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Hot Take On The Maui Clean Water Act Arguments (Protip: ARRIVE EARLY)

Protip for the public line for SCOTUS arguments: you have to get there really early. As in really early. Before 5 am early. Because that's the time that we, along with some of our William and Mary Law students (pictured above, after the arguments), arrived at 1 First Street NE to take up our place in line yesterday for the arguments in the Maui Clean Water Act case. And we were -- literally -- the very last allowed in for the full arguments. We roadtripped it from Williamsburg (more on that in a future post), meaning that we awoke long before 5am, leaving the law school at an ungodly hour. It would have been a shame to have taken all that effort, only to not get in. So heads-up line standers: get there early.

Why all this effort, you may ask? After all, you can read the transcript the same day, or listen to the recording at the end of the week. Why bother being there in person? To us, there's nothing like witnessing it firsthand to catch some of the nuances. And the spectacle of U.S. Supreme Court arguments. The protests, the media scrum, the big-time lawyering. It is especially critical for soon-to-be-lawyers to see great advocates (all three who argued were, in our opinion, excellent), and observe the very jurists whose opinions they have been reading and analyzing during law school live and in-person (especially in this age of Celebrity Justices). I sure wish I had the chance to do this during my law education. Williamsburg is just within reasonable striking range of DC, so we figured we should make the effort. This is the second time we've done this (Knick was the first), and we're convinced the effort is worth it. 

As for impressions of the substance of the arguments, we think its going to be a very close one. Even though it is not bold to predict a split Court in nearly any Supreme Court case, we think this one merits it. It all turns on the language of the Clean Water Act, and what does the term "from" mean. Really. The advocates proposed various analogies about what the term means, using whiskey flasks, punchbowls, groceries. And there were all sorts of probable and improbable hypotheticals from the bench.  

In the end, the conclusion we reached is that the statute isn't all that clear one way or the other about what it means in the situation presented here: is the pollutant in the Pacific Ocean "from" the County of Maui's treated effluent injection well even though it was transported from the well to the ocean by groundwater? Several Justices pretty clearly thought yes, while others thought no. Reasonable minds apparently can differ. Which to us means that this case may be resolved more on policy grounds than by classic statutory interpretation (if there is even such a thing).

Thus, some of the Justices were looking for middle ground (see Justice Breyer's suggestion of a new "functional equivalent" test), while others (the Chief Justice, and Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh) probing about "limiting principles" on the Respondent's argument that any after-the-fact traceability from a point source to a jurisdictional water was enough to trigger CWA liability. That's a tough hill to die on, given the nearly unfettered liability that is triggered, so we're thinking the inability to articulate a viable limitation on liability may push several Justices to reject the argument. With several Justices appearing to have their minds set (Kagan, Sotomayor, Alito, and (presumably) Thomas), we think Justice Kavanaugh is going to be the fulcrum on this one. 

Finally, what's interesting about this case is the ongoing state court dispute about whether it has been settled. Most of the time, courts are not made aware of ongoing settlement efforts. Here, however, the Court was told about the settlement (a letter that, interestingly, no longer appears on the docket). A Justice might reasonably think to themselves: how strong is the Respondent's argument if it is so desperate to settle, especially at this stage of the game? 

So although the case was submitted yesterday, this one isn't over. It might be settled. It might not. The Court may rule by June, or it might not. 

Transcript, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, No. 18-260 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2019) 

Cal App: Agency Has Power To Adjudicate Whether The Agency Itself Is Taking Property (Really)

Update 10/25/2019: an astute and seasoned correspondent writes that the issue of whether a property owner must raise constitutional issues in the administrative proceedings was settled in a published opinion that involved the same agency, the California Coastal Commission. See Healing v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n (1994) 22 Cal. App. 4th 1158 (we put in in California citation style just because) ("These [the takings questions] are questions for a court of law to decide at an evidentiary trial, not by mandamus review of an administrative record of proceedings where the parties' right to present evidence was limited by the very nature of the administrative process.").

Why the Coastal Commission doesn't know its own law, escapes us.  

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Hat tip to Benjamin Rubin at the California Eminent Domain Report for writing up a recent opinion issued by the California Court of Appeal, Greene v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. B293301 (Oct. 9, 2019).  

We won't repeat his detailed analysis, but are posting the opinion here only to point out what we think is a critical flaw in the court's ruling.  In sum, the court concluded that the California Coastal Commission was within its authority when it imposed a truncated setback as a condition of beachfront homeowners building an addition to their home. With what it concluded was substantial evidence to support the condition, the court affirmed. That part of the case really didn't attract our attention that much.  

What did get our spider sense tingling was the court's ruling on the homeowners' takings claim. The owners asserted that imposing the condition violated their right to just compensation. But the court didn't address the merits of the claim, concluding instead that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies because they had not presented the takings issue to the Commission. California law, according to the court, requires an appellant to have presented "the 'exact issue'" to the Commission in order to preserve it. After all, the Commission is entitled to notice that you think that their decision works a taking. The arguments the Greenes made before the Commission "did not give the Commission an opportunity to evaluate that issue." Slip op. at  13.

But wait, this is both an appeal from an administrative (as they call them in California, a writ of administrative mandate), as well as an original jurisdiction complaint, right? See slip op.at 4 ("On May 5, 2017, the Greenes filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to invalidate the five-foot setback condition.") How does an agency (the CCC isn't quite an executive branch agency as far as we can tell, but is one of those "fourth branch" hybrid agencies things) have any power to rule on issues of constitutional law? Especially its own actions? Only the courts may do that, so why is there any obligation for an administrative appellant to ask the agency itself not to act unconstitutionally? An agency's authority is limited to applying its enabling statute and its rules to the facts presented, not to determine whether its own actions are constitutional or not. Separation of powers, anyone? 

Benjamin's post asks a good question:

As such, you may be wondering if the result would have been different had the homeowners filed their takings claim in federal court as opposed to state court.  With the uptick in federal takings claims following the Supreme Court’s decision in Knick, we will likely get a definitive answer to that question in the near future.

A valid point. Especially true, given that it is hornbook law that you don't need to exhaust admin remedies in order to raise a § 1983 claim. The same reasons that animate that rule (the question of whether an agency has acted unconstitutionally isn't something that the agency itself can rule on) you'd think would apply with equal force under California law.  

Greene v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No. B293301 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2019) 

2019 Brigham-Kanner Conference: The New New Property - Public Resources And Private Rights

Here is a transcript of the remarks I delivered today at the 2019 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference. I was honored to join lawprof Henry Smith and Florida Supreme Court Justice (ret.) Ken Bell (who authored the Florida court's opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment which was challenged in SCOTUS as a "judicial taking") to speak about "Public Resources and Private Rights" (moderated by Professor Katherine Mims Crocker). After paying our respects to 2019 B-K Prize winner Professor Steven Eagle, we each addressed some part of the question.

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The New New Property

As always, I bring to you tidings of "aloha" from the state where the legislature thought it was a going to reduce the price of residential housing by taking fee simple interests from "A" and giving them to "B," the leaseholders. 

Where now, the median price for a single-family, two bedroom, one bath, single wall house hovers just shy of $800 grand. 

And the state where the legislature thought that limiting the amount of rent gas companies could charge to their franchisees would somehow magically translate into lower gas prices at the pump for consumers. 

Where now, the price of gas is close to the highest in the nation -- although sorry, Californians, you may have us beat -- at or near $4 bucks a gallon. 

And in what may be a case of one-out-of-three-ain't-bad (so you don't write us off completely), our modest little jurisdiction is also responsible for at least one Supreme Court decision that we as property advocates really appreciate -- Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) -- where the Court both affirmed that the right to exclude is one of those fundamental rights that is immune from interference by regulation unless first compensated, but also in one of the overlooked holdings of that case put in the context not of a fundamental right because it was recognized by state (Hawaii) law, but one sourced in the actions of Corps of Engineers personnel who had confirmed via a Section 10 Rivers and Harbors Act regulatory permit that Kaiser Aetna possessed the right to keep others out of the navigable marina it created:

While the consent of individual officials representing the United States cannot "estop" the United States, it can lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of "property" expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes over the management of the landowner's property.

I mention Kaiser Aetna because it is a good lead in to my portion of this panel, which is focusing on “Public Resources and Private Rights.” While we mostly speak of “property” as a private right, thanks in large part to our late colleague Charles Reich, whose place in the popular zeitgeist was secured by “The Greening of America,” but whom we lawyers will always remember as the author of the influential article “The New Property.” (And when I say "influential," I mean it is the most-cited article published by the Yale Law Journal. Ever.) 

That article got us to thinking about property in a different way: not exclusively as an instrument of private rights – most exemplified by the right to exclude – but as maybe something that looked a bit more like the commons. Things like government benefits, contracts, licenses, and in what may be the most famous instance, Board of Regents v. Roth, a government job. In that case a poor sap teaching at a state college who lacked tenure. (I feel your pain, brother.)

As we know the Court concluded that Professor Roth, who although he did not possess tenure, if he could show he possessed "new" property, could not be dismissed before the college conducted a hearing. In short, as what we might call Due Process Property. 

In the property rights context, we’ve seen similar rulings from the lower courts – most prominently the Second Circuit in Brody v. Port Chester (ask Dana Berliner about that one), the Tenth Circuit in M.A.K. Investment (before they declare your property blighted, they’ve got to tell you), and from my home court in Kellberg v. Yuen. 

How have government-granted or government-recognized “property” rights translated beyond the scope of individually-owned property? And can these Due Process property rights be translated to the language of takings-and-compensation property?

Two recent decisions highlight the differences. The first is from my home jurisdiction’s Supreme Court.

Now you might think that given the amount I give the business to my home court – Professor David Callies studied the opinions of our court over a 10 year time frame and revealed that it ruled in favor of environmental and similar plaintiffs nearly 90% of the time – that when our court issues a decision recognizing a new breed of “property” that I might rejoice. And it is a right that, as far as we can tell, no other court, state or federal, has ever recognized. 

The court concluded the Sierra Club possesses a constitutional property right in a "clean and healthful environment" entitling the organization to certain procedural protections under the state constitution’s due process of law clause. The ruling allowed the Club to intervene in a Public Utilities Commission petition regarding a power purchase agreement for a now-defunct electric plant on Maui. 

Here’s that again in case it didn't quite sink in: the court recognized a property right in a clean and healthful environment. 

Maui Electric filed an application with the State PUC, seeking the Commission's approval of an agreement between the utility and Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Company which, if approved, would allow a rate increase to account for the additional production charges associated with the Puunene Plant, a coal-powered facility on former sugar lands in central Maui which transformed bagasse, the byproduct of sugar production, into electric power. We use the past tense because by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, the plant had closed, following the recent closure of the sugar plantation. No sugar plantation, no sugar, no bagasse. 

Sierra Club asked the PUC to intervene in the administrative process under the PUC's rules, asserting its own rights as well as several of its Maui members. The power plant, the petition asserted, would "impact Sierra Club's members' health, aesthetic, and recreational interests. Sierra Club also asserted its organizational interest in reducing Hawaii's dependence on imported fossil fuels and advancing a clean energy grid." 

Pretty vague stuff, and to me, more like policy questions than something best resolved by an adjudicative proceeding, but under existing judicial standing rules in similar cases in original jurisdiction actions brought in Hawaii courts, nothing too far from the norm. We’re not subject to Article III standing requirements, and the Hawaii Supreme Court’s state standing doctrine can best be summarized as “come on in the water’s fine.”  There's little doubt that if this were a case brought in a Hawaii trial court, that Sierra Club adequately alleged judicial standing. Anyone questioning that conclusion need only recall the Superferry case in which the Hawaii Supreme Court held that Sierra Club had standing to raise an environmental challenge to the now-defunct inter-island ferry because the ferry threatened the organization with four types of injury: (1) endangered species could be adversely impacted by a high-speed ferry; (2) the Superferry could increase the introduction of alien species; (3) surfers, divers, and canoe paddlers who used a state operated harbor could conceivably suffer adverse impacts; and (4) the threat of increased traffic on the road next to the harbor entrance. Again, that's a pretty vague butterfly-effect logic to gain standing. But for better or worse, that's the current state of Hawaii's standing law. 

However, the Maui Electric case was not an original jurisdiction action, it was an administrative proceeding in the Commission under the PUC's admin rules, governed by a different standard, one based in the Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act. Under the APA, an outsider may intervene in a "contested case" (an quasi-judicial adjudicative administrative process) when an agency rule or a statute gives the party a seat at the table, or when intervention is required by law because the agency is adjudicating that party's rights (in this case, the law was the Hawaii Constitution's due process clause).

And here, the Sierra Club alleged both that PUC statutes and the Hawaii Constitution's procedural due process of law protections gave it the right to intervene in the agency proceedings: 

Sierra Club argued that its members were concerned that the Puunene Plant relied too heavily on coal in order to meet its power obligations under the existing agreement and also that its members were concerned "about the public health and visibility impacts of burning coal."

Neither the PUC nor the court of appeals bought the Sierra Club's theory. The Commission denied intervention and decided Maui Electric's application without the Club's presence. The Club appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals which agreed with Maui Electric and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It concluded that because Sierra Club was not "aggrieved" by the decision by the PUC (because it correctly excluded the Club from the admin case), the appellate court did not have jurisdiction.

So up to the Hawaii Supreme Court they went, on the same two theories: the Club should have been allowed to intervene, either because the PUC's governing statutes gave it the right to do so, or because due process required it because the Club's property was at stake in the PUC proceeding. After rejecting a claim of mootness, three of our five justices got to the constitutional question: does the Hawaii Constitution recognize Sierra Club's environmental concerns as a property interest entitling it to procedural due process?

The majority based its conclusion on Article XI, section 9 of the Hawaii Constitution (a provision added by the 1978 constitutional convention):

Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality, including control of pollution and conservation, protection and enhancement of natural resources. Any person may enforce this right against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.

That, the majority held, created a legitimate claim of entitlement to a clean and healthful environment, and thus it is a property right. It "is a substantive right guaranteed to each person." The majority noted that the court had earlier held that Native Hawaiian rights -- a right also found in the Hawaii Constitution -- are "property" rights, and that environmental concerns are no different. As a self-executing right, it is a legitimate entitlement --

We therefore conclude that HRS Chapter 269 is a law relating to environmental quality that defines the right to a clean and healthful environment under article XI, section 9 by providing that express consideration be given to reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the decision-making of the Commission. Accordingly, we hold that Sierra Club has established a legitimate claim of entitlement to a clean and healthful environment under article XI, section 9 and HRS Chapter 269.

After reaching the conclusion that Sierra Club owns property in a clean and healthful environment, it was all over but the shouting and the majority held by applying the Professor Roth test, that the PUC had a duty to provide a hearing before it deprived the Club of its property:

The risks of an erroneous deprivation are high in this case absent the protections provided by a contested case hearing, particularly in light of the potential long-term impact on the air quality in the area, the denial of Sierra Club’s motion for intervention or participation in the proceeding, and the absence of other proceedings in which Sierra Club could have a meaningful opportunity to be heard concerning HC&S’s performance of the Agreement.

Finally, in a footnote, the majority made it clear that the result is immune from future legislative tinkering. This is a ruling based on the Hawaii Constitution, and thus no mere legislature can mess with it too much. 

Two justices disagreed, arguing this was a stretch, and one of those Pandora’s Box situations:

Respectfully, the Majority’s expansive interpretation of what constitutes a protected property interest in these circumstances may have unintended consequences in other contexts, such as statutes where the legislature has mandated consideration of specific factors by executive agencies when implementing a statute.

The dissent concluded the majority's result was unnecessary, because it was more of a policy choice than a judicial decision, and ultimately, if denied administrative intervention in the PUC, Sierra Club could deploy the loose standing rules which we mentioned earlier in this post, and institute an original jurisdiction action.

So is this property, New Property, or what we might call New New Property? 

The biggest question I have about the majority's conclusion is this: if the most fundamental aspect of owning "property" is the right to exclude others from the res, how in the world do members of the public have the right to exclude other members of the public from a clean and healthful environment? 

As the U.S. Supreme Court held in the aforementioned Kaiser Aetna, and Nollan "[w]e have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, 'the right to exclude [others is] 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'' (Or maybe Stevie Wonder said it better when he sang "this is mine, you can't take it.") 

Either way, the ability to keep others off of what you own -- and have the law back you up -- is one of the defining sticks in the bundle of rights which we call property.

Thus, I don’t think the court adequately grappled with the real foundational question built into the arguments -- should these types of environmental concerns even be shoehorned into the concept of "property" as that term has been used for thousands of years? Doesn't "property" as used in the Hawaii Constitution's due process clause mean private property? After all, as far as we can tell, every other time this court has dealt with property in Hawaii's due process clause, it has either expressly defined, or implicitly assumed, that the property interest at stake was private property, and not a right that looks more like something "owned" collectively by everyone. Essentially what the majority accomplished was a subtle redefinition of property from a private right to a public resource. 

So what’s on the horizon? I’m thinking the second shoe to drop is going to be "public trust" rights. As Professor Callies has written on the Hawaii form of the public trust which goes well beyond the Roman and English concepts, if the notion of public property is extended to the public trust, there’s a danger that this background principle could well eclipse – or indeed swallow up completely – the notion of private property. 

