affirmed. That part of the case really didn't attract our attention that much.  

What did get our spider sense tingling was the court's ruling on the homeowners' takings claim. The owners asserted that imposing the condition violated their right to just compensation. But the court didn't address the merits of the claim, concluding instead that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies because they had not presented the takings issue to the Commission. California law, according to the court, requires an appellant to have presented "the 'exact issue'" to the Commission in order to preserve it. After all, the Commission is entitled to notice that you think that their decision works a taking. The arguments the Greenes made before the Commission "did not give the Commission an opportunity to evaluate that issue." Slip op. at  13.

But wait, this is both an appeal from an administrative (as they call them in California, a writ of administrative mandate), as well as an original jurisdiction complaint, right? See slip op.at 4 ("On May 5, 2017, the Greenes filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to invalidate the five-foot setback condition.") How does an agency (the CCC isn't quite an executive branch agency as far as we can tell, but is one of those "fourth branch" hybrid agencies things) have any power to rule on issues of constitutional law? Especially its own actions? Only the courts may do that, so why is there any obligation for an administrative appellant to ask the agency itself not to act unconstitutionally? An agency's authority is limited to applying its enabling statute and its rules to the facts presented, not to determine whether its own actions are constitutional or not. Separation of powers, anyone? 

Benjamin's post asks a good question:

As such, you may be wondering if the result would have been different had the homeowners filed their takings claim in federal court as opposed to state court.  With the uptick in federal takings claims following the Supreme Court’s decision in Knick, we will likely get a definitive answer to that question in the near future.

A valid point. Especially true, given that it is hornbook law that you don't need to exhaust admin remedies in order to raise a § 1983 claim. The same reasons that animate that rule (the question of whether an agency has acted unconstitutionally isn't something that the agency itself can rule on) you'd think would apply with equal force under California law.  

Greene v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No. B293301 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2019) 

2019 Brigham-Kanner Conference: The New New Property - Public Resources And Private Rights

Here is a transcript of the remarks I delivered today at the 2019 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference. I was honored to join lawprof Henry Smith and Florida Supreme Court Justice (ret.) Ken Bell (who authored the Florida court's opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment which was challenged in SCOTUS as a "judicial taking") to speak about "Public Resources and Private Rights" (moderated by Professor Katherine Mims Crocker). After paying our respects to 2019 B-K Prize winner Professor Steven Eagle, we each addressed some part of the question.

----------------------------

The New New Property

As always, I bring to you tidings of "aloha" from the state where the legislature thought it was a going to reduce the price of residential housing by taking fee simple interests from "A" and giving them to "B," the leaseholders. 

Where now, the median price for a single-family, two bedroom, one bath, single wall house hovers just shy of $800 grand. 

And the state where the legislature thought that limiting the amount of rent gas companies could charge to their franchisees would somehow magically translate into lower gas prices at the pump for consumers. 

Where now, the price of gas is close to the highest in the nation -- although sorry, Californians, you may have us beat -- at or near $4 bucks a gallon. 

And in what may be a case of one-out-of-three-ain't-bad (so you don't write us off completely), our modest little jurisdiction is also responsible for at least one Supreme Court decision that we as property advocates really appreciate -- Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) -- where the Court both affirmed that the right to exclude is one of those fundamental rights that is immune from interference by regulation unless first compensated, but also in one of the overlooked holdings of that case put in the context not of a fundamental right because it was recognized by state (Hawaii) law, but one sourced in the actions of Corps of Engineers personnel who had confirmed via a Section 10 Rivers and Harbors Act regulatory permit that Kaiser Aetna possessed the right to keep others out of the navigable marina it created:

While the consent of individual officials representing the United States cannot "estop" the United States, it can lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of "property" expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes over the management of the landowner's property.

I mention Kaiser Aetna because it is a good lead in to my portion of this panel, which is focusing on “Public Resources and Private Rights.” While we mostly speak of “property” as a private right, thanks in large part to our late colleague Charles Reich, whose place in the popular zeitgeist was secured by “The Greening of America,” but whom we lawyers will always remember as the author of the influential article “The New Property.” (And when I say "influential," I mean it is the most-cited article published by the Yale Law Journal. Ever.) 

That article got us to thinking about property in a different way: not exclusively as an instrument of private rights – most exemplified by the right to exclude – but as maybe something that looked a bit more like the commons. Things like government benefits, contracts, licenses, and in what may be the most famous instance, Board of Regents v. Roth, a government job. In that case a poor sap teaching at a state college who lacked tenure. (I feel your pain, brother.)

