inversecondemnation.com

New Takings Cert Petition (Ours): Can Govt Thwart Federal Court Regulatory Takings Claims By Seeking Abstention In Favor Of State Courts?

Here's the latest in a case we've been following since before it became one of ours.

In Gearing v. City of Half Moon Bay, No. 21-16688 (Dec. 8, 2022), the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of a regulatory takings case, holding that federal courts should abstain from considering regulatory takings cases in favor of pending state court eminent domain actions, even when the condemnor instituted the state court action after the federal takings lawsuit was filed.

In the time since the Ninth Circuit issued the opinion, our law firm has joined up with our colleague Kristen Renfro who represented the owner in the court of appeals. That's why we won't be commenting further, and instead suggest you read the cert petition we filed today, chiefly authored by Counsel of Record Deborah LaFetra (lately of the Tyler v. Hennepin County takings case). 

Here is the Question Presented:

Thomas and Daniel Gearing are categorically prohibited from building on residentially zoned vacant land that the City of Half Moon Bay prefers as an open space public park. They exercised their choice of forum by filing a lawsuit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and seeking just compensation, costs, and attorneys’ fees. The City responded by filing an eminent domain lawsuit in state court that significantly limits the issues and the Gearings’ remedies. The City then convinced the federal court to abstain from deciding the Gearings’ first-filed federal lawsuit under Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). As a result of the forthcoming state court decision to which federal courts are bound to give full faith and credit, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the Gearings will be deprived of full just compensation as well as other recovery authorized by the Civil Rights Act.

The question presented is:

Whether federal courts may deprive takings claimants of their chosen forum by invoking the prudential Pullman abstention doctrine to require them to first litigate their claims in state court.

Stay tuned, as always.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gearing v. City of Half Moon Bay, No. ___ (June 1, 2023)

Tyler Takings Round-Up

Here are what others are saying about Supreme Court's recent ruling in Tyler v. Hennepin County, No. 22-166 (U.S. May 25, 2023), the case in which the Court unanimously held that the county's keeping the excess equity in Ms. Tyler's home over what she owed in property taxes and fees is an uncompensated taking of private property.

• As usual, lawprof Ilya Somin was first out of the gate with "Major Unanimous Supreme Court Victory for Property Rights in Tyler v. Hennepin County" ("While the Supreme Court decision left some notable issues unresolved, it nonetheless sets a significant precedent. Most obviously, the jurisdictions that currently authorize home equity theft—some twelve states and the District of Columbia—will no longer be allowed to do so. In addition, the holding that states cannot just redefine property rights at will has important implications for other property rights issues. It makes it harder for states to avoid takings liability.")
• Amanda Karras has this casenote at the International Municipal Lawyers Association's blog, "Supreme Court Rules Against County in Important Takings Case" ("States and local governments may also look to Nelson as guidance and provide a mechanism for the return of the surplus equity after the sale of the property.  That said, while Nelson remains good law, the question of overruling Nelson was not on the table, and it may be that such a scheme (which would allow a local government to keep surplus equity after the sale of the property if there is a mechanism for the return of the equity to the homeowner) may not be viewed favorably by the current Court and may also conflict with subsequent precedents from the Court.")
• Amy Howe, SCOTUSblog "Justices rule Minnesota county violated takings clause" ("The county pointed to a 1935 state law that strips an owner who falls behind on her property taxes of her interest in the property. Therefore, the county argued, there was no property for the government to take. The court disagreed, stressing that 'property rights cannot be so easily manipulated.' Indeed, Roberts observed, even Minnesota itself 'recognizes that in other contexts a property owner is entitled to the surplus in excess of her debt.' Although the county can sell Tyler’s condo to recover the $15,000 that she owes it, Roberts wrote, it cannot 'use the toehold of the tax debt to confiscate more property than was due.' By keeping the $25,000, Roberts concluded, the county 'effected a ‘classic taking in which the government directly appropriates private property for its own use.''
• Federalist Society webinar with Tony Francois, "Courthouse Steps Decision: Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota" ("Join us as Tony Francois provides a detailed analysis of the decision and discusses the potential implications from this landmark ruling.").

We'll update as merited.

Unanimous SCOTUS: "state law cannot be the only source" Of Property Rights, And "traditional property law principles" As Enforced By The Takings Clause Play A Role

We'll be rendering to unto Caesar, but first we must
decide: classic or creamy?

That was quick: it seems like it was only yesterday -- or maybe more accurately, less than a month ago -- that we were listening in live to the Supreme Court as it heard arguments in Tyler v. Hennepin County, No. 22-166, our law firm's case which argues that Hennepin County's keeping the excess equity in Ms. Tyler's home over what she owed in property taxes and fees is an uncompensated taking of private property and also violates the Excessive Fines Clause.

This morning, the Court issued this unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts (again proving he's the Court's "property guy"), in which the Court held that the County's seizing Ms. Tyler's condo to satisfy her tax debt and then "keeping the change" is a taking. It's a relatively short opinion with no dissents and a very short two-Justice concurring opinion laying out some thoughts on the Excessive Fines theory (which the majority avoided, see slip op. at 14 ("Because we find that Tyler has plausibly alleged a taking under the Fifth Amendment, and she agrees that relief under “the Takings Clause would fully remedy [her] harm,” we need not decide whether she has also alleged an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.")). 

We're not going to comment too much on this decision, because this is one of our firm's cases. But before we post what others are saying about it, we do have a few highlights to point out.

• As noted in this post's title, perhaps the most significant and interesting part of the opinion is the passage of page 4 and 5, where the Court finally gets to a question that we've been asking for a while: is state law the exclusive source of property law and property rights? True, state law can recognize more interests as property, but it cannot recognize less. Here's what the unanimous Court has to say about the issue:

The Takings Clause does not itself define property. Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U. S. 156, 164  (1998). For that, the Court draws on “existing rules or understandings” about property rights. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). State law is one important source. Ibid.; see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U. S. 702, 707 (2010). But state law cannot be the only source. Otherwise, a State could “sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests” in assets it wishes to appropriate. Phillips, 524 U. S., at 167; see also Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 164 (1980); Hall v. Meisner, 51 F. 4th 185, 190 (CA6 2022) (Kethledge, J., for the Court) (“[T]he Takings Clause would be a dead letter if a state could simply exclude from its definition of property any interest that the state wished to take.”). So we also look to “traditional property law principles,” plus historical practice and this Court’s precedents. Phillips, 524 U. S., at 165–168; see, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 260–267 (1946); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1001–1004 (1984).

• Thus, although Minnesota law has statutorily ipse dixited its own property law to define the excess equity as not property, the courts are not bound by the state's view of what constitutes compensable (i.e., Fifth Amendment "private") property, if "[h]istory and precedent say otherwise." Slip op. at 5. The government may have the the power to require you to pay property taxes, and the power to sell your home to exact those taxes if you fail to voluntary pony up, "[b]ut it could not use the toehold of the tax debt to confiscate more property than was due." Slip op. at 6
• OK, Chief, we get that before you ascended to the bench, as an advocate you argued Tahoe Sierra, and that you prevailed in that case. And we dig that you cite it for some good language. See, e.g., slip op. at 6 ("By doing so, it effected a “classic taking in which the government directly appropriates private property for its own use.” Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 324 (2002) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Tyler has stated a claim under the Takings Clause and is entitled to just compensation."). But come on man, you repped the government in that case! Retconning your own work only goes so far and let's just say that Tahoe Sierra isn't the best authority when you need to cite cases for property rights propositions. (But as long as you keep writing good property owner opinions as a judge, we're not going to complain too much.)
• After establishing the principle that state law cannot exclusively define the term "private property" as used in the Fifth Amendment and that history and tradition and what Justice Thurgood Marshall called "core" or "normative" property principles are part of it, the Court took a dive into history "at least as far back as Runnymeade in 1215" and the Magna Carta. Check out pages 6-9, where the opinion concludes that there is a "consensus that a government could not take more property than it was owed[.]"
• Court next rejected the County's argument that the issue was settled in Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U. S. 103 (1956), where the Court rejected a "belated" argument that the city keeping the excess equity was a taking (the owner had, until arguments in the Supreme Court, limited its arguments to due process and equal protection claims). There, unlike the County's procedure here, the taxpayer could have availed himself of a procedure to recover the surplus. But the County has no similar process, and there's "no opportunity for the taxpayer to recover the excess value; once absolute title has transferred to the State, any excess value always remains with the State." Slip op. at 11.
• The Court also rejected the County's "constructive abandonment" argument, which went like this: Ms. Tyler impliedly abandoned her property when she failed to timely pay her property taxes. The Court held no, an owner must do more than neglect to pay her taxes. This isn't akin to situations in which the Court has found abandonment, such as where owners fail to make any use of their property. Here, the "keep the change" statute "gives no weight to the taxpayer's use of the property. Indeed, the delinquent taxpayer can continue to live in her house for years after falling behind in taxes, up until the government sells it." Slip op. at 14.
• Armstrong Batsignal:

The Takings Clause “was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong, 364 U. S., at 49. A taxpayer who loses her $40,000 house to the State to fulfill a $15,000 tax debt has made a far greater contribution to the public fisc than she owed. The taxpayer must render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, but no more.

• The Court also made short work of the County's argument that Ms. Tyler lacked standing because "she did not affirmatively 'disclaim the existence of other debts or encumbrances' on her home worth more than the $25,000 surplus." Slip op. at 3. The Court concluded that (a) none of these assertions were in the record, but even if there are such encumbrances, she still plausibly alleges a financial harm because even if the tax sale extinguishes other liens on the property, Ms. Tyler remained personally liable to the other lienor. And "[h]ad Tyler received the surplus from the tax sale, she could have at the very least used it to reduce any such liability." Slip op. at 4.
• We were really wishing for a citation to Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) as a way of signaling more on the "where does property come from" issue, but were sadly disappointed. Not too much, mind you. Just a bit.

More to come as the analysis and commentary rolls in.

Tyler v. Hennepin County, No. 22-166 (U.S. May 25, 2023)

Mass SJC: Big Dig Can't Squeeze New Easement Into An Old One: Easements Taken By Eminent Domain Are Interpreted Like Every Other Easement

Check out this one from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Smiley First, LLC v. Dep't of Transportation, No. SJC-13300 (May 23, 2023). [But first, a disclosure: our law firm filed this amicus brief in support of the property owner.]

Now that that is out of the way, here's the case.

Back in 1991, MassDOT's predecessor-in-interest took an easement by eminent domain for the relocation of Conrail facilities displaced by the infamous Big Dig project. The 1991 takings order described the easement taken:

"In connection with the laying out of the State highway hereinbefore described, it is necessary to relocate portions of railroad rights of way and land is hereby acquired for said relocation as follows:

"Easements are hereby taken in parcels 60-E-RR-1, 60-E-RR-5, and 60-E-RR-6, shown on the plan hereinafter referred to, for the relocation of facilities of the Consolidated Rail Corporation, including all trees and structures located thereon . . . .

Said easements (i) shall be used for railroad purposes only, (ii) shall not be used for the storage of any hazardous materials, hazardous wastes or hazardous substances other than in connection with the extension of Interstate Route 90 or the reconstruction of Interstate Route 93, and (iii) shall be subject to the rights of the owner of the underlying fee as hereinafter provided. . . .

Slip op. at 5.

Flash forward a few decades and MassDOT wants to use that same easement for "construct[ing] a test track and a 6,000 square foot building for newly purchased subway cars." Slip op. at 2. That, in MassDOT's view, is a "railway purpose," and within the scope of the taken easement. But to the property owner (by now, Smiley), this was a new use of the old easement. So, MassDOT, time to think about buying it, or if we're not willing to sell, then another taking along with just compensation provided. But MassDOT didn't go in that direction, it asserted that the new use was included in the existing 1991 easement, so decided you get nothing. See slip op. at 3 ("Based on its contention that the 2018 taking merely confirmed rights that it already held under the 1991 taking, MassDOT refused to pay Smiley any compensation for the 2018 taking, and this litigation ensued.").

The trial court concluded "that easements taken by eminent domain are not to be construed in favor of the freedom of the land" as in the usual case (where the owner of the servient estate retains all uses not inconsistent with the easement), and consequently entered summary judgment for MassDOT, concluding that a test track is within the scope of the easement for "railroad purposes." Slip op. at 9-10. The trial court held that the usual rule, where the intent of the grantor and grantee control, doesn't work for eminent domain, which is not a voluntary transaction and you can't really drill down and figure out the condemnor's intent. Thus, any rules of construction designed to give effect to the intent of the parties are not helpful.

The SJC reversed, and entered summary judgment for the owner. Yes, intent is not relevant, but the other rules of construction still apply. Slip op. at 11. And the big rule in construing easements is that any doubts about whether a use is included in the easement should be resolved in favor of freedom of land from the servitude. In other words, a narrow construction in favor of the owner of the servient estate (Smiley).

With that rule (re)established, the court concluded that the purpose of the 1991 easement wasn't for general railroad purposes, but for "the laying out of the State highway[,]" and more specifically for relocating Conrail. Slip op. at 12. But what about that "railroad purposes" language? That doesn't help because it is too general, and the specific purpose controls over the general; any railroad use had to be within the scope of laying out the highway and relocating Conrail. 

The more recent easement, by contrast, "exceeds the scope of the 1991 taking" because MassDOT can use the land for testing of rail vehicles and related uses. Slip op. at 16-17. Here's how the court phrased it:

Here, whereas the purpose of the 1991 taking was to relocate railroad rights of way and Conrail's facilities, the 2018 taking provides, "[f]or the avoidance of doubt," that it encompasses the 1991 purpose, but that it also includes "all lawful railroad purposes within the Commonwealth." Specifically, the 2018 taking states that it encompasses, "without limitation," testing, calibration, and storage of any type of railroad vehicle, and the associated uses such as parking that are necessary to those primary uses.

The Red Line test track project, which falls within this language, is a new and different project from the original relocation of Conrail's railroad track and facilities. It involves an additional 6,000 square foot building, a different type of railroad car, and a considerably larger portion of the burdened land than did the single track originally constructed by Conrail pursuant to the 1991 easement.

Slip op. at 17-18.

The SJC rejected each of MassDOT's counterarguments, concluding that "[b]ecause the scope of the 2018 easement exceeded the scope of the 1991 easement, it represented an additional taking. Accordingly, Smiley's claim for damages under G.L. c. 79 should not have been dismissed, and, on remand, Smiley is entitled to pursue its claim for damages." Slip op. at 24.

Smiley First, LLC v. Dep't of Transportation, No. SJC-13300 (Mass. May 23, 2023)

Iowa Trial Court: Pipeline Precondemnation Entry Statute Is Facially Unconstitutional

When a court's opinion (even a trial court's opinion) starts out with the epigram, "'Freedom and property rights are inseparable, you cannot have one without the other.'- George Washington," you know you are in for a ride.

So begins the opinion of the Clay County, Iowa District Court in Navigator Heartland, LLC v. Koenig, No. EQCV034863 (May 3, 2023). The issue was the validity under the Iowa Constitution of Iowa's precondemnation entry statute, which allows pipeline condemnors to enter property for land surveys:

After the informational meeting or after the filing of a petition if no informational meeting is required, a pipeline company may enter upon private land for the purpose of surveying and examining the land to determine direction or depth of pipelines by giving ten days’ written notice by restricted certified mail to the landowner as defined in section 479B.4 and to any person residing on or in possession of the land. The entry for land surveys shall not be deemed a trespass and may be aided by injunction. The pipeline company shall pay the actual damages caused by the entry, survey, and examination.