And our court is just one vote shy of concluding that Native Hawaiian rights – a form of cultural property – qualify as constitutional property.  Australia’s High Court has recently concluded that the property rights first recognized in the Mabo v. Queensland decision lead to a requirement for compensation when those rights were expropriated. Real money, even if it is Australian dollars. And since we’re here in the south what does the recognition of cultural property mean for things like those troublesome Confederate monuments that sit there on courthouse lawns (and across the street from certain law schools)? Is there a cultural property right for them to remain, or to be paid compensation to leave? 

As if responding to the Hawaii Supreme Court, the following year, the DC Circuit – applying Pennsylvania’s similar constitutional provision – came to the opposite conclusion. 

The court held that the Pennsylvania Constitution's Environmental Rights Amendment's guarantee of "clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic [sic] values of the environment" was not a liberty or property interest triggering the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections. 

The case was a challenge by Riverkeeper to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's enabling statute, which requires FERC to recover its costs from the industries it regulates. Riverkeeper asserted this makes it more likely that FERC will approve pipelines. 

The court first concluded that Riverkeeper had standing. And it quickly dismissed its claim to possess a liberty interest because the ERA's rights are not "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," and "the right to a healthy environment can[not] itself fairly be described as a 'liberty' interest." 

The court subjected Riverkeeper's "property" claim to a bit more analysis. State law defines property, and Pennsylvania's ERA "guarantees" certain things, and even calls them "rights." The court concluded, however, that the ERA's rights are "vague and indeterminate." Slip op. at 8. And the rights it recognizes do not have "some acertainable monetary value."  Most importantly, the question is whether the rights look like "any traditional conception of property."

The court held that because the ERA recognizes the rights as belonging to "the people," it failed this latter test:

Most importantly, the Environmental Rights Amendment creates no right to exclude—or anything like it. To the contrary, its first sentence vests the single “right” at issue collectively in “[t]he people,” its second sentence confirms that “Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people,” and its third sentence requires the Commonwealth to conserve and maintain environmental resources “for the benefit of all the people.” Moreover, although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the Amendment is judicially enforceable by private individuals, it has also confirmed that the right the Amendment creates is shared equally by all Pennsylvanians.

In other words, no Pennsylvanian may exclude any other from the right to clean air, pure water, and a preserved environment. So, the Amendment protects not private property rights, but public goods. In that respect, it is like “the right that we all possess to use the public lands”—which for due-process purposes “is not the ‘property’ right of anyone.”

The court concluded that "[t]he amendment is unlike traditional or even new property in yet other respects. For one thing, the right to a preserved environment cannot be bought or sold—and thus has no 'ascertainable monetary value,' as the Supreme Court’s 'property-as-entitlement cases have implicitly required.'"

So which is it, and maybe more critically what defines “property?” State law, notions of natural law or fundamental rights?

On that, I’d like to touch on one more recent decision, which will naturally lead us into a discussion of one of my favorite metaphysical law cases, Stop the Beach Renourishment (yes, we’re going to dive into judicial takings in a moment).

This is a case from the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that state officials failed "to return interest that was allegedly skimmed from their state-managed retirement accounts." The District Court denied class action status and granted the State summary judgment, concluding the case was "potentially unripe" because the State had not finished the process of administrative rulemaking, which might, in the court's view, address the plaintiffs' claims for interest.

The Ninth Circuit – somewhat surprisingly, given its reputation --  reversed. The State argued that because the Washington Court of Appeals held that the statute at issue didn't require the payment of interest, there was no "property" that was taken when the state officials kept the interest. If it ain't property under state law, the state argued, it ain't "property." 

Not quite, held the Ninth Circuit. Interest on principal is one of those "core" and "traditional" property rights that a state simply cannot disavow:  

There we observed that “constitutionally protected property rights can—and often do—exist despite statutes . . . that appear to deny their existence.” Citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Phillips, we noted that “a State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests long recognized under state law.” We then held that there is “a ‘core’ notion of constitutionally protected property into which state regulation simply may not intrude without prompting Takings Clause scrutiny.” This “core” is “defined by reference to traditional ‘background principles’ of property law.” In that case, we concluded that interest income earned on an interest-bearing account falls within this class of fundamental property rights. 

In short, while state law usually defines property, there are certain sticks that transcend a state's ability to redefine them out of existence. 

Before we move to Justice Bell and Stop the Beach Renourishment, let me say this. First, thank you to Lynda Butler for again asking me to be here. I’ve said before that being in this room is like being at the Super Bowl for property law. This is Yankee Stadium in October, the Champs Elysees or Wimbledon in July (although with the stellar talent in the room, I kind of feel like the poor sap up matched up with Venus Williams). Second, hearty congratulations to Professor Eagle. His regulatory takings treatise is one of those rare ones that is on what I call my “back” bookshelf. The books within reach when you turn around at your desk. A well-deserved recognition for your wonderful work and scholarship. 

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Anthony Palazzolo Drives His Property

Check this out. What at first appears to be something along the lines of the grainy Zapruder film (this particular piece was recorded on video, not film, and certainly well before the days of high-res camera phones that we now take for granted) is an important piece of takings history.

It is (the late) Anthony Palazzolo driving his famous "wetlands" property, recorded after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in his favor in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).

Dwight Merriam, who graciously provided the raw footage, became Tony Palazzolo's friend after interviewing him for an article Dwight was writing on the Supreme Court decision, and they frequently met, dined together, and conversed as Palazzolo's matter continued on remand. Dwight recorded this video from the back seat of Palazzolo's car. In the front is John Boehnert of Providence, another longtime friend of Dwight's and a preeminent Rhode Island land use and coastal law lawyer, author of the ABA book "Zoning the Oceans."

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)

Friday Round-Up: California Inverse Condemnation, Lawprof Epstein Litigates Public Trust, Property In Ecology, And More

Here's what we're reading this Friday:

• Plaintiffs Cannot Bring Inverse Condemnation Claims Before a Public Agency Makes a Final Determination on Allowable Development - California Land Use & Development Law Report
• One reason for the high cost of housing in California may surprise you — overregulation - Los Angeles Times (Barista's note: is anyone surprised at all by this?) 
• Law Prof Richard Epstein to Lead Challenge of Obama Center in Jackson Park - Chicago Maroon
• Property in Ecology - PERC
• Black People’s Land Was Stolen - New York Times Opinion
• Injunctions Give Teeth to Property Rights - Human Events
• In a Turnabout, SCOTUS Now Says Federal Takings Claims are Ripe When the Government Fails to Compensate Property Owners - Sarah Beachy (Axley) 
• Update on the Preakness Takings Case - Ilya Somin (Volokh Conspiracy)
• It would be cheaper to buy coastal homes than to keep fighting nature, new report says - Raleigh News & Observer
• A Quiet Revolution In Property Rights - Richard Epstein (Defining Ideas)

Check 'em out. 

Thursday Round Up: Hawaii Water Law, "New" Property, The Edge Denied!

Here's what we're reading today:

• New Ruling In Maui Water Case Still Doesn’t Resolve Old Dispute (Honolulu Civil Beat) - about the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals' recent unpublished memorandum opinion in a long-ongoing water law fight on Maui. The long and the short of it is the court held that whether a short-term license from the State to use water (month-to-month, max one-year as the statute requires) is "temporary" or not (these licenses have been renewed for 18 years to allow the administrative process to be completed) is a factual question that can be resolved by summary judgment. Court held no. In our view, these things operate much like preliminary injunctions, which although they are temporary in nature, can stretch out for quite a long time while the wheels of justice grind. Cert application to the Hawaii SCT coming, for sure. Any guesses on which way this will come out: Native Hawaiian plaintiffs, water law, 18 years is "temporary?" 
• Looking Back: Charles Reich and His Era (Walter Olson at Cato) - noting the death of Professor Charles Reich, author of the influential Yale Law Review article on "new property." A topic we've hit up from time to time. 
• 'He's finished!' U2 guitarist The Edge's dreams of building $100million family compound on an untouched Malibu mountainside are shattered after he loses a 14-YEAR legal battle (Daily Mail) - In what may be the last chapter of a case we've been following (see California Coastal Development in a Nutshell: Hire Jesus - Moses, Actually - To Sell Your Luxe Home Plans, and Become One With the Mountain), the California Supreme Court denied review of the case, meaning that even a woke rock star can't develop in California.

The Ocean May Be Subject To The Public Trust, But Private Owners Own The Seaweed

We recommend you pick up the opinion of Maine's Supreme Judicial Court in Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., No. Was-17-142 (Mar. 28, 2019), because it deals with property rights in an area subject to the public trust. We think the court did a pretty good job of setting out the competing claims and the background of the oft-misunderstood public trust doctrine. 

The issue was whether the public (in this instance, Acadian Seaplants) has the right under the jus publicum to harvest living rockweed, a seaweed which anchors itself to "the rocky ledges that accent [Maine]'s coastline." Slip op. at 1.

Specifically, we are asked to determine whether rockweed is private property that belongs to the adjoining upland landowner who owns the intertidal soil in fee simple, or property that is held in trust by the State through the jus publicum for the public to harvest.

Id.

The court concluded that "rockweed in the intertidal zone belongs to the upland property owner and therefore is not public property, is not held in trust by the State for public use, and cannot be harvested by members of the public as a matter of right." Slip op. at 2. The court summarized the public trust law this way:

In short, the English common law tradition vested both “title” to and “dominion” over the intertidal zone in the crown. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894). Title—the jus privatum—belonged to the crown “as the sovereign” but was held subject to the public’s rights of “navigation,” “commerce,” and “fishing”—the jus publicum—which the crown held in trust for the public. Id. After the American colonies gained independence, the ownership of intertidal land devolved to the particular state where the intertidal area was located. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988); Shively, 152 U.S. at 14-15; State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 78-79, 72 A. 875 (1909).

Slip op. at 7.

Private property rights are recognized in certain areas of the shoreland. In the intertidal zone -- as contrasted to land below the mean high water mark (which is public), and the dry sand beach (which is private) -- the land is privately owned, but not absolutely. It is "subject to certain public rights." Id. at 9.

Read the opinion (pages 12-18) for the reasons why the court concluded -- due to the nature of rockweed, and the "specialized equipment and skiffs required to harvest in in this area -- the right to harvest it belongs to the private upland owners. Overall, the rockweed harvesting did not really look like the usual activities (fishing, navigation) that are done in the water. The court balanced the competing interests, concluding that "Acadian’s activity is qualitatively similar to other uses of the intertidal zone that we have held are outside of the public trust doctrine." Slip op. at 21. 

This opinion is a good read because it shows that mere invocations of the public trust should not be enough to completely discount private property rights. The public trust doctrine, after all, is supposed to be about protecting activities undertaken, and not ownership qua ownership. Check it out.  

Ross v. Acadian Seaplants, Ltd., No. Was-17-142 (Maine Mar. 28, 2019)

Webinar Today - Low Income Populations: Underrepresented Socially, Overrepresented as Victims of Natural Disasters

Later today (starting at 1pm ET), our colleague Edward Thomas is chairing an ABA-produced webinar on "Low Income Populations: Underrepresented Socially, Overrepresented as Victims of Natural Disasters: Using the Law to Solve a Serious Problem."

As in other areas of life, when natural disasters strike, it is often the owners of modest means who are the hardest hit. Floods, wildfires, sea level rise, you name it. And Ed has been there: he's a former FEMA guy, and currently the President of the Natural Hazard Mitigation Association who understands that property rights have to be respected in these situations. 

Find out more information about the program and register here. 

New Amicus Brief In SCOTUS Hawaii Case: Takings Is About Denial Of *Use* Not Whether Property Has Value

Would you pay, say $10 for an undeveloped Maui beachfront parcel that is zoned for hotel and residential purposes, but currently is not developable because the County in the past wanted to condemn the land and turn it into a public park (but then ran out of money)?

In furtherance of its acquisition plan, the County changed the parcel's Community Plan (known as a "general plan" in most jurisdictions) designation to "park." But it never amended the Hotel zoning, which allows lesser intensive uses such as single-family homes. But then the County didn't have enough money -- beachfront property, it turns out, was (and is) a lot more spendy than the government appraisers thought -- so it never actually acquired the land. But having downplanned the parcel in order to take it, it never bothered uplanning it when it couldn't: the County never reverted the CP designation to its former state, but instead left the "park" designation in place.

Which resulted in a land bank, because under Hawaii law an application for use of the land and development permits (or even things like confirmation that development doesn't need any discretionary permits) cannot even be processed by the County planning agency unless both the zoning and the CP are "consistent." And here, Hotel zoning is not "consistent" with the CP park designation. End result: no development unless and until the County amends the CP park designation, which it is not inclined to do. Why should it, after all? No development or use allowed is just about as good as having a park there, with the added benefit that they don't have to bother paying for it. 

So going back to our initial question: would you pay something to step into the shoes of the property owner in this story? It could be a good deal: maybe, just maybe, some time in the indeterminate future, the County just might change those use prohibitions, and let whomever owns the property then actually do something with it, true? Why not take a chance? 

We'd bet that a lot of people might take that bet and pay $10 to roll the dice. And might pay even more. No present use, but hey, maybe some value. In the Hawaii Supreme Court's words, the owners could "hold it for a period of time, and as it increases in value and depending on [their] strategy and financial objectives, sell it for profit."  And that, the court concluded, was a use. Because someone might pay for it. Thus, the court held there was no regulatory taking because the owner retained what the court called "investment use."

Welcome to newspeak, takings edition. 

The property owner, as we mentioned in this post, has challenged the Hawaii Supreme Court's ruling, by asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case.

Last week, a coalition of those who believe that in Lucas and other decisions, the Court held that takings doctrine is based on deprivation of use -- and not simply value (after all, what doesn't have some value or "investment use?") -- filed an amici brief which argues:

This case raises two important issues that have divided the lower federal courts and state courts of last resort in the quarter century since Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The petition first asks whether any residual value in a parcel of property that is rendered unbuildable by regulation will defeat a categorical total takings claim. If so, the petition asks to what extent the courts should consider any residual value when evaluating a total takings claim. Review by this Court is necessary to provide much needed stability and uniformity in takings law. As the law stands right now, a property owner’s right to obtain compensation for a categorical taking varies depending upon seemingly irrelevant factors, such as the property’s location. Constitutional rights should not be subject to such uncertainty and uneven application.

Br. at 5.

Stay tuned for further. 

Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, Cato Institute, Owners' Counsel, et al., Leone v. County o..

ALI-CLE 2019 Eminent Domain And Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Palm Springs Agenda - Register Now!

You've known for a while that Palm Springs, California, specifically the Renaissance Palm Springs Hotel (a resort facility, but right in town, so you will have many options for "off campus" activities like art museums, the aerial tram, golf, and whatever suits your fancy, and close-in to the Palm Springs Airport), is the venue for our 2019 ALI-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation, January 24 through 26, 2019.

Of course, you also knew that the programming would be the usual spread of topical and cutting-edge topics, presented by some of the nation's experts. But we didn't give you the details. So here are some of the programs we're having: 

• Keynote Address: "Property Rights: Foundation for a Free Society" - Taylor Revley, most recently the past President of the College of William and Mary, and also former law school Dean (as well as a long-time leader of one of Virginia's most prominent private firms) will deliver the keynote. We're very lucky to have secured his participation, and his talk will focus on both the practical and the theoretical.
• Relocation: we're doing two separate panels on relocation issues. This is a growing area that many of us unfortunately overlook. No longer -- here's your chance to find out the latest: "How to Work Through a Complicated Relocation, From A to Z: Making it Happen" and "Mass Relocation and Navigating Cultural Conflicts: Displacement of Immigrant and Refugee Communities."
• "Knick of Time: A First Look at the Supreme Court's Revisit of Ripeness: Are Takings State or Federal?" We look at the arguments and the Court's opinion in the case that may upend Williamson County ripeness in regulatory and inverse cases against local governments (which may be issued by January).
• "Earth, Wind, (Water) and Fire: A Report From the Front Lines of the Flood and Wildfire Inverse Cases." Flood, wildfire, and other inverse cases present big issues, nationwide. 
• Loss of Access and Damages: How to Prove Just Compensation"
• "Palazzolo, Preexisting Regulations, and Reasonable Likelihood of a Regulatory Takings Judgment as Elements of Just Compensation." Hear directly from the source how you can present the case when preexisting regulations are claimed to depress the market value of land. 
• "Eminent Domain and Property Rights in the Popular Media: How to Respond to Misconceptions and Urban Legends."  Eminent domain and takings stories in the media and social platforms are rife with misinformation. How do you correct the record? 
• Two programs on the hot pipeline issue: the first focuses on challenges to the power to take and environmental and regulatory challenges, while the second is about "Compensation Pitfalls: How to Avoid Problems."
• "Run for the Border: Fence and Wall Condemnations." The idea of building a barrier along the southern border has burst on the headlines - what do you as a takings lawyer need to know?
• "Fight the Power: The Impact and the Valuation of Power Lines in Partial Takings" - takings for energy corridors continue to dominate; find out how this might affect value from lawyers, engineers, and scholars. 

