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New Article (Donald Kochan): "Involuntary Regulatory Servitudes: Correcting for 'Regulatory Takings' Terminological Problems"

Check this out, a new SSRN posting by lawprof Donald Kochan (George Mason/Scalia Law).

If this one is not a direct sequel to his earlier work on re-branding the "takings clause" (a piece we think is excellent and is part of the materials we teach in our Eminent Domain course at William and Mary Law), it does at least seem like a spiritual successor.

Here, Professor Kochan suggests that we're being unclear when we use the term "regulatory takings" to describe those instances where an exercise of some governmental power other than eminent domain results in what feels like an eminent domain taking from the property owner's viewpoint.

Instead, he argues, we should focus on the burdens the regulations place on an owner's use (what the common law described as a servitude). To us, that seems very consistent with the Supreme Court's approach, and proposals from other commentators. And it does focus the inquiry on the right question, namely what effect has a regulation put on an owner's property rights. As that suggests, this should be a property-centric inquiry, and not on such unknowables such as the "character of the government action," or whether an owner has "distinct investment-backed expectations."

Here's the Abstract:

This essay challenges the use of the term “regulatory takings” in our takings jurisprudence and scholarly discussion. The words we choose when developing doctrine matter. They can, even subconsciously, affect—by reducing, enlarging, distorting, limiting, or accurately shaping—the perceived and functional quality and character of the things they describe.

The better way to frame the inquiry underlying what is often called regulatory takings law should be to determine not whether there is a “regulatory taking” – some special kind of taking – but instead whether there is a regulation that amounts to a taking. Segmenting the judicial treatment of regulatory effects into a specialized analysis that takes it farther and farther away from an enterprise focused on equivalency between the private law of voluntary servitudes and the public law of what we should be calling involuntary regulatory servitudes. Regulations that restrict some but not all sticks in the property rights bundle should be characterized as the involuntary equivalent of the voluntary instrument, mechanism, or transfer that would have been necessary to achieve a parallel result. The essay proposes an alternative test for determining whether a regulation should be deemed a taking based on a comparison between the effect on the bundle from the regulation and determining whether the same effect in the private marketplace would have required a consensual, mutually beneficial exchange with appropriate compensation. This would better serve the meaning and purposes of the so-called Takings Clause.

The essay also documents the usage history of the regulatory takings label. To be sure, “regulatory takings” was not a dominate part of the takings lexicon before 1981. The first law review publication available in Westlaw to use the term “regulatory takings” is from 1965. The first court opinion to use the term came in a footnote in 1977. Briefing in advance of the 1980 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Agins v. Tiburon involved significant invocations of “regulatory takings” language across nearly a dozen briefs. But, the U.S. Supreme Court in its Agins opinion never uses the phrase “regulatory takings.” The first major court opinion to use “regulatory takings” language is the dissenting opinion by Justice William Brennan—joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell—in the 1981 case of San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego. And, the Brennan dissent may have entrenched the term in the takings lexicon and is likely the impetus for widespread adoption of the term after 1981.

A must-read for all you takings...uh, dirt law...mavens.

Links From Today's ABA Land Use Session

Here are the cases and other materials we discussed in today's Section of State & Local Government Law Land Use group meeting on takings:

• By The Thinnest Of Margins, SCOTUS Declines Public Use Pretext "Spite Taking" Case
• SCOTUS Declines To Review NYC Rent Control Challenge
• Sheetz pt. I - "Radical Agreement" At SCOTUS: "Your Money Or Your Rights" Isn't OK Just Because A Legislature Does It
• In DeVillier v. Texas, The Winner Takes It All
• Unanimous SCOTUS: "state law cannot be the only source" Of Property Rights, And "traditional property law principles" As Enforced By The Takings Clause Play A Role
• "Final decision" ripeness incentivizes government to be opaque, and avoid saying no.
• Texas takes a more practical (and realistic) approach to takings ripeness: City of Buda v. N.M. Edificios and City of Kemah v. Crow
• New Cert Petition: Does The Obligation To Provide Just Compensation Waive Sovereign Immunity?
• Inverse liability for wildfires?
• New Law Review Article: John Groen, "Takings, Original Meaning, and Applying Property Law Principles to Fix Penn Central," 39 Touro L. Rev. 973 (2024)
• Yee v. Escondido and physical occupation takings lower court split: CA8: Yee v. Escondido Doesn't Save Eviction Moratorium From Takings Review and CA9: No Physical Commandeering In Eviction Moratorium Because Yee Says "You Let The Tenants In, So You Can't Complain About Keeping Them (For Free)"
• Florida Appeals Court: TDRs, Beekeeping, And Camping Are Not Economically-Beneficial Uses, So Downzoning Is A Lucas Taking

PS: If you are not a member of the Land Use group, you really should be. We summed up the reasons why here.

New Law Review Article: John Groen, "Takings, Original Meaning, and Applying Property Law Principles to Fix Penn Central," 39 Touro L. Rev. 973 (2024)

Today's must-read, a (very) recent article by our Pacific Legal Foundation colleague John Groen, published in the Touro Law Review, "Takings, Original Meaning, and Applying Property Law Principles to Fix Penn Central."

Get the pdf here.