As we know the Court concluded that Professor Roth, who although he did not possess tenure, if he could show he possessed "new" property, could not be dismissed before the college conducted a hearing. In short, as what we might call Due Process Property. 

In the property rights context, we’ve seen similar rulings from the lower courts – most prominently the Second Circuit in Brody v. Port Chester (ask Dana Berliner about that one), the Tenth Circuit in M.A.K. Investment (before they declare your property blighted, they’ve got to tell you), and from my home court in Kellberg v. Yuen. 

How have government-granted or government-recognized “property” rights translated beyond the scope of individually-owned property? And can these Due Process property rights be translated to the language of takings-and-compensation property?

Two recent decisions highlight the differences. The first is from my home jurisdiction’s Supreme Court.

Now you might think that given the amount I give the business to my home court – Professor David Callies studied the opinions of our court over a 10 year time frame and revealed that it ruled in favor of environmental and similar plaintiffs nearly 90% of the time – that when our court issues a decision recognizing a new breed of “property” that I might rejoice. And it is a right that, as far as we can tell, no other court, state or federal, has ever recognized. 

The court concluded the Sierra Club possesses a constitutional property right in a "clean and healthful environment" entitling the organization to certain procedural protections under the state constitution’s due process of law clause. The ruling allowed the Club to intervene in a Public Utilities Commission petition regarding a power purchase agreement for a now-defunct electric plant on Maui. 

Here’s that again in case it didn't quite sink in: the court recognized a property right in a clean and healthful environment. 

Maui Electric filed an application with the State PUC, seeking the Commission's approval of an agreement between the utility and Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Company which, if approved, would allow a rate increase to account for the additional production charges associated with the Puunene Plant, a coal-powered facility on former sugar lands in central Maui which transformed bagasse, the byproduct of sugar production, into electric power. We use the past tense because by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, the plant had closed, following the recent closure of the sugar plantation. No sugar plantation, no sugar, no bagasse. 

Sierra Club asked the PUC to intervene in the administrative process under the PUC's rules, asserting its own rights as well as several of its Maui members. The power plant, the petition asserted, would "impact Sierra Club's members' health, aesthetic, and recreational interests. Sierra Club also asserted its organizational interest in reducing Hawaii's dependence on imported fossil fuels and advancing a clean energy grid." 

Pretty vague stuff, and to me, more like policy questions than something best resolved by an adjudicative proceeding, but under existing judicial standing rules in similar cases in original jurisdiction actions brought in Hawaii courts, nothing too far from the norm. We’re not subject to Article III standing requirements, and the Hawaii Supreme Court’s state standing doctrine can best be summarized as “come on in the water’s fine.”  There's little doubt that if this were a case brought in a Hawaii trial court, that Sierra Club adequately alleged judicial standing. Anyone questioning that conclusion need only recall the Superferry case in which the Hawaii Supreme Court held that Sierra Club had standing to raise an environmental challenge to the now-defunct inter-island ferry because the ferry threatened the organization with four types of injury: (1) endangered species could be adversely impacted by a high-speed ferry; (2) the Superferry could increase the introduction of alien species; (3) surfers, divers, and canoe paddlers who used a state operated harbor could conceivably suffer adverse impacts; and (4) the threat of increased traffic on the road next to the harbor entrance. Again, that's a pretty vague butterfly-effect logic to gain standing. But for better or worse, that's the current state of Hawaii's standing law. 

However, the Maui Electric case was not an original jurisdiction action, it was an administrative proceeding in the Commission under the PUC's admin rules, governed by a different standard, one based in the Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act. Under the APA, an outsider may intervene in a "contested case" (an quasi-judicial adjudicative administrative process) when an agency rule or a statute gives the party a seat at the table, or when intervention is required by law because the agency is adjudicating that party's rights (in this case, the law was the Hawaii Constitution's due process clause).

And here, the Sierra Club alleged both that PUC statutes and the Hawaii Constitution's procedural due process of law protections gave it the right to intervene in the agency proceedings: 

Sierra Club argued that its members were concerned that the Puunene Plant relied too heavily on coal in order to meet its power obligations under the existing agreement and also that its members were concerned "about the public health and visibility impacts of burning coal."

Neither the PUC nor the court of appeals bought the Sierra Club's theory. The Commission denied intervention and decided Maui Electric's application without the Club's presence. The Club appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals which agreed with Maui Electric and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It concluded that because Sierra Club was not "aggrieved" by the decision by the PUC (because it correctly excluded the Club from the admin case), the appellate court did not have jurisdiction.