Navigator wanted to enter Koenig's land to conduct surveys in anticipation of condemnation. Koenig objected, and the court held a trial at which it heard testimony about the scope of the proposed entries. One witness:

identified the four types of surveys typically performed on each affected property; these include a civil survey, a biological/environmental survey, a cultural survey, and a geotechnical survey. Each of the four surveys are completed at separate times, thus at a minimum, surveyors would expect to enter onto the private land on at least four separate occasions. She additionally testified that Navigator typically hires third parties to perform each of the surveys. She conceded that her lay understanding of the Iowa Code §479B.15 does not limit the duration or number of times surveys may occur so long as they are confined to surveying purpose for the proposed pipeline path.

Opn. at 3.

The property owner argued that the statute effects a facial taking by requiring owners to open their properties to third parties without compensation: "Koenig asserts that Iowa Code §479B.15 strips landowners of their right to exclude by statutorily allowing pipeline companies to come onto private land to perform certain surveying operations, which amounts to a per se taking. Additionally, Koenig argues that the statute does not provide for just compensation in accordance with Article I section 18 of the Iowa Constitution." Opn. at 6-7.

The court noted that until recently, Penn Central "had been the leading approach to determine whether a regulatory use restriction amounts to a taking." Opn. at 8. But Cedar Point changed that, according to the court: if there's a physical invasion, that's a taking, after which the question becomes whether the government has provided compensation. 

But, the court also noted, "Cedar Point did not open the door for all government-authorized physical invasions to amount to takings[,]" if those invasions are "consistent with longstanding background restrictions on property rights." Opn. at 9.

Thus, the critical question is: are these private pipeline precondemnation invasions consistent with those background principles? The court held no, they are not. "The Court observes important similarities between the facts of this case and Cedar Point."

Like the private labor organizations in Cedar Point, Navigator presently seeks to repeatedly enter onto privately owned land despite a lack of consent from the landowner. While true the California statute in Cedar Point allowed labor organizations to enter on the property for up to 120 days per year three hours per day whereas Navigator is seeking to enter for no more than four days (ranging from thirty minutes to eight hours at a time); the Court is leery to enter into too much detailed comparison of the intrusive nature of the invasion because, as Cedar Point makes clear, the frequency and duration of the invasion is no longer relevant. Id. at 2074 (“the fact that a right to take access is exercised only from time to time does not make it any less a physical taking” and “the duration of an appropriation—just like the size of an appropriation—bears only on the amount of compensation.”)

Opn. at 10.

The court concluded that although survey access may be a "traditional privilege," the Supreme Court's lack of reference to such access or utility easements "leads to a conclusion." Opn. at 11. And that conclusion? Survey access is more like the union easement in Cedar Point than the background access exceptions also noted in the opinion.

In looking to the language in Iowa Code §479B.15, the Court concludes that the standards established in Cedar Point are applicable. The statute is not a use restriction which can be analyzed under the Penn Central “Takings Test”. Rather, because the statute grants pipeline companies right to physically enter and occupy privately owned land, the statute appropriates a right to invade the landowner’s property. When such appropriation occurs, the Court follows the traditional rule “Because the government appropriated a right to invade, compensation is due.” Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2076.

The Court finds that Iowa Code section 479B.15 appropriates Koenig’s right to exclude others from his privately owned land. Without Iowa Code §479B.15, Koenig would have had the right under Iowa law to exclude the pipeline company and any third-party surveyors from hi property. Because the statute amounts to a government authorized physical invasion, and additionally appropriates Koenig’s right to exclude, the Court is convinced Iowa Code §479B.15 effects a per se taking for which just compensation is required. 

Opn. at 12.

The court also concluded that the statute does not provide just compensation. Yes, the statute requires the pipeline company entering private property to pay "actual damages" caused by the invasion or occupation, but does not, on its face, require just compensation for the invasion if there's no physical damage resulting:

However, if no physical damage is done to the private property, does Iowa Code §479B.15 still require compensation to the landowner for the government-authorized taking? §479B.15 says no and any other interpretation of such is unreasonable. At the end of trial Navigator argued that the distinction between “actual damages” and per se damage is a distinction without a difference. Navigator’s counsel argued that Koenig’s “actual damage” is any damage that he may claim. The Court does not find such interpretation to be reasonable because the damage has to be “actual” and cannot be subjective. It has to be reasonably ascertainable. The statute requires such.

Opn. at 16 (footnote omitted).

A property owner may not be able to easily ascertain the extent of the economic damages caused by a precondemnation survey entry. The damages caused may be pretty subjective, and similar to pain and suffering in tort law. "Therefore, a clear and common sense reading of Iowa Code §479B.15 is that, if by going onto private property to survey, a pipeline company causes actual damage to the property, compensation is required to cover the damages. However, because non actual damages resulting from the government authorized taking are subjective and not readily ascertainable, the Court cannot interpret the meaning of 'actual damages' within the statute to cover a per se taking in and of itself. To find otherwise would deprive 'actual damages' of all its ordinary meaning." Opn. at 17.

Finally, the court concluded that the usual presumption of constitutionality does not save the statute, because there's no reasonable alternative construction the court might give it.

All we can say is wow.

Trial Ruling on Defendant's Counterclaim re: Constitutionality of Iowa Code § 479B.15, Navigator Heartland...

Condemnation 101: Preparing & Presenting an Eminent Domain Case Webcast (May 18, 2023)

Missed out on the 2023 ALI-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation Conference back in February in Austin, and the legendary "Condemnation 101" track?

Well, here's your chance to get the knowledge. On May 18, 2023, ALI-CLE is going live with a rebroadcast of that program, including real-time Q & A with the program Planning Co-Chairs.

As we've noted before, the Condemnation 101 program is a great "basic training" program for lawyers new to the eminent domain and takings practice. But it is also a fantastic refresher course for those experienced dirt lawyers looking to brush up on the fundamentals.

CLE credits are available, of course. And unlike the in-person program back in February, there's no danger of ice storm delays!

More about the program here, including registration information, fees, the agenda, and the faculty. And, just because you are a reader of this blog, you can get an additional $50 off the registration -- just enter COND50 in the box during checkout. Or, alternatively, bring a friend and get the group discount an even better deal.

We missed out on most of the Condemnation 101 program back in February because we had our own chairing duties in the room next door. So we may be in the audience along side of you on May 18 for this very popular and useful program.

See you there.

SCOTUS GVR's Pipeline Cert Petition On Delegation Of Eminent Domain To Private Parties

In this Order, the Supreme Court granted this cert petition which presents these questions:

Whether a facial challenge to Congress’s delegation of eminent domain power to private parties is properly filed in district court, as this Court held in PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141 S. Ct. 2244 (2021), or with FERC, which has admitted it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of this delegation.

Whether a facial challenge to Congress’s overly broad delegation of legislative power to FERC is properly filed in district court or with FERC, which has admitted it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of this delegation.

Whether a facial challenge to Congress’s delegation of eminent domain power to FERC is properly filed in district court or with FERC, which has admitted it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of this delegation.

As the Order notes:

Petition GRANTED. Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED for further consideration in light of Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, 598 U. S. ___ (2023).

So what is this Axon case the Court refers to? You might want to read some of the amicus briefs filed in the case to find out. All of them are posted on the case's docket here. Or read this summary from the Federalist Society, "Supreme Court Holds That Federal District Courts Have Jurisdiction To Hear Structural Challenges To FTC And SEC."

Or better yet, we refer you to our colleague Michael Realbuto's post on the McKirdy Riskin Olson DellaPelle Condemnation Blog, "SCOTUS Sends Pipeline Eminent Domain Case Back to the District Court." Our read of Axon is that you don't have to ask an agency to pass on the constitutionality of its own actions or the scope of its authority. As Michael writes:

On April 14, 2023, the Court released a unanimous 9-0 decision in Axon holding the district court retains § 1331 jurisdiction over structural separation-of powers challenges because that type of separation-of-powers injury cannot be remedied by the agency itself or the court of appeals. The Court’s April 2023 summary decision in the MVP matter was clearly guided by the holding in Axon and proves to be a victory for the landowners who will now have their day in Court. Notwithstanding the District Court’s ability to hear the MVP case, there are some cases on the books that the landowners must overcome. For example, in Penneast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141 S. Ct. 2244 (2021), the Supreme Court expressly held that the Federal Government can constitutionally confer on pipeline companies the authority to condemn necessary rights-of-way in which a State has an interest. While it’s going to be an uphill battle, we are tuned in to see how this fight shapes out.

What do you think will happen on remand? We think we know.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bohon v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, No. 22-256 (U.S. Sep. 15, 2022)

Tyler SCOTUS Takings Argument Round-Up

Our Pacific Legal Foundation Property Rights Litigation Tyler team,
and Counsel of Record Christina Martin (second from right)

Here are your links to the buzz about Tyler v. Hennepin County, No. 22-166, our law firm's case which argues that Hennepin County's seizure of Ms. Tyler's condo and then keeping the excess equity over what she owed in property taxes and fees, is an uncompensated taking of private property, and also violates the Excessive Fines Clause.

• Transcript and audio recording of the oral arguments.
• Kelsey Reichmann, Grandma who lost her house to debt finds high court sympathy (Courthouse News Service)
• Lawprof Ilya Somin, Unusual Cross-Ideological Agreement in Tyler v. Hennepin County (Volokh Conspiracy)
• Steve Osunsami, Laura Romero, Dr. Mark Abdelmalek, Doug Vollmayer, Supreme Court takes on what critics call predatory tax foreclosure practice (Good Morning America)
• Amy Howe, Justices appear likely to side with homeowner in foreclosure dispute (SCOTUSblog)
• Mark Sherman, Supreme Court seems to favor woman who got $0 in condo sale (Associated Press)

More on the way. Stay tuned.

Today's Takings SCOTUS Oral Argument Transcript And Recording: Tyler v. Hennepin County

Coffee is for closers.
(Yes, we were up and at the desk at 4 a.m. local time
to listen live. We just needed a direct injection of coffee.)

Here is the transcript, and the audio recording of today's U.S. Supreme Court arguments in Tyler v. Hennepin County, No. 22-166, our law firm's case which argues that Hennepin County's keeping the excess equity in Ms. Tyler's home over what she owed in property taxes and fees, is an uncompensated taking of private property, and also violates the Excessive Fines Clause.

We will bring you the analysis of the arguments and the pundits' predictions in a subsequent posts. But for the time being here these are in case you missed out listening live. Stay tuned.

Transcript, Tyler v. Hennepin County, No. 22-166 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2023)

Hawaii Supreme Court To Hear Major Severance Damages Appeal In Rail Takings Cases

Update: the court has rescheduled the arguments to June 22, 2023, at 10 a.m.

The Hawaii Supreme Court has scheduled oral arguments in an important eminent domain case about severance damages for the Honolulu Rail Authority's condemnation of land in Honolulu for one of its stations (assuming, of course, that the under-construction rail line actually gets past downtown, or simply stops where its historic predecessor, the Oahu Railway terminated more than a century ago).

Here's the details and the court's description of the issues (scroll to the bottom), from the Hawaii Judiciary's web site.

[Barista's note: we won't be commenting on this one in detail, because this was our case when we were in private practice.]

Thursday May 18, 2023 – 10 a.m.

NOS.

SCAP-22-0000335 (Consolidated with Nos. SCAP-22-0000336,
SCAP-22-0000337, SCAP-22-0000338, SCAP-22-0000340,
SCAP-22-0000341, SCAP-22-0000343 SCAP-22-0000344,
SCAP-22-0000345, AND SCAP-22-0000352)

SCAP-22-0000335, SCAP-22-0000336, SCAP-22-0000337,
SCAP-22-0000340, SCAP-22-0000341, SCAP-22-0000343,
SCAP-22-0000344, AND SCAP-22-0000345

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, acting by and through the HONOLULU AUTHORITY FOR RAPID TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff/
Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, vs. VICTORIA WARD, LIMITED, a Delaware Corporation; et al., Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, and 1240 ALA MOANA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; et al., Defendants-Appellants/ Cross-Appellees, and WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a national banking association; et al., Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellees.

SCAP-22-0000338 CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, acting by and through the HONOLULU AUTHORITY FOR RAPID TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, vs. VICTORIA WARD, LIMITED, a Delaware Corporation; et al., Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, and 1240 ALA MOANA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; et al., Defendants-Appellants/ Cross-Appellees, and WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a national banking association; et al., Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellees.

SCAP-22-0000352 CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, acting by and through the HONOLULU AUTHORITY FOR RAPID TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellant, vs. VICTORIA WARD, LIMITED, a Delaware Corporation; et al., Defendants/ Counterclaim Plaintiffs-Appellees, and 1240 ALA MOANA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; et al., Defendants-Appellees, and WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a national banking association; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

The above-captioned cases have been set for argument on the merits at:

Supreme Court Courtroom
Aliʻiōlani Hale, 2nd Floor
417 South King Street
Honolulu, HI 96813

The oral argument will also be livestreamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorneys for City and County of Honolulu, acting by and through the Honolulu Authority for Rapid Transportation:

Terence J. O’Toole, Sharon V. Lovejoy, and Lindsay E. Orman, of Starn O’Toole Marcus & Fisher; Paul S. Aoki, and Rozelle A. Agag, Deputies Corporation Counsel

Attorneys for Victoria Ward, Limited, et al.:

Mark M. Murakami, Gregory W. Kugle, Nicholas K. Ernst, and Clinton K. Hamada of Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert

NOTE: Order Granting Application for Transfer, filed 10/13/22.

NOTE: Certificate of Recusal, by Associate Justice Paula A. Nakayama, filed 4/19/23.

NOTE: Order assigning Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, R. Mark Browning due to recusal and Circuit Court of the First Circuit, Judge James S. Kawashima due to a vacancy, filed 4/19/23.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., McKenna, and Eddins, JJ., and Chief Circuit Judge Browning, in place of Nakayama, J., recused, and Circuit Judge Kawashima assigned by reason of vacancy

Brief Description:

These interlocutory appeals arise out of a condemnation action filed in 2018 by HART against Victoria Ward to take several acres of Victoria Ward’s mixed-use development community located in the Kakaʻako neighborhood of Honolulu (Ward Village). The purpose of HART’s taking was to construct a segment of railway and the Kakaʻako Station within Ward Village.

A number of the appeals at issue concern Victoria Ward’s claims for severance damages. The Hawaiʻi Community Development Authority (HCDA) issued Victoria Ward a Master Plan Permit in 2009. The Master Plan Permit states, in part: “a more detailed transit route and station location shall be addressed and incorporated.” The parties disagree as to whether this language in the Master Plan Permit, together with Victoria Ward’s conduct, preclude Victoria Ward from recovering severance damages for impacts to non-taken property.

The circuit court issued a number of summary judgment orders precluding Victoria Ward from seeking severance damages. The circuit court also ruled on several related matters, specifying that “blight of summons” interest accrual would be paused during the pendency of the interlocutory appeals, and that Victoria Ward may not recover for loss of a luxury tower that allegedly could have been built on the site of the Kakaʻako station, for relocation of units from that tower to less valuable locations, for severance damages to property stipulated to be distinct from those where condemnations took place, or for replacing lost parking if replacement costs exceed loss in value. HART appeals from other circuit court rulings, including those specifying that some of Victoria Ward’s damages may not be offset by certain alleged “special benefits” flowing from the rail project.

We granted transfer and consolidated HART and Victoria Ward’s appeals for all purposes including oral argument and disposition.

The arguments will be live-streamed if you cannot make it in person to the court.

Condemnation 101 (2023), Redux

Missed out on the 2023 ALI-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation Conference back in February in Austin, and the legendary "Condemnation 101" track?

Well, here's your chance to get the knowledge. On May 18, 2023, ALI-CLE is going live with a rebroadcast of that program, including real-time Q & A with the program Planning Co-Chairs.