With a title like that, who could resist? Here's the Abstract:

Justice Clarence Thomas, dissenting in Murr v. Wisconsin, suggested the Supreme Court take a “fresh look” at its regulatory takings jurisprudence and see “whether it can be grounded in the original public meaning of the Takings Clause.” He repeated this request in Bridge Aina Le’A, LLC v. Hawaii Land Use Commission, but also sharply criticized the existing takings analysis developed in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, stating: “If there is no such thing as a regulatory taking, we should say so. And if there is, we should make clear when one occurs.”

This article responds to Justice Thomas and contends that the original and current public meaning of the term “property” as used in the Takings Clause is a group of rights, the most essential being the right to possess, the right to exclude others, the right to alienate, and, most saliently, the right to beneficial use. Contrary to assertions by the Court and commentators that the Takings Clause was originally limited to direct appropriations or physical takings of property, many early 19th century cases found takings based on destruction of the right of beneficial use, cases that today we call regulatory takings. The development of takings jurisprudence leading to the 1922 decision by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon is based on protection of these rights. This Article focuses on the essential rights that define property and thereby exposes the flaw of Penn Central which bases a taking on diminution in value, rather than substantial interference with a property right. Drawing on the original public meaning and early takings jurisprudence, as well as recent precedent in Lingle v. Chevron USA and Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, this article proposes a takings framework based on formal or functional transfer of rights, rather than diminution in value.

Most definitely check it out.

New U Chi L Rev Article (Comment): "Guns and the Right to Exclude: Saving Guns-at-Work Laws from Cedar Point's Per Se Takings Rule"

The latest issue of the University of Chicago Law Review has this student-authored piece that is worth your time reading. "Guns and the Right to Exclude: Saving Guns-at-Work Laws from Cedar Point's Per Se Takings Rule," 91 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2047 (2024). 

Here's the Abstract:

The Supreme Court’s decision in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid has left considerable uncertainty in the realm of takings law. In Cedar Point, the Court announced a new rule that government-authorized physical occupations of property, even temporary ones, constitute per se takings. But the Cedar Point decision left significant questions unresolved regarding the scope of its per se takings rule and its various exceptions.

To resolve these questions, this Comment looks to the example of guns-at-work laws. Enacted by about half of the states, guns-at-work laws protect the right of a business’s employees, customers, and invitees to store firearms in private vehicles, even if those private vehicles are on company property (e.g., parking lots and parking structures). In addition to having important public safety implications, guns-at-work laws serve as a fruitful example to understand takings doctrine.

Relying on this example, this Comment reaches three conclusions regarding takings doctrine and its application to guns-at-work laws. First, government-authorized physical occupations, even seemingly trivial ones, can constitute per se takings. This suggests that at least initially, guns-at-work laws constitute per se takings. Second, when applying the open-to-the-public exception, courts should look to the subsections of a business and not attempt to weigh between subsections to determine the character of the business as a whole. Consequently, courts should treat employee-only parking lots and parking lots open to the public differently for the purposes of the open-to-the-public exception: the open-to-the-public exception exempts parking lots open to the public, but not employee-only parking lots, from Cedar Point’s per se takings rule. Finally, the longstanding-restrictions-on-property-rights exception only requires a contemporary law to have a historical analogue, not an exact historical match. Thus, Founding Era militia laws are a similar historical analogue to guns-at-work laws. Consequently, guns-at-work laws are not a per se taking under Cedar Point.

We can't say we agree 100% with the piece's conclusions, but still urge you to check it out.

Call For Papers: "Housing and Exactions: The Next Frontiers After Sheetz"

Our outfit (Pacific Legal Foundation) has put out a call for papers. on the topic of land use exactions and housing law. Honorarium included for accepted papers, and there will be a workshop to follow.

Here's the description:

This workshop seeks to build on the result of Sheetz v. County of El Dorado and chart the course of the next steps in exactions/unconstitutional-conditions law. From Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, through Dolan v. City of Tigard and Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Management District, and now including Sheetz, the Supreme Court has looked to the doctrine of exactions and unconstitutional conditions to ensure property rights are protected. In doing so, it has created a constitutional bulwark protecting the right to build housing on private property, an important stick in the property rights bundle.

The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Sheetz held that legislatively-imposed development-fee schedules are subject to judicial scrutiny under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. This ruling promises to change how local and state governments extract development impact fees from property owners in exchange for building permits; and it may very well do more. This is where you come in.

We seek papers that address the questions arising from the Sheetz ruling. We welcome proposals that look at this issue from legal, economic, political, historical, and related angles, including empirical and nonempirical approaches.