So up to the Hawaii Supreme Court they went, on the same two theories: the Club should have been allowed to intervene, either because the PUC's governing statutes gave it the right to do so, or because due process required it because the Club's property was at stake in the PUC proceeding. After rejecting a claim of mootness, three of our five justices got to the constitutional question: does the Hawaii Constitution recognize Sierra Club's environmental concerns as a property interest entitling it to procedural due process?

The majority based its conclusion on Article XI, section 9 of the Hawaii Constitution (a provision added by the 1978 constitutional convention):

Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality, including control of pollution and conservation, protection and enhancement of natural resources. Any person may enforce this right against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.

That, the majority held, created a legitimate claim of entitlement to a clean and healthful environment, and thus it is a property right. It "is a substantive right guaranteed to each person." The majority noted that the court had earlier held that Native Hawaiian rights -- a right also found in the Hawaii Constitution -- are "property" rights, and that environmental concerns are no different. As a self-executing right, it is a legitimate entitlement --

We therefore conclude that HRS Chapter 269 is a law relating to environmental quality that defines the right to a clean and healthful environment under article XI, section 9 by providing that express consideration be given to reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the decision-making of the Commission. Accordingly, we hold that Sierra Club has established a legitimate claim of entitlement to a clean and healthful environment under article XI, section 9 and HRS Chapter 269.

After reaching the conclusion that Sierra Club owns property in a clean and healthful environment, it was all over but the shouting and the majority held by applying the Professor Roth test, that the PUC had a duty to provide a hearing before it deprived the Club of its property:

The risks of an erroneous deprivation are high in this case absent the protections provided by a contested case hearing, particularly in light of the potential long-term impact on the air quality in the area, the denial of Sierra Club’s motion for intervention or participation in the proceeding, and the absence of other proceedings in which Sierra Club could have a meaningful opportunity to be heard concerning HC&S’s performance of the Agreement.

Finally, in a footnote, the majority made it clear that the result is immune from future legislative tinkering. This is a ruling based on the Hawaii Constitution, and thus no mere legislature can mess with it too much. 

Two justices disagreed, arguing this was a stretch, and one of those Pandora’s Box situations:

Respectfully, the Majority’s expansive interpretation of what constitutes a protected property interest in these circumstances may have unintended consequences in other contexts, such as statutes where the legislature has mandated consideration of specific factors by executive agencies when implementing a statute.

The dissent concluded the majority's result was unnecessary, because it was more of a policy choice than a judicial decision, and ultimately, if denied administrative intervention in the PUC, Sierra Club could deploy the loose standing rules which we mentioned earlier in this post, and institute an original jurisdiction action.

So is this property, New Property, or what we might call New New Property? 

The biggest question I have about the majority's conclusion is this: if the most fundamental aspect of owning "property" is the right to exclude others from the res, how in the world do members of the public have the right to exclude other members of the public from a clean and healthful environment? 

As the U.S. Supreme Court held in the aforementioned Kaiser Aetna, and Nollan "[w]e have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, 'the right to exclude [others is] 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'' (Or maybe Stevie Wonder said it better when he sang "this is mine, you can't take it.") 

Either way, the ability to keep others off of what you own -- and have the law back you up -- is one of the defining sticks in the bundle of rights which we call property.

Thus, I don’t think the court adequately grappled with the real foundational question built into the arguments -- should these types of environmental concerns even be shoehorned into the concept of "property" as that term has been used for thousands of years? Doesn't "property" as used in the Hawaii Constitution's due process clause mean private property? After all, as far as we can tell, every other time this court has dealt with property in Hawaii's due process clause, it has either expressly defined, or implicitly assumed, that the property interest at stake was private property, and not a right that looks more like something "owned" collectively by everyone. Essentially what the majority accomplished was a subtle redefinition of property from a private right to a public resource. 

So what’s on the horizon? I’m thinking the second shoe to drop is going to be "public trust" rights. As Professor Callies has written on the Hawaii form of the public trust which goes well beyond the Roman and English concepts, if the notion of public property is extended to the public trust, there’s a danger that this background principle could well eclipse – or indeed swallow up completely – the notion of private property. 

And our court is just one vote shy of concluding that Native Hawaiian rights – a form of cultural property – qualify as constitutional property.  Australia’s High Court has recently concluded that the property rights first recognized in the Mabo v. Queensland decision lead to a requirement for compensation when those rights were expropriated. Real money, even if it is Australian dollars. And since we’re here in the south what does the recognition of cultural property mean for things like those troublesome Confederate monuments that sit there on courthouse lawns (and across the street from certain law schools)? Is there a cultural property right for them to remain, or to be paid compensation to leave? 