As we've noted before, the Condemnation 101 program is a great "basic training" program for lawyers new to the eminent domain and takings practice. But it is also a fantastic refresher course for those experienced dirt lawyers looking to brush up on the fundamentals.

CLE credits are available, of course. And unlike the in-person program back in February, there's no danger of ice storm delays!

More about the program here, including registration information, fees, the agenda, and the faculty. And, just because you are a reader of this blog, you can get an additional $50 off the registration -- just enter COND50 in the box during checkout. Or, alternatively, bring a friend and get the group discount an even better deal.

We missed out on most of the Condemnation 101 program back in February because we had our own Chairing duties in the room next door. So we may be in the audience along side of you on May 18 for this very popular and useful program.

See you there.

Links And Materials From The 22d Annual Texas Eminent Domain Conference

Good crowd.

Here are the cases and other materials we spoke about on Friday at the 22d Annual Texas Eminent Domain Conference, in Austin. A big thank you to the Planning Chairs and to our friends at CLE International for the speaking invite.

• Sackett v. EPA (SCOTUS and WOTUS)
• Wilkins v. United States (Federal Quiet Title statute of limitations)
• Tyler v. Hennepin County (Takings, Excessive Fines - Home Equity Theft)
• Eychaner - the near-miss on revisiting Kelo
• Louisiana's successful (!) necessity challenge
• Self-executing Just Compensation: First Circuit (it is self-executing) vs Ninth Circuit (it isn't); see also Devillier v. Texas (pending)
• Property in the non-takings context: K-9 putting his paws on car is a "search" because...trespass to chattels

The other cases discussed are in your materials!

The nearby Caldwell County Courthouse. A classic.

Why did no one tell me that Jabba's Palace is in Austin?

Join Us At The 22d Annual Texas Eminent Domain Conference, April 13-14, Austin

If you are in the Austin area (or anywhere in Texas for that matter), please consider joining us April 13 and 14, 2023 for the 22d Annual Texas Eminent Domain Conference.

Two days of great programming and talking shop, plus a chance to connect and re-connect with friends and colleagues. And, of course, all the things Austin has to offer. Yes were were there not that long ago, but come on...Austin is a great conference venue, right?

We're speaking about "National Eminent Domain and Takings Trends," and the balance of the program is pretty darn good also (see here or below for the full agenda).

Registration ongoing, but space is filling up fast so don't miss out.

See you there.

Agenda & Program, 22d Annual Texas Eminent Domain Conference (CLE Int'l), Austin, Apr. 13-14, 2023)

Indiana App: This House Is "Residential Property" Qualifying It For The Statutory 150% FMV Enhancement

As part of the nationwide reaction to Kelo v. New London, Indiana adopted a statute that in some cases requires the condemnor to compensate property owners at not just fair market value, but at 150% of FMV.

As far as we can tell, the Indiana Court of Appeals' opinion in Guzzo v. Town of St. John, No. 21A-PL-2213 (Jan. 19, 2023) is the first appellate case applying that statute, or any similar law. Read on.

The statute at issue, Ind. Code § 32-24-4.5-8, sets compensation for the taking of "residential property" at 1.5x the fair market value:

Sec. 8. (a) Notwithstanding IC 32-24-1, a condemnor that acquires a parcel of real property through the exercise of eminent domain under this chapter shall compensate the owner of the parcel as follows:

....

(2) Subject to subsection (b), for residential property:

(A) payment to the owner equal to one hundred fifty percent (150%) of the fair market value of the parcel as determined under IC 32-24-1;

(The limitation noted in subsection (b) deals with the effective date of the statute after the legislature altered the text of the original statute which required the owner to have occupied the taken property.)

The court noted the issue was whether "the Guzzos' property met the definition of residential property." Slip op. at 18. The statute defines "residential property" as "real property that consists of: (1) a single[-]family dwelling that is not owned for the purpose of resale, rental, or leasing in the ordinary course of the owner’s business; and (2) the land on which the dwelling is located.” Id. The trial court concluded no, relying on a statement in the Fiscal Impact Statement that the owners had not used the house for personal use. The Court of Appeals saw the issue much more simply:

We agree with the Guzzos that the trial court erred by determining that INDIANA CODE § 32-24-4.5-6.2 was ambiguous, by relying on the Fiscal Impact Statement, and by denying the Guzzos’ request for the Town to compensate the Guzzos at the statutory rate of 150% of the fair market value of the Property as residential property. When entering its order, the trial court ignored the plain language of INDIANA CODE § 32-24-4.5-6.2, which specifically provides that residential property means “real property that consists” of “a single[-]family dwelling that is not owned for purposes of resale, rental, or leasing” and “the land on which the dwelling is located.” When interpreting this statute, we must be “mindful of both what it does say and what it does not say.” City of Lawrence, 68 N.E.3d at 585. The statute does not define residential property by stating that the property must be owned for personal use or that the owner must occupy the property as a residence. Here, the Property contained a single-family dwelling. Indeed, as the trial court determined, the Property contained a structure that had been “the family’s home.” (App. Vol. 2 at 49). Moreover, it is undisputed that it was not owned for purposes of resale, rental, or leasing. However, instead of applying the plain language of the statute, the trial court improperly relied on the Fiscal Impact Statement and injected a personal use requirement into the definition of residential property.

Slip op. at 21.

The court rejected the argument that use of the word "dwelling" implies some kind of habitability, because in a zoning case, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that, absent further definition by the legislature, the common meaning of "dwelling" means a place where people can live, and does not include any requirement of that building being actually habitable. A single-family home like the Guzzo property, is a "dwelling."

Because the Guzzos’ real property consisted of property containing a single-family dwelling that was not owned for purposes of resale, rental, or leasing, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying the Guzzos’ request for the Town to compensate the Guzzos at the statutory rate of 150% of the fair market value of the Property as residential property under INDIANA CODE § 32-24-4.5-8(a)(2).

Slip op. at 22.

One dissent, so this one may be going further.

And yes, this case involves a statutory right, not baseline constitutional principles. But still, a nice win.

Read more from the lawyers who rep the property owner here.

Guzzo v. Town of St John, No. 21A-PL-2213 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2023)

IRWA's Summary Of Major Eminent Domain Cases & Legislation (June-Dec 2022)

The International Right of Way Association's Real Estate Law Committee produces twice-a-year reports "which contain summaries of eminent domain decisions and legislation within the United States."

And what is really nice is that they make the report available.

Here's the latest.

We're posting it here because we're one of the co-authors. Hat tip to our co-authors Brad Kuhn, Jillian Friess Leivas, and Ajay Gajaria.

The report is short, and doesn't contain a lot of fluff. Just what you wanted.

Cases And Links From Today's Land Use Institute Session: "The Use of Eminent Domain for Redevelopment & Economic Development Projects"

Here are the opinions that we spoke about this afternoon at the Land Use Institute on "The Use of Eminent Domain for Redevelopment & Economic Development Projects."

• Redevelopment: You Can't Just Say "Redevelopment" - Take Now, Decide Later Isn't A Public Use
• Due Process: Before Taking Property, Condemnor Must Provide Notice Reasonably Calculated To Put The Owner On Actual Notice
• Scope of delegation: A Hospital Parking Lot Isn't An Authorized Reason To Take
• Necessity: No Necessity: Landowner Met Burden - Condemnor Did Not Consider Other Sites
  
• After the taking: First Circuit: "[T]he Fifth Amendment precludes the impairment or discharge of prepetition claims for just compensation in Title III bankruptcy."

Thanks for joining in.

Ice Ice Baby: A Report From The 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Feb 1-4, 2023, Austin

We were eagerly anticipating 40th American Law Institute-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation Conference. The 2022 Conference in Scottsdale was one of the first meetings where everyone was back in-person (and was a smashing success), but that conference was early in the game so not everyone could or would attend. But in the past year most of us got back to some semblance of "normal," and the turnout promised to be good.

We had record registrations: with over 300 attendees, faculty, and staff signed up, things were shaping up.

Plus, we were headed to Austin, Texas. The last time we held the Conference there in 2016, we loved it so much it has been in-demand for a return visit. And this year is the debut Conference for some new planning co-chairs for both the main tracks as well as the "Condemnation 101" tracks, so the buzz for the 2023 Austin Conference was building.

But then the weather reminded us that Mother Nature is often the boss. 

Very Icy Austin on Wednesday (Conference Eve).

On Tuesday, one day before the Conference was to get underway, the 2023 Central Texas Ice Storm blew in and things were gonna get (as they say) "challenging."

Austin Airport effectively shut down with few flights in or out. Planes and cancellations stacked up nationwide. And even for those nearby, slick icy roads, and seemingly everything was closed, from gas stations to hotels to restaurants. Widespread power outages. 

Were we ready with Plan B if people couldn't get on-site? Read on.

Unless you are already here or are driving,
you ain't getting to Austin via AUS any time soon, pard.

Even flying from sunny California was a problem.

Ticket agent: Austin flight cancelled. How about flying to Houston and then driving?

Me: Sure, that'll work. Just get me to Texas and I'll figure it out from there.

Improvise, adapt, overcome: planes, trains, and automobiles (and car rentals, and long-distance rideshares, and four-layovers-from-Boise flights). Jacksonville to Austin via Chicago and Nashville.

Although those of us who made it to Austin were receiving widespread reports of people delayed and rerouted, we had only a handful who said they would not be pressing forward to get here. 

When this is what greets you when you arrive
at your conference site...uh oh.

And yes, Austin was cold and icy. Most things shuttered and widespread loss of power. But the Conference venue was up and running, and throughout the day on Wednesday, faculty, staff, and attendees were showing up. Trickling in, but showing up or on the way.

When this is what you see at the United Airlines
luggage counter, you ask yourself:
Can I make my presentation in a t-shirt and sweats? (Yes!)

We had confidence, and were prepared
for everyone to get to Austin.

So the aforementioned Plan B went into effect. Agenda items shuffled from tomorrow to today because the speaker is here, now. One speaker in the room, one speaker remote. Our audience is full of experts ... say, Billy can you pinch-hit on this panel? Sure. One speaker remoting in from his (unexpected) hotel room in Phoenix and presenting, before he went to the airport in the afternoon to continue on to Austin.

And so forth. Our long-time ALI-CLE Program Attorney, Amy Weinberg (who was delayed out of Philadelphia) was working furiously behind the scenes doing a lot of juggling, updating, texting and calling, and making alternative arrangements. And the tech team from ALI-CLE was preparing for overload if needed.

Plan A: continue to set the room up, assuming everyone is here or on the
way, and we'll have most or all of our people in the room.

Our Planning Chairs were ready, even if not
all of us were actually there (yet).

Plan B: the ALI-CLE technical crew was prepared to livestream
and record the Conference if the weather made travel
to Austin impossible or infeasible.

The tech command center.

Before we go on, a big thank you to our generous sponsors.
Without your support, this Conference would not be as
good as it is, year after year.

We're underway, with a pretty good crowd.

Thursday morning, 9:00 a.m., and we're looking not too bad. A fair number of folks have pressed forward despite the weather and travel disruptions and are in the room. More report they are not tapping out, and are pressing onwards.

We have more viewers remote than we originally anticipated, but the tech is holding up.

Over the next couple of days, our lawyers, judges, legal scholars, appraisers, law students, right-of-way agents, relocation experts, property owners, and other related professionals made their way to Austin.

The fact that folks who were experiencing some rather dramatic travel difficulties and delays (ask Jack about his late night Uber from Houston airport to Austin, or how our west coasters got re-routed all over creation), didn't quit but were determined to get to Austin told us something about why this Conference has been so successful over the decades.

It's more than great programming from the nation's experts. The Conference is also an essential venue to get acquainted with new colleagues and welcome them to the Dirt Law Bar, reconnect with long-time friends, and have a bit of fun together.

Most of the Conference attendees eventually made it, and very few (reasonably) threw in the towel and turned around for home. This was the 40th edition of the Conference, and we really know why it is one of the most-established and successful conferences in the ALI-CLE stable of programs. This year's experience really drove home why we come, and why our attendees and faculty are so dedicated and committed, despite the sacrifices we make to attend or to present. 

Hybrid: Pacific Legal Foundation's John Groen
remoting in while en-route via Phoenix, and
Baylor lawprof Jessica Asbridge on
"Everything Old is New Again: Why Today’s Practitioners
Need to Understand the Original Meaning of the
Takings and Just Compensation Clauses."


The "Condemnation 101" track was wildly popular
both with new members of the Eminent Domain Bar,
as well as old hands. Standing room only throughout the day.

We also had reports from the field that the remote viewing
was going well. Here's how we looked in the
mountains of North Carolina.

Let's not forget the substance of the Conference.
Lots of practical learning. Here's Hawaii's Mark Murakami
and Virginia's Steve Clarke on "Avoiding the Real Jeopardy:  
Structuring Eminent Domain Settlements."
And no, two-time Jeopardy! champion Steve did not
give answers in the form of a question.

Weather throughout Wednesday and Thursday was icy and nasty,
but towards the end of Thursday seemed to be clearing up.

Consequently, the view from the podium looked better and better
with more showing up and more reporting they were nearly there.

The programming at the Conference is traditionally
a mix of practical subjects and the more theoretical.
Here's one of the highlight latter programs,
Alan Ackerman (Michigan), Matthew Ackerman (also Michigan),
and Steve Davis (Missouri) on "What Does the Supreme Court
Mean When it Says Just Compensation is “Self-Executing?"

There's an ethics program, naturally, for those of us in jurisdictions
with mandatory CLE requirements. But we try and not do "typical"
(i.e., boring) ethics programs. Here's Sarah Kellner (Colorado) and
Shane Rayman (Ontario, CN) on "Ethics: Building Your Practice
by Mentoring the Next Generation of Eminent Domain Professionals."

An example of our practice-oriented programming: Tony DellaPelle
(New Jersey), Bernadette Duran-Brown (California), 
and Andrew Lines (Illinois) on "Preparing Your Expert
Witness to Shine in Virtual Proceedings:
Tools and Tips For Trial Lawyers." 

Andrew actually pretended he was far, far away for his "deposition"
when he was in fact one floor up from the Conference room.
Way to go all-in.

Thanks to our generous sponsors, we were able to avoid Austin's
icy roads and have our Mickelthwait barbecue
brought in for lunch. Was it well-received? See for yourself. Line
was through the lobby and nearly out the front door.

Thank you to Texas Supreme Court Justice Jimmy Blacklock
for speaking on "Developing Property Right Issues in Texas,
Questions and Answers with Justice Jimmy Blacklock"
(interviewed by Justin Hodge (Texas)

It was not an echo-chamber either. Here, in a hotly-debated
session, Jeff Redfern (Virginia), Steve Silva (Nevada), and
Lawprof Emilio Longoria (St Mary's Law, Texas)
debate "When the SWAT Team Comes (No) Knocking:
Police Power Takings."

Jeff, Steve, and Prof Longoria's session got everyone's blood pumping.

It wasn't all serious, and we had a bit of fun.
Like this after-hours live edition of the Eminent Domain & Right of Way
Clubhouse with Beth Smith (Wisconsin), Patrick McAllister (Indiana)
and some dude who was having a post-CLE session beer.

Some of our faculty are more formal and like to speak
standing at the lectern. Here, Pacific Legal Foundation's Jon Houghton
(New Jersey) and Ben Stormes (Montana) on
"Avoiding Pitfalls When Trying a Penn Central Case:
Lessons From the Takings Trenches."

Others are less formal, and speak while sitting
(and wildly gesticulating to make sure you are paying attention).
Kristen Renfro (California), and some guy on
"Your Regulatory Takings Case is in Federal Court – Now What?"

By Friday morning, the Austin weather was looking up. Really up.
And we nearly had everyone in the room.
By hook or by crook, most everyone was there.