Some possible topics:

• Must a permit condition imposed by a legislative body on a category of properties be tailored with the same degree of specificity as a permit condition that targets a particular single development to be constitutional?
• An article exploring the Sheetz concurrences by Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh offering different arguments about the need for legislative exactions to be tailored.
• Beyond the analysis of Koontz, is there a basis in constitutional text, history, and/or case law for holding stand-alone impact fees (as opposed to in-lieu fees) subject to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions?
• How does the requirement that the government “make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development” work when evaluating a generally imposed legislative exaction?
• What does “essential nexus” require to be constitutional?
• Are there economic models that prove or disprove the claim that inclusionary zoning meets the nexus requirement of the Nollan-Dolan-Koontz-Sheetz exactions test?
• Does inclusionary zoning create meaningful workforce and affordable housing?
• Alternatively, does inclusionary zoning have a negative impact on the production of affordable housing? Empirical studies of communities with inclusionary zoning policies in place could yield meaningful information if studied.
• Do all inclusionary-zoning schemes rely upon Kelo v. City of New London, and if they do, then would the right inclusionary-zoning challenge have the promise of overturning Kelo?
• How have states limited local government’s ability to legislatively impose fees on developers, and is there empirical evidence of more and cheaper housing in the states with those limits?
• True or false: The weaker the nexus, the more difficult it will (or should) be for the government to establish proportionality.
• How do impact fees affect housing supply and affordability? What is the tradeoff between property taxes and fees?
• How can YIMBYs incorporate the Sheetz decision into their work and build from it to successfully encourage communities to build more housing?
• Besides inclusionary-zoning fees, are there other government-imposed fees on builders and developers that may violate the nexus prong of the Nollan-Dolan-Koontz-Sheetz test? What are they and why is there a lack of nexus between the fee and the demand?

Fertile grounds for exploration.

Details here, including deadlines. Check it out, and then submit a proposal.

New Article (Comment): "Vacancy Taxes: A Possible Taking?" (U. Chi. L. Rev.)

A new student-authored journal article worth reading, Christine Dong, "Vacancy Taxes: A Possible Taking?," 91 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1725 (2024).

Here's the Abstract:

Vacancy taxes are an increasingly popular solution to the paradoxical problem of high housing demand coupled with high vacancy. Cities across the country facing housing shortages have either implemented or are considering adopting vacancy taxes to encourage property owners to rent or sell their property. Soon after San Francisco adopted a vacancy tax with one of the broadest definitions of vacancy, property owners lobbed a constitutional challenge under the Takings Clause, taking advantage of a moment of doctrinal instability.

This Comment seeks to make sense of how this and similar potential challenges would fare, given an expanding, property-protective takings doctrine, but a high constitutional tolerance for taxes. Using the San Francisco vacancy tax as a concrete example, this Comment evaluates possible arguments that the tax effects a regulatory or physical taking. It contends that even this stringent vacancy tax would not be a taking under either framework, and highlights elements of a different vacancy tax or regulation that may tip the scales of this analysis. It explores original understandings of land use (and nonuse) regulations to argue that fines levied on the nonproductive use of property are a background principle of property law that generally precludes the conclusion that vacancy taxes are takings.

Download the pdf here.

Worth your time to check out.

Guest Post (Jennifer Polovetsky): "Is Judicial Deference to Government Agency Decisions in Eminent Domain Cases at Risk?"

Today we have a guest post by New York colleague Jennifer Polovetsky, who writes about the intersection of administrative law (Chevron deference) and public use in eminent domain.Thanks to Jennifer (and to the New York Law Journal) for allowing us to republish her intriguing piece.

_____________________________

Is Judicial Deference to Government Agency Decisions in Eminent Domain Cases at Risk?

by Jennifer Polovetsky

Since 1984, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Chevron U.S.A., v. Natural Resources Defense Council case, it has been well-settled law that the judiciary must defer to agency determinations in connection with the interpretation of a statute when the law was ambiguous or unclear (so long as the agency’s interpretation was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious). See Chevron, 468 U.S. 837 (1984). The Chevron standard has been applied across the board in many legal cases since then.

On June 28, 2024, however, SCOTUS overruled Chevron in the consolidated cases of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless v. Department of Commerce, and held that Chevron was inconsistent with both the constitutional obligation of courts to say what the law is and with the Administrative Procedure Act. Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo, 144 S Ct 2244 [2024]. The Loper court held that the stare decisis factors did not support retaining Chevron, and SCOTUS further held that going forward, courts “must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.”

What does Chevron being overruled mean with respect to the courts deferring to a government agency’s determination that an eminent domain property acquisition qualifies as a “public use”? See Chevron, 468 U.S. 837. Well, that remains to be seen. As of now, under the 2005 SCOTUS decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), the law of the land remains the same: Courts must defer to the government’s determination that an eminent domain seizure of property satisfies the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment takings clause. See U.S. Const. Amend. V. Specifically, SCOTUS held the following in Kelo: 

“[T]his ‘court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the … public.’ Id., at 244. Rather, it has embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’ [Citations omitted.] Without exception, the court has defined that concept broadly, reflecting its longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments as to what public needs justify the use of the takings power.” Berman, 348 U. S. 26; Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986. Pp. 6–13. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469.

Now that the SCOTUS decision in Loper has essentially ended judicial deference to agency decisions, a new eminent domain challenge seeking a similar result may soon reach SCOTUS—straight from New York. See Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo, 144 S Ct 2244. The case, called Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, New York, 96 F4th 209 [2d Cir 2024], involves the Brinkmann family, owners of a chain of hardware stores who purchased property in the Town of Southold, on the North Fork of Long Island, with plans to develop it into a new hardware store. The Town of Southold, however, denied the Brinkmanns the permits they applied for to build the hardware store, claiming that this same property had been slated for a public park. Subsequently, the Town of Southold seized the Brinkmanns property via eminent domain. The Brinkmanns responded by filing a challenge to the eminent domain seizure on the basis that the taking was pretextual. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the Brinkmanns and deferred to the Town of Southold’s determination that the eminent domain seizure was both lawful and satisfied the public use requirement under the Fifth Amendment. See Brinkmann, id.; see also U.S. Const. Amend. V.