And more (including an Ethics session for those of you who need the MCLE credits).  And the usual 101 track, for those new to the practice, or for experienced lawyers looking for a refresher.

As planning chairs, we've made a special effort to include on the faculty speakers from different backgrounds: property owner lawyers, condemning agency lawyers, right of way professionals, academics, engineers, relocation experts, and appraisers. We think you will like the line up.  

The full agenda, along with the speakers, will be published shortly by ALI-CLE. We'll announce it here, when ready. 

But don't wait, register now here. Early registration and group discounts available. 

Also: we have settled on the 2020 venue, and will make the announcement in Palm Springs. You asked for this venue, and we're bringing it to you!

Earlier this year, we had a fantastic conference in Charleston. Sold out. Attendees reported having a great time, and learning a lot. Our aim is to build and grow the Conference, and you joining us in Palm Springs is another step in that direction.

Ping me if you have questions. 

From The "Be Careful What You Wish For" Department: California May Take Beach Easement

According to this story ("California moves closer to taking public pathway from billionaire Vinod Khosla") in the Santa Cruz Sentinel, the State of California is considering exercising eminent domain to take an easement for public access over his San Mateo County property to access Martins Beach. 

This is the case that resulted in a cert petition after the California Court of Appeal ordered the owner to open up the route to the beach across private property which the previous owner had kept available to the public, but which Khosla closed. As we noted in this post ("Our Unfiled* Amicus In The California Beach Access Case"), the case involves an effort to open back up an access route to the beach across what is now Khosla's land, simply because his predecessor allowed access (no good deed goes unpunished). After Khosla purchased and closed access, the Surfrider Foundation went to court and obtained an order compelling him to allow public access. 

After the California Supreme Court denied review, the owner sought U.S. Supreme Court review, asserting that the California Court of Appeal's decision to open the parcel to the public until such time the owner obtains a permit to "allow" him to close it "is a per se physical taking" because it takes his right to exclude the public from his land. 

The article sets out the story, along with the usual not-quite-correct facts that often color the narrative in beach cases (i.e., "[a] state agency is moving closer toward forcing Silicon Valley billionaire Vinod Khosla to permanently open Martins Beach in San Mateo County to the public..."). Not quite: the beach has always been public, it's the access across his land that is at issue. Anyhow, please do read the entire piece.

Two bits stuck out at us:  

"The State Lands Commission appraised a public right-of-way over the 6.4 acres of Martins Beach Road at $360,000 in 2016. But Khosla said he would only sell it for $30 million, nearly as much as he paid for the entire property." Just comp and damages of $360k seems on the low side to us, and got us to wondering whether the State has taken a realistic look at how much this might cost the public were the property condemned. Not only would the State have to pay the cost of the land acquired, but also the damages to the remainder. And those could be huge. After all what's the value of an isolated beachfront property vs. a beachfront property with an adjacent public pathway, one that is apparently quite popular? The delta seems like a lot more than $360k, or some portion thereof.

And that's related to our second point: an exercise of eminent domain won't make Khosla's arguments about his right to exclude go away: "Sources familiar with the case have said that the commission may be wary of using eminent domain because, if Khosla loses his ongoing legal battles, it would be paying for something the public might otherwise get for free, and setting a precedent with other wealthy coastal landowners. Others, however, believe that taking the access route now might render Khosla’s legal challenges moot because he would no longer own the rights to the road." In our view, that would simply shift Khosla's right to exclude argument from his cert petition to the valuation trial. He'd still argue, we'd bet, that he has the right to exclude the public from the accessway, and therefore the compensation award must take that into account when assessing severance damages to the remainder. 

We've been through a few similar cases, involving the taking of portions of littoral property for public access to a public beach. And in none of these cases has the condemning agency ever realistically assessed the severance damages wrought on the remainder, and the loss of value caused by having a public pedestrian highway plopped next to your property. 

Tuesday Reading List - Flood Takings, Cuba Property, Beach Access, And ... Space Aliens

Here's what we are reading (or listening to) this Tuesday:

• Richard Epstein's podcast on "Is it a Taking When the Government Floods Your House?" (Federalist Society)
• Teaching takings: Professor Stephen R. Miller on Contemporary Issues in Teaching Land Use: Question 8: Hot Topics in Takings (lawprof blawg)
• "Communist-run Cuba to recognize private property in new constitution" (Reuters)
• "What if You Owned a Beach but Weren't Allowed to Get to It?" asks the New York Times. The answer, it seems, is that you deserve it (a concept with which we have no beef), and therefore should get it for free. Call us crazy, but how about condemning and paying for an easement, including severance to the remainder...maybe that would work? 
• "Careful Judge - That Condemnation is Constitutionally Protected" - our New York colleague Mike Rikon reminds us of a concept that is often overlooked: "A condemnation proceeding is not like private litigation. A condemnation claim is the enforcement of a constitutional mandate that just compensation be paid."  
• Colleague Sheldon Gilbert has this tweetstorm on one of the more ridiculous applications of the "rational basis" test, one that came our way via a law review article from Professor Kanner. In short, space aliens might be responsible for legislation, and that's good enough under the RBT. Includes a link to the Ninth Circuit oral arguments. 

Links And Materials From Today's Transportation Research Board Session

Here are the cases and other items I either spoke about or mentioned at today's Transportation Research Board's 57th Annual Workshop on Transportation Law in Cambridge, Massachusetts:

• The Colorado public use cases: public use vs. public purpose: Lafayette and Carousel Farms
• On the Supreme Court docket: Violet Dock Port (SCOTUS, Louisiana)
• The Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling on valuation of a unique property (replacement cost vs fair market value)
• "New" property vs. "old" property - environmental rights as "property" (CADC, Hawaii)
• Tribal immunity from eminent domain (CA10, cert denied)
• Public can use the electricity produced, not the land taken (but that's good       enough) (SD)
• Utility takings: Claremont (Cal), Missoula (Montana)
• Post-Kelo statutes: how effective? (Georgia)
• The relationship between condemnation and inverse: Stimson (NC)
• Inverse vs. tort, part II: MR/GO and Katrina flooding (CAFED)
• Maryland: government inaction could result in inverse liability (Maryland)
• Objecting to eminent domain is a political opinion (CA9)
• Highest and Best Use could include "conceptual plans" (Florida)
• Causing a nonprofit to lose even more money is considered compensable "goodwill" under California law (California)
• Billboard valuation - loss of income isn't compensable, but there is more that one way to still get it (NC)
• Larger parcel, quick take deposit (Hawaii)
• Here's the amicus brief we filed in the above case, which cites Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 391, 395 (1st Cir.) (condemnation on island of Vieques caused severance damages to parcels on Puerto Rico), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 772 (1944).
• Federal Relocation Act, inverse condemnation, and attorney fees  (West Virginia)
• The larger parcel in inverse cases (aka the "denominator" issue) (SCOTUS)
• Bye bye, Williamson County? (SCOTUS)
• Palazzolo applied (NY)
• Judicial Takings Redux - Martin's Beach (SCOTUS)

Thanks to my fellow speakers -- Bernadette Duran-Brown and Laura Curry -- and to the organizers of the Conference for asking me to be here. 

Land Use Institute - Detroit

We're in Detroit the rest of the week at the Mercy Law School for the venerable Land Use Institute, now in its 32nd iteration.

Planning Chair Frank Schnidman has assembled a great faculty including out Detroit colleague Alan Ackerman (above, talking about takings liability for flooding), and we'll be spending the time talking inverse condemnation, public trust, planning law, homelessness, autonomous vehicles, affordable housing, RULIPA, and similar topics. We'll be presenting on "Eminent Domain, Vested Rights, and Regulatory Takings," "Client Representation: Developer, Government, and Citizens Groups," and "Federal Laws Affecting Local Land Use Decision Making." 

If you are here with us in Detroit, stop by and say hello. If you aren't here, shame on you! This is one of the best and most affordable tuition deals in CLE.

But all kidding aside, if you are not in Detroit now, be sure to calendar these two dates:

• 2018 Land Use Institute: April 11-12, 2019, Baltimore, MD (Royal Sonesta Harbor Court Hotel)
• 2020 Land Use Institute: April 23-24, 2020, Tampa, FL (Le Meridien Tampa)

Reserve the dates!

Our Unfiled* Amicus Brief In The California Beach Access Case

We're not going to be filing an amicus brief in support of the petition for cert in the case involving Martin's Beach on the Northern California coast. Masters of the Universe like Paul Clement and his team hardly need help from the kids in the back row.*

The case has been getting a lot of press, first in Northern California where it is a bit of a cause célèbre, and now nationally, with pieces like this article from the Los Angeles Times ("With Supreme Court challenge, tech billionaire could dismantle beach access rights — and a landmark coastal law"). Besides, the poor signal-to-noise ratio in beach cases (as we've written before) often makes hoping for a rational result futile. But the way the LA Times article framed the case (uber rich guy is trying to blow up your beach access!) made us want to point out a couple of things that did not make their way into in the cert petition.

Before we do so, first recall that the issue in the case is "[w]hether a compulsory public-access easement of indefinite duration is a per se physical taking." But wait, you say, this case is Property Owner, Petitioner vs. Surfrider Foundation, Respondent. Surfrider, last we checked, was a private organization and does not have the power of eminent domain, so how can this case involve a taking?

Because the essence of the petition is that this is a judicial taking.

Now before your run fleeing into the wilderness at the mere mention of judicial takings -- after all, how much wood could a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood? -- bear with us. We know the petition doesn't mention the phrase "judicial taking" directly, and only talks about it indirectly (see Pet. 26-27). We guess this is probably intentional, and a wise move. The last thing the Justices probably look forward to wading into is a doctrinally messy judicial takings case. (Is there any other kind?)

Well yes, this kind. As we pointed out in a post-Stop the Beach Renourishment article, the posture of this case is exactly the kind of case in which the question of "judicial takings" is squarely presented. The Martin's Beach case reminds us of our old favorite, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), where the appeal (yes, appeal) to the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that the California Supreme Court's decision holding shopping centers were a traditional forum for speech was a taking of the PruneYard's right to exclude.

Same here, where the property owner is asserting that the California Court of Appeal's decision to open the parcel to the public until such time the owner obtains a permit to "allow" him to close it "is a per se physical taking." In short, we think this is a great case in which the Court could confirm what to us is the least controversial aspect of the "judicial takings" canon: that when a court makes a ruling that is alleged to have taken property, the owners' remedy includes invalidation of the judicial act, and not only an award of just compensation. The easiest judicial takings case, like every other takings case, is the one where physical invasion is the result. 

Now that we have that out of the way, here are the two items which were not featured in the petition.

First, under California law, an owner doesn't need the government's permission to exercise her right to exclude. If it were not clear enough from the common law, California statutes say so. California Civil Code § 654, presented for your consideration:

The ownership of a thing is the right of one or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In this Code, the thing of which there may be ownership is called property.

Now, we wish we had remembered this, but fortunately a California colleague pointed it out. One of the reasons we like doing this is that we learn something new every day. 

Second, since California property owners have the right to exclude others from their land (something which the courts below recognized), does it make any difference that the prohibition on excluding the public might be "temporary" or "permanent?" The courts below found that that made all the difference, because only permanent takings are physical takings. (We thought this article rebutted that argument pretty well.)

Putting that aside for the moment, our view is that another of old favorites, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), is very relevant here. Recall that there, the Court was asked whether the landowners' acceptance of a Corps of Engineers' section 10 dredge and fill permit, and physically connecting a private navigable waterway to the ocean, was enough to say that the owner had somehow surrendered the right to exclude. The majority held that they weren't, and reconfirmed that the right to exclude is a fundamental part of what it means to "own" something. And government-sanctioned trespassing without first taking property isn't any less of a constitutional violation just because there may be a "pull date" on the trespass, or the chance that in the future, the right to exclude may be restored. And isn't there always the possibility that an invasion won't last forever, something we pointed out in this brief in Arkansas Game & Fish, where we wrote that this is a question of compensation, not the threshold question of whether there's been a taking:

Thus, the government cannot avoid liability for a taking when it floods property simply by asserting that it did not intend for the invasion to be permanent. Temporal metaphysics are less important than the actual permanent damage and deprivation of use inflicted by an invasion.

As long as the property is damaged for a length of time, that's good enough.

As an aside, the unusual situation in Kaiser Aetna repeated itself a few years later and resulted in a Ninth Circuit decision which affirmed the principle that the right to exclude is fundamental. See Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1991), where the government argued that the public's right to navigate upon a waterway predated private ownership and lay "dormant" after the property became nonnavigable, and thus any interference with right to exclude was merely temporary. Same reasoning, same result as in Kaiser Aetna.   

Should the Supreme Court grant cert in the Martin's Beach case? You now know what our answer is. 

---------

*Any other reason for not filing a brief, you ask? No time, brothers and sisters, no time. Otherwise, we'd be there. 

32nd Annual Land Use Institute: Detroit, April 19-20, 2018

Mark your calendars, plan to come: Detroit, April 19-20, 2018. For what is perhaps the best deal in CLE (tuition as low as $400), the 32d Annual Land Use Institute, sponsored by our section of the ABA, the Section of State and Local Government Law.

The venue is the Detroit Mercy School of Law, and the conference hotel is the historic Westin Book Cadillac in downtown Detroit. The Land Use Institute is being held in conjunction with the Section's Spring State and Local Law Conference. Register for one conference, and you are free to move between sessions (no additional registration fees).

Planning Chairs Frank Schnidman and Dean Patrica Salkin have assembled an excellent faculty and program for the two days. Topics include: "Nuts and Bolts of Land Use Practice: Vested Rights and Regulatory Takings," "Public-Private Partnerships," "Climate Change and Resilient Development," "Client Representation: Developer, Government and Citizen Groups," "Housing Supply and Affordability: Planning Alternatives and Legal Consequences," and "Community Benefits Agreements, Environmental Justice and Access to Housing." The Annual Richard Babcock Keynote Address will be by Wendie Kellington, "The Role of Planning and Law in Solving Homelessness." Complete agenda is posted here.

Other featured speakers: Dennis Archer, former Detroit Mayor (and Past President of the American Bar Association); Neisen Kasdin, former Mayor of the City of Miami Beach; Jared Fleischer, Quicken Loans; and Maurice D. Cox, Director, Planning & Development, City of Detroit. And, as always, a renown national faculty of land use law practitioners, scholars, jurists, and public officials. 

Come and join us in the reborn City of Detroit, where there's a lot to do and see.

New Cert Petition: Beach Access, Temporary And Permanent Takings, And Permits To Exercise The Right To Exclude

Here's the cert petition, filed today by SCOTUS superstar Paul Clement in a case we've been following out of Northern California.

Here are the Questions Presented:

This case involves a stretch of private property along the California coast known as Martins Beach. The California Coastal Commission and the County of San Mateo want Martins Beach to be open to the public, but they do not want to pay to purchase the property, or even for an easement. Instead, they have taken the position that the owner of the property cannot exclude the public unless it first obtains a permit deemed necessary for any change, including a decrease, in the “intensity” of the public’s use of or access to the ocean under the California Coastal Act. In their view, because the previous owner of Martins Beach chose to allow members of the public to access the property upon payment of a fee, the current owner must do so as well—and on the exact same terms, no less—unless and until it obtains a permit allowing it to do otherwise.

Respondent Surfrider Foundation took up their cause and convinced the state courts to accept that capacious interpretation of the Coastal Act and to enjoin petitioner from excluding the public from its private property unless and until it obtains a “coastal development permit” allowing it to do so. While the court below recognized that this injunction against exercising the right to exclude constitutes a textbook physical invasion of private property, it nonetheless concluded—in a decision that deepens an entrenched split among the lower courts—that it is not a compensable taking because the possibility of obtaining a permit renders the physical taking “temporary,” and only “permanent” physical takings qualify as per se takings. Thus, under the decision below, petitioner is entitled to zero compensation for a compelled public easement across its private property because of the possibility petitioner could one day obtain a permit allowing it to exercise the most foundational property right, i.e., the right to exclude.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a compulsory public-access easement of indefinite duration is a per se physical taking.

2. Whether applying the California Coastal Act to require the owner of private beachfront property to apply for a permit before excluding the public from its private property; closing or changing the hours, prices, or days of operation of a private business on its private property; or even declining to advertise public access to its private property, violates the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and/or the First Amendment.

More soon.

Related articles

How Do You Exclude Someone From A Clean And Healthful Environment? Hawaii Supreme Court Rules The Public Has A <em>Property</em> Right In The Environment

Eminent Domain Abuse, Coming To A Theater Near You

Hawaii Business Magazine Asks: "How Much Will Rail Cost Us In the End?" Our Answer: As Much As It Takes

Indiana: Equal Footing Doctrine Means Public Owns Up To The Ordinary High Water Mark

Update: thanks to Daniel Lehmann for keying us in to this case, now being reviewed by the Supreme Court, involving the foundational question of whether title to Equal Footing Doctrine submerged lands is a question of state or federal law. Scheduled for the Court's 2/16/2018 conference.