By Friday were were pretty much back to normal.
Nearly all faculty and all attendees in the room.
And thus we turned it over to our Saturday morning stalwarts,
starting with Jim Burling, here speaking about "The Many Theories of
Property - Do They Matter in Court?" (and Pufendorf)

No one wanted to miss Michael Berger's "Regulatory Takings Update"
on Saturday morning either.

When you can fill this many seats at a CLE conference on a
Saturday morning after two full days of programming,
you know your speakers are the
right ones (thank you Jim and Michael).

After Jim and Michael did their thing, we held our "National Forum,"
a moderated "open-mic" session where Conference attendees
take to the podium and speak about their case or issue,
or crowdsource a question. Here, Pacific Legal
Foundation's Kady Valois, speaking about
our firm's latest takings cert grant.

We were happy to announce that the 41st ALI-CLE Eminent Domain &
Land Valuation Litigation Conference will be held February 1-3, 2024,
at the JW Marriott in New Orleans.
Save the date!

Ivy Cadle (Georgia - Go Dawgs!) is already planning his trip to
#EminentDomain 2024 in New Orleans.
See you there, Ivy.

With the programming wrapped up, it was time for farewells
and thank yous. Here, four of our law students from William and Mary Law,
who took the time out of their schedules to make their way to
Austin for some real-world learning and networking.
Well done, new colleagues!

Even after the proceedings closed, there was more work to be done.
Here, the ALI-CLE Tech Team breaks it down, after successfully
guiding us through the past four days. They are a large part of the
reason why this Conference works so well (plus, they make the
speakers look really good on camera).

To those who joined us - in-person or on-line, thank you. This conference reminded us of why this program is so successful, and why we all return year-after-year.

To those of you who didn't (or couldn't) join us, here's what you missed. You need to remedy that, and come join us next year in New Orleans...

We'll see you in New Orleans for
#EminentDomain2024!
(Want to keep the conversation going in the
interim? Join the ALI-CLE Eminent Domain Conference
page on LinkedIn.)

We're Remote, So It's Easy To Join Us For The 36th Annual Land Use Institute

Land users: come join us online for the 36th Annual Land Use Institute. Yes, the venerable program is back again, with the usual line up of dirt law experts covering all you need to know and bringing you up to speed on the latest. Here's the description of the program:

This Annual Land Use Institute program is designed for attorneys, professional planners, and government officials involved in land use planning, zoning, permitting, property development, conservation and environmental protection, and related litigation. It not only addresses and analyzes the state-of-the-art efforts by government to manage land use and development, but also presents the key issues faced by property owners and developers in obtaining necessary governmental approvals.

This outstanding program features:

• Preeminent faculty of practitioners and academics who provide nationwide perspective without losing sight of state-specific issues.
• Critical review and analysis of the most important new cases;
• Practice-oriented discussion of basics and “hot” topics;
• Guidance on routine and complex procedural issues; and
• Substantial high-quality and well-researched course materials.

Topic and speaker details in the brochure. A very modest registration (law students are free!).

Find out more here. And come join us. We'll be speaking next week Tuesday (Feb. 14, 2023) on "The Use of Eminent Domain for Redevelopment & Economic Development Projects."

LAND USE INSTITUTE - 36th Annual Land Use Conference Program

"Emerging Issues In Property Rights" - Wednesday, February 8, 2023, 3-4pm ET (Free!)

Join our Pacific Legal Foundation colleagues Jon Houghton, Daniel Woislaw, Kady Valois, and Sam Spiegelman (moderating) tomorrow, Wednesday, February 8, 2023, at 3:00 - 4:00 p.m. ET for a free webinar, "Emerging Issues in Property Rights."

Here's the agenda:

Protecting private property rights has been at the heart of PLF’s work since our founding in 1973. Our view, and that of the American Founders, is that property rights are foundational to all other constitutional rights.

Our relentless defense of property rights has secured many precedented victories, including 12 property rights wins at the U.S. Supreme Court—and counting.

Unfortunately, even today, the need for property rights champions remains critical.

Government officials too often relegate property rights to second-class status among Americans’ constitutional rights—cloaking their assaults in erroneous assertions of environmental protection or cleverly constructed land use restrictions.

To learn more about property rights’ legal landscape in 2023, join us for part two of our four-part webinar series, Emerging Issues in Property Rights. Our panel of PLF attorneys will preview the road ahead for property rights and strategies to restore these fundamental rights to their rightful constitutional status.

Join us, and register here (free!).

Farm [Eminent Domain] Lawyer - The Doohickeys

"...When the big man comes a knockin, he is there to represent the humble little farmer with his farm law arguments.

The judges all agree and so does every jury,
they say he's the best farm lawyer in the whole state of Missouri..."

Thanks to our Missouri colleague Paul Henry (himself a darn good farm lawyer) for sending this our (and your) way.

(Nearly) Last Call: There's Still Time To Join Us For The 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Feb 1-4, Austin

We really want you there...

One (nearly) last reminder that there's still time to register for your space at the 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, February 1-4, 2023, in Austin. In the past several years, we have sold out due to the conference room capacity and the conference hotel block. But there's still space, although we are nearly full. So register now - don't delay any further! 

Here's the brochure with the complete agenda, schedule, and faculty listing. But to tempt you, here are some of the highlights of the program:

• Everything Old is New Again: Why Today’s Practitioners Need to Understand the Original Meaning of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses
  
• When the SWAT Team Comes (No) Knocking: Police Power Takings

• Private Utility Takeovers – Lessons From a 67 Day Trial

• "Contraband": How Property Rights Helped Pave the Way for Civil Rights

• Valuation Issues When Billboards and Signs are Condemned

• Setting Client Expectations and Identifying Red Flags

• Preparing Your Expert Witness to Shine in Virtual Proceedings: Tools and Tips for Trial Lawyers

• Developing Property Right Issues in Texas - Questions and Answers from the Bench (with Texas Supreme Court Justice Jimmy Blacklock)

• Eminent Domain and Regulatory Takings Updates: Important Decisions You Need to Know

• Ethics: Building Your Practice by Mentoring the Next Generation of Eminent Domain Lawyers

• the Condemnation 101 program (a one-day course for those new to the practice, or for experienced practitioners wanting a refresher)
• ...and much more!

To register, go here.

Looking forward to seeing everyone in Austin for the 40th edition of the Conference.

Program Brochure, 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Austin, Texas, Feb 1-...

NY Appellate Division: A Hospital Parking Lot Isn't An Authorized Reason To Take

Unsurprisingly there isn't a lot there in the majority opinion in Bowers Dev. LLC v. Oneida Cnty. Indus, Dev. Agency, No. 2022-00744 (Dec. 23, 2022) (this is from the New York courts after all, which don't seem to write long opinions), but we're posting it so you can compare the majority with the dissent.

Majority: agency's power to take is limited by the terms of the delegation of eminent domain power (for "commercial" facilities), and here, eminent domain is being used to take property for a parking lot for a hospital. That isn't a "commercial" use. Slip op. at 2 ("While OCIDA’s determination and findings indicate that the subject property was to be acquired for use as a surface parking lot, the record establishes that, contrary to respondents’ assertion, the primary purpose of the acquisition was not a commercial purpose. Rather, the property was to be acquired because it was a necessary component of a larger hospital and healthcare facility project.").

Dissent: Not so fast: courts are supposed to defer to an agency's statements about why it is taking property, and we're supposed to defer to an agency's interpretation of what ambiguous statutory terms such as "commercial" mean. See slip op. at 5 (the majority "further concludes, in summary fashion and without any elaboration, that OCIDA’s use of eminent domain here “was not [for] a commercial purpose.” The majority’s conclusion on that latter issue, however, gives no deference to OCIDA’s express determination that it was exercising its lawful eminent domain power in furtherance of its express corporate purpose to 'promote, develop, encourage and assist in the acquiring, constructing, reconstructing, improving, maintaining, equipping and furnishing,' inter alia, 'commercial' facilities, and 'thereby advance the job opportunities, health, general prosperity and economic welfare of the people of the [S]tate of New York'") (Curran, J., dissenting).

Whose vision do you like more?

Bowers Dev. LLC v. Oneida Cnty. Indus. Dev. Agency, No. 22-00744 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 23, 2022)

Wyoming: When You Settle An Eminent Domain Fight By Waiving All Future Claims, You Can't Take Advantage Of A Reclaim Statute

Here's one that's holding over from 2022, but we wanted to make sure to post because it's a good reminder that when you settle a case, you settle the case.

Wyoming is one of those jurisdictions that has one of those "I want it back" provisions, where if property is not actually used for X years after it is acquired by the government, the owner may ask for it to be returned. In Wyoming, the term is 10 years:

If a public entity acquires property in fee simple title under this chapter but fails to make substantial use of the property for a period of ten (10) years, there is a presumption that the property is no longer needed for a public purpose and the previous owner or his successor may apply to the court to request that the property be returned to the previous owner or his successor upon repayment of the amount originally received for the property in the condemnation action. A public entity may rebut the presumption created under this subsection by showing good cause for the delay in using the property.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-801(d).

Back in the day, Colton and the Town got into a beef over land apparently needed (or wanted) for the municipal airport. Colton sued for inverse condemnation, and "and sought to prevent the Town from condeming any portion of the property." After a bench trial, the court was ready to lay down the law: it rejected Colton's arguments and concluded that the Town could take 30 acres of property after a determination of compensation.

But before the comp hearing took place, peace prevailed and the parties settled. The Town would pay an agreed-upon amount and would acquire the 30 acres from Colton. And critically, the settlement agreement "contained several terms releasing the Town from all past, present, and future claims related to the disputed 30.17 acres." 

Ten years passed. Apparently, the Town didn't make use of the property and Colton wanted it back. He sued, seeking to reclaim it. The trial court granted the Town summary judgment.

In Colton v. Town of Dubois, No. S-22-0078 (Nov. 3, 2022), the Wyoming Supreme Court agreed, concluding that by executing the settlement agreement, Colton waived his statutory rights, even though yes, the Town acknowledged it had not used the property for the airport. (This is a true waiver situation (and not the more usual forfeiture where someone's inaction is deemed to have surrendered their rights), since Colton knowingly gave up his right to reclaim.)

The court first accepted that the Town acquired Colton's property in a way that triggered the statute because it was acquired under the threat of condemnation. Next, the court concluded the statute was in force at the time of the settlement, and therefore Colton is assumed to have known about it. The court also concluded that Colton intended to relinquish his statutory rights because the agreement unambiguously says so in the "Statement of Purpose" and "Release" provisions. There, the agreement notes the agreement is to resolve all claims, including future claims:

The stated purpose of the settlement agreement is to resolve any claims the parties “may have in the future arising out of or in any way related to the above taking[.]” This purpose is further reflected in the terms of the settlement agreement. In multiple sections Mr. Colton agreed to release the Town from “any and all” claims. The settlement agreement also definitively states “Colton and Dubois hereby do, fully, finally, absolutely and forever settle any and all claims, disputes and differences that now exist, [and] may exist in the future . . . with respect to the taking[.]” The release provisions are broad but nonetheless unequivocal in expressing Mr. Colton’s intent to waive “any and all” future claims, “related in any way” to the condemnation action, which would include any claims he had pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-26-801(d). See Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P., 438 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2014) (“Just because the waiver is all encompassing does not mean that it is unclear or vague.”). Thus, the settlement agreement undisputedly manifests the intent necessary to satisfy the third element of waiver.

Slip op. at 6.

Finally, the court noted that the waiver is in accordance with public policy (an element of waiver under Wyoming law). We like the freedom to contract, and we like settlements, the court concluded.

So what lessons can we take from this? When you settle, you settle. Done. Pau. Finis. Unless you want to hold on to some rights (in which case you don't agree to language that waives your rights so broadly). But don't be surprised if the other side really insists on that language. And that points to another option: if you want to retain your rights, don't settle. The waiver of future rights is just one of those things that parties have to assess the risk of when they are deciding on fight or flight. 

Colton v. Town of Dubois, No. S-22-0078 (Wyo. Nov. 3, 2022)

Ohio: Necessity Is Judged By The Property Taken, Not The Overall Project

Thanks to a colleague giving us a heads-up, we're starting 2023 with a neat case.

In Ohio Power Co. v. Burns, No. 2021-1168 (Dec. 29, 2022), the Ohio Supreme Court declined to apply a statutory presumption of necessity to the power company's efforts to use eminent domain to expand the scope of several existing utility easements to upgrade electric transmission lines. Although the case turned on the interpretation of the term "appropriation" in the Ohio statute, it has some lessons for those of us not in the Buckeye State.

In the absence of three statutory presumptions that a taking is necessary, the general rule in Ohio is that the condemnor bears the burden of proving necessity by a preponderance of the evidence. Here, "[t]he landowners opposed the easements in general, alleging that the appropriations were overly broad and unnecessary, and they challenged the need for several of the easement terms specifically, including the need for distribution lines." Slip op. at 4.

The trial court considered testimony and other evidence submitted by the power company to show the project was necessary, including evidence that the Ohio Power Board adopted a resolution "recognizing the necessity of acquiring easements in connection with the project." Slip op. at 5. But the evidence showed the Board had not reviewed any specific easement, "and instead, through its resolution, delegated to the officers, engineers, and other agents of the company the authority to acquire individual easements to complete the project." Id. 

Therein lay the issue: the owner argued that the term "appropriation" in the statute is the trigger to the creation of either a rebuttable -- or an irrebuttable -- presumption in favor of necessity, and this means an individualized determination, not a conclusion about whether a project broadly is necessary. In other words, easement-by-easement, and not project-as-a-whole.

The trial court rejected the argument, but the court of appeal reversed. After which, the power company sought -- and the Supreme Court granted -- discretionary review.

The court concluded that "appropriation" was not meant broadly to mean the project or the overall taking, but each condemned easement. After noting that "[t]he property rights of an individual are fundamental rights," slip op. at 10, and that judicial review of takings ensure that "no more [is taken] than that necessary to promote the public use." Id.

Pages 11-14 is where the opinion laid out the reasons why appropriation was meant narrowly, and you can read that part if you are interested.

Those of us not in Ohio will want to pick it back up at page 15, where the court rejected the power company's "doing this individually and seeking necessity determinations from the Power Board for each easement would be too much trouble" argument.

First, the court held that nothing is requiring the company to seek the Board's review. It only needs to do so if it wants to take advantage of the statutory presumptions. Slip op. at 15 ("Ohio Power is not required to have the Siting Board or the Power Board approve the individual appropriations in order to appropriate a property or an interest or right therein. But if it does get such approval, then it obtains the legal presumption of necessity.") (citation omitted). 

Second, inconvenience is no matter: "Simply because it may be inconvenient or tedious for Ohio Power to obtain the required resolutions or approvals for each appropriation to be entitled to a presumption under R.C. 163.09(B)(1)(a) or (c) does not mean that such an interpretation is unreasonable or absurd." Id.

Although the court concluded there was no need for another necessity hearing, it sent the case back down for another review of the evidence by the trial court:

Here, the trial court stated that it reviewed the easement terms and found them all necessary based on Rentschler’s testimony and its belief that Ohio Power knows best. Generally, a trial court’s findings of fact will be upheld when they are supported by some competent and credible evidence. See Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 81, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). While Rentschler did discuss each of the easement terms individually during her testimony, and while we have stated that some deference to the government or the agency may be appropriate in eminent-domain cases, Norwood at ¶ 62, 66, a blanket statement that all the easement terms are necessary, without findings to support that decision beyond the deference given to Ohio Power and Ohio Power’s own agent, Rentschler, makes us question whether the trial court did conduct the appropriate review. Therefore, we remand the cause to the trial court to make the specific findings concerning the challenged easement terms consistent with the presumption set forth in R.C. 163.09(B)(1)(b).