Specifically, in Brinkmann, the Second Circuit held that the Brinkmanns’ allegation—claiming that the Town of Southold’s eminent domain seizure of their property for a park was pretextual—was of no moment. The Brinkmann court cited Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), where SCOTUS held that “[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has decided that something is a public use, ‘the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.’” The Brinkmann court went on to cite Kelo, and further held that “it is demonstrated that judicial deference is justified by federalism.”

On June 11, 2024, the Brinkmanns filed a petition with SCOTUS seeking certiorari review of the Second Circuit decision, in a final effort to undo the Town of Southold’s condemnation of their land.

Will SCOTUS grant the petition for certiorari in light of the Loper decision? Maybe, as this is an issue that may need clarification. In this writer’s sole opinion, the Brinkmann and Loper decisions seem somewhat at odds with each other. Specifically, Brinkmann holds that under the SCOTUS decisions in Berman and Kelo, the courts cannot review a legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use. See Brinkmann, id.; Kelo. However, under Loper, SCOTUS just held that the courts have a constitutional obligation to decide whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.

The real question is: Will the Loper holding interfere with a government’s statutory eminent domain authority? Many crucial infrastructure and redevelopment projects depend on the government’s ability to acquire the property interests it needs via eminent domain in order to move forward with such projects. On the other hand, many property owners who, like the Brinkmanns, believe that the government’s eminent domain seizure of their property is unfair and pretextual may now start to file their own legal challenges in light of Loper; and such lawsuits may allege that the government agency exceeded its statutory eminent domain authority and that the court does not have to automatically defer to the government’s “public use” determination in eminent domain property seizures.

In this writer’s sole opinion, the Loper holding will not interfere with a government’s eminent domain authority. The power of eminent domain, granted to the government by the Fifth Amendment at the same time that our country was founded, is an awesome and almost insurmountable power that has been used for many different public purposes, especially in New York (i.e., infrastructure, creation of public parkland, alleviation of urban blight, affordable housing, schools, etc., without limitation). 

With the expansion of the definition of “public use” to essentially mean anything that serves a “public purpose” under Kelo, and the reinforcement of the doctrine of judicial deference to a legislature’s judgment of what constitutes public use under Brinkmann, it is unlikely that the law will change and that courts will no longer defer to government determinations in eminent domain cases. However, as with all legal challenges, we will have to wait and see what SCOTUS does, if anything, in connection to the Brinkmann’s petition for certiorari review of the Second Circuit’s holding.

Reprinted with permission from New York Law Journal, © ALM Media Properties LLC. All rights reserved.

New Article: "The Benefits of the Fourth Amendment's Property-Rights Baseline"

Regular readers know that in addition to our focus on Fifth Amendment property rights, we're also looking at the Fourth Amendment as a vehicle that protects and promotes property rights.

In that vein, here's a forthcoming article that is worth reading,"The Benefits of the Fourth Amendment's Property-Rights Baseline," by lawprof Nicholas Alden Kahn-Fogel.

Here's the Abstract:

Since 2012, Fourth Amendment claimants have had two alternative doctrinal tests available to establish that government investigative activity constitutes a Fourth Amendment search implicating their rights. First, if the government physically intrudes onto a person, house, paper, or effect to gather information, its conduct is a search, even if the claimant had no reasonable expectation of privacy against the government intrusion. The Court has referred to this directive as the "property-rights baseline." Second, even in the absence of a physical intrusion onto a constitutionally protected area, if government surveillance infringes a person's reasonable expectation of privacy, such surveillance is also a search. I have previously argued that expansive property frameworks proposed by Justice Gorsuch and by some scholars are likely to resemble the privacy rubric for Fourth Amendment interpretation, both in the results they would produce and with regard to the subjectivity and unpredictability often attributed to the privacy model. However, contrary to recent scholarly claims, the narrower physical intrusion test is a valuable supplement to the privacy framework; it will often lead to different results than the privacy standard and will frequently lead to clearer analysis, more predictable results, and broader protection against government surveillance than was the case under the exclusively privacy-based regime that preceded the Court's endorsement of the property-rights baseline.

Check it out.

Book Launch Event, Aug 13, 2024: Jim Burling, "Nowhere to Live: The Hidden Story of America's Housing Crisis"

If you are in the California Southland (or plan to be in the next week), please be sure to reserve on your calendar Tuesday, August 13, 2024, to join us in-person for the launch of our colleague Jim Burling's forthcoming book, "Nowhere to Live: The Hidden Story of America's Housing Crisis."

Here's a blurb about the book, which is available for preorder on Amazon:

A century of policy mistakes ruined America’s cities and created an unprecedented housing crisis.   
 