* * * *

In our experience, rationality often takes a second chair when delving into the question of who may own various parts of beaches. It's certainly true in our home jurisdiction, where any claims to private rights anywhere near a beach can be met with howls of protest, regardless of what the law might actually provide in any given circumstance. Trying to unwrap these cases can be an exercise in frustration, and if you don't understand the background and politics -- the "real story" -- you can't really say you understand a decision.

That is what we're wondering about the Indiana Supreme Court's long-awaited opinion in Gunderson v. Indiana, No. 46S03-17060PL-423 (Feb. 14, 2018), in which the court concluded that the public, and not the Gundersons, owned the area below Lake Michigan's ordinary mean high water mark. We have read the opinion, and the court frames the issue the same we see it: "What is the precise boundary at which the State’s ownership interest ends and private property interests begin?" Slip op. at 1. But what, if anything, in the real story here and what other forces are at play other than those we read in the opinion and briefs? We wish we knew.

The case is a property lawyer's delight, full of things like the Equal Footing Doctrine, the Northwest Ordinance, public trust, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), and Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). (If you don't need to look up any of these terms, congratulations - you are officially a property law geek.) We recommend you read the opinion yourself; it isn't that long (29 pages) you will be entertained for sure. 

Here's the short version: everyone actually agreed that the ordinary mean high water mark -- or, as the case cryptically shortens it "OHWM" -- is the boundary between public land and the Gunderson's private property. The big question was where was that line? The plat map of the owners' lots, which they can trace back to an 1837 federal land patent, say they own up to the "Lake Edge." In 2010, however, the Town of Long Beach adopted what the court refers to as an "administrative boundary" which set the public-private boundary landward of where the the Gundersons thought it was. The court framed the issue this way:  

The basic controversy here is whether the State holds exclusive title to the exposed shore of Lake Michigan up to the OHWM, or whether the Gundersons, as riparian property owners, hold title to the water’s edge, thus excluding public use of the beach. All parties agree that land below Lake Michigan’s OHWM is held in trust for public use. The legal dispute relates to the precise location of that OHWM: whereas the Gundersons argue that it lies wherever the water meets the land at any given moment, the State and Intervenors locate the boundary further landward to include the exposed shore.

Resolution of this case entails a two-part analysis: First, we must determine the boundary of the bed of Lake Michigan that originally passed to Indiana at statehood in 1816. Second, we must decide whether the State has since relinquished title to land within that boundary. The former question is a matter of federal law; the latter inquiry, a matter of state law. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 376-77 (1977) (“[D]etermination of the initial boundary between [the beds of navigable waters] acquired under the equal-footing doctrine, and riparian fast lands [is] a matter of federal law . . . [whereas] subsequent changes in the contour of the land, as well as subsequent transfers of the land, are governed by the state law.”).

Slip op. at 6-7 (footnote omitted). 

The court concluded that at statehood, the Equal Footing Doctrine gave the State title to submerged lands. The Gundersons argued this means just what their documents say: right up to the lake edge, where ever that is at the moment. The State, by contrast, argued this means the OHWM. The court held that the Northwest Ordinance did not shift the line or alter the State's title, and that the Gundersons' deed and other documents did not either, because although the federal government had the power in 1827 to convey Equal Footing submerged lands to private interests, such a conveyance must have been explicit, which it was not here. 

The heart of the opinion starts on page 13 of the slip opinion, where the court concludes that the public-private boundary is the OHWM, and not the water's edge. The court acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court cases on this issue are not 100% clear or consistent (some, for example, merely mention "submerged" land, or those "bounded by navigable waters"), but concluded that those terms really mean OHWM. The court relied on the Corvallis Sand & Gavel case, which noted that the states own riparian land "between the high and low water mark, as well as the bed of the river[.]" Slip op. at 14. 

After siding with the State that the public cannot give up its public trust ownership except in unusual circumstances, the court agreed with the property owners that the state agency's attempt to alter the public-private line established by the Equal Footing and related doctrines by defining where the OHWM is located was ineffective. These regulations defined OHWM is a more clear fashion, which the government asserted was better because they provided more certainty than the common law doctrines. Perhaps so, but the court concluded that a state agency cannot amend the law, only the legislature can. Besides, there's a natural symmetry to a legally-defined (but moving) boundary:

The common-law OHWM is a moveable boundary subject to the natural variability of the shoreline. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Manual of Surveying Instructions at 81 (“When by action of water the bed of the body of water changes, the OHWM changes, and the ownership of adjoining land progresses with it.”). Riparian boundary law relies on the adaptive doctrines of accretion and erosion to account for these shoreline dynamics. Under the accretion doctrine, the riparian landowner gains property as the OHWM shifts lakeward due to the gradual deposit of sand or other material. Bath v. Courts, 459 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). The doctrine of erosion, by contrast, has the opposite effect: the riparian landowner loses property as the boundary shifts landward due to the gradual loss of shoreline. 93 C.J.S. Waters § 187 (2017). These doctrines operate to maintain the status quo of relative rights to the shores of navigable waters. While the physical boundary shifts (e.g., shelving or terrestrial vegetation) the legal relationships—private riparian ownership and public trust title—remain the same. In other words, while accretion or erosion may change the actual location of the OHWM, the legal boundary remains the OHWM.

Slip op. at 25 (footnotes omitted). What we refer to as the "bitter and sweet" approach to accretion and erosion. Thus, the court concluded the natural OHWM is the public-private boundary, not the the line in the rules promulgated by the agency.

Finally, the court rejected the argument that any public trust uses other than those previously recognized by common-law tradition would be a taking: fishing, commerce, and navigation. The court held that it would not be a taking for either the legislature or the courts to expand the scope of the public's use of public trust property, and since the legislature hasn't acted, the court would. Slip op. at 23 ("Absent a statutory framework of public trust rights in the shores of Lake Michigan, this Court retains its common law powers to articulate—and even expand—the scope of protected uses."). Thus, the public may "at minimum" walk on land below the OHWM without infringing on the littoral owner's property rights.  

But the court declined to expand it further, deferring to the Indiana Legislature on that one. 

The local paper covered the story: "Indiana Supreme Court rules Lake Michigan shoreline belongs to all Hoosiers." 

Will this be the last stop for this case, or will there be a cert petition? Stay tuned, as always. 

Gunderson v. Indiana, No. 46S03-17060PL-423 (Ind. Feb. 14, 2018) 

ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Conference - In-Person Registration SOLD OUT (But You Can Still Join By Live Webcast)

Our upcoming American Law Institute-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation Conference in Charleston, South Carolina has SOLD OUT our in-person registrations. 

We will have a record attendance (with over 100 first-time attendees) and the conference hotel has informed us that we can fit no more people in the meeting rooms. We cannot remember this happening before, but it tells us that we will have an energizing and exciting conference. 

Thank you to all of you who signed up and are coming or joining in online for the webcast -- we'll see you soon at the "four corners of the law."

And if you delayed too long in registering, please don't despair. You can still attend from home or the office because ALI has set up a live webcast of the sessions. Go here for more on how to sign up to attend by webcast.

And stay tuned: for 2019, we've already picked the venue (hint: west coast), and we are at a site which can accommodate as many attendees as can join us. We will make the formal announcement of the dates and location of the 2019 Conference in Charleston next week.

After we do, please make your plans and don't delay and risk getting left out! 

How Do You Exclude Someone From A Clean And Healthful Environment? Hawaii Supreme Court Rules The Public Has A Property Right In The Environment

What better way to bid farewell to 2017 than with a whopper case from the Hawaii Supreme Court? And we're not exaggerating -- this one is really big.  

Now you might think that given the amount of time this blog devotes to property interests and property rights, we'd be downright tickled when our home court -- which may not be the friendliest court in the land for property owners and property rights -- goes against expectations and actually recognizes a constitutional property right. A right that, as far as we can tell, no other court, state or federal, has ever recognized.

Despite the Hawaii Supreme Court's recognition of a property right, however, we're not at all on board, because In re Maui Electric Co., No. SCWC-15-0000640 (Dec. 14, 2017), concluded the Sierra Club possesses a constitutional property right in a "clean and healthful environment" entitling the organization to due process protections. This allowed the Club to intervene in a Public Utilities Commission petition regarding a power purchase agreement for a now-defunct electric plant on Maui.

Read that again in case it didn't quite sink in: the court recognized a property right in a clean and healthful environment.

Before we get to our thoughts about why we characterize this as a whopper conclusion, some background.

A Defunct Coal-Powered Sugar Power Plant

Maui Electric filed an application with the State PUC, seeking the Commission's approval of an agreement between the utility and Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Company which, if approved, would allow a rate increase to account for the additional production charges associated with the Puunene Plant, a coal-powered facility on former sugar lands in central Maui which transformed bagasse, the byproduct of sugar production, into electric power. We use the past tense because by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, the plant had closed, following the recent closure of the sugar plantation. No sugar plantation, no sugar, no bagasse.

Sierra Club asked the PUC to intervene in the administrative process under the PUC's rules, asserting its own rights as well as several of its Maui members. The power plant, the petition asserted, would "impact Sierra Club's members' health, aesthetic, and recreational interests. Sierra Club also asserted its organizational interest in reducing Hawaii's dependence on imported fossil fuels and advancing a clean energy grid." Slip op. at 5.

Standing vs. Administrative Intervention

Pretty vague stuff, and more like policy questions than something best resolved by an adjudicative proceeding, but under existing judicial standing rules in similar cases in original jurisdiction actions brought in Hawaii courts, nothing too far from the norm. There's little doubt that if this were a case brought in a Hawaii trial court, that Sierra Club adequately alleged judicial standing. Anyone questioning that conclusion need only recall the Superferry case in which the Hawaii Supreme Court held that Sierra Club had standing to raise an environmental challenge to the now-defunct inter-island ferry because the ferry threatened the organization with four types of injury: (1) endangered species could be adversely impacted by a high-speed ferry; (2) the Superferry could increase the introduction of alien species; (3) surfers, divers, and canoe paddlers who use Kahului Harbor could suffer adverse impacts; and (4) the threat of increased traffic on the road next to the harbor entrance. Again, that's a pretty vague connect-the-dots logic to gain standing. But for better or worse, that's the current state of Hawaii's standing law. 

However, the Maui Electric case was not an original jurisdiction action, it was an administrative proceeding in the Commission under the PUC's admin rules, governed by a different standard, one based in the Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act. Under the APA, an outsider may intervene in a "contested case" (an quasi-judicial adjudicative administrative process) when an agency rule or a statute gives the party a seat at the table, or when intervention is required by law because the agency is adjudicating that party's rights (in this case, the law was the Hawaii Constitution's due process clause). See Kaleikini v. Thielen, 237 P.3d 1067, 1082-83 (Haw. 2010).

Here, the Sierra Club alleged both that PUC statutes and the Hawaii Constitution's procedural due process protections gave it the right to intervene in the agency proceedings:

Sierra Club argued that its members were concerned that the Puunene Plant relied too heavily on coal in order to meet its power obligations under the existing agreement and also that its members were concerned "about the public health and visibility impacts of burning coal."

Slip op. at 5.

Intervention Denied

Neither the PUC nor the court of appeals bought the Sierra Club's theory. The Commission denied intervention and decided Maui Electric's application without the Club's presence. The Club appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals which agreed with Maui Electric and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It concluded that because Sierra Club was not "aggrieved" by the decision by the PUC (because it correctly excluded the Club form the case), the appellate court did not have jurisdiction. 

At Long Last, a Vehicle for the Supreme Court

The issue had been brewing in Hawaii's agencies and lower courts for awhile, and giving the current Hawaii Supreme Court the opportunity to make this ruling had been on wish lists at least since former Governor Neil Abercrombie appointed the majority of the five Justice court back in 2014. But until now, this issue (and others with a similar approach -- recognizing certain rights in the Hawaii Constitution as property, for example) had never secured the necessary three votes.

So up to the Hawaii Supreme Court they went, on the same two theories: the Club should have been allowed to intervene, either because the PUC's governing statutes gave it the right to do so, or because due process required it because the Club's property was at stake in the PUC proceeding.

Three-Justice Majority: No Statutory Right to Intervene, But Sierra Club Owns "Property"

The Gov. Abercrombie-appointed three Justice majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Pollack, rejected two arguments which could have avoided this difficult and groundbreaking result. First, as we noted above, by the time the case reached the court, the Puunene Plant was offline, a victim of Hawaii's loss of the sugar industry. Maui Electric argued the Sierra Club's appeal was thus moot and the court should dismiss. Or, the majority might have combed through the PUC's statutes and concluded that Sierra Club possessed a statutory (and not a constitutional) right to intervene.

But the majority accepted neither argument, first concluding that the case even though moot was nonetheless crying out for resolution by the court (the so-called "public interest" exception to the usual mootness rules), and also rejecting Sierra Club's claim for a statutory right to intervene. See slip op. at 12-15 for the majority's mootness analysis, and pages 19-21 for its rejection of the statutory argument.

Having disposed of these preliminaries, the court got to the constitutional question: does the Hawaii Constitution recognize Sierra Club's environmental concerns as a property interest entitling it to procedural due process?

The majority based its conclusion on Article XI, section 9 of the Hawaii Constitution (a provision added by the 1978 constitutional convention):

Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality, including control of pollution and conservation, protection and enhancement of natural resources. Any person may enforce this right against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.

That, the majority held, created a legitimate claim of entitlement to a clean and healthful environment, and thus it is a property right. It "is a substantive right guaranteed to each person." Slip op. at 23-24. The majority noted that the court had earlier held that Native Hawaiian rights -- a right also found in the Hawaii Constitution -- are "property" rights, and that environmental concerns are no different. Slip op. at 23 (citing In re Īao Ground Water Mgmt. Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit Applications, 287 P.3d 129, 142 (Haw. 2012)). As a self-executing right, it is a legitimate entitlement.

Interestingly, the majority seemed to anticipate criticisms of this conclusion by noting that the constitutional text itself limited this property right to being exercised within the framework of existing environmental statutues, rules, and ordinances. This will, the majority reasoned, keep things in check. What made it interesting is that the opinion concluded that the very PUC statutes which it had earlier rejected as providing Sierra Club with the right to intervene, were environmental statutes that gave it a property right to intervene.

We therefore conclude that HRS Chapter 269 is a law relating to environmental quality that defines the right to a clean and healthful environment under article XI, section 9 by providing that express consideration be given to reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the decision-making of the Commission. Accordingly, we hold that Sierra Club has established a legitimate claim of entitlement to a clean and healthful environment under article XI, section 9 and HRS Chapter 269.

Slip op. at 34-35.

After reaching the conclusion that Sierra Club owns property in a clean and healthful environment, it was all over but the shouting and the majority held that the PUC had a duty to provide a hearing before it deprived the Club of its property:

The risks of an erroneous deprivation are high in this case absent the protections provided by a contested case hearing, particularly in light of the potential long-term impact on the air quality in the area, the denial of Sierra Club’s motion for intervention or participation in the proceeding, and the absence of other proceedings in which Sierra Club could have a meaningful opportunity to be heard concerning HC&S’s performance of the Agreement.

Slip op. at 30.

Finally, in a footnote, the majority made it clear that the result is immune from future legislative tinkering. This is a ruling based on the Hawaii Constitution, and thus no mere legislature can mess with it too much. See slip op. at 43 & n.33 ("Our ultimate authority is the Constitution; and the courts, not the legislature, are the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution."). 

Two-Justice Dissent

We won't walk through the complete rationale of the two-Justice dissent, because it is a relatively short 20 pages, and it would be easier for you to read it yourself. In sum, Chief Justice Recktenwald (joined by Justice Nakayama), would have concluded that neither the PUC statutes nor Hawaii's due process clause gave Sierra Club the right to intervene in the power plant's PUC application. The dissenters warned of "unintended" consequences which will flow from this decision:

Respectfully, the Majority’s expansive interpretation of what constitutes a protected property interest in these circumstances may have unintended consequences in other contexts, such as statutes where the legislature has mandated consideration of specific factors by executive agencies when implementing a statute.

Dissent at 14.

The dissent concluded the majority's result was unnecessary, because it was more of a policy choice than a judicial decision, and ultimately, if denied administrative intervention in the PUC, Sierra Club could deploy the loose standing rules which we mentioned earlier in this post, and institute an original jurisdiction action. Dissent at 17. 

How Do You Exclude Others From a Clean and Healthful Environment?

The biggest question we have about the majority's conclusion is this: if the most fundamental aspect of owning "property" is the right to exclude others from the res, how in the world do members of the public have the right to exclude other members of the public from a clean and healthful environment?

As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), "[w]e have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, 'the right to exclude [others is] 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'' Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982), quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)." Or maybe Stevie Wonder said it better when he sang "this is mine, you can't take it."

Either way, the ability to keep others off of what you own -- and have the law support you -- is one of the defining sticks in the bundle of rights which we call property. 

Thus, we think the court didn't grapple with the real foundational question built into the arguments -- should these types of environmental concerns even be shoehorned into the concept of "property" as that term has been used for thousands of years? Doesn't "property" as used in the Hawaii Constitution's due process clause mean private property? After all, as far as we can tell, every other time this court has dealt with property in Hawaii's due process clause, it has either expressly defined, or implicitly assumed, that the property interest at stake was private property, and not a right that looks more like something "owned" collectively by everyone. Essentially what the majority accomplished was a subtle redefinition of property from a private right to a public resource.