As if responding to the Hawaii Supreme Court, the following year, the DC Circuit – applying Pennsylvania’s similar constitutional provision – came to the opposite conclusion. 

The court held that the Pennsylvania Constitution's Environmental Rights Amendment's guarantee of "clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic [sic] values of the environment" was not a liberty or property interest triggering the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections. 

The case was a challenge by Riverkeeper to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's enabling statute, which requires FERC to recover its costs from the industries it regulates. Riverkeeper asserted this makes it more likely that FERC will approve pipelines. 

The court first concluded that Riverkeeper had standing. And it quickly dismissed its claim to possess a liberty interest because the ERA's rights are not "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," and "the right to a healthy environment can[not] itself fairly be described as a 'liberty' interest." 

The court subjected Riverkeeper's "property" claim to a bit more analysis. State law defines property, and Pennsylvania's ERA "guarantees" certain things, and even calls them "rights." The court concluded, however, that the ERA's rights are "vague and indeterminate." Slip op. at 8. And the rights it recognizes do not have "some acertainable monetary value."  Most importantly, the question is whether the rights look like "any traditional conception of property."

The court held that because the ERA recognizes the rights as belonging to "the people," it failed this latter test:

Most importantly, the Environmental Rights Amendment creates no right to exclude—or anything like it. To the contrary, its first sentence vests the single “right” at issue collectively in “[t]he people,” its second sentence confirms that “Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people,” and its third sentence requires the Commonwealth to conserve and maintain environmental resources “for the benefit of all the people.” Moreover, although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the Amendment is judicially enforceable by private individuals, it has also confirmed that the right the Amendment creates is shared equally by all Pennsylvanians.

In other words, no Pennsylvanian may exclude any other from the right to clean air, pure water, and a preserved environment. So, the Amendment protects not private property rights, but public goods. In that respect, it is like “the right that we all possess to use the public lands”—which for due-process purposes “is not the ‘property’ right of anyone.”

The court concluded that "[t]he amendment is unlike traditional or even new property in yet other respects. For one thing, the right to a preserved environment cannot be bought or sold—and thus has no 'ascertainable monetary value,' as the Supreme Court’s 'property-as-entitlement cases have implicitly required.'"

So which is it, and maybe more critically what defines “property?” State law, notions of natural law or fundamental rights?

On that, I’d like to touch on one more recent decision, which will naturally lead us into a discussion of one of my favorite metaphysical law cases, Stop the Beach Renourishment (yes, we’re going to dive into judicial takings in a moment).

This is a case from the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that state officials failed "to return interest that was allegedly skimmed from their state-managed retirement accounts." The District Court denied class action status and granted the State summary judgment, concluding the case was "potentially unripe" because the State had not finished the process of administrative rulemaking, which might, in the court's view, address the plaintiffs' claims for interest.

The Ninth Circuit – somewhat surprisingly, given its reputation --  reversed. The State argued that because the Washington Court of Appeals held that the statute at issue didn't require the payment of interest, there was no "property" that was taken when the state officials kept the interest. If it ain't property under state law, the state argued, it ain't "property." 

Not quite, held the Ninth Circuit. Interest on principal is one of those "core" and "traditional" property rights that a state simply cannot disavow:  

There we observed that “constitutionally protected property rights can—and often do—exist despite statutes . . . that appear to deny their existence.” Citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Phillips, we noted that “a State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests long recognized under state law.” We then held that there is “a ‘core’ notion of constitutionally protected property into which state regulation simply may not intrude without prompting Takings Clause scrutiny.” This “core” is “defined by reference to traditional ‘background principles’ of property law.” In that case, we concluded that interest income earned on an interest-bearing account falls within this class of fundamental property rights. 

In short, while state law usually defines property, there are certain sticks that transcend a state's ability to redefine them out of existence. 

Before we move to Justice Bell and Stop the Beach Renourishment, let me say this. First, thank you to Lynda Butler for again asking me to be here. I’ve said before that being in this room is like being at the Super Bowl for property law. This is Yankee Stadium in October, the Champs Elysees or Wimbledon in July (although with the stellar talent in the room, I kind of feel like the poor sap up matched up with Venus Williams). Second, hearty congratulations to Professor Eagle. His regulatory takings treatise is one of those rare ones that is on what I call my “back” bookshelf. The books within reach when you turn around at your desk. A well-deserved recognition for your wonderful work and scholarship. 

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