Slip op. at 17.

And that's as good a way to remember this case: necessity isn't always a belief that the "condemnor knows best."

Ohio Power Co. v. Burns, No. 2021-1168 (Ohio Dec. 29, 2022)

You Can't Just Say "Redevelopment" - Take Now, Decide Later Isn't A Public Use

A classically short opinion from the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Fourth District) in HBC Victor LLC v. Town of Victor, No. 683 (Dec. 23, 2022). (So short that we were tempted to simply post the opinion and let you read it, because it will probably take you just as long to read our summary; but we're up to the challenge of making our summary even shorter than the opinion, so here goes.)

The town wants to take property "connected to an enclosed regional shopping center known as Eastview Mall[.]" Slip op. at 1. Until Co-19, the property was occupied by a retail department store, but the store closed permanently in February 2021. The owner tried to get a new tenant, but unsurprisingly, that came up short.

Perhaps sensing an opportunity, the Town sought to condemn for redevelopment. But its resolution of taking did not specify what it wants the property for:

"[t]he proposed Acquisition is required for and is in connection with a certain project . . . consisting of facilitating the productive reuse and redevelopment of the vacant and underutilized Proposed Site through municipal and/or economic development projects . . . by attracting and accommodating new tenant(s) and/or end user(s)."

Slip op. at 2.

Even in condemnor-friendly New York, this one should raise a red flag. But not enough: "[i]n its determinations and findings, the Town stated that 'no specific future uses or actions have been formulated and/or specifically identified." Id.

When you draft your findings like that, condemning agency, shame on you. (Kudos, however, for your honesty.)

Pointing to a recent similar case by the Second Department, the Appellate Division concluded that "[b]ecause the Town has not indicated what it intends to do with the property, we are unable to determine whether 'the acquisition will serve a public use.'" Slip op. at 2. The public use for the taking is determined at the time of the taking, and simply speculating that the taking will produce future public benefits isn't enough:

In simple terms, the government cannot take your land and then decide later what to do with it without running afoul of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Slip op. at 2. 

The court rejected the Town's argument that it doesn't need a particularized plan, and the government can take property for redevelopment even if it hasn't yet decided how the property will be used. The court first noted that "the Town professes to have no idea what it intends to do with petitioner's property." Slip op. at 3. It might even transfer the property to the owner of the adjoining shopping mall. "Again, unless and until the Town says what it plans to do with the property upon taking, we cannot determine whether the taking will serve a public use." Id.

And there's no indication or claim that the property here is blighted, even under New York's notoriously low standards for blight:

To the contrary, the evidence at the public hearing established that petitioner has cleaned and maintained the premises since the Lord & Taylor vacancy and continues to pay property taxes at the assessed value of more than $4,000,000. We do not equate mere vacancy with blight, especially when the vacancy occurs unexpectedly in the midst of a global pandemic.

Slip op. at 3.

Taking invalidated; attorneys' fees to the owner.

Think the Town will have another go at it? If so, think it'll draft the resolution the same way (or will it heed Justice Scalia's Lucas dictum)?

HBC Victor LLC v. Town of Victor, No. 683 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 23, 2022)

No Necessity: Landowner Met Burden - Condemnor Did Not Consider Other Sites

Check this out, a decision upholding a necessity challenge to a taking.

Necessity, you say? What's this? Aren't necessity challenges subject to an even more deferential judicial standard of review than the rational basis test applied to declarations of public use? Didn't the U.S. Supreme Court in Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335, 349 (1900) say that "[t]he general rule is that the necessity or expediency of appropriating particular property for public use is not a matter of judicial cognizance but one for the determination of the legislative branch of the government...."? What gives?

In Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Gov't v. Bendel, No. 22-0432 (Dec. 23, 2022), the local government brought an expropriation action (that's eminent domain or condemnation to you non-Louisiana chappies), seeking to take property to construct four detention pods to improve drainage. The owner objected, challenging the public use and necessity of the taking (the government was taking more property than it needed). The trial court agreed with the owner and dismissed. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed.

How so, you may ask, given the low bar for necessity where the courts for the most part wash their hands of the issue?

This challenge, as you might have guessed, was made under Louisiana law. And there, the standards are a bit more realistic. Although Louisiana law also recognizes that the extent and location of the taking are within the discretion of the condemning agency and its decision is entitled to a presumption the taking satisfies a public need or interest, it also recognizes that if the owner carries its burden of showing the location was selected in bad faith or so capriciously or arbitrarily that the selection "was without an adequate determining principle," then a reviewing court may conclude the condemnor abused that discretion.

That's what happened here. Although the mere availability of alternative sites to place the drainage project "is not, by itself, an indication that the expropriator has acted arbitrarily or capriciously," slip op. at 7, the appeal court reviewed the trial court's findings that looked at things like "alternate route[s], costs, environmental factors, long-range area planning, and safety considerations." Id.

In the end, the court of appeal reviewed the evidence submitted by the parties -- which included testimony by one witness that "he had never seen a case where a property that has never been flooded was converted to purposely make it flood because usually lower elevated property would be used so that so much excavation would not be necessary," slip op. at 16 -- and agreed that the owner carried its burden:

In this case, the testimony and evidence make clear that no alternate routes were considered. The total cost of the project is unknown. Environmental factors and long range area planning were not considered. None of the witnesses testifying on behalf of LCG indicated that safety considerations were made regarding the gas line that runs through the property. Based on all of these factors, we cannot say that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding that LCG acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

Slip op. at 19.

Now if only other courts would look at necessity the same way.

Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Gov't v. Bendel P'ship, No. 22-0432 (La. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2022)

CA9: Land Use Is A "Sensitive Area Of Social Policy" So We're Gonna Let A Local Govt Bleed The Property Owner Out

Here's another one from the Ninth Circuit, argued on what one advocate called "land use day at the Ninth Circuit" (except, unlike the other two cases argued that day, the decision in this one gets published). 

In Gearing v. City of Half Moon Bay, No. 21-16688 (Dec. 8, 2022), the panel upheld the dismissal of a takings case, holding that federal courts should abstain from considering regulatory takings cases in favor of pending state court eminent domain actions, even when the condemnor instituted the state court action in response to the federal takings claim (and even though, unlike the other two cases argued that day, the federal takings claim is ripe).

This one started in federal court, where the property owner asserted the city's rejection of its development application worked a taking. In response, the city ran to state court and filed an eminent domain action to take the owner's fee simple interest in the land (we presume that's the property the city is condemning, because the opinion doesn't specify). Next, the city ran back to federal court with its state court complaint in hand and asked the federal court to exercise Pullman abstention to let the state court condemnation action play out first. The district court agreed ... federal case gone (for now).

Rejecting the owner's argument that abstention here was just a backdoor state-procedures exhaustion requirement -- both of which were rejected by the Supreme Court in Knick and Pakdel -- the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel first concluded that there's nothing in either of those cases that make federal takings claims immune from Pullman abstention. Those cases involved ripeness and exhaustion, and didn't say anything that prohibit federal courts from ducking federal civil rights issues. See slip op. at 7 ("As an initial matter, neither Knick nor Pakdel explicitly limit abstention in takings litigation. Neither case even addresses abstention."). Abstention is to avoid "friction" between federal and state courts, and to prevent federal courts from unduly interfering with the delicate balance between the states and the federal courts. Id.

Addressing the owner's argument that Pullman abstention results in a de facto return to the state court exhaustion requirement rejected by Knick, the panel concluded that "[t]he state court can adjudicate the eminent domain action without reaching the regulatory taking issue because eminent domain and regulatory takings suits compensate property owners for different injuries." Slip op. at 9.

Eminent domain compensates property owners for the forced sale of their properties to the government; the property is transferred to the government, and the owner is paid the property’s fair market value as of the date the government made a deposit on the property. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1263.310. A regulatory taking action, on the other hand, compensates a property owner for “[t]he economic impact of [a] regulation . . . and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.” See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2005) (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)); Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory Takings § 8-9(a) (2021) (surveying methods of calculating compensation proportional to harm and level of interference).

Id.

In our view, the actual differences between a regulatory takings/inverse claim and an exercise of eminent domain are not those identified by the court, because it isn't so much about different injuries (eminent domain isn't at all about "injury" at all), but more like different property being taken and valued. Here, the owner's regulatory takings claim asserts that by engaging in some otherwise legitimate function (denial of permission to develop), the government has, from the owner's perspective, effectively condemned the right to use the property (the development rights), or even the fee simple interest if this is framed as a Lucas taking, but has not provided just compensation for the interest(s) taken. On the other hand, the owner's argument in the state court eminent domain case isn't that the government action is unconstitutional because it has not provided compensation, but that it has not paid (or offered) enough compensation for whatever interests it is taking. Those differences have nothing to do with the owner's "injury."

And wait, you say, in the eminent domain action, doesn't the property owner have to raise the issues he's raising in the regulatory takings action as part of his defense or as part of the highest and best use of the property? We'd think yes, that the owner has some sort of argument, or defense, or counterclaim that the eminent domain action isn't fully compensating him for the interests actually taken, and either should (or more likely must) raise these issues in the state court. Or would be taking a pretty big risk by not raising the issue. 

But the Ninth Circuit panel saw no downside, and concluded that the owner could somehow reserve the federal claim, even with an England reservation!

The Gearings could defend the eminent domain action without challenging the constitutionality of the City’s enforcement of LUP Section 9.3.5 or other regulations, and simply recover the fair market value of the property as restricted by those regulations.¹ When the eminent domain action concludes, they could then litigate their regulatory taking claim in federal court and recover damages for the economic impact of the regulation and interference with their investment-backed expectations. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39. The Gearings have not cited, and we are not aware of, any support for their assertion that the constitutionality of the City’s restrictions on their properties must be adjudicated before compensation can be determined for purposes of eminent domain.

----------------------------------

¹ To the extent the Gearings argue that this would result in issue preclusion that would bar their federal claims, they are incorrect, because issue preclusion only applies to issues that were “actually litigated and decided in the prior proceedings.” Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Washington, 8 F.4th 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added). As noted, the Gearings would not be required to litigate their takings claim in the eminent domain action. Thus, this case is distinct from San Remo Hotel II, in which the property owners were required to litigate their takings claim in state-court proceedings in order for those claims to ripen for federal review. See 545 U.S. at 347.

Slip op. at 9-10.

Having determined that Pullman abstention was not categorically precluded, the panel found it simple to conclude that the doctrine should be invoked here because land use is a "sensitive area of social policy." But if Pakdel and Knick, stand for anything, they to reflect the Supreme Court’s thorough rejection of the longstanding trope that takings claims challenging land use regulations are “local” matters outside the competency of federal judges, and that federal courts need to give local governments a lot of leeway and right-of-first-action when it comes to restricting property owners' uses.

The Court made clear that land use and takings claims are civil rights matters and are to be treated like every other civil rights claim. If federal courts can resolve cases about monkey selfies, nude dancing, creating Valentine’s Day artwork out of naked bodies, and whether pet pigeons are diseased (all examples taken from cases in which a federal court resolved the issues) then it doesn't seem like a straightforward land use question is uniquely sensitive or so inherently local as to be beyond the ken of federal judges expressly tasked by Constitution (amend XIV) and statute (section 1983) with dealing with the issue.

More on the decision here ("Does Pullman Abstention Apply to Federal Takings Claims Post-Knick?") and here ("This Week at the Ninth: Abstention and the Golden Globes").

Will there be more on this one? Stay tuned.

Gearing v. City of Half Moon Bay, No. 21-16688 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2022)

Ohio: Property Got Nominated Real Good - Saying You Want To Put Up Site For UNESCO Designation Is Enough To Support Taking

Check out the Ohio Supreme Court's 6-1 opinion in State ex rel. Ohio History Connection v. Moundbuilders Country Club Co., No. 2020-0191 (Dec. 7, 2022), in which the court held held that the taking of the Country Club's lease for the property served a public use.

Court News Ohio beat us to the punch is summarizing the case and the dissent, so instead of us repeating, we suggest you go check it out:

The Ohio History Connection can proceed with its efforts to transform the Octagon Earthworks of Newark into a public park by extinguishing the Moundbuilders Country Club lease on the land, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today.

A Supreme Court majority affirmed a Fifth District Court of Appeals decision allowing the History Connection to take the land through eminent domain. The state agency wants to convert the Octagon Earthworks into a public park so that it can nominate the structures to the World Heritage list as part of the interconnected Hopewell Ceremonial Earthworks.

Writing for the Court majority, Justice Michael P. Donnelly stated that establishing the earthworks as a public park will “help preserve and ensure perpetual public access to one of the most significant landmarks in the state of Ohio.”

Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor and Justices R. Patrick DeWine, Melody Stewart, and Jennifer Brunner joined Justice Donnelly’s opinion. Justice Patrick F. Fischer concurred in judgment only.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sharon L. Kennedy wrote that under Court precedent, if the public use of the land is “contingent and prospective” and the private use is “actual and present,” then taking the land by eminent domain is not lawful. She wrote the History Connection presented that its ownership of the land would only allow for the federal government to nominate the earthworks to the World Heritage list, and there are no assurances it will be named a heritage site.

Please do read the entire story: "State Can Acquire Octagon Earthworks From Country Club."

That, and the opinion. And the dissent which argued that Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006) (a case most readers of this blog will be familiar with) required that the Country Club's allegations needed to be resolved by the trial court, and not disposed of by law-and-motion.

The ultimate reason for the appropriation, however, is more than a nomination. The History Connection stated in its resolution, “The Ohio History Connection strongly desires the Hopewell Ceremonial Earthworks, including the Newark Earthworks, be approved for inclusion on the World Heritage List. Such an inclusion would provide historical and educational benefits to all Ohioans, as well as future generations.”

Op. at 19.

More here ("Ohio Supreme Court rules against Moundbuilders Country Club in Newark Earthworks case") from the Columbus Dispatch.

State ex rel. Ohio History Connection v. Moundbuilders Country Club Co., No. 2020-0191 (Ohio Dec. 7, 2022)

Hawaii 5-80: Land Use Law At The University Of Hawaii

Starting in January, we'll be teaching the venerated, and oh-so-important Land Use course (Law 580) at the University of Hawaii's Law School.

We're at least temporarily stepping into some mighty big slippers (this is Hawaii, so we don't always wear shoes), as this is the course that our mentor Professor David Callies taught for decades. And is there a better venue in which to teach and study land use law and regulation, and its limits? After all, Hawaii may be the most heavily-regulated land on the planet, and is a focal point for every issue you can think of, from zoning to environmental restrictions to takings to public trust to subdivision to admin law to ... well, you get the drift.

We'll cover those topics, as well as the fundamentals. And we have a few surprises up our sleeve - some impressive guest lecturers, explorations of dirt law careers, and maybe a field trip or two. We'll bring you the highlights here, as they happen.

Is there a bit of pressure on us to get it right? You bet. But are we looking forward to it (not just an opportunity to head back to the 808, but because this is a great subject)? You bet.

Here's The Program For The 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Feb 1-4, 2023, Austin

Here it is, the official agenda and program for the 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, February 2-4, 2023 (with a special event the evening of Wednesday, February 1, 2023 to entice you to arrive early).

Here's the brochure with the complete agenda, schedule, and faculty listing. But to tempt you, here are some of the highlights of the program:

• Everything Old is New Again: Why Today’s Practitioners Need to Understand the Original Meaning of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses

• Private Utility Takeovers – Lessons From a 67 Day Trial

• Valuation Issues When Billboards and Signs are Condemned

• Setting Client Expectations and Identifying Red Flags

• Developing Property Right Issues in Texas - Questions and Answers from the Bench: A View From the Bench (with Texas Supreme Court Justice Jimmy Blacklock)

• Eminent Domain and Regulatory Takings Updates: Important Decisions You Need to Know

• Ethics: Building Your Practice by Mentoring the Next Generation of Eminent Domain Lawyers

• ...and much more!