We understand the Hawaii Supreme Court's commitment to keeping courthouse doors open to resolve claims, especially when the claims involve the environment and those who profess to protect it. As we noted earlier, the court's standing doctrine for original jurisdiction cases sets the bar so low that it is, for all practical purposes, a mere pleading speed bump, and not a substantive check on dragging the courts into political and policy questions. The standing rule, as our courts have held, is a "prudential rule of judicial self-governance" for courts exercising their original jurisdiction, and does not, technically speaking, govern courts' appellate jurisdiction in appeals under the Administrative Procedures Act. But now the barn doors are open in both. On that, we think the dissenting opinion is right when it concluded that rejecting intervention in the PUC only meant Sierra Club could have instituted an original action in a Maui trial court. Thus, the courthouse door could remain open without needlessly undermining the concept of property. 

On The Horizon: Public Trust as a "Property" Right?

Also as we noted earlier, this decision was a long time coming, and anyone paying attention has been expecting this shoe to drop whenever the Justice Pollack-led branch could garner that critical third vote. Now that it has, this naturally leads to the follow up question, what could be next?

It stands to reason the next candidate for the second shoe is "public trust" rights, which in the recent telescope cases just missed that third vote. There, Justice Pollack and Justice Wilson concurred, concluding that both Native Hawaii and public trust are property interests. They argued that article XI, section 1 of the Hawaii Constitution created a property property interest in natural resources which are to be administered for public benefit. See Concurring op. at 29-30. Now that this same telescope case is back in the Supreme Court, we would not be surprised if the same three Justices who found that environmental concerns are property take a hard look at extending that rationale.

Other Thoughts

Two final thoughts before wrapping up this long post in farewell to 2017:

1.  If environmental concerns grounded in the Hawaii Constitution are property, and Native Hawaiian interests are property, and if public trust principles are property, are there other, similar interests in the constitution where property could be found? We think there is one that deserves a hard look. Article XI, section 3 reads a lot like sections 1 and 9:

The State shall conserve and protect agricultural lands, promote diversified agriculture, increase agricultural self-sufficiency and assure the availability of agriculturally suitable lands. The legislature shall provide standards and criteria to accomplish the foregoing.

Farmers and ranchers may want to consider raising arguments similar to those which carried the day in Maui Electric. After all, we don't have a hierarchy of state constitutional rights, where some rights are more equal than others.

2.  Citizens United lovers, rejoice: in Hawaii's courts, corporations are persons entitled to constitutional rights. Yes, you read that correctly. The constitutional provision at issue here provides that "Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality, including control of pollution and conservation, protection and enhancement of natural resources. Any person may enforce this right against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law." The Maui Electric majority held that the Sierra Club has a property right under this provision meaning that hey, the Sierra Club is a "person."

Aloha and welcome to Hawaii jurisprudence, Citizens United!

In re Maui Electric Co., No. SCWC-15-0000640 (Haw. Dec. 14, 2017)

 

In re Maui Electric Co., No. SCWC-15-0000640 (Dec. 14, 2017) (Recktenwald, C.J., dissenting)

Staten Island Wetlands Regulations Are A Penn Central Taking. A Penn Central Taking!

We're in court today (so blogging about lawyering must yield to the actual practice of lawyering) so we're going to just post this here, and let you consider it. And maybe wait for our New York City colleagues (who just happen to represent the property owner), to weigh in via their eminent domain blog. 

The New York Appellate Division's opinion in City of New York v. Baycrest Manor, Inc., No. D59668 (Nov. 15, 2017) is an eminent domain case which involves the valuation of wetlands on Staten Island, and Palazzolo's holding that long-existing restrictive regulations are not baked into a parcel's value.

The City claimed that the condemned property was not worth a whole lot because the wetlands regulations predated the condemnee's purchase. The owner, by contrast, argued that it had a pretty good shot at prevailing on a regulatory takings claim, because the Supreme Court in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 601 (2001) concluded that acquisition of land after the time the government imposes an allegedly restrictive regulation does not deprive the owner of the ability to challenge the restrictive regulation as a taking. The Supreme Court in that case held that prohibiting the a takings challenge would result in a "windfall" to the government, allowing the state to "shape and define property rights and reasonable investment-backed expectations." Id. at 626. Thus, because the state cannot "put an expiration date on the Takings Clause," the Court held that "[f]uture generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land." Id. at 627.

We get it, but as we noted here, New York's courts aren't exactly on our same wavelength when it comes to Palazzolo and preexisting regulations.

The Appellate Division in this case agreed with the property owner that Palazzolo took out the City's preexisting regulation argument, and that the owner had shown there was a reasonable probability that the wetlands regulations worked a regulatory taking under Penn Central, rejecting the City's argument that "a subsequent purchaser cannot challenge a preexisting regulation as a taking." Slip op. at 4. 

Wait... did we say the owner proved a Penn Central taking?

Yes, yes we did. 

So it was a doubleplusgood decision: a court that gets both Palazzolo and Penn Central. 

But it wasn't all great news, because the court wrapped up the opinion by agreeing with the condemnor that the valuation for the property should have been done the way the condemnor's appraiser said it should be done. The court reduced the just compensation award from nearly $400k to just over $150k. 

Disappointing, but we're liking the court's Palazzolo and Penn Central analysis, even in spite of this letdown. 

Penn Central!

One final note: the owner's lawyer, Jon Houghton, will be presenting at the upcoming ALI-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation Conference in Charleston, SC, January 25-27, 2018. He'll be talking about "Second Avenue Subway: Valuation Issues in Transportation Corridor Construction." But we suspect if you buy him a cup of coffee, he'll be glad to talk Palazzolo, Penn Central, and this case, too.

City of New York v. Baycrest Manor, Inc., No. D49668 (N.Y.A.D. Nov. 15, 2017) 

Lucas Not Invited To Lucas Conference

Check this out: according to this article ("This SC man won a Supreme Court case. He wants to know why he can't talk about it"), David Lucas, the lawyer-property owner behind the big reg takings case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1993), was apparently not invited to speak at the (ongoing) event at the University of South Carolina law school marking the 25th anniversary of the decision. The local paper reports:

The University of South Carolina law school is holding a three-day event to mark the 25th anniversary of a S.C. man’s legal victory in the U.S. Supreme Court. But the victor in that case, Davis Lucas, isn’t invited, and he’s upset.

. . . .

Lucas, who sued for the right to build on two lots on the Isle of Palms, is upset neither he nor his attorneys were invited to participate. He said he only found out the forum was being held because a friend’s son attends USC’s law school.

Lucas, who lives in Bishopville, worries his argument in support of property rights won’t be represented. Meanwhile, he expects state regulators to argue the court ruling limits their ability to protect the coast. Lucas also is upset that former S.C. Chief Justice Jean Toal, who joined a majority on the state Supreme Court in ruling against him before he won his federal appeal, was invited.

We're going to be talking about the Lucas case and its impact in a couple of months, right there in South Carolina, at the 35th Annual ALI-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation Conference in Charleston. Professor Lynda Butler (William and Mary Law), and Jonathan Wood (Washington, DC) will present the session "Lucas 25 Years Later: Property Rights in the Age of Global Warming." 

We invite Mr. Lucas to come join us in Charleston, just a short hop away from the lots he formerly owned. Heck, we may even pay a visit out to nearby Isle of Palms.

Cert Denied, Denied, Denied, Denied In Property Cases (But Don't Give Up The Ship Just Yet)

No soup for you!

Update: our colleague Bryan Wenter has his take on one of the cases denied review here ("U.S. Supreme Court Again Declines to Consider Important Property Rights Issue Regarding the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine") ("Because the current composition of the U.S. Supreme Court leans ideologically conservative by any traditional measure and it takes only four of nine Justices to grant certiorari, on the surface it is surprising that the Court has yet to take up a case, such as CBIA or 616 Croft Ave., that would finally resolve this distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative takings. The surprise is enhanced to a degree by the fact that the Court considered both cases in conference four times, which suggests a serious interest in the issue.").

* * * *

To bring you up to speed on cases of interest in the Supreme Court's cert pipeline that we've been following, the short story is that none of them were granted review. Here's a list:

• Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, No. 16-1305 (cert. denied Oct. 2, 2017). This is the case where the NC Legislature gave municipalities the green light to move the location of the "public trust" shoreline. What had always been private was thus public. We filed an amicus brief urging the Court to review the case. This case caught at least one Justice's attention, since it was relisted after a response was requested. Here's a local news story on the case: "U.S. Supreme Court declines to hear case that threatened public's right to beach access."
• Jarreau v. S. Lafourche Levee District, No. 17-163 (cert. denied Oct. 30, 2017). This is the case asking whether a state can, consistent with the Just Compensation Clause,  categorically bar "business losses" which occur as an inevitable result of a taking. We filed an amicus brief in this one, too. Here's an oped about the case, which summarizes the issues. This one also seemed like it might have legs, since a response was requested. But cert denied.
• 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood, No. 16-1137 (cert. denied Oct. 30, 2017). This case presented the "legislative vs. executive exaction" question that has been left unanswered for a while. We said so in an amicus brief we joined. This case seemed like a good vehicle, too, especially after it was relisted four times. 
• Wayside Church v. Van Buren County, No. 17-88 (cert. denied Oct. 30, 2017). Williamson County ripeness, again. An issue that is really ripe for SCOTUS review (pun intended). Lots of amici jumped in, although we didn't file a brief in this case (so we know it isn't us causing the denials, at least). 

What to make, if anything, from these denials in cases that looked pretty good? No real vehicle problems, and issues that are primed for the Court to take up: yet cert denied, denied, denied...and denied.

There are many ways to read the tea leaves, including the usual "the Court just wasn't interested." But we have speculated that these denials are not something to necessarily despair about, and are more a sign of inopportune timing and the Justices who are supportive of property rights wanting to keep their powder dry for a time when they have a more solid majority. We base our speculation on two cases.

First, Murr v. Wisconsin, a decision where Justice Kennedy authored a perplexing majority opinion that seems to satisfy no one except those who simply think regulatory takings case should always be decided against the property owner. With Justice Kennedy possibly controlling the majority in property cases, perhaps the risk of another Murr was simply too much, and it was better for the pro-property Justices to vote to deny cert than risk it.

Bolstering this speculation is the second case, Bay Point Properties v. Mississippi Transportation Comm'n, No. 16-1077 (cert. denied June 26, 2017), in which we represented the petitioner. There, after relisting the case multiple times, the Court denied cert on the last day of the term, three days after ruling in Murr. No Justice dissented from the denial, but Justices Gorsuch and Thomas filed a curious "statement" which says (we're paraphrasing here) good issue, lower court split, and interesting case; you should raise this issue down the road "at the next opportunity." If so, then why not now? The only answer we could muster was that things were not just ready on the merits to get a good result.

Which is what led us to the conclusion that this maybe what is going on in these other cases -- good issues all, but timing is just not good now. 

That's our take. So what do you think is going on? 

2018 ALI-CLE Eminent Domain Conference - Agenda And Faculty Now Posted

The complete agenda and faculty list has now been posted on the ALI-CLE website, and early registration is open! Go now and reserve your spot. 

We paid a visit to Charleston recently, the venue for our January 2018 conference, to scout it out. We can report that we're going to have a great time, for sure. When we polled you last year, you selected Charleston as your first choice (a new city for the Conference), and it is shaping up to be a very good selection. In addition to the usual lineup of CLE programming, there are a ton of things to see and do in the area. We recorded a short video down at the "four corners of law" (the intersection of Meeting Street and Broad Street), to give you a preview (the weather was much better than in our 2016 preview video, too).

As an added exclusive bonus, there will also be a special sneak preview of the movie about Kelo v. City of New London, Little Pink House. If you joined us in Austin in 2016, you’ll remember that we spoke with Ted Balaker, the film's producer about the movie, which was then being shot. It is now complete, and we're privileged to be getting a before-the-public screening of the film on Friday evening of the Conference.  

So plan on joining us in Charleston, January 25-27, 2018. See you there. 

2018 ALI-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation and Condemnation 101, Charleston, SC, January 25-... 

Conflict Check: Hawaii Adds To Lower Court Regulatory Takings Split: Is Leaving Land Vacant On The Hope It Is Worth More In The Future "Economically Beneficial Use"?

This just in: the Hawaii Supreme Court has rendered a unanimous opinion in Leone v. County of Maui, No. SCAP-15-599 (Oct. 16, 2017), a case we've naturally been following because it involves regulatory takings (and we were involved in a similar case on a neighboring property). 

We haven't had a chance to review the 48-page opinion in detail (once we do so, we will post a more detailed review), but the issue the court was presented with was, as we noted here, whether leaving land in its vacant state court be considered an economically beneficial use. Short story is that the court held yes, it could, thus seeming to create a lower court split (hello, cert petition) with at least one other court, the Federal Circuit in Lost Tree, concluding that economically beneficial use means more than someone might buy it down the road. 

There's much more to the case than this issue alone, so we will have more once we've had a chance to digest it. Stay tuned. 

Leone v. County of Maui, No. SCAP-15-599 (Oct. 16, 2017) 

2018 ALI-CLE Eminent Domain Conference: Early-Bird Registration Discount Now Posted

It's not too early to reserve your spot at the 35th Annual ALI-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation Conference, to be held at the Francis Marion Hotel in historic downtown Charleston, South Carolina, January 25-27, 2018. 

We're finalizing the Conference details, but can report that the program will, as usual, feature expert presenters from across the nation, and both an in-depth update on the subjects we love, and a "101" track for those new to the field or who would appreciate a refresher. Check out some of the topics:

• Takings and Damaging by Flood: Case Selection Advice For Savvy Practitioners
• Quarterbacking the Case: Blocking Defenses, Controlling the Witnesses, and Converting for Verdicts
• We've Been Working on the Railroad: Utility Crossing Disputes
• Protecting Your Record,and Anticipating Appeals
• Lucas 25 Years Later: Property Rights in the Age of Global Warming
• Building and Growing Your Eminent Domain Practice With Social Media (and the Ethical Issues that Social Media Raises)
• Alternative Dispute Resolution in Condemnation: An Eminently Agreeable Solution
• Project Influence: How to Educate the Bench
• Should We Re-Think Regulatory Takings Law? The Takings Clause, Privileges and Immunities, and Due Process

And more. We've put together two-and-a-half days of programming, social events, and networking opportunities to get to know your colleagues. All in a city that is eminently walkable, and full of interesting history.  Here's a summary of the 2017 San Diego Conference. 

The Conference has been very well attended for the past several years, and the hotel has quickly sold out. So make your reservations now. Plus, an early-registration tuition discount is available if you register for the Conference how. Go here for more information. 

Come join us in Charleston in January. 

Cal Eminent Domain Report On The Strange "Martins Beach" Decision

We've been offline lately, hanging out at the ABA Annual Meeting in New York, so haven't had time to post, even though there is a lot to post about.

Thankfully, our colleague Brad Kuhn at the California Eminent Domain Report is on the ball, and has written up his thoughts about the California Court of Appeal's decision in the case involving a Silicon Valley billionaire, surfers, beach access, and ... California. 

We will have some thoughts once we find the time to sit down and write them up, but in the meantime, please read Brad's thoughts on the case at "Court Holds Temporary Injunction on Martins Beach Access Dispute Does Not Constitute a Taking."

More shortly. 

Brief In Opposition In Public Trust Takings Case

Here's the Brief in Opposition in Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, No. 16-1305 (Aug. 11, 2017), the case in which North Carolina property owners are asking the U.S. Supreme Court (cert petition here) to review a N.C. Court of Appeals decision which involves wet and dry sand beaches, the location of the public trust boundary, and other favorite topics.

The case arose because the N.C. Legislature by statute moved the public trust" shoreline landward, and allowed the public to use what had formerly been private beach.  We filed an amicus brief in the case, supporting the property owners. 

We'll also post the reply brief when it is filed. Stay tuned. 

Brief in Opposition, Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, No. 16-1305 (Aug. 11, 2017) 

A Quarter-Century Of Lucas: What's Next?

Load this one up for your morning drive, or workout: the Federalist Society's podcast on "Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council at 25." Featuring Professor Eric Claeys, Professor Michael Wolf, and Pacific Legal Foundation's James Burling. Well worth your time.

Here's the description:

This spring marks the 25th anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. In Lucas, a 5-4 Court majority held that a state law can effect a "regulatory taking" and trigger inverse condemnation requirements if it deprives an owner of all viable uses of his land. Join our panel to hear a discussion of questions such as: Did Lucas mark a major change in Supreme Court regulatory takings doctrine? Was the decision about right, or did it go too far or not far enough? Is Lucas still relevant to regulatory takings law today, and what are the chances that the decision might be reconsidered or extended?

There are other Lucas retrospectives in the works.

Start here, with Professor Carol Brown and Dwight Merriam's recent article, "On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Lucas: Making or Breaking the Takings Claim." 