For many families, homelessness is no longer someone else’s problem. It is right around the corner, a real threat in their own immediate future. Our housing crisis is the result of a long history of government policies, court cases, and political manipulation. While these disparate causes make up a tangled web, they have one surprising root: the attack on private property rights. For more than a century, government policies and court decisions have attacked, undermined, and eroded private property rights. Whether it be exclusionary zoning, eminent domain abuse, rent control, or excessive environmental regulations, the cumulative impact of these assaults on private property is that it’s become increasingly difficult—or even impossible—to build adequate housing supplies to meet market demands. We are fast approaching a time when millions of typical Americans will, quite literally, have nowhere to live. 

Nowhere to Live: The Hidden Story of America’s Housing Crisis, takes readers through the history of how we got here. With stories going back to the Civil War, the early twentieth century, and the ill-fated “urban renewal” movement of the 1950s, Nowhere to Live reveals how the government layered mistake upon mistake to create the current crisis. It also provides a way out: not by government fiat, but through the restoration of private property rights.  

The event will take place at the Pacific Club in Newport Beach, California, from 6:00-8:00 p.m., on Tuesday, August 13, 2024. It will feature Pacific Legal Foundation President Steven Anderson, and national zoning expert Nolan Gray, and, of course, Jim. The event will feature an open bar and is free. Register here.

Come, join us and learn and celebrate!

New Article: "The Ends of Means-Ends Scrutiny"

Here's an article worth reading, just posted to SSRN, Procaccini, The End of Means-End Scrutiny (July 29, 2024).

For your takings and individual liberty nerds, please focus on pages 36-38 (showing how takings analysis is not accomplished by the usual means-ends scrutiny), pages 40-42 (social and economic liberties), and pages 43-44 (searches and seizure).

Why move from means-ends scrutiny to more robust judicial review? Zero in on pages 50-52 ("Transforming Rights from Mediated Interests to Uncompromising Trumps"). We're thinking the author concludes this move is a bad thing, but we're not so sure it is.

Here's the Abstract:

It is black letter law that courts apply means-end scrutiny to evaluate laws that burden constitutional rights. Not anymore. Discreetly and pervasively, this Supreme Court has ousted means-end scrutiny from constitutional law. It has done so through a series of smaller and seemingly unconnected doctrinal incursions, including the introduction of history and tradition tests, the transformation of equality doctrines, and the embrace of formalist rules to govern constitutional law.

This Article provides a complete and interconnected critique of the numerous doctrinal transformations that together comprise the larger constitutional revolution of ending means-end scrutiny. It tracks how this upheaval now touches nearly every fundamental right and important federal power. But not in exactly the same way. Rather, the Court has selectively abandoned means-end scrutiny to benefit the same subset of authorities, rights, and groups. In particular, the end of means-end scrutiny has reoriented the landscape of constitutional law to weaken federal authority, strengthen protection for libertarian as opposed to egalitarian rights, and benefit private power and dominant political, economic, and social groups.
The upshot of this patterned end of means-end scrutiny is a foundational change not just to the prevailing methodology of constitutional adjudication but also to the very nature of constitutional rights and judicial review. By eliminating consideration of governmental means and ends from the construction of rights, the Court has crafted a new form of judicial review that is court-centric, formalist, and dominance-reinforcing. The Article tracks and critiques this doctrinal and theoretical transformation, connecting it to the most salient debates in constitutional law today and exposing the deep and troubling consequences of the seismic--and yet largely silent--collapse of means-end scrutiny.

Whether you agree or disagree with the author's premise, it is worth checking out.

New Article - "Sheetz v. County of El Dorado: Legislatures Must Comply with the Takings Clause" (Brian Hodges & Deb La Fetra)

Check this out: our Pacific Legal Foundation colleagues (Brian Hodges and Deborah La Fetra we on our Sheetz SCOTUS team), have posted a new scholarly piece on SSRN, "Sheetz v. County of El Dorado: Legislatures Must Comply with the Takings Clause."

Here's the Abstract:

For more than 30 years, the Supreme Court has recognized that building permit conditions requiring a dedication of property to the public implicate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and are therefore subject to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as set out by Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). But for nearly as long as the Nollan/Dolan doctrine has been in place, state and lower federal courts have divided on the foundational question of whether the doctrine applies equally to all branches of government, or if it applies only to administrative exactions imposed by agencies on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g., California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 929 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (acknowledging a decades-long split of authority); Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117-18 (1995) (recognizing that the split of authority raises an important question of constitutional law).

The United States Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in in Sheetz v. County of El Dorado settled this split of authority by ruling that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies to all branches of government, including the legislature. 601 U.S. 267, 280 (2024). Although the holding drew support from the full Court, the opinion drew three concurring opinions commenting on additional questions may need to be determined on remand or in future litigation. Id. at 280-84.

This article reviews the state of the law regarding Nollan/Dolan’s special application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions both before and after the Sheetz case and discusses the questions posed by the concurring opinions—i.e., whether an impact fee is an exaction subject to Nollan and Dolan and whether class-based exactions should be held subject to the same heightened scrutiny, “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests as all other exactions. The article then discusses the decision’s implications on other emerging takings issues, including whether sovereign immunity can bar property owners’ recovery of just compensation and the cognizability of judicial takings claims.  

Download the article here.

Highly recommended.

New Article: "Original Understanding of 'Background Principles' in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid"

Worth reading: a student-authored piece in the latest issue of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, "Original Understanding of 'Background Principles' in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid."