To register, go here.

Register now and hold your space. In the past several years, we have sold out due to the conference room capacity, and the conference hotel block. So don't delay. 

Looking forward to seeing everyone in Austin for the 40th edition of the Conference.

Program Brochure, 40th ALI-CLE Eminent Domain & Land Valuation Litigation Conference, Austin, Texas, Feb 1-...

CAFED Hears Arguments In Two Takings Cases

Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United States, No. 21-1849

As written up in the FedCircuitBlog (a must-follow for all you federal takings mavens):

It concerns the federal government’s liability for taking private property. Specifically, in this case, the Federal Circuit will review the conclusion of the Court of Federal Claims that the government’s action was the cause-in-fact of flooding damage and that, as a result, a taking-by-flooding occurred. The government appeals the CFC’s judgment, while Ideker Farms cross-appeals.

Behrens v. United States, No. 22-1277

Also from the FedCircuitBlog:

Behrens v. United States, which concerns a claim the federal government was liable for taking land for public use through the National Trails System Act. Specifically, in this case, the Federal Circuit will review the determination by the Court of Federal Claims that the plaintiffs were not entitled to compensation because the scope of the easement in question was broad enough to encompass railbanking and the construction of a hiking and biking trail.

What's "The State of Takings Law: 100 Years After Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon and One Year After Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid"? Incoherent (But Getting Better)

For the last week, the blog has been a bit idle. That hasn't been because we're slowing down, but was mostly the result of our blog platform being worked on behind-the-scenes, which knocked a lot of the hosted blogs offline, this one included. But things look good now, so here we are.

We were also on the road, traveling to New York for the Seventeenth Meeting of the American College of Business Court Judges, where we were able to join an august panel of takings mavens (pictured above, L-to-R: Judge Paul Wallace, Professor Julia Mahoney, some guy, Nancie Marzulla, and Professor Richard Epstein) to talk about the state of takings law.

The title of our program was "The State of Takings Law: 100 Years After Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon and One Year After Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid," and we spent our time discussing and debating the state of takings law and theory.

When it came our turn at the mic, we started by answering the call of the question: the current state of takings law is "incoherent...but with the footnote that it appears to be getting better." We won't go into the details of why we so concluded, but you can guess: the default test for a regulatory taking, Penn Central, is hardly a model of coherence and when you add in the various procedural traps that remain, you get ... a lot of fodder for panels like these.

Our appreciation goes out to George Mason U. Law School and Professor Donald Kochan, who were kind enough to include us among these august speakers.

Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference Wrap-Up

The William and Mary Law School has posted David Morrill's summary of the recent Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference.

In addition to a full day of academic and practicing bar speakers on Friday, and the award banquet on Thursday evening, the Conference included two full days of student-oriented programming earlier in the week, where practicing land use and property rights spoke about their practices, the hot topics in the field, and how they ended up in this practice area. Every session was well attended, as the photos from the events show.

Check it out. And please join us at future Conferences!

New Takings Cert Petition: Can An Agency Decide Constitutionality Of Delegation Of Federal Eminent Domain Power?

Here's a recently-filed cert petition in a pipeline case. This one asks whether an agency -- here, FERC -- has primary administrative jurisdiction over a facial challenge to Congress' delegation of federal eminent domain authority to a private party. 

Here are the Questions Presented:

Whether a facial challenge to Congress’s delegation of eminent domain power to private parties is properly filed in district court, as this Court held in PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141 S. Ct. 2244 (2021), or with FERC, which has admitted it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of this delegation.

Whether a facial challenge to Congress’s overly broad delegation of legislative power to FERC is properly filed in district court or with FERC, which has admitted it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of this delegation.

Whether a facial challenge to Congress’s delegation of eminent domain power to FERC is properly filed in district court or with FERC, which has admitted it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of this delegation.

We shall follow along, naturally. Or you can shadow the docket.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bohon v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, No. 22-256 (Sep. 19, 2022)

Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference 2022 Report: It's Chief Justice Roberts' Property World, We Just Live In It

We spoke on the second panel of the day at the 2022 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference at the William and Mary Law School. The subject of our panel -- which included Professors David Callies, Tim Mulvaney, and Dave Owen -- was "Reshaping the Framework Protecting Property Under the Roberts Court."

Here's a rough transcript of my remarks.

--------------------------------------

President Reveley, Professor Butler, distinguished Brigham-Kanner Prizewinners (present and future), mentors, colleagues, family and friends: thank you for the opportunity to speak today.

The story goes that when asked what it was like to be a part of the "Rat Pack,*" that Dean Martin responded "It's Frank's world, we just live in it."

When I first heard the title of this portion of the program and the discussion of how and if the Roberts Court is reshaping property, my first reaction was a paraphrase of Dean Martin's quip, with a legal twist:

It's the Chief Justice's property world; we just live in it.

Now let me explain. Our session asks if the Roberts Court is reshaping the framework of property protections, and if so how.

I can answer the first part with a definitive yes. The Roberts Court is reshaping the way we look at property, and specifically the term “private property” as employed in the Fifth Amendment.

Summed up, this is property’s “moment” at the Supreme Court.

And to me, there's no question that it is the Chief who is, in Reggie Jackson’s immortal words, “the straw that stirs the drink.”

The “how” takes us to a series of decisions by the Court, most of which have seen the Chief take the lead in producing the opinion. Or at least providing the intellectual steam and the vision of how the Court views this thing called “private property” and its role in the pantheon of civil and human rights. In addition to Cedar Point, how many of the Court's property or property-related opinions has he authored? Knick. Penn East. Horne II. Murr dissent. Winter. This recent per curiam sure reads a lot like he wrote it, too. Those opinions he didn't author he played a big part in: the fifth vote in Koontz; presumably employing his role as Chief to organize unanimous or nearly unanimous decisions in Arkansas Game, Horne I, Brandt, Hawkes, and Sackett; and joining in very pro-property rights pluralities when there wasn't a majority. (Did we miss any?)

So let’s take a look at the vibe of these decisions, starting with the most recent, Cedar Point Nursery v. California. And before we go further, let me proudly disclose my bias, as my own law firm – the same law firm as our Brigham-Kanner honoree, Pacific Legal Foundation – represented the property owner in Cedar Point.

There, the narrowest framing of the issue would ask whether there’s any difference between a temporary and permanent physical invasion. The Court has already told us that a permanent physical occupation is considered a taking, which shifts the burden to the government to either pay up, or back off.

And on that, let another hat tip to my former law partners Diane Hastert and Charlie Bocken who bucked more than a century of seemingly contrary law and started us down this path with 1979’s Kaiser Aetna v United States in a decision authored by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist (who, the following Term, would be the boss of a young Harvard Law grad named John Roberts).

In Kaiser Aetna, the majority concluded that just because a navigable waterway might be subject to federal regulatory authority didn’t mean that along with the regulatory authority came the public. If those regulations invited the public to “come on in, the water’s fine,” that’s such a dramatically different nature than mere regulation, and triggered the obligation to pay compensation. Or, in that case, decide whether the price of regulation was worth the cost. It was not, and the federal government chose to back off instead of pay, leaving the owner to bar the public if it chose.

Kaiser Aetna re-introduced us to the centrality of the “right to exclude” (another hat tip to Prizewinner Tom Merrill) and the notion that permanent invasions triggered the Fifth Amendment calculus. Leaving open the natural question: what if the invasion isn’t “permanent?”

Let’s set that aside for a moment, and get to the issue the Kaiser Aetna Court was able to avoid dealing with: what might be the more difficult question of the source of the right to exclude and other property rights deemed to be within the scope of how private property is defined in the Fifth Amendment (and Kaiser Aetna was a pure Fifth Amendment case, as the federal government was the party pushing the closed gates open).

I say this was an easier question in Kaiser Aetna because there, the Court noted that under Hawaii law – all the way back to the Kingdom days – these type of waterways were not considered “navigable” in the sense we do (even though many of them were, in fact, navigable. Thus, the majority reasoned, if state law recognizes an admittedly unusual right to exclude, who are we as mere federal judges to say otherwise? On that, they were on firm footing, going at least as far back as Justice Holmes in another case out of Hawaii, Damon v. Hawaii, in which he noted in the most Holmesian language that if local law recognizes portions of the ocean as private property, then so does the Fifth Amendment.

So let’s flash forward to Cedar Point which resolved that permanent vs temporary question, holding that permanence is not the sine qua non of takings. But the Court did have to grapple with the issue of where the property interest the owner asserted was taken actually came from. (Or maybe “who” defines property.) We all know that state law is the touchstone of private property and states have a lot of latitude about how to define and redefine it. As the Court noted in Cedar Point, "[a]s a general matter, it is true that the property rights protected by the Takings Clause are creatures of state law."

But, as we all know, a state’s notion of property cannot go below the floor of the Fifth Amendment, and the Court has never countenanced state law defining property in a way that eliminates “fundamental elements” of “central importance to property ownership.” Indeed, the Cedar Point majority rejected California’s argument that state regulations limited the fundamental right to exclude). The Court held that core property right such as the right to exclude are not “empty formalities, subject to modification at the government’s pleasure.”

For that notion, I think there’s no better statement of the issue than Justice Thurgood Marshall in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, where he emphasized that property includes a “normative dimension” insulated by the Fifth Amendment from state tampering. These fundamental rights protect individual autonomy:

I do not understand the Court to suggest that rights of property are to be defined solely by state law, or that there is no federal constitutional barrier to the abrogation of common law rights by Congress or a state government. The constitutional terms “life, liberty, and property” do not derive their meaning solely from the provisions of positive law. They have a normative dimension as well, establishing a sphere of private autonomy which government is bound to respect.

Justice Marshall continued:

Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised if a legislature attempted to abolish certain categories of common-law rights in some general way. Indeed, our cases demonstrate that there are limits on governmental authority to abolish “core” common-law rights, including rights against trespass, at least without a compelling showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable alternative remedy.

For more, see the Chief’s dissenting opinion in Murr v Wisconsin, where he argued that Justice Kennedy’s multifactor test (surprise!) for defining the denominator property in takings isn’t so much defined by state law as the baseline, but turns on a multiplicity of factors (what one advocate in that case called Penn Central squared).

The Chief argued that the question of property should always start with state law and traditional understandings (this is my property line) but doesn't always end there. And that gets me to my point here: when trying to predict what the Court might do about property and how it might analyze it, the best place to start isn't with "new property," but with old property. So dirt lawyers and scholars, dust off your Lord Coke, your Blackstone, and your Grotius. State law goes only so far, and cannot dominate the conversation and shape an owner's expectations (if expectations are even part of the calculus).

Let me suggest what some of those "normative" dimensions of property might qualify as "core" would look like. What, in addition of the right to exclude, are fundamental to the notion of property?

• The right of reverter. This is where Yee v. Escondido may come into play. If I invite you on my property subject to certain terms (you can only stay for a year or a month, or can only stay if you continue to pay rent), can the government alter that deal?
• The right to timely compensation when your property is taken.
• The right to be indemnified when property is taken. Can "other law" interfere with the natural operation of compensation? Or, what does it mean when the Court says the Just Compensation Clause is "self-executing?"

Before I sign off, let me wrap up by recognizing the people who attend this Conference. The William and Mary law students who take advantage of this great event and spend the day (or more!) with us, seeing how the things they are leaning in class are applied in the world.The alums of our Land Use course, and our Eminent Domain and Property Rights course. It was heartening to see that many lawyers who first attended this Conference as students continue to come as lawyers. And I am thrilled to see several emerging property law scholars in attendance, because among them may be the next generation of B-K Prizewinners.

And finally, to Jim Burling for his hard earned, well-deserved recognition. This Conference is the Cooperstown of Dirt Law, and I'm thrilled to be here sharing in the celebration. And if it isn't out of place, this student (and yes, I continue to consider myself a law student -- a 38L at this point) would like to honor one of his teachers. I do consider Jim Burling to be one of those legal mentors who shaped my own views of property and law.

I anticipate many years of continued studying at your side, Jim. And I might have to modify slightly my opening thoughts; I should say that it isn't the Chief Justice's property world we live in: it's Jim Burling's Property World.

Congratulations, Jim.

------------------------------------------------------------

*We refer to the Rat Pack in its Vegas iteration, not the original RP formed by Humphrey Bogart.

Still Time To Join Us (In-Person Or Remote) For The 19th Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference

One last reminder that there' still time to register for the upcoming Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference at the William and Mary Law School in Williamsburg, Virginia, September 29-30, 2022. If you can't make it to the historic campus, there's an option to attend remotely.

In our opinion, the Conference is the best of its kind because it brings together legal scholars and the practicing bar to talk dirt law theory and practice. We also a have a full supplemental program for law students, that covers property law and careers in eminent domain law, a recruiting session, a program on international property rights, and a program on land use law.

Registration for the Conference is ongoing, and you can sign up here.

Here is the full agenda. (We'll be speaking on Panel #2, "Reshaping the Framework Protecting Property Under the Roberts Court.")

Come on, join us!

 

It's The Vibe! - Eminent Domain In Pop Culture

Be sure to check out Anthony Alderman (MRICS, SR/WA, CRE, Senior Managing Director at Cushman & Wakefield), who guests on Episode 98 of Clint Schumacher's Eminent Domain Podcast, "Eminent Domain in Pop Culture."

You know we are going to really appreciate an episode "about depictions of eminent domain in popular culture – often a juror’s only prior exposure to condemnation law." Whether it's the vibe of contitution, or how eminent domain can show up in novels, Netflix, Russian and Australian movies, memes (and meme briefs), or nerding out on Star Trek metaphors. We love this topic.

But it's not all distractions, because the episode also covers "what makes appraising for eminent domain acquisitions different from other appraisal projects as well as current issues of interest in the appraisal field."

What a fun episode. Don't miss it.

Indiana: Before Taking Property, Condemnor Must Provide Notice Reasonably Calculated To Put The Owner On Actual Notice

Here's the latest in a controversy we've been following.

In 624 Broadway LLC v. Gary Housing Authority, No. 22S-CT-140 (Aug. 29, 2022), the Indiana Supreme Court held that the Authority failed to provide the property owner adequate notice that it would be taking its property as part of a redevelopment project.

The Gary Housing Authority wanted to redevelop 624 Broadway's commercial property in downtown Gary into mixed-use residential. The Authority instituted an "administrative taking" under Indiana law, which is "an alternative to the 'traditional' lawsuit route" that "occurs when an authorized governmental body condemns property and awards damages through resolutions." Slip op. at 2.

The administrative taking statute only requires notice to the property owner by publication. And that's exactly the notice the Authority gave 624 Broadway. "It twice published notice of the resolution and upcoming meeting in two area newspapers of general circulation." Id. Broadway's agent found out about the meeting from a reporter, and he appeared at the meeting and spoke. At the meeting, the Authority confirmed the taking and assessed $75k in damages, and set another meeting to consider objections.

The owner asked to postpone that meeting, but the Authority refused. The owner even sued (unsuccessfully) to get a TRO to stop the meeting so that the owner's appraiser could evaluate the property. With nothing stopping it, the Authority held the meeting, at which it concluded it could take the property, and awarded the $75k in damages. One day after that meeting, the owner's appraiser inspected the property, and a short time later issued a report valuing it at $325k.

624 Broadway raised a constitutional due process argument, asserting that the notice provided by the Authority was insufficient. Hold on, the Authority countered, the statute only requires us to publish notice of the taking and our hearing, and there's no question we did that. Although the lower courts bought that assertion, the Indiana Supreme Court didn't.