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California Supreme Court: Accept The Exaction, Or Let Your Home Fall Into The Sea - Your Choice

Winter storms damaged a seawall which protected a blufftop, oceanfront home. The owners, not surprisingly, wanted to rebuild the wall to protect their home. The Coastal Commission, as is its wont, saw this as an opportunity to extract some goodies from the owners. So it granted a limited-term permit to rebuild the wall, conditioned on the owners not repairing a stairway leading from the top of the bluff to the private beach:

Ultimately, the Commission approved a coastal development permit allowing seawall demolition and reconstruction, with the addition of midbluff geogrid protection below Lynch‟s home. The permit was subject to several conditions, three of which are at issue here. Special condition No. 1(a) prohibits reconstruction of the lower stairway. Special condition No. 2 provides that the seawall permit will expire in 20 years and prohibits future blufftop redevelopment from relying on the seawall as a source of geologic stability or protection. Special condition No. 3 requires that, before expiration of the 20-year period, plaintiffs must apply for a new permit to remove the seawall, change its size or configuration, or extend the authorization period.

The owners recorded these restrictions, as the were required to do, and "[a]round the same time," they objected to the conditions. While this case was being decided, they rebuilt the seawall.

In Lynch v. California Coastal Commission, No. S221980 (July 6, 2017), the unanimous California Supreme Court held that the owners waived their right to challenge the conditions, because they accepted the benefit of the permit:

In the land use context, a landowner may not challenge a permit condition if he has acquiesced to it either by specific agreement, or by failure to challenge the condition while accepting the benefits afforded by the permit. Generally, challenges to allegedly unlawful conditions must be litigated in administrative mandate proceedings.

Slip op. at 5-6 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

Why the court qualified the above statement with "in the land use context," the opinion does not explain. Is this not the same in other contexts? If not, all we can figure is that the court views land use regulations as some sort of super-duper exercise of government's police powers, or that property rights are not on equal footing with other civil rights. 

Does this mean that in other contexts that if you accept a permit to exercise your rights, you can accept and challenge simultaneously? For example, what if a city says "here’s your parade permit, granted only on the condition that you don’t speak ill of Donald Trump." So if you hold your parade despite this unconstitutional condition, have you waived your free speech challenge under Lynch, or does the italicized limitation on the holding show that land use regs are different in the California court's view?

In general, permit holders are obliged to accept the burdens of a permit along with its benefits. (See Sports Arenas Properties, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1985) 40 Cal.3d 808, 815.) This rule stems from the equitable maxim, “He who takes the benefit must bear the burden.” (Civ. Code, § 3521.) Plaintiffs obtained all the benefits of their permit when they built the seawall. They cannot now be heard to complain of its burdens.

Slip op. at 7. 

The court rejected the owners' arguments that they might lose their home was a reason to not apply the general waiver rule. We can't make exceptions to legislative acts (referring to the fact that the California legislature has, in the past, allowed simultaneous challenge to allegedly illegal exactions, even though the owner accepted a permit), that's not our role as a court. "If such an expansion is needed, the Legislature is the appropriate body to create it." Slip op. at 9.

Besides, "[a]n exception allowing applicants to challenge a permit‟s restrictions after taking all of its benefits would change the dynamics of permit negotiations and would foster litigation." Slip op. at 9. All we can say to that is "wow." So it's cool that your home may fall into the ocean if you want to challenge this condition on your exercise of your constitutional rights, but hey, that's your problem or the legislature's problem, not ours. The court's role is to save local government from litigation. 

We can't say we were surprised by this ruling -- it is California, after all -- but to have the opinion lay out the court's disregard for anything but government power so starkly, with nary a nod towards the predicament that the owners found themselves in, is still shocking. 

Lynch v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. S221980 (Cal. July 6, 2017) 

Cases And Links From Today's American Planning Association's 2017 Planning Law Review

Here are links to the cases and materials we spoke about today during our portions of the APA's 2017 Planning Law Review webinar:

• Justice Kennedy's Social Justice Warrior Test For Takings Clause "Property" In Murr v. Wisconsin
• The Federal Circuit's Lost Tree decision (cert denied just after Murr, so this should be seen as a bookend to that case).
• Town of Ponce Inlet v. Pacetta, LLC, No. 5D14-4520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 16, 2017).
• Case to watch: 616 Croft Avenue, LLC v. City of West Hollywood, No. 16-1137 (cert. petition filed Mar. 17, 2017) (legislative vs. administrative exactions). 
• Case to Watch II: Highland-in-the-Woods, LLC v. Polk County, No. 2D15-2801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2017) (quasi-legislative exactions and Nollan/Dolan).
• Case to Watch III: Scher v. Burke, No. S230104 (Cal. June 15, 2017) (public recreational dedications along the coast, and vested rights).
• Case to Watch IV: State of New Jersey v. North Beach 1003, LLC, No. A-3393-15T4 (N.J. App. Div. June 22, 2017) (coastal dunes and takings). 
• Case to Watch V: "Voters May Not Usurp City’s Administrative Land Use Authority Through Initiative Process" (from Miller, Starr, Regalia's land use blog). 

Thanks to all those who were on the call. They tell us there was record attendance. 

SCOTUS Amicus Brief: States May Be Able To Rewrite Property Law, But They Can't Avoid Paying For The Change

Here's the amici curiae brief we filed today on behalf of Owners' Counsel of America, NFIB Small Business Legal Center, Cato Institute, and Professor David Callies in support of a cert petition which we detailed here.

The case is a regulatory takings claim, and involves wet and dry sand beaches, public trust, and other favorite topics. The case arose because the N.C. Legislature by statute moved the "public trust" shoreline landward, and allowed the public to use what had formerly been private beach.  

Here's the Summary of Argument from our brief:

The North Carolina Court of Appeals permitted the Town of Emerald Isle (Town) to impress into public service the portion of the Nies family’s property above the mean high water mark as a road and park. North Carolina law has never subjected this dry sand to public ownership, through the public trust doctrine or otherwise. The court below, however, ignored this distinction, holding that the Town’s permitting the public to use to the Nies’ dry sand was not a taking because the Nies never owned the right to exclude the public from “public trust” areas of the beach. But under North Carolina law—and the law of the vast majority of other jurisdictions—the public trust is limited to land below the mean high water mark, and cannot be extended by the legislature or by a court, and at the same time avoid the constitutional obligation to pay just compensation. Simply put, the public trust doctrine isn’t a means to transform without compensation what has always been private property under North Carolina law, into a public resource.

This brief makes three points. First, the just compensation requirement is self-executing, and even if a state may alter its property law by statute, it cannot avoid its constitutional obligation to pay for the change. Second, since its inception, the scope of North Carolina’s public trust doctrine has been strictly limited to state-owned beaches seaward of the mean high water mark; until it was extended to include the dry sand beach up to the vegetation line, the North Carolina public trust was consistent with the law of a vast majority of other jurisdictions. Third, expansion of the “public trust” beyond its traditional scope cannot completely swallow up the Just Compensation Clause. 

Br. at 4. Stay tuned. 

Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Amici Curiae Owners' Counsel of America, National Federation of Indep... 

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Federal Court: Williamson County Ripeness Not Required In Facial Takings Claims

We don't usually post trial court decisions. They are, obviously, subject to change by an appellate court, and because many are interlocutory, alteration by the rendering court iself.

But for this order from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, we'll make an exception. It's a land use case (it's right there in the first sentence, "This is a land use case."), in which the plaintiffs are challenging two ordinances adopted by the County. The first prohibited obstruction of the beach with ropes, chains, signs, or fences. The second prohibited anyone from interfering with public use of dry sand beach areas. Under Florida law, the dry sand portion of the beach is privately owned. 

As you might expect, because the effect of the ordinance was to invite the public to use private property (as Laurence Tribe wrote in his treatise on Constitutional Law when discussing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), this is the government telling the public "come on in, the water's fine"), this resulted in a lawsuit. The plaintiffs raised a facial takings challenge in federal court, and sought a preliminary injunction. In response, the County filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Williamson County rendered the takings claim premature. 

The District Court's opinion rejecting the County's motion to dismiss contains a good summary of the nature of takings claims, especially facial" versus "as applied" challenges:

Ordinarily, a takings claim is raised as an “as-applied” challenge. An as-applied claim considers “the particular impact of government action on a specific piece of property” and “requires the payment of just compensation.” Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 494 (1987). This type of as-applied challenge can only be brought after the plaintiff has availed himself of all available state procedures for seeking just compensation and been denied. See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195 (“Williamson County ripeness doctrine”). A plaintiff may also raise a facial takings challenge to “the mere enactment” of a statute or regulation when it constitutes a taking. Id. Facial challenges to a statute or regulation have been allowed both where the regulation denies all economically viable use of land, and also where the regulation has authorized a physical taking. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36)); Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 495 (quoting Hodel); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.6 (quoting Hodel). Because the facial takings challenge is a narrow one, plaintiffs “face an uphill battle[] in making a facial attack.” Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295.

Slip op. at 6-7. Here, the Goodwins claim that the mere enactment of the ordinance is a regulatory taking. The court rejected the County's argument that the Goodwins didn't adequately plead the claim (Iqbal doesn't require much, just a plausible claim), and that they improperly raised a "substantially advance" theory (which was rejected as a takings claim in Lingle). The court concluded that "facial takings claims can still be valid after Lingle." Slip op. at 11. 

The court also rejected the County's Williamson challenge to the claim, concluding that the Goodwins didn't need to have first sought compensation from the Florida courts before coming to federal court because the "doctrine does not apply to a facial takings claim because a facial challenge is 'generally ripe the moment the challenged regulation or ordinance is passed.'" Slip op. at 11 (citing Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 (1997); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1013 n.4 (“Facial challenges are ripe when the [ordinance] is passed.”)).  

Finally, the court concluded that a preliminary injunction is a valid remedy to seek for a facial takings claim. Although an as-applied takings claim is one seeking compensation, "facial takings challenges are a horse of a different color, because the relief requested is declaratory and injunctive, rather than just compensation." Slip op. at 13.  

A judge who understands the concepts and applies them correctly - hallelujah!  

Order, Goodwin v. Walton County, No. 3:16-cv-364 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2017) 

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New Regulatory Takings Cert Petition: Legislature Can't Simply Declare Private Property To Be Public

Here's the cert petition, recently filed, which asks the U.S. Supreme Court to review a decision of the North Carolina appellate courts. We say "appellate courts," because the decision being reviewed is one from the N.C. Court of Appeals, because the N.C. Supreme Court, after granting discretionary review, punted and dismissed the appeal after it was fully briefed and teed up for oral arguments.

What happened that cause the court to dismiss? Who really knows the internals, but the one thing we do know is that some members of the court changed due to a judicial election. We know the above because we were watching the case closely; we filed an amicus brief in support of the property owner in the N.C. Supreme Court, a brief that apparently didn't get read (not that amicus briefs get read all that frequently anyway, but you get our drift).

The case is a regulatory takings claim, and involves wet and dry sand beaches, public trust, and other favorite topics. The case arose because the N.C. Legislature by statute moved the "public trust" shoreline landward, and allowed the public to use what had formerly been private beach. 

Here's the Question Presented:

Whether the Takings Clause permits a state to statutorily redefine an entire coastline of privately owned dry beach parcels as a “public trust” area open for public use, without just compensation?

We're going to follow this case, closely. Will we be also filing an amicus brief to make up for our (unread) N.C. Supreme Court amicus?

Maybe, maybe. 

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, No 16-____ (U.S. Apr. 27, 2017)

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Notes And Links From Today's Hawaii Land Use Conference Session On Reg Takings

To supplement your written materials for the 2017 Hawaii Land Use Conference, here are the decisions and other materials which we spoke about this morning at the 2017 Hawaii Land Use Conference:  

• Leone: Hawaii Supreme Court oral arguments in "economically beneficial use" case. 
• CNMI: Compensation Delayed, Is Justice Denied
• Our colleagues' recent Hawaii State Bar Association talk about developments in Hawaii land use law.
• Kauai condemnation: Hawaii Supreme Court arguments in "larger parcel" case. 
• Guam: Eminent Domain Interest Statute Cannot Limit Constitutional Right to Just Compensation
• Entry statutes: the California Supreme Court decision in Property Reserve: the court rewrites the statute in order to save it.
• Virginia federal court rejects facial challenge to Virginia's entry statute.
• North Dakota Supreme Court finds that small entries are "examinations" and not takings.
• Pipeline takings: Pennsylvania appellate court agrees that the polar vortex made them do it.
• North Carolina's Map Act case (Kirby). Land banking to keep the eventual acquisition price low, is a taking.
• California's City of Indio case: temporary "no build" area while city gets around to taking the property is a taking.
• Virginia: an unacceptably low appraisal = "bona fide" offer.
• Colorado Supreme Court reads its eminent domain statute narrowly: when it says Commission must approve taking, DOT can't do it.
• Georgia appellate court: appraisal "before" negotiations means just that.
• Who decides, Part I: California Supreme Court in City of Perris -- judge decides Nollan/Dolan issues (but they may be project influences, so property owners do the happy dance).
• Who decides, Part II: West Virginia Supreme Court concludes that condemnor (not the courts) is sole determiner of sufficiency of quick take deposit.
• Municipal takings of public utilities: Montana Supreme Court writes "more" out of the "more necessary" clause.
• Creative Thinking Prize: Texas Supreme Court sides with property owner who formed conservation district to beat back a taking. Don't tell me no, tell me how.
• Pending issues at SCOTUS: (1) attorneys' fees under the URA; (2) Murr v. Wisconsin - the "larger parcel' in regulatory takings.
• Speaking of attorneys' fees: property owner's claim that trial date (and not date of complaint) was date of valuation was not reasonable.
• Law review articles of note:
• Bill Wade's article on damages and just comp when you are dealing in income-producing properties
• Virginia Law Review article on state constitutional property.
• Mike Berger's lookback on "Property, Democracy & The Constitution."
• Arizona Law Review: do animals have property rights?

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Hawaii Supreme Court Oral Arguments In Lucas "Economically Beneficial Use" Taking Case

After the Hawaii Supreme Court decided GATRI v. Blane, 962 P.2d 367 (Haw. 1998) one big question remained.

In GATRI, the court held that in the coastal zone, a county Community Plan (also known as a "General Plan" in some counties) is a binding land use regulation, and thus has the force and effect of law. (Outside the coastal zone, the CP/GP's don't actually control any land uses, and are general statements of long-term planning goals. The zoning, and the zoning alone, regulates the uses of land.)

But the state legislature in the Coastal Zone Management Act mandated a different result in the coastal zone and there, the planning also controls land use, as the court held in GATRI. Thus, in order to develop property in the coastal zone in accordance with the applicable zoning, the applicable CP/GP must also permit the use. This is know as "plan-zone consistency," and when the zoning and the planning are consistent, all is well. 

The big question, however, is what happens when the zoning and the CP/GP are not consistent? First, we know that as a consequence of the inconsistency, the landowner cannot use her land in accordance with the zoning. Second, what, if any uses can be made of the property under the CP/GP designation? If none, this should set off your takings alarm bells: when a property is deprived by regulation of its economically beneficial uses, what is left but a Lucas wipeout?

As we detailed in our preview post, this is the issue confronting the Hawaii Supreme Court in a case argued last week, Leone v. County of Maui. There, the parcel is zoned "Hotel" (which permits residential use as a matter of right), but is designated on the CP as "park." In other words, its GATRI inconsistent. 

We won't go into the background or the arguments made by each side (for details, see our earlier post, and the amicus brief we filed in support of the property owners in an earlier phase of the case in which the County lost its argument that the case wasn't ripe under Williamson County because the owners hadn't made an attempt to get the hotel zoning and the park CP consistent by seeking an amendment to the CP which would allow for residential use). Instead, we've posted the oral argument recording above for your edification. 

After the Court of Appeals correctly determined that Williamson County doesn't require a takings plaintiff to seek a change in the law in order to ripen her claim, the Lucas wipeout question ended up being presented to a Maui jury, which somehow concluded that despite the plan/zone inconsistency, the Leones' have some economically viable uses remaining.

What those uses are, we can't imagine. We know the Leones can't build a home which the hotel zoning would otherwise permit. And we know the Leones can't make use of it as a park because the lot is too small (the minimum lot size in the park CP is 1 acre, and the Leone parcel is less than 1 acre). That should have been game, set, and match.

But it wasn't, and after the adverse jury decision, the property owners appealed. To explain the verdict, the County made all sorts of arguments that in our view, can't be harmonized in a way that makes any sense under the Fifth Amendment or federal court caselaw. Who knows, maybe the jury bought the County's argument the Leones could hold the property for "investment" purposes (in other words, despite it being frozen out of present uses today, in the future it might have value), despite that argument being foreclosed as a matter of Fifth Amendment law by cases like Lost Tree. Or maybe the Leones really could open a park concession or something and that is an economically beneficial use of the parcel, even though the CP says otherwise. Or maybe they could have somehow convinced the County to let them build a home, even though it is flatly prohibited by their own rules and GATRI, and that it wasn't the inconsistency which caused the County to deny the Leones' application to build. (Other neighboring homeowners eventually secured the County's ok, and even though those parcels were in different situations, the County pointed to them and argued why not the Leones as well?)