From the Introduction:

But in Cedar Point, when considering a regulation that authorized union organizers to enter certain businesses, the Court held that even a temporary physical occupation was a per se taking requiring compensation.

The Court’s shift to a per se rule is significant because it means a landowner can receive “just compensation” without satisfying Penn Central’s high bar required for regulatory takings. For governments, the Cedar Point holding could pose a heavy financial burden if they must compensate landowners for temporary intrusions authorized under existing regulations. Due to this imposing financial burden, some have suggested that Cedar Point threatens existing civil rights regimes, which at first blush resemble the labor rights regulation at issue in Cedar Point.

But Cedar Point also recognized three exceptions to its per se rule, one of which is particularly expansive: “longstanding background restrictions on property rights.” Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts defined this exception as “background limitations [that] encompass traditional common law privileges to access private property.” The opinion listed several examples, including entering private land for public or private necessity or to enforce criminal law. For governments, these background principles could alleviate otherwise staggering financial liability due to the Cedar Point rule.

...

This Note argues that these principles are part of the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and then offers an originalist framework for deriving them. The Framers viewed provisions like the Takings Clause as “declaring” existing law that the American people already recognized as enforceable. When viewing the Takings Clause this way—as declarative of “general law”—it becomes apparent that the methodology of Cedar Point reflects the original understanding of the Fifth Amendment. In addition to confirming Cedar Point’s originalist pedigree, general law also informs the framework for how originalists can divine these background principles.

Check it out.

Can The California Coastal Commission Be Reined In?

The California Coastal Commission is infamous for being the most out-of-control governmental agency in the nation. This regulatory leviathan fancies itself the undisputed czar of land use and other activities in its fiefdom, the California coastal zone.

Created in 1976 as an agency with regulatory authority across California's 1,000+ miles of coast (and land in a defined shoreward zone), it has since expanded to its current role as a government-outside-the-government, whose main role it often seems is more about wielding an iron fist over anything that happens in the coastal area, than protecting coastal access and resources while also respecting property rights as its governing statutes require.

The Commission has been blessed with procedures that appear insanely unfair to anyone not familiar with how things work in California. For example, any two Commissioners may file an administrative appeal of a municipalilty granting a development permit to get it overturned; and to whom do the Commissioners appeal? To the very Commission on which they sit, of course! Yeah, that seems fair.

For decades, the Commission has enjoyed unprecedented power and a legislature and judiciary unwilling to place or enforce any realistic limits on its power. For example, the courts have interpreted a statute that bars the Commission from taking property without compensation to give the Commission the discretion to waive, overrule, or ignore any restrictive state or local coastal law, if the Commission believes to apply it would result in a taking (the Coastal Act are full of these type of restrictions on use). This is tantamount to the Commission exercising legislative power to rewrite the law ad hoc.

OK, enough editorializing. (Strong letter to follow!)

But of late, there may be cracks in the edifice. In large part because of the YIMBY movement, the Commission has become subject to public criticism for being an impediment to reasonable development, something it is not all that used to. Why should Bakersfield, Fresno, and non-coastal communities bear the burden of absorbing the new housing needed to address California's housing shortage, while the while I-got-mine elite coastal enclaves maintain their exclusivity?

A group called "Circulate San Diego" has studied this phenomenon and published this report ("A Better Coastal Commission"):

This report documents numerous examples where the Coastal Commission has resisted, opposed, and delayed the construction of deed-restricted affordable homes that use programs like Density Bonus Law. This is even true for projects on land that is already zoned for multi-family housing, in plans already approved by the Coastal Commission itself.

Similarly, this report documents examples where the Coastal Commission opposes projects that the Legislature encourages as a part of California’s efforts to combat climate change. Crosswalks, bicycle lanes, and infill development near transit are all goals of recent statewide legislation, yet the Coastal Commission opposes or delays many of these projects. Their decisions to prioritize car travel above all other modes is inconsistent with modern climate goals, as adopted by the Legislature.

The report makes some modest recommendations for reform:

• Amend Density Bonus Law to require its implementation by the Coastal Commission, as proposed in AB 2560 (2024).
• Remove or narrow the special exemptions that keep housing reforms from applying to the coast.
• Mandate procedural reforms at the Coastal Commission.
• Apply transportation and climate policy to the Coastal Zone.
• Avoid creating, or narrowly draw, coastal exemptions to new housing legislation.
• Look skeptically on Coastal Commission requests for more authority.

Reacting as you might expect (with affront), the Commission is "offended at even the suggestion" it gets in the way of housing in the coastal zone. See this story from the San Diego Union-Tribune ("Has the Coastal Commission made housing and climate crises worse? It's offended at even the suggestion"). 

But this seems to be one of those "moments." After all, even the Commission's usual allies are asking questions and proposing reforms. When you've lost San Francisco democrats, and the California Supreme Court agrees to take up the first case in a decade which may call your power into question, Coastal Commission, you are missing the cultural zeitgeist. 

Will anything come of this report, and the reform movement generally? Will there be a reckoning for the California Coastal Commission?

If one is in the cards it won't be easy because we know that when there's a threat to its power, it pulls out all the stops and fights like hell. Stay tuned. 