Taking property required due process notice, and that process requires some kind of hearing. The notice provided must be reasonably calculated to inform. Yeah, the Authority complied with the statute and published notice, but that alone doesn't mean the notice of the hearing was "constitutionally sound." The court noted that "[c]ertainly, a statute can provide more protection than the Constitution. But when a statute provides less, the government must do more." Slip op. at 5 (footnote omitted).

Not that notice by publication is always bad. You can publish notice where it isn't possible or practicable to give other kinds of notice. But if you know where to find someone, or can easily figure that out, then you have to make an effort.

The Housing Authority admittedly knew the identity and address of 624 Broadway’s registered agent. Indeed, its September 19 damages resolution included his address. 624 Broadway’s articles of organization, filed with the Indiana Secretary of State, listed its registered agent, his address, and an email address for service. Further, the Housing Authority demonstrated its ability to successfully communicate with 624 Broadway during its eminent domain lawsuit. See L.D., 938 N.E.2d at 671 (finding notice by publication insufficient when a party “had successfully given notice” in a previous case but “made no attempt to do so” in the instant case). Yet once it transitioned to an administrative taking, it apparently became incapable of sending a letter or email to 624 Broadway. An administrative taking may be a “streamlined procedure for taking private property,” Util. Ctr., Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 985 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind. 2013), but it cannot circumvent the Constitution. “[W]hen notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. Because the Housing Authority knew how to provide personal notice, its notice by publication was a “mere gesture.”

Slip op. at 6.  

But wait, the owner's agent actually knew about the meeting (found out from a reporter) and showed up. That's not enough? No, the court concluded, "we cannot say 624 Broadway was not prejudiced: under our harmless error standard, and error's 'probable impact' is "sufficiently minor' if it did not 'affect the substantial rights of the parties.'" Id. (citation omitted). It is likely that if the Authority provided adequate notice, 624 Broadway could have at least had its appraisal ready to go. 

Having found a problem the next question was remedy. The court concluded that the owner is not entitle to vacate the taking, because the court was not convinced that it was for a bad purpose. "And nothing indicates that the taking was 'subterfuge ... to convey private property to a private individual for private use' or that the Housing Authority acted arbitrarily and capriciously." Slip op. at 7. So the court declined to vacate the taking, and sent the case back for a properly-noticed hearing on damages where the Authority can consider all of the owner's evidence. Yeah, that'll surely change things.

We shall see.

More on the decision here ("Gary Housing Authority violated Constitution in eminent domain case").

624 Broadway LLC v. Gary Housing Authority, No. 22S-CT-140 (Ind. Aug. 29, 2022)

Registration Underway - 19th Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference (Sep 29-30, 2022)

There's still space for you to join us -- preferably in-person, but remotely if that is not possible for you -- at the 19th Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference, September 29-30, 2022, at the William and Mary Law School in Williamsburg.

The American Law Institute was kind enough to post a notice about the Conference and the ALI members who are on the speaking faculty here.

Registration for the Conference is ongoing, and you can sign up here. Here is the full agenda. (We'll be speaking on Panel #2, "Reshaping the Framework Protecting Property Under the Roberts Court."

In our opinion, the Conference is the best of its kind, and brings together legal scholars and the practicing bar to talk dirt law. So please come join us.

CA11 Oral Arguments In Pipeline Taking: If Florida Law Says The Owner Gets Compensation Plus A Car, Does A Federal Court Have To Recognize That?

Here's the latest in a case we've been following. The U.S. Court of Appeals recently heard oral arguments in a case where a private Natural Gas Act condemnor (the Sabal Trail pipeline) exercised the delegated federal power of eminent domain to take the property of a Florida owner.

As we reported here, the issue is whether federal or state law applies in these cases. The big reason why the question of whose law applies is that under the Fifth Amendment, "just compensation" does not include attorneys' and other fees, while under the Florida Constitution's "full compensation" provision (which we noted here), a property owner may recover fees and costs. The District Court held that Florida law, not federal, applied, and Sabal Trail appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

The arguments are worth listening to. Is this a question of "choice of law?" Or does it go to how the "property interest" is defined in these takings (by state law). Or do the federal standard of "just compensation" govern? In our opinion, the most interesting part of the arguments starts at the 20:48 mark, where one of the judges asks the property owner's lawyer (our colleague Thor Hearne):

Let me give you what I think is a tough hypothetical for you. Maybe you'll be able to distinguish it. Florida decides in its wisdom that when any government decides to take property for eminent domain, whether it's permanent or an easement, or something like that, not only do you get just compensation as that term is commonly understood, you get attorneys fees and costs, and you get a brand new car. So a federal court has a case under the Gas Act and the question is: do you get the car?

(Note: we think the answer is "Yes, you get the car because Florida law defines the property interest being taken, and Florida law has included attorneys fees and costs and a car as part and parcel of an owner's rights when their land is taken.")

More on the arguments here: "11th Circ. Wary Of Axing Atty Fees In Pipeline Easement Cases."

Links From CRE's "Supreme Court Update: Is This Property's Moment?"

Here are the links to the cases and other materials that we mentioned (and some we didn't) earlier today at the Counselors of Real Estate's program on "Supreme Court Update: Is This Property's Moment?" Thank you to our colleagues at CRE for including us in the program.

I.  The evolving ground rules

• Takings cases can go to federal court:
  • Condemnation: PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey (eminent domain and the 11th Amendment)
  • Inverse and regulatory: Knick v. Township of Scott (opening back up federal courts to takings claims).
• How you define the “property” taken is key:
  • Murr v. Wisconsin (the larger parcel issue, applied in regulatory takings cases).
  • Koontz (money as property ... and exactions).
  • Brandt (easements, vel non)
• The exclusion “stick” is really important:
  • Any distinction between “permanent” and “temporary” takings is a matter of valuation, not liability: Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid. 
  • Horne v. USDA (II) (California raisins and physical invasions)
  • Arkansas Game (physical invasions, again).
•  Remedies:
  • The remedy for a “taking” isn’t limited to just compensation: Horne v. USDA (I).
  • Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (preliminary injunctions, diesel-electric submarines, and Pearl Harbor).

 II.  Issues on the horizon

• Compensation and timing:
  • what to do when the condemnor doesn’t promptly pay up?
  • what is the date of valuation?
• Ability of condemnor to define the taken property:
  • Is there an obligation to value severance damages?
  • Fee take vs easement.
  • Temporary vs permanent.
• Does the Constitution protect property’s use, or value? Police power or takings?
• Whither Yee and the future of the physical occupation rule.
• Are eviction moratoria “takings?”
• Can you really get to federal court and stay there?
• The undivided fee rule ... constitutional?

Ye Olde Law 608: Eminent Domain & Property Rights, S5E1 @ William & Mary Law

Is there a more appropriate place at which to study property rights and dirt law than William and Mary Law School? After all, it is a stone's throw from Jamestown, the place where there's a good argument the concept of property law and property rights first took hold in the New World. As noted by author David Price in "Love and Hate in Jamestown - John Smith, Pocahontas, and the Start of a New Nation" -

The introduction of private property for the common citizen had a salubrious effect on the owners' sense of initiative, as John Rolfe would observe. By the end of 1619, he reported, the "ancient" (or longtime) colonists had chosen their allotments, "which giveth all great content, for now knowing their owne lande, they strive and are prepared to build houses and to cleare their grounds ready to plant, which giveth ... greate incouragement, and the greatest hope to make the colony florrish that ever yet happened to them."

Was it a coincidence that at the same time as property rights took hold, that the seeds of representative and republican government were also planted? As Price writes:

The other major liberalization of 1619 sprang from the company's desire for "a forme of government there as may bee to the greatest benifitt and comfort of the people, and wherby all injustice grevance and oppression may be prevented." That form of government would be English America's first representative legislature. Sir Thomas Dale's authoritarian "Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall" would be superseded by enactments of a locally elected body, to be known as the General Assembly.

And also just down the road from the Law School, coincidentally, is where the "new birth of freedom" took hold, again by way of a property-centric argument. So yes, William and Mary Law is a very appropriate venue for the study of property rights and property law.  

With that background in mind, in just over three weeks, we're about to get underway with the fall semester at the Law School, where we're again teaching two upper-division courses: Eminent Domain and Property Rights (Law 608), and Land Use Controls (Law 425). For a sampling of what we cover, check out some of the final papers our students produced last year - pretty compelling stuff.

The enrollment in the courses has really grown over the five years we've done them, which might be a reflection that the word is getting out. in the Eminent Domain and Property Rights class we cover not only eminent domain and just compensation, but takings, civil forfeiture, property theory, the cultural view of what it means to "own" something, and international approaches to property law and property rights. And, importantly, how to lawyer up these cases (this is a professional school after all). Of course, we take advantage of the opportunity to have some of the nation's best property law scholars "guest lecture" during the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference. Here's the official description of the course:

Property rights and the sovereign's power of eminent domain have been essential components of Anglo-American law for centuries, and the protection of the right of private property ownership is one of the foundations on which the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the post-Civil War Amendments are built. This course will introduce students to the practical lawyering and analysis necessary for eminent domain practice, including the nuts and bolts of takings practice as well as the study of recent (and ongoing) U.S. Supreme Court cases. In addition, this course will focus on the history, policy, and, to some extent, the politics of property rights, eminent domain law, and related legal topics. We will examine how the right of private property was developed in common and constitutional law, the relationship of property rights to other civil rights and the sovereign's power to take land, the role of federal and state courts in protection of property rights, how private property squares with environmental law, and the proper 'place' of property rights in the modern administrative state. Course materials will be cases and selected portions of books and journal articles, and other materials which will be made available. Grading will be based on a take home paper and class participation.

The Land Use Controls class is your class land use regulation class that focuses on things like zoning and planning, the administrative process, vested rights, nonconforming uses, due process, Euclid, private land use controls, nuisance, and other dirt law topics.   

Students: it's not too late to join (add/drop will commence soon after the first day of classes). We can't promise that you will gain instant knowledge of the subjects, but can guarantee a rewarding semester taking a deeper dive, coming out of it in December with a greater appreciation of these areas of law, and a working understanding of what it takes to actually practice. Come, join us!

IRWA's Summary Of Major Eminent Domain Cases & Legislation (Jan-May 2022)

The International Right of Way Association's Real Estate Law Committee produces twice-a-year reports "which contain summaries of eminent domain decisions and legislation within the United States."

And what is really nice is that they make the report available. 

We're posting it here because we're one of the co-authors. Hat tip to our co-authors Brad Kuhn, Jillian Friess Leivas, and Ajay Gajaria.

The report is short, and doesn't contain a lot of fluff. Just what you wanted.

New Cert Petition (Ours): Can Condemnor Delay Actually Paying Compensation Indefinitely?

Last week, along with my colleagues Deborah La Fetra and Kady Valois, we filed this cert petition in a case we've been following (even before we joined as counsel).

The petition seeks review of the Fifth Circuit's opinion holding that there's nothing a federal court can do if a local government does not pay a state-court just compensation judgment for an unreasonably long time. Because we are counsel in the case we won't go into further detail, but will leave it to you.

Here's the Question Presented:

A fundamental element of just compensation is "certain payment of the compensation without unreasonable delay.” Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 62 (1919). In 2013, the Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans inversely condemned the properties of 70 home and business owners for a flood control project. The property owners obtained state court judgments starting in 2018. Louisiana law prohibits enforcement of judgments against state and local governments—even just compensation judgments—which go unpaid unless government voluntarily appropriates the funds. The Sewerage Board has refused to do so, in some cases for years. The question presented is:

May the government, consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ self-executing command of Just Compensation for takings of private property, indefinitely delay paying just compensation?

Follow along here, or on the Court's docket.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, No. 22-52 (July 20,...

More Than Just A Property Lawyer: A Salute To Three Decades Of Service

An officer and a gentleman.

Before I go on, a note: we're posting this with a slight bit of reluctance, because we know that friend and colleague Mark M. Murakami does not crave the spotlight, but is the type to downplay this sort of thing. But I think it is important to acknowledge milestones -- especially the accomplishments of friends in public service -- so please read on.

You may already know of many of his professional legal accolades: Owners' Counsel member, SCOTUS amicus brief author, Best Lawyer in a slew of categories, regular CLE faculty member and presenter, and land use, eminent domain, and property law legal scholar (he will be returning this fall to the U. Hawaii Law School on the adjunct faculty) to name a few. But he isn't just an accomplished lawyer, and you may not have known of his military accolades that the rack of decorations and awards his uniform reveals.

Last Saturday, Captain Murakami officially retired from the U.S. Coast Guard after more than thirty years of active and reserve service, donning his whites for one final time to celebrate and reflect with family, friends, colleagues, and comrades-in-arms in a brief outdoor ceremony at Coast Guard Base Honolulu.

Mark began his military service at the Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut (yes, that New London if you are looking for another eminent domain connection here), and after commissioning served in command and other assignments, rising in rank and responsibility. Eventually he attended law school while on active duty, and after graduating first in his law school class, returned to service as a Judge Advocate.

But his devotion to his young family and the prospects of a full-time civilian law practice resulted in the difficult decision to step away from a life at sea and of active service. He transferred to the reserves, and returned home to Hawaii. That's when I was lucky enough to get to know Mark -- every major law firm in town wanted him, but as my (former) firm's Hiring Chair, I and my colleagues pressed hard: come join us in our eminent domain and property practice, Mark!

This wasn't exactly his existing legal expertise, but we made the pitch that land use, takings, and property law were really exciting topics, that a lawyer with his smarts would not have any trouble catching up, and that there's no better place to practice property law in town than in our firm. We were rewarded when Mark joined our law firm, where today he remains a partner.

Our predictions were correct. Mark quickly became one of the best land use, property, and eminent domain lawyers (and not just these topics).

Not only was this the best professional decision I ever made as Hiring Chair, it began our long professional association and personal friendship. I followed Mark's continuing military career with pride and admiration, amazed how he could balance a successful full-time private law practice, his ever-expanding and far-flung responsibilities in reserve military service (that required way more than the advertised "one weekend a month"), public service to the Bar and the profession, and of course his devotion to his family. And to "be there," as impossible as it sounds, paying full attention to each. Always worried that he wasn't doing enough in every role he took on, when the reality was he not only pulled his own weight, but brought others along with him.

It was with that same pride and admiration that we gathered last Saturday to celebrate and to express our appreciation to Mark for serving our Nation, and to recognize his family for sharing him with all of us. We were all able to sleep better each night with the knowledge that Mark was standing the watch.

Thank you, my friend.

John Quincy Adams Loses A Takings Case

No, not that JQA. (Sorry for the clickbaitey headline.) But who could resist the Fifth Circuit's per curiam opinion in John Quincy Adams v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply District, No. 21-60749 (July 20, 2022) which held that Mr. Adams, who owned property near a reservoir, could not sue state officials in federal court for injunctive relief for due process violations and takings.

Adams alleged that Mississippi water district officials were violating a state statute by not allowing him to exercise the option to re-acquire property that the water district had condemned decades earlier. His federal court complaint avoided directly asking for money damages because those claims would mean the state officials would have Eleventh Amendment immunity. Instead, "[t]he Adamses requested a declaratory judgment that the District’s sales and leases of property without notice were ongoing constitutional violations and asked the court to fashion whatever injunctive relief it deemed necessary to correct the violations going forward, including ancillary monetary relief." Slip op. at 4.

Motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction granted, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

But doesn't the Ex parte Young exception to the usual rule that you can't sue state officials in their official capacities in federal court apply? After all, Adams sought to enjoin what he claimed were ongoing violations, which counts as prospective injunctive relief, right? Not here, the Fifth Circuit concluded, because although Adams alleged that the officials had violated his rights in the past, he had not alleged enough to show that they would do so again:

Once any claims for monetary relief were properly dismissed because of sovereign immunity, all that remains was in essence a demand for the court to order the District to comply with state law in the future as to any of the family’s former land. Even if the Adamses’ rights were violated in the past, the Adamses have at best offered “[a]llegations of possible future injury” that they have not claimed is imminent, or “certainly impending,” or anything other than speculative. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Slip op. at 7.

One correction to the district court's dismissal: the Fifth Circuit noted the dismissal should have been made without prejudice.

John Quincy Adams v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., No. 21-60749 (5th Cir. July 20, 2022) (per curi...

CA1 Splits With CA9: "[T]he Fifth Amendment precludes the impairment or discharge of prepetition claims for just compensation in Title III bankruptcy."

Here's the latest in an issue we've been following for a while. You recall that several years ago, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held there's nothing particularly special about an unresolved takings claim for just compensation that sets it apart from other creditor claims in a government bankruptcy.

The Ninth Circuit majority held that owners who assert their property was taken by the debtor-government before the bankruptcy -- but who have not been compensated -- are just unsecured creditors who must "share[] the pain" of the government going broke and sloughing off debt, even if it means that as a result the owner has had its property taken without just compensation. See "Ninth Circuit: Inverse Condemnation Plaintiff Must "Share The Pain" - City Can Shed Obligation To Pay Just Compensation In Bankruptcy, Which Is 'Purely A Monetary Claim'."

Next up, Round 2: In In re Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Cooperative de Ahorro y Credito Abraham Rosa, No. 22-1119 (July 18, 2022), the First Circuit went the other way.

Here's the setup. Puerto Rico property owners had claims for just compensation against the Commonwealth. One set of owners was (allegedly) owed compensation for the straight-up eminent domain-ing of their land by quick-take; they claimed the deposits didn't cover the actual amount of compensation. The other group of owners had inverse claims. The court noted that "[f]or purposes of this appeal, all parties agree that the Commonwealth ... took private property from at least some of the takings claimants before petitioning for [bankruptcy]." Slip op. at 18. That agreement would have consequences in the court's later analysis, so remember this point.

The Commonwealth's petition ("perhaps the largest and most consequential public bankruptcy in the nation's history") sought relief for "sovereign debt ... under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act." Slip op. at 8. The Commonwealth's reorganization plan proposed to treat the claims of the property owners as general unsecured debt, payable "at a pro-rata share of the overall recovery for general unsecured creditors." Slip op. at 12. In other words, likely pennies on the dollar, if that. 

The property owners objected: hold on, we have had our property taken without compensation, and our claims are not plain-old unsecured debt because the constitution says we get just (full) compensation. Thus, a claim for compensation can't be wiped out in bankruptcy. Confirming the plan would leave us holding the bag, and thus, the court can't confirm the plan with our claims listed as unsecured debt. 

And guess what? The Title III court agreed, and "directed the Board to modify the plan of adjustment to provide for full payment of any valid eminent domain and inverse condemnation claims if the Board wished to make the plan confirmable." Slip op. at 12-13. The Board did so (while reserving its right to appeal, which it eventually did).

The First Circuit started off by noting that the "appeal raises important questions about the interplay between the power to equitably restructure debts in bankruptcy and the Constitution's requirement that just compensation be paid whenever the government takes private property for public use." Slip op. at 8. Let's get to the holding first:

[O]therwise valid Fifth Amendment takings claims arising prepetition cannot be discharged in Title III bankruptcy proceedings without payment of just compensation.

Slip op. at 9. And by "just" compensation, the court meant whatever full compensation is owed to the owners. How did the court reach this result? Read on.

First, the court rejected the federal government's argument that this isn't a constitutional right vs bankruptcy power issue at all, but that the Article III court's holding was merely it exercising its equitable powers. No, the court concluded, "we read the Title III court's ruling to say precisely what it appears to say: that discharging valid, prepetition takings claims for less than just compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment and render a plan providing for such discharge unconfirmable under PROMESA." Slip op. at 16.

Next, having rejected the feds' invitation to avoid the constitutional question, the court concluded, "we move on to assessing whether the Fifth Amendment precludes the impairment or discharge of prepetition claims for just compensation in Title III bankruptcy. For the following reasons, we conclude that it does." Slip op. at 18. Can bankrupt governments "eliminate their obligation to pay just compensation and instead pay only reduced amounts based on a formula applicable to most creditors[?]" Slip op. at 19. The court held no.

First, "the Supreme Court has been very clear: the bankruptcy laws are subordinate to the Takings Clause." Slip op. at 20. Bankruptcy laws are subject to the Fifth Amendment.

Second, the court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the Fifth Amendment protects only property held by the owners at the time of the bankruptcy. And because their real property had already been taken by the Commonwealth -- either through expropriation by eminent domain, or inversely taken by seizures -- the only "property" possessed by the owners at the time of the bankruptcy were unsecured claims.

The Commonwealth -- get this -- relied on Knick for that argument. Yes, you read that right. Because the right to compensation "arises at the time of the taking" the theory goes, the claim doesn't arise later when the government denies compensation. And by the time the goverment denies compensation, the owners have already lost their real property: "because the takings at issue here all occurred prepetition, the [Commonwealth] contends, any constitutional violation would have arisen only at the time of the taking." Slip op. at 22. The Commonwealth asserted therefore, that compensation is "untethered from the substantive Takings Clause violation itself." Id. 

The First Circuit rightly held no, that Knick does not "cast doubt on the Fifth Amendment's requirement that just compensation be paid." Id. And here's the critical part:

Recognizing that the "right to full compensation arises at the time of the taking," id., does not imply that the subsequent denial of that compensation does not also raise Fifth Amendment concerns. We decline to read Knick as changing the Fifth Amendment right to receive just compensation into a mere monetary obligation that may be dispensed with by statute.

Id.

The court rejected an argument that the Fifth Amendment protects only rights in specific property, and not unsecured claims for money. Slip op. at 23. That isn't looking at the issue the right way, the court noted. This isn't a question of "whether a bankruptcy law has effected a taking of property" (i.e., whether bankruptcy law wiped out the ability to enforce a contract or other claim), but rather "whether the denial of just compensation for a taking" that "no one disputes" has occurred violates the right to compensation. Slip op. at 24.

Having disposed of that argument, the court next rejected the contention that "nothing about a claim for just compensation makes it any different for bankruptcy purposes than a claim for money damages for any other kind of constitutional violation." Slip op. at 25. Relying on the "language and nature of the Takings Clause," the First Circuit held that "compensation is different in kind from other monetary remedies." Slip op. at 26. The court concluded:

Just compensation then does not serve only as a remedy for a constitutional wrong; it serves also as a structural limitation on the government's very authority to take private property for public use. As the Court has stated, "where the government's activities have already worked a taking . . . , no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation." Id. at 321. Simply put, the Fifth Amendment contemplates a "constitutional obligation to pay just compensation."

Id. (citing First English, 482 U.S. at 315).

Thus, the court concluded, "payment of just compensation [is] unlike most other instances in which the government engages in a constitutional violation and is required to remedy that violation by paying money." Id.

The court expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in the Stockton case. Instead, the First Circuit found "the dissenting opinion of Judge Friedland in that case to be more persuasive." Slip op. at 27. Dissenting in Stockton, Judge Friedland wrote:

The majority instead holds that Cobb has forfeited all property rights in the condemned parcel under California law, and that his pending claim is "simply" a statutory claim for monetary damages. But the statutory character of Cobb’s claim does not diminish its constitutionally protected status—indeed, a constitutional claim for just compensation is a statutory claim for monetary damages under California law.

Here's how the First Circuit wrapped up:

Reduced to its nub, the issue we decide is rather simple. The Fifth Amendment provides that if the government takes private property, it must pay just compensation. Because the prior plan proposed by the Board rejected any obligation by the Commonwealth to pay just compensation, the Title III court properly found that the debtor was prohibited by law from carrying out the plan as proposed.

Slip op. at 30-31.

Naturally, given our view that Stockton was ever-so-wrong, we feel validated by the First Circuit here. So remember that part-and-parcel of the power to take property is the corresponding obligation to, you know, actually pay for it. All of it. And anything that interferes with that right, whether it is, as here, a Congressional bankruptcy statute, a state statute, or anything else must yield to the Just Compensation imperative.

In re Financial Oversight & Mgmt Bd for Puerto Rico v. Cooperative de Ahorro y Credito Abraham Rosa, No. 22...

New Novel: "Wise-Cracking Lawyer" Gets Caught Up in Eminent Domain ... And Murder!

A "brash, wise-cracking unapologetic lawyer" gets caught up in "two innocuous words of legalese" and next thing you know, he's embroiled in "lies, deceit, and ultimately murder." Sound like your practice? (ha!) If so, then have we got a novel for you: "Eminent Domain" by Ronald D Demmans.

Yes, a novel where condemnation is a central plot point:

Brett Simmons and the town of Lenore are inextricably linked. Brett Simmons, the brash, wise-cracking, unapologetic lawyer and Lenore, the hometown he loves. Two innocuous words of legalese will lead Brett down a dangerous path of lies, deceit and ultimately murder. He has taken a look behind the curtain…the wrong curtain. He has seen too much and what he has uncovered could cost him everything: his career, his freedom, even his life. With the odds clearly stacked against him and the future of Lenore at stake, Brett engages in a battle with Warren Winfield, Lenore’s corrupt mayor and a ruthless international criminal cartel. Alone, Brett Simmons stands little chance of winning. But Brett is not alone in his fight. He finds himself partnered with Melanie Stockton, a beautiful, tough-as-nails cop. The rapport is instantaneous; the attraction, unexpected. With Brett going undercover and Melanie forced to confront a well-armed band of mercenaries, whatever feelings they have for each other will have to be put on hold…and the waiting might take forever. This is Brett Simmons’ story…and only he can tell it.

This isn't the first time that eminent domain drives a factional story. See "Netflix And Take: Expropriation And Redevelopment UK Style In 'The Stranger,'" for example, and of course, our old favorite, "The Castle."

Check it out. More about the book and the author here.

So, fellow dirt lawyers, what other ideas can we suggest for legal thrillers? Some of the suggestions we've received thus far: "Quiet Title, Whispering Death" (the new Spenser adventure where Spenser and Hawk investigate a claim of prescriptive rights but end up with a cold case of murder); "Colonial Ordinance - Murder on the Beach" (a Martha's Vineyard dirt lawyer investigates the mysterious death of a stranger who dared walk on private tidal flats); "Ancient Lights, Ancient Frights" (a lawyer representing a home owner deprived of her view gets caught up in a byzantine maze of extortion and murder). 

DC Circuit OK's Pipeline That's Already Built

Here's the latest in a case we've been following.

In City of Oberlin v. FERC, No. 20-1492 (July 8, 2022), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held FERC adequately explained why, in granting a certificate of public convenience, it relied in part on evidence that some of the natural gas in the pipeline was slated to go to Canada. 

Earlier, the court held FERC had not explained why well enough (or at all), and sent the case back down to give FERC the chance to do so. The handwriting was on the wall in the remand order because the court pointedly did not vacate FERC's order granting the certificate: "we remand without vacatur, because we find it plausible that the Commission will be able to supply the explanations required, and vacatur of the Commission's orders would be quite disruptive, as the Nexus pipeline is currently operational."

If you build it, they will approve.

So full steam ahead, pipeline, while FERC gets its ducks in a row.

This is one of those Natural Gas Act pipeline cases, involving FERC's approval of a certificate of public convenience. That, as you know, is the trigger to a private pipeline exercising the NGA's delegated power of eminent domain, because it effectively settles the question of whether the takings are for a public use or purpose. Also, as you know, an agency's decision is, generally speaking, subject to a highly deferential judicial standard of review under the Admin Procedures Act, and a certificate may only be set aside if it is arbitrary and capricious.

Here, the city argued that FERC didn't do it right, and the certificate should be set aside. FERC concluded that the agreements the pipeline company already had made to distribute the gas to be transported was sufficient to support a determination of public use or purpose. But, the owners argued, a large percentage of that (42%) would be going to -- the horror! -- Canada, and FERC never reached any conclusion whether the remaining gas for distribution in the U.S. would support a finding of public use.

Perhaps not surprisingly in light of the D.C. Circuit's remand order, FERC "elaborated on its reasoning for considering the export precedent agreements in its decision to grant the certificate." Slip op. at 8. Even though some of the gas was headed to the Great White North, some gas was still in U.S. interstate commerce and not within a single state.

Was this "arbitrary and capricious" or "contrary to law" as the standard of review commanded? We'll give you one guess (no). See slip op. at 11-3. 

Let's skip to the Public Use analysis. "[T[he City maintains that FERC's crediting export precedent agreements as a benefit runs afoul of the Takings Clause because a pipeline shipping gas for export 'does not serve a public use.'" Slip op. at 15. Given the court's answer to the earlier question of whether FERC's reasons for granting the certificate of public convenience was not arbitrary and capricious, what do you think the court's answer was to the public use question?

The court upheld the taking, concluded that FERC's reasons were adequate, even if the evidence about exports was excluded. The pipeline "was needed to alleviate a bottleneck from the Appalachian Basin and to increase supply to Midwestern markets." Slip op. at 17-18. "FERC also explained that building a pipeline with excess capacity would enhance the pipeline grid for the future." Slip op. at 18.

The court rejected the city's other public use objections:

The City launches a few objections at FERC’s analysis, but none render the decision arbitrary and capricious. First, the City contends that FERC did not identify which pipelines FERC considered in determining that existing pipelines did not have enough capacity to transport the gas the Nexus Pipeline would move. But FERC identified the pipelines on remand in precisely the same manner it did in its initial order—by looking at “other pipeline compan[ies’] electronic bulletin boards.” Compare Remand Order P 27, with Certificate Order P 40 n.29. Even assuming that is insufficient, the City did not challenge this aspect of FERC’s order in Oberlin I and therefore cannot do so now. Nw. Ind. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 872 F.2d 465, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“It is elementary that where an argument could have been raised on an initial appeal, it is inappropriate to consider that argument on a second appeal following remand.”).

Second, the City complains FERC did not analyze a hypothetical pipeline specifically sized to transport 42% of the Nexus Project’s capacity. But given that FERC had analyzed a pipeline sized to transport 59% of the Nexus Project’s capacity, there was no need for FERC to start its analysis anew. FERC had already found that shrinking the project would barely reduce the amount of land that the project would require, and that excess capacity could reduce the costs and disruption from constructing additional pipelines in the future. Certificate Order PP 42–45. FERC’s determination that this reasoning applied to a pipeline sized for 42% of the Nexus Project’s capacity was reasonable.

Slip op. at 18 (footnote omitted).

City of Oberlin v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, No. 20-1492 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2022)

Eminently Outplayed: Condemnation Lawyer Is The New Jeopardy! Champion - Well Done, Steve Clarke!

Check this out: our friend and colleague, eminent domain lawyer Stephen J. Clarke is the new Jeopardy! champion.

And it wasn't just a plain-old win for Steve. It was an exciting, come-from-behind triumph, based (no doubt) on his careful, strategic thinking and thoughtful play (this is chess, not checkers!). Just like his eminent domain cases!

Watch the above, or see "BUZZER BEATER Jeopardy! fans stunned by WILD upset in final round after champ lost by shocking dollar amount in game with Mayim Bialik."

The big moment:

But as many of you know, this wasn't Mr. Clarke's first rodeo. Recall that he served as a contestant at our Ethics Jeopardy! at the 2021 ALI-CLE Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation Conference. So yes, in addition to valuable CLE credits, the Conference is great training for your game show appearances!

Well done, and congratulations Steve.