SCOA_010517_SCAP_15_599

The oral argument recording (above and at the top of the post) has all of the details, and is a worthy listen for you takings junkies. The issues are all there: Williamson County, Lucas, Nollan/Dolan, nothing omitted. 

Check it out. 

Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, Leone v. County of Maui, No. 29696 (Haw. App. filed. Sep.... 

Monday Reading: Raisin Redux, Beach Appeal Dismissal, Zoning, And More

Here's what we're reading today:

• From the Los Angeles Times, via Professor Kanner: "Those California raisins may be gone from the airwaves, but they're still making waves in court" - after Horne, what's next for the California raisin industry? 
• Remember that case about who owns parts of North Carolina's beaches, set for argument shortly (we filed an amicus brief in the case, by the way)? Well, in this terse order, the N.C. Supreme Court sua sponte (or "ex mero motu" as they call it there) dismissed the appeal, no reason given. Read "NC Supreme Court drops case over beachfront property" for some of the guesses why. 
• From Forbes: "Gallup, Zoning Is Reducing American Productivity And Making The Poor Poorer" (Many people are choosing to live in more expensive and smaller spaces, and "the Gallup report lays the real blame squarely on local elected officials and the influence of incumbent homeowners that constrain supply with aggressive zoning.")
• From Professor Richard Epstein: "The Environmental Permit Menace" (his thoughts on NEPA, if you couldn't guess already)  

 

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2017 Hawaii Land Use Law Conference, January 19-20, 2017

Registration is now open for the 2017 Hawaii Land Use Conference, presented by the Hawaii State Bar Association and the University of Hawaii Law School, at the downtown Honolulu YWCA's Fuller Hall on January 19-20, 2017. "This 2 day conference is a must attend for any attorney or professional whose practice involves land use and development," as the registration web site says (we agree).  

Topics include the latest in Transit-Oriented Development, the Thirty Meter Telescope, GMO (including the recent rulings from the Ninth Circuit), and the topic we'll be presenting, "Takings: Regulatory and Physical."

The final agenda has not yet been released, but if experience is any guide, Planning Chair Professor David Callies will put together two days of timely topics, presented by distinguished faculty. 

And the cost can't be beat: $200 for members of the Real Property and Financial Services Section and government lawyers, $300 for other HSBA members, and $325 for everyone else. 

Members of the HSBA can register on line, while others need to do so on paper here or below. 

We'll post more when the agenda and faculty list is finalized. In the meantime, reserve your space, because this conference is only held once every two years, and as a consequence, the room fills up quickly. 

2017 Hawaii Land Use Law Conference brochure and registration form 

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Annual Hawaii Bar Association Land Use Update Video

Every year, our partners Greg Kugle and Mark M. Murakami update the Hawaii State Bar Associations Real Property Section on the latest decisions and issues in Hawaii and national land use law. The week before last, they did their thing, and the HSBA kindly recorded it for those of you who couldn't be there. 

Well worth watching or listening. 

Public Trust, Tidelands, And Land Titles: A Short Visit

"Petitioner owns the fee title to property known as the Ballona Lagoon, a narrow body of water connected to Marina del Rey, a manmade harbor located in a part of the city of Los Angeles called Venice. Venice is located on the Pacific Ocean between the Los Angeles International Airport and the city of Santa Monica."

Summa Corp. v. Cal. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198, 199-200 (1984). 

As you know, when we're in the neighborhood, we like to visit the sites of famous cases. In the past, we've stopped by the sites of the Hadacheck, Kaiser Aetna, Nollan, Dolan, and PruneYard cases.

Here's the latest, the location of a somewhat obscure case (if any Supreme Court case can be called "obscure"), smack dab in the middle of urban Los Angeles. As the above quote from the case notes, Ballona Lagoon lies between Venice Beach and Marina del Rey, and when visiting either of these places, it would be pretty easy to overlook this tucked-away site. Whatever the dispute was, today the site is tranquil and the main features are some very nice homes and a hiking trail. And wetlands, tidelands, and some nature. If Southern California's beaches aren't occupying all of your attention when you are in this part of LA, check it out next time you're nearby.      

"The present case arises from a lawsuit brought by respondent city of Los Angeles against petitioner Summa Corp. in state court, in which the city alleged that it held an easement in the Ballona Lagoon for commerce, navigation, and fishing, for the passage of fresh waters to the Venice Canals, and for water recreation. The State of California, joined as a defendant as required by state law, filed a cross-complaint alleging that it had acquired an interest in the lagoon for commerce, navigation, and fishing upon its admission to the Union, that it held this interest in trust for the public, and that it had granted this interest to the city of Los Angeles. The city's complaint indicated that it wanted to dredge the lagoon and make other improvements without having to exercise its power of eminent domain over petitioner's property."

"The trial court ruled in favor of respondents, finding that the lagoon was subject to the public trust easement claimed by the city and the State, who had the right to construct improvements in the lagoon without exercising the power of eminent domain or compensating the landowners. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the ruling of the trial court. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal.3d 288, 644 P.2d 792 (1982). In the Supreme Court of California, petitioner asserted that the Ballona Lagoon had never been tideland, that even if it had been tideland, Mexican law imposed no servitude on the fee interest by reason of that fact, and that even if it were tideland and subject to a servitude under Mexican law, such a servitude was forfeited by the failure of the State to assert it in the federal patent proceedings. The Supreme Court of California ruled against petitioner on all three of these grounds. We granted certiorari, 460 U.S. 1036 (1983), and now reverse that judgment, holding that even if it is assumed that the Ballona Lagoon was part of tidelands subject by Mexican law to the servitude described by the Supreme Court of California, the State's claim to such a servitude must have been presented in the federal patent proceeding in order to survive the issue of a fee patent."

Petitioner's title to the lagoon, like all the land in Marina del Rey, dates back to 1839, when the Mexican Governor of California granted to Augustin and Ignacio Machado and Felipe and Tomas Talamantes a property known as the Rancho Ballona. The land comprising the Rancho Ballona became part of the United States following the war between the United States and Mexico, which was formally ended by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. 9 Stat. 922. Under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States undertook to protect the property rights of Mexican landowners, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Art. VIII, 9 Stat. 929, at the same time settlers were moving into California in large numbers to exploit the mineral wealth and other resources of the new territory. Mexican grants encompassed well over 10 million acres in California, and included some of the best land suitable for development. H.R.Rep. No. 1, 33d Cong., 2d Sess., 4-5 (1854).

To fulfill its obligations under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and to provide for an orderly settlement of Mexican land claims, Congress passed the Act of March 3, 1851, setting up a comprehensive claims settlement procedure. Under the terms of the Act, a Board of Land Commissioners was established with the power to decide the rights of "each and every person claiming lands in California by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government. . . ." Act of Mar. 3, 1851, § 8, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 632. The Board was to decide the validity of any claim according to "the laws, usages, and customs" of Mexico, § 11, while parties before the Board had the right to appeal to the District Court for a de novo determination of their rights, § 9; Grisar v. McDowell, 6 Wall. 363, 73 U. S. 375 (1868), and to appeal to this Court, § 10. Claimants were required to present their claims within two years, however, or have their claims barred. § 13; see Botiller v. Dominguez, supra. The final decree of the Board, or any patent issued under the Act, was also a conclusive adjudication of the rights of the claimant as against the United States, but not against the interests of third parties with superior titles. § 15.

In 1852, the Machados and the Talamantes petitioned the Board for confirmation of their title under the Act. Following a hearing, the petition was granted by the Board, App. 21, and affirmed by the United States District Court on appeal, id. at 22-23.

. . . 

The Secretary of the Interior subsequently approved the survey, and in 1873, a patent was issued confirming title in the Rancho Ballona to the original Mexican grantees. Id. at 101-109. Significantly, the federal patent issued to the Machados and Talamantes made no mention of any public trust interest such as the one asserted by California in the present proceedings. 

. . . 

The question we face is whether a property interest so substantially in derogation of the fee interest patented to petitioner's predecessors can survive the patent proceedings conducted pursuant to the statute implementing the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. We think it cannot.

In the end, a unanimous Court upheld private title. Because the owners possessed a federal patent pursuant to the United States' treaty obligations, that was superior to the tidelands trust. This case settled the title for other, similarly-situated properties up and down California. 

If California's history, land titles, treaties, and the Supreme Court isn't your thing, the beach is only a block away.

Hawaii Supreme Court Amicus Brief: In Eminent Domain, Parcels Need Not Abut In Order To Be Considered Part Of A Larger Tract

Here's the latest in that case we told you about a couple of months ago, a published ruling in an eminent domain case from the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals. We wrote that in our view, the court got it really wrong on one of the three issues in the case, whether two parcels which the condemnee alleged he used together could be considered the "larger tract" for purposes of severance damages.

The case involves three parcels on Kauai -- one of which is owned by a fellow who has been a thorn in the County's side -- which were condemned by the County for the expansion of a public beach park. The County was taking Parcels 49, 33, and 34. Sheehan owned 49, and HRH, a corporation, owned 33 and 34. Sheehan asserted his use of Parcel 49 stretched across 33, 34, and Area 51 -- a portion of another Parcel but not a separate record lot. He claimed to use Area 51 pursuant to an easement.

Parcel 49 (green)

Parcel 33 (pink)

Parcel 34 (yellow)

Area 51 (blue)

The court of appeals held that Hawaii law requires that two parcels abut before a jury can consider them part of a larger parcel. The property owned by the condemnee was separated from the other parcel he claimed to use, and not physically connected. The condemnee claimed he used the two parcels together as a boat yard, and therefore the taking of his property damaged his use of the other.

The ICA held that the owner "cannot satisfy the physical unity requirement” because the two parcels Petitioners claim to use together are separated by two others. County of Kauai v. Hanalei River Holdings, Ltd., No. CAAP-14-0000828, slip op. at 31; 2016 Haw. App. LEXIS 224, at *10 (2016). The ICA asserted the "must touch" test was established by the Hawaii Supreme Court in City and County of Honolulu v. Bonded Investment Co., Ltd., 54 Haw. 523, 511 P.2d 163 (1973), which, in the ICA's view, required "that all of the pertinent lots abut one another." Slip op. at 20.

The property owner applied for cert (we don't call them "petitions" in Hawaii, but rather "applications for certiorari"), and the first of the three Questions Presented asks, "[m]ust two parcels physically abut in order for the jury to consider whether they are part of a larger parcel?" The County opposed the application.

We thought the erroneous larger parcel analysis by the court of appeals was too important an issue to let it go, especially in a published opinion that would control future cases. So yesterday, on behalf of the Owner's Counsel of America and the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, we filed an amici brief in support of the property owner on the first Question Presented.

We'll let you read the briefs, but to give you a flavor, here's the Summary of Argument. In short, we're asking the Supreme Court do one of two things: either accept cert and overturn the ICA's "must touch" holding, or partially depublish the portion of the ICA's opinion which sets out the faulty analysis: 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Two parcels need not abut in order for an eminent domain jury to consider whether they are components of a larger parent tract. This court endorsed the national majority rule when it held that separate use, and not separate location, is the “factor [which] is controlling here on the question of whether [the three lots in that case] constituted one tract of land.” Id. at 527, 511 P.2d at 166 (“It is clear to us that the owners not only by choice and design had separated the use of Lot 65 from Lots 59 and 60 . . .”). The overwhelming weight of authority nationwide similarly rejects per se rules, and is in accord with Bonded Investment’s approach.

The ICA, however, concluded that Petitioners “cannot satisfy the physical unity requirement” because the two parcels Petitioners claim to use together are separated by two others. Cnty of Kauai v. Hanalei River Holdings, Ltd., No. CAAP-14-0000828, slip op. at 31; 2016 Haw. App. LEXIS 224, at *10 (2016) (Petitioners’ Parcel 49 “is not adjacent to [Petitioners’] ‘Area 51.’”). The court established a bright-line requirement never before seen in Hawaii law, concluding that two parcels claimed by a property owner to be parts of a larger parcel must “abut one another.” Id., slip op. at 32, 2016 Haw. App. LEXIS at *10 (“we reject Sheehan’s argument that under Bonded Inv. II there is no requirement that all of the pertinent lots abut one another”). Unless this court corrects this ruling, the physical contiguity requirement adopted by the ICA is precedential, and will be applied by the lower courts to the detriment of property owners, by depriving them of their right to have a jury consider all evidence of the economic damages caused by a taking.

Determination of just compensation and damages is not one-size-fits-all, but requires legal rules that accommodate the facts specific to each case. For example, in State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand & Gravel, 468 P.2d 306 (Idaho 1970), the court recognized that the condemnation of a gravel pit resulted in severance damages to the owner’s gravel processing plant. After all, the owner no longer had use for a plant to process gravel, because after his pit was condemned, he no longer had any gravel to process. The ICA would have cut off that inquiry, however, merely because the processing plant was located four and a half miles away. Id. at 309. Categorical rules ignore the facts in each case, and emphasize the efficiency of summary judgment over the reality that property owners very often use separate parcels of land as a single economic unit. But if an intervening river doesn’t prohibit the jury determining that the condemnation of one parcel damaged another, then neither should being separated by Parcels 33 and 34. See Town of Jupiter v. Alexander, 747 So.2d 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (parcels separated by Loxahatchee River). If seventeen nautical miles of open ocean aren’t a categorical bar, neither are the few yards in the case at bar. See Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 391, 395 (1st Cir.) (condemnation on island of Vieques caused severance damages to parcels on Puerto Rico), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 772 (1944).

We are in the midst of the Honolulu rail, the largest transportation project in Hawaii’s history, in which the condemnation of private property is an essential component. The court must ensure that the governing law correctly guides the lower courts, and protects the rights of property owners who are entitled to just compensation—“the full and perfect equivalent” of the property taken. See United States v. Klamath & Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119, 123 (1938). Condemnors must also provide damages under article I, section 20 of the Hawaii Constitution, including severance damages to the remaining property when only a portion is taken. See Terr. v. Honolulu Plantation Co. 34 Haw. 859 (Terr. 1939) (severance damages mandated by Hawaii Constitution).

This brief makes two points. First, the three unities are not inflexible, as the ICA concluded. There is no need for parcels to touch. The ICA’s ruling is contrary to both Bonded Investment and the overwhelming majority of other courts nationwide. Second, having been published, the ICA’s opinion is precedent. If left unreviewed by this court, the ICA’s erroneous larger parcel analysis will be applied in future eminent domain actions; if this court rejects certiorari, it should nevertheless ensure the ICA ruling has no precedential effect.

For its part, the County's opposition brief doesn't really focus on the ICA's "must touch" ruling, instead arguing that the property owner couldn't show severance damages, because he didn't introduce any proof that he used the two parcels together.

The ICA's emphasis on the physical unity prong of the test is clearly understandable in light of the fact that it had maps in front of it that showed Parcel 49 was physically remote from Area 51, and Petitioners had put nothing in the record showing that there was a unity of use of the two parcels. While Petitioners now argue that the ICA erred because the more modern trend is to emphasize unity of use over physical unity (e.g., App. at 5-6), in fact there was no evidence in the record as to unity of use.

Opp. at 8.

Indeed, the County was going to get summary judgment anyway, since the owner had no right to use the separate parcel because the County had earlier revoked his boatyard permits:

As already demonstrated in this response, Sheehan could not use Parcel 49 or Area 51 as a boatyard. His permits had been revoked by the Kauai Planning Commission, and that revocation was subsequently upheld by the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit and he ICA, and certiorari review was subsequently denied by this Court. Although the revocation was technically not final at the time of the condemnation trial because it was being appealed, there is now no question that Petitioners could not have legally used Parcel 49 and Area 51 for a boatyard, and thus there was no unity of use.

Opp. at 9.

Stay tuned. In certiorari proceedings, the parties usually do not file additional briefs, unless the Supreme Court asks for them. We'll let you know what happens.  

Brief Amici Curiae of Owners' Counsel of America and Nat'l Federation of Independent Business Small Business...

Application for Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court, County of Kauai v. Hanalei River Holdings, Ltd., N...

2

Plaintiff/Appellee/Respondent County of Kauai&#x27;s Response to Defendants/Appellants/Petitioners&#x27; Ap...

Maine Supreme Court Considers Public Prescriptive Easements For Beach Access

Apparently (if the level of media coverage is any measure), the question of public access to beaches is a big thing in Maine:

• After Harpswell court case, public use surges on beaches
• Opponent of Harpswell beach access puts property up for sale
• Maine’s high court hears arguments in beach access case in Harpswell
• Maine high court reverses decision giving public access to Harpswell beach
• Owner of Harpswell beach road says it will remain open — for now

This question has also already resulted in a couple of decisions which we've covered:

• Maine: On Second Thought, We Were Right When We Said That Beach Property Is Not Subject To Special Rules
• New Cert Petition: By Upholding Public Beach Road Access, Maine Supreme Court Judicially Took Our Driveway

And here's the latest, an opinion from the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Cedar Beach/Cedar Island Supporters, Inc. v. Gables Real Estate LLC, No. Cum-14-531 (July 19, 2016). The court concluded that the owners of the road had not acquiesced in light of Maine law's presumption that the owner has granted the public permission to use uncultivated land for recreational use. To rebut the presumption, the party claiming a public prescriptive easement must show 20 years of continuous public use. 