New Article: "At Will [Employment] as Taking," 133 Yale L.J. 2165 (2024)

Here's the abstract:

Employment at will is legally and politically entrenched. It is the default termination law in forty-nine states and controls the working lives of most U.S. workers, creating a political economy of precarity and exploitation. In light of these challenges, this Essay offers a novel framework for a constitutional challenge to the at-will termination regime under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.

The argument advanced in this Essay is that at-will rules strip workers’ job security and are, thus, unconstitutional takings of workers’ property. Following the Supreme Court’s lead, numerous courts equate public-sector workers’ job security with property entitlements in their jobs under the Due Process Clause. I offer theories to expand this doctrine from the public sector to the private sector, and from the Due Process Clause to the Takings Clause. As a sword, takings claims can be raised against the prevailing termination regimes in forty-nine states. As a shield, at-will-as-takings claims can protect public-sector workers against increasing precarity in federal, state, and local government work.

This Essay makes two additional contributions. First, it rejects the premise underlying contemporary critiques of the Supreme Court’s takings doctrine that identify employers as the only property owners on the job. Second, it offers a property-friendly progressive constitutional vision that rejects reliance on the administrative state as the only tool for progressive policy advancements.

Read the entire article here.

What do you think?

New Article: 2024 National Eminent Domain Update (Practical Real Estate Lawyer, May 2024)

Thanks to our co-author, the ever-wonderful Amy Boulris, and the good people at ALI-CLE for shepherding us through the process of getting the 2024 National Eminent Domain Update published in The Practical Real Estate Lawyer, and for allowing us to post it here.

This is our summary of what we think were the most interesting -- if not the most important -- eminent domain cases over the past year from state and federal courts.

Amy Brigham Boulris & Robert H. Thomas, 2024 National Eminent Domain Update (ALI-CLE Prac. Real Est. Lawyer...

Commit To Submit: Call For Papers "Imagining the Future of Regulatory Takings"

Have thoughts about where regulatory takings are (or should be) headed? Here's your chance to get in on the conversation, and to shape the future of the law.

Our outfit, the Pacific Legal Foundation, in cooperation with the Antonin Scalia Law School's Journal of Law, Economics, and Policy, are calling for papers on "Imagining the Future of Regulatory Takings." There will be an in-person discussion of these papers at the Law School in October 2024.

Here's the full description:

A century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, assured us that “[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” In the ensuing one hundred years, courts have struggled to draw the line defining “too far.” Some still wonder whether such a line should even exist. As Justice Clarence Thomas recently said, “If there is no such thing as a regulatory taking, we should say so. And if there is, we should make clear when one occurs.”

To date, many jurists and scholars have argued that the “too far” line is anything but clear. The regulatory takings doctrine is a hodgepodge of balancing and categorical tests alongside a scattered throng of exceptions, with little guidance on which tests or exceptions apply when, much less how to apply them in a principled and consistent manner. There are the categorical tests of Lucas (“total” takings) and Loretto (“physical” takings) and the amorphous balancing tests like the Penn Central ad hoc regime and the threshold “relevant parcel” test. Then there are vexing and unanswered questions about whether some restrictions on property are simply exempted from a takings analysis: When is a property restriction a “background principle” baked into the meaning of property itself as opposed to a restraint on a recognized property right? When, if ever, does a valid exercise of the police power operate outside of takings constraints? And, to top it all off, we still aren’t settled on how to define “property.” Pacific Legal Foundation seeks papers that offer fresh ideas on how to make “too far” more just, more concrete, and more principled. We welcome proposals that look at this problem from legal, economic, political, historical, and related angles, including empirical and nonempirical approaches.

For accepted works there is a $2500 honorarium and an opportunity to publish your work in the Journal. Certain travel expenses to the Law School also will be covered.

Download the full brochure for all the details, including timeline, and a list of possible topics.

Please consider submitting, and joining us in this fascinating enterprise. Find out more here.

Call for Papers: "Too Far: Imagining the Future of Regulatory Takings"

Thursday Round Up: Pretextual Takings, Squatting, Unconstitutional Conditions

Here's what we're reading today:

• Michael Berger, "Is a taking based on pretext constitutional?," Daily Journal (a take on the Second Circuit's recent decision holding that a property owner could not assert a pretext claim where the allegedly pretextual use did not confer a private benefit.
• Christian Britschgi, "Are 'Squatters' Rights' Out of Control?" Reason (the "squatting" issue has roared into the public zeitgeist lately; if you haven't been following it closely, here's a good place to start).
• Remember that case, currently pending the North Carolina Supreme Court, about what remedies are available if a court invalidates a taking, but the condemnor just goes ahead and seizes the property anyway? Here are all the briefs in that case, including our amicus in support of the property owner).
• Levine, Nash & Schapiro, "The Unconstitutional Conditions Vacuum in Criminal Procedure," 133 Yale L.J. 1401 (2024) (in which the authors argue that the unconstitutional conditions analysis (aka Nollan/Dolan) should be applied in situations where criminal defendants are subject to government coercion; it is interesting to see how those outside the Dirt Law bubble view the doctrine).
• Bianchi, Brifkani, Halaby, Huang, "Court rules for PhRMA in challenge to Oregon drug price transaparency law" JDSupra (a breakdown and summary of a recent District Court decision concluding that an Oregon statute that requires the disclosure of trade secrets is a Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto taking; includes a link to the court's opinion).