The trial court agreed with the claimants, concluding that they showed adversity and acquiescence because of the history of "loud parties" on the beach, the fact that the public littered on the road, and because a chain-link fence erected 40 years ago was later removed. The Supreme Court rejected the first two reasons, holding that the parties took place on the beach and not on the road, and "littering is not the type of hostile action that shows disregard of the owner's claims entirely and use of the land as though the claimant owned the property." Slip op. at 10. Littering is bad, but it's not adverse. Got it.

The fence removal was the most problematic. But it was not enough: the court concluded that it was a single instance, and "one or two" incidents of acquiescence are not enough to prove adversity. The erection of the fence "evidenced a clear demonstration of nonacquiescence sufficient to defeat the creation of a public prescriptive easement at that time." Slip op. at 12 (emphasis added). But the converse was not also true, and the removal alone wasn't enough to prove acquiescence.

Thus, the court presumed that the owners allowed the public to use the road for recreational purposes. Access denied.  

Big thanks to our Maine (and State and Local Govt Section) colleague, Mike Dumas, for monitoring these cases, and sending the opinion along. 

Cedar Beach/Cedar Island Supporters, Inc. v. Gables Real Estate LLC, No. Cum-14-531 (Me. July 19, 2016)

Amici Brief: If A Legislature Or Court Moves The Public Trust Shoreline Inland, It's A Taking

Here's the amicus brief we filed yesterday on behalf of lawprof David Callies and our colleagues at Owners' Counsel of America in an important case involving ownership and use of the "dry sand" beach, now pending in the North Carolina Supreme Court.  

In Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, No. COA15-169 (N.C. App. Nov. 17, 2015), the court of appeals held that the dry sand portion of the beach -- the part between the mean high water mark and the dune or vegetation line -- is subject to the public trust. Consequently, the Town was not liable for a regulatory taking when it allowed the public, for a fee, to drive on the beach. The Nies family, which thought it owned the property inland of the MHWM under long-standing North Carolina law, and that the public trust only applied to property seaward of the MHWM, sought compensation.  The North Carolina Supreme Court granted discretionary review. 

The ownership of the dry sand beach isn't an issue limited to North Carolina, and indeed is a burgeoning question nationwide, as state and local government seek to expand the public beaches, but want to do so without condemning and paying for the private rights impacted.  

Our brief argues:

The Court of Appeals permitted the Town of Emerald Isle (Town) to impress into public service the portion of the Nies family’s property above the mean high water mark as a road and park. North Carolina law has never subject this dry sand to public ownership, through the public trust doctrine or otherwise. The Court of Appeals, however, ignored this distinction, holding that the Town’s permitting the public to use the Nies’ dry sand was not a taking because the Nies never owned the right to exclude the public. This Court should reverse, and reconfirm—in accordance with its existing precedents and the vast majority of other jurisdictions—that the public trust is limited to land below the mean high water mark, and cannot be extended by the legislature or by a court to insulate the Town from avoiding its constitutional obligations to condemn the property and pay just compensation under the law of the land clause and the Fifth Amendment. Simply put, the public trust doctrine isn’t a means to transform what has always been private property under North Carolina law into a public resource, without compensation.

Affirming the court of appeals would put North Carolina into a distinct minority: Every state, with a handful of exceptions, limits the public's rights at the mean high or low water marks. See Br. at 11-15.

We'll put up the property owners' merits brief and the other amicus brief, in a separate post. 

[Proposed] Brief of Amici Curiae Owners' Counsel of America and Professor David L. Callies, Nies v. To...

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California Coastal Development In A Nutshell: Hire Jesus - Moses, Actually - To Sell Your Luxe Home Plans, And Become One With The Mountain.

A good story for your weekend reading from the Los Angeles Times, "U2's The Edge and his decade-long fight to build on a pristine Malibu hillside," about the rock guitarist's decade-long effort to build his dream home compound in the exclusive coastal town. Running smack dab in to the California Coastal Commission, this was a clash between a guy who is touted as being "an activist, an artist, that made his money from spreading peace and love in the world," and people whom you might expect would support a guy like The Edge. 

Yeah, but it's still filthy lucre, and even Mr. Edge's donation of a public-access hiking easement and $1 million to maintain it were not enough. 8-4, project denied. 

Not until the Coastal Commission's Director-For-Life died, and The Edge replaced his project manager with "an artist and sometime model, who had interrupted his architecture career in 2007 to play the title role in a National Geographic documentary, 'The Missing Years of Jesus'" (a guy whose name is also biblical, Moses Hacmon), did things start falling into place.

"We are artists," Hacmon told the commissioners. "For us, the mountain is the sculpture, and our inspiration…our intention is to disappear and become one with the mountain."

Who could possibly argue with that? The 8-4 vote against the project swung to a 12-0 approval. No less than a miracle, a parting of the Red Tape. 

As you might expect -- even when a righteous dude like The Edge, an environmentalist, is the one doing the developing -- the Sierra Club has sued to overturn the Coastal Commission. 

New Cert Petition: By Upholding Public Beach Road Access, Maine Supreme Court Judicially Took Our Driveway

Here's a cert petition recently filed, which asks the U.S. Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court under a judicial takings theory.

The petitioners argue that the Maine court took their private property when it departed from its prior decisions and a statute and concluded that a road to their home was a public beach access road, and not their private driveway. 

Here are the Questions Presented:

1. Did the Maine Supreme Judicial Court effect a “judicial taking” in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when it upheld the Superior Court’s reliance upon extrinsic evidence of the intent of petitioner’s deceased predecessor in title, John McLoon, to determine that the dedication and acceptance of “Coopers Beach Road” as a public way included the Petitioner’s driveway despite the fact that the dedication petition itself failed to specifically describe the driveway or the location of the driveway as required by the applicable state statute?

2. Did the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s approval of the Superior Court’s reliance upon extrinsic evidence of Mr. McLoon’s intent in derogation of the express specificity requirements of the state statute arbitrarily deprive the Petitioners of their property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth& Amendment?

More on the case here, from the Bangor Daily News, "Couple takes Owls Head waterfront access case to US Supreme Court." More on the Maine court's ruling here ("Maine top court upholds Owls Head access to waterfront road"). 

Follow along with the Supreme Court's docket here.  

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Edwards v. Blackman, No. 15-1343 (Apr. 29, 2016)

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Cal App On Tidelands And Mexican Title: Owner Has Title In Land Used For Beach Access, But May Have Lost It By Dedication

Another day that we're tied up, so there won't be too much analysis. But we wanted to post this fascinating case out of the California Court of Appeal, Friends of Martin Beach v. Martin Beach 1 LLC, No. A142035 (Apr. 27, 2016).

As the caption of the case indicates, it involves beach access. Specifically, access to a Northern California beach that, despite some junky Yelp reviews, is apparently popular enough to spawn a "friends of" activist defense group. The Friends want access across private property owned by a really rich Silicon Valley guy. Before he owned it, they alleged, the owners let the public cross to get to the beach. The Silicon Valley guy, however, didn't continue that practice, and the lawsuit followed.

The owner claimed he had exceptionally good title, because the land, like much land in California, could trace title back to a Spanish or Mexican grant made while this was part of Alta California in the Zorro days. Title had been federally patented, and thus was free of the tidelands trust to which littoral property is usually subject. When the United States got California after the Mexican-American War, it promised in the resultant Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to recognize and protect preexisting Spanish and Mexican land grants "inviolate." In furtherance of this promise, the U.S. constituted a land commission which after a very lengthy process issued federal patents for the properties which qualified. That is a fascinating story in itself. Generally speaking, under the Equal Footing Doctrine, when a state enters the Union the new state gets title to tidelands, except in those situations where the federal government has issued such a patent.

The Friends asserted that they could access the beach pursuant to the tidelands trust, while Silicon Valley guy asserted his was one of those patented properties. The trial court granted the owner summary judgment on both his claim to patented title (thus there was no right of access under the tidelands trust), as well as his argument that the public had not acquired any rights by virtue of the alleged prior use (public dedication).

The Court of Appeal partially agreed, affirming his land is not subject to the tidelands trust. The U.S. Supreme Court (in another fascinating California case) had concluded that the trust doesn't apply to federally patented land in California. This land was similar. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment on the public dedication issue, concluding that there remain disputed facts. Case remanded for more. 

We'll have more after we have a chance to digest the opinion in detail. In the meantime, enjoy the weekend reading.

Friends of Martin Beach v. Martin Beach 1 LLC, No. A142035 (Cal. App. Apr. 27, 2016)

Another Takings Pilgrimage (Unconstitutional Conditions Technically, But Close Enough)

The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California. A quarter-mile north of their property is Faria County Park, an oceanside public park with a public beach and recreation area. Another public beach area, known locally as "the Cove," lies 1,800 feet south of their lot. A concrete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the beach portion of the Nollans' property from the rest of the lot. The historic mean high tide line determines the lot's oceanside boundary.

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)

From time-to-time, and when we're in the neighborhood, we like to drop by the sites of familiar (and famous) takings and land use cases. Like Kaiser Aetna (in our own backyard), Dolan, and PruneYard. We've been there, done that. 

So there we were in Central California (Ventura County to be exact), and we're driving up the coastal highway when around the bend comes the site of the Nollan case, the one where the California Coastal Commission tried to condition permission for Mr. Nollan to build a second story on his dream house on his giving the public access across the beach in front of his house ("makai," as we in Hawaii say).

So here you go, some photos of the lot, the beach, the other areas described in Justice Scalia's opinion, and the view from the road. These should give you a sense of what the case was about, and why it came out the way it did.

And yes, we snapped the beachside photos by only temporarily "physically occupying" the private beach, but we do recognize the gravity of our trespass. See 483 U.S. at 823 (We think a "permanent physical occupation" has occurred, for purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.").

A panorama from the ocean side, with "the Cove" on the right,
which shows the seawall and beach.

These effects of construction of the house, along with other area development, would cumulatively 'burden the public's ability to traverse to and along the shorefront.' Therefore the Commission could properly require the Nollans to offset that burden by providing additional lateral access to the public beaches in the form of an easement across their property.

And one from the road side of the lot, showing the neighboring houses,
and how the houses generally obstruct views from the road to the beach.

On remand, the Commission held a public hearing, after which it made further factual findings and reaffirmed its imposition of the condition. It found that the new house would increase blockage of the view of the ocean, thus contributing to the development of "a ‘wall' of residential structures" that would prevent the public "psychologically . . . from realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have every right to visit."

Looking east from the coastal road towards the nearby hills.
The main highway (U.S. 101) is behind that stand of palm trees. 

The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the same legitimate police power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking. We agree. Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would have protected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding construction of the new house -- for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on fences -- so long as the Commission could have exercised its police power (as we have assumed it could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of the condition would also be constitutional. Moreover (and here we come closer to the facts of the present case), the condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere.

Space for a viewing platform, anyone?

JUSTICE BRENNAN argues that imposition of the access requirement is not irrational. In his version of the Commission's argument, the reason for the requirement is that, in its absence, a person looking toward the beach from the road will see a street of residential structures, including the Nollans' new home, and conclude that there is no public beach nearby. If, however, that person sees people passing and repassing along the dry sand behind the Nollans' home, he will realize that there is a public beach somewhere in the vicinity. Post at 849-850. The Commission's action, however, was based on the opposite factual finding that the wall of houses completely blocked the view of the beach, and that a person looking from the road would not be able to see it at all.

"Lateral access"

"The Cove" (south of the lot)

Faria County Park, "a quarter-mile north of their property"

Small town.  

The Commission also noted that it had similarly conditioned 43 out of 60 coastal development permits along the same tract of land, and that, of the 17 not so conditioned, 14 had been approved when the Commission did not have administrative regulations in place allowing imposition of the condition, and the remaining 3 had not involved shorefront property.

Cal App: Intentionally Flooding Land To Protect The Environment Is A Physical Taking

A longer one from the California Court of Appeal, but unfortunately, we don't have the time to digest it in detail. But you really should read Pacific Shores Property Onwers Ass'n v. Dep't of Fish and Wildlife, No. C070301 (Jan. 20, 2016), in which the court upheld a ruling that the Department of Fish and Wildlife inversely condemned the plaintiffs' property by a physical taking, when it allowed their land to be flooded.

The interesting part of this decision is the Department's purpose in allowing the flooding, environmental protection. Local government had historically provided some flood protection to these properties by "breaching" a sandbar when the water reached a certain level. When the Department took over that function, it decreased the level of protection, and although it required the water to reach a higher level before breaching, it didn't eliminate it completely. The Department argued that it could not be liable in inverse condemnation, because the land historically was flood prone, and the only circumstance in which it could be liable is if its "conduct resulted in more water flooding plaintiffs' properties than would have flowed onto their lands without any flood protection." Slip op. at 32. In other words, some protection is better than nothing, you ingrate property owners! 

The court rejected that argument, concluding that the Department was strictly liable for its intentional conduct to flood the plaintiffs' land:

This is not a case of an agency simply altering risks to land historically subject to flooding should a flood control project fail. (See Bunch II, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 450.) This is a case where the agency intentionally ensures private property will be flooded by reducing the level of flood protection that had been historically provided, and doing so for purposes other than flood control. This intention to flood plaintiffs’ properties resembles in many respects the types of projects foreseen by the court opinions discussed above where agencies intentionally divert water to a location to protect other property.

Slip op. at 37. 

The court also rejected the Department's argument that its raising of the requirements was done as part of a flood control project (where the reasonableness standard applies, not strict liability). The court held that the reason the Department did what it did was to protect the environment and wetlands, not to prevent floods. Cheeky argument alert: we flooded your land to protect against floods.

The court concluded that the Department now has a flowage easement over the plaintiffs' properties. You broke it, you bought it.

The property owners also appealed the the trial court's rejection of their claim that the California Coastal Commission's arguably illegal exercise of regulatory authority over their lands was a regulatory taking. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the owners should have sought a writ of administrative mandamus and challenged the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction as unlawful.  

Finally, the court of appeal upheld the trial court's determination that the plaintiffs' attorneys' fee award was limited to the amounts in their contingency agreement, and could not be calculated on an hourly basis. The difference was pretty big: $45,800 in fees under the contingency agreement versus $556,210 under a straight lodestar calculation. 

Pacific Shores Property Onwers Ass'n v. Dep't of Fish and Wildlife, No. C070201 (Cal. App. Jan. 2...

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HAWSCT Oral Arguments In Seawall Hot Potato Case

A case that we've been following with some mild amusement has reached the Hawaii Supreme Court, where it was argued last week.

Our amusement stems from the fact that shoreline and beachfront property in Hawaii -- especially when that property is in the fabled "Gold Coast" of Waikiki at the foot of Diamond Head -- is usually fought over by those wanting to own it. But this one is different, because in this case, everybody wants the other guy to own it, because it involves a seawall that needs upkeep. And seawall upkeep don't come cheap.

We posted the trial court's decision concluding that the State of Hawaii owns it, here. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, and the State sought, and the Supreme Court granted, certiorari.

You can listen to the oral arguments -- the issues are the language of a statute, prescriptive easements, and implied dedication -- here. 

Here is the description of the case and issues from the Judiciary web site: 

This case arises from a dispute between Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee Gold Coast Neighborhood Association (Gold Coast), a non-profit organization, and Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant State of Hawai`i (the State) over who owns and is responsible for a stretch of seawall (the seawall) that is on or near the seaward boundaries of property between 2943 Kalakaua Avenue and 3019 Kalakaua Avenue on the Waikiki coastline.

On July 12, 2007, Gold Coast filed a complaint for declaratory relief, seeking an order from the court that the State is responsible to maintain and keep the seawall in good and safe condition. Subsequently, on April 26, 2010, the State filed its own complaint, also seeking an order from the court that the State does not own and is not responsible for the seawall.

On November 29, 2013, the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit court) held that the State owns the seawall and the real property under the seawall pursuant to the theories of surrender and implied dedication. The circuit court subsequently held in a separate order that Gold Coast was not entitled to attorneys’ fees because the State was protected by sovereign immunity.

Both parties appealed the circuit court’s orders. On June 30, 2015, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) issued a published opinion in which it affirmed the circuit court’s order holding that the State owns the seawall under the theories of surrender and implied dedication, and reversed the circuit court’s order denying Gold Coast attorneys’ fees, concluding that the State waived its sovereign immunity when it filed its own complaint against Gold Coast.

In its application for writ of certiorari, the State contends that the ICA erred when it held that: 1) the seawall could be transferred to the State without the State’s approval; 2) the seawall could be transferred to the State even though the seawall property owners were not parties to the case; and 3) the State waived its sovereign immunity.

We'll follow along and have more when the Supreme Court issues its ruling.

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Watch Now: Hawaii 2015 Property Litigation Update

For those of you who missed last week's Hawaii State Bar Association presentation by our Damon Key partners Mark M. Murakami (left) and Greg Kugle (right) on the significant 2014-2015 decisions by the Hawaii Supreme Court about land use, administrative appeals, quiet title, shoreline, regulatory takings and condemnation, and preemption, you're in luck: the Real Property Section recorded the session. Check it out.  

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