Check 'em out.

New Article: "Eminent Domain, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and the Rule of Law" (Steve Davis, Social Education Journal)

Check this out. Friend and colleague Steve Davis has authored "Eminent Domain, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and the Rule of Law," 88 Social Education J. 1 (2024).

As summarized on the Federal Takings blog:

Steve explains the rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and focuses on its critically-important (but lesser-known and appreciated) right to compensation when the government takes its citizens’ private property for public use. The article offers a primer on eminent domain history and abuse, from the application of the Takings Clause to the states to the Kelo decision. Steve goes on to present current, real-life issues before the Supreme Court that affect every-day Americans and explains their background and importance.

The article concludes, “the Fifth Amendment’s essential constraints on the government’s extraordinary and easily-abused power of eminent domain remains as important today as it has over centuries—truly a fundamental piece of our understanding about the rule of law.”

Social Education is published by the National Council for the Social Studies, which “is the largest professional association in the country devoted solely to social studies education,” according to its website.  “NCSS serves as an umbrella organization for elementary, secondary, and college teachers of history, civics, geography, economics, political science, sociology, psychology, anthropology, and law-related education.”

Check it out. Well worth a read, even for you experienced ones.

Call For Academic Papers: "Too Far: Imagining The Future of Regulatory Takings"

Have thoughts about where regulatory takings are (or should be) headed? Here's your chance to get in on the conversation, and to shape the future of the law. Our outfit, the Pacific Legal Foundation, in cooperation with the Antonin Scalia Law School's Journal of Law, Economics, and Policy, are calling for papers on "Imagining the Future of Regulatory Takings." There will be an in-person discussion of these papers at the Law School in October 2024.

Here's the full description:

A century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, assured us that “[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” In the ensuing one hundred years, courts have struggled to draw the line defining “too far.” Some still wonder whether such a line should even exist. As Justice Clarence Thomas recently said, “If there is no such thing as a regulatory taking, we should say so. And if there is, we should make clear when one occurs.”

To date, many jurists and scholars have argued that the “too far” line is anything but clear. The regulatory takings doctrine is a hodgepodge of balancing and categorical tests alongside a scattered throng of exceptions, with little guidance on which tests or exceptions apply when, much less how to apply them in a principled and consistent manner. There are the categorical tests of Lucas (“total” takings) and Loretto (“physical” takings) and the amorphous balancing tests like the Penn Central ad hoc regime and the threshold “relevant parcel” test. Then there are vexing and unanswered questions about whether some restrictions on property are simply exempted from a takings analysis: When is a property restriction a “background principle” baked into the meaning of property itself as opposed to a restraint on a recognized property right? When, if ever, does a valid exercise of the police power operate outside of takings constraints? And, to top it all off, we still aren’t settled on how to define “property.” Pacific Legal Foundation seeks papers that offer fresh ideas on how to make “too far” more just, more concrete, and more principled. We welcome proposals that look at this problem from legal, economic, political, historical, and related angles, including empirical and nonempirical approaches.

Proposals are due by April 15, 2024, and for accepted works there is a $2500 honorarium and an opportunity to publish your work in the Journal. Certain travel expenses to the Law School also will be covered.

Download the full brochure for all the details, including timeline, and a list of possible topics.

Please consider submitting, and joining us in this fascinating enterprise.

Call for Papers: "Too Far: Imagining the Future of Regulatory Takings"

New Article: Missed Opportunities in State Takings Challenges to Pandemic-Era Restrictions (Brennan Center's State Court Report)

Thank you to the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School's State Court Report (#statecourtreport) for publishing our piece "Missed Opportunities in State Takings Challenges to Pandemic-Era Restrictions." The title gives a hint about what this is about: how state and local government's reaction to Co-19 spurred challenges not only under the U.S. Constitution, but under state constitutions. We give examples of -- and comment on -- missed opportunities and out-and-out errors in several approaches.

Here are the opening paragraphs:

Responding to the Covid-19 pandemic, the federal government and many state and local governments imposed a variety of restrictions on individuals and businesses. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, for example, purported to suspend the ability of property owners to evict nonpaying tenants — a move the U.S. Supreme Court rejected as beyond the agency’s power. State and local governments adopted similar eviction moratoria, and many directed businesses to close or curtail operations. Litigation followed.

Much of that litigation focused on the federal Fifth Amendment’s requirement that the government provide just compensation when it takes private property for public use. Property and business owners have generally been unsuccessful in pressing federal takings claims for Covid-19 restrictions. But it is established that the rights acknowledged by the U.S. Constitution are merely a floor, not a ceiling. This notion recognizes that states may freely offer a higher level of protection of rights under their own laws or more severely restrict the state’s powers (or both). And many state constitutions go further, guaranteeing compensation when property is damaged. 

We also take a quick look at a still-pending case in Michigan, with the hope that the Michigan Supreme Court does not fall into these same traps.

We'd appreciate it if you were to read the entire piece -- it's short, we promise!

"Groping in a Fog" - Bound by Oath Podcast, S3 E2: Regulatory Takings - Penn Coal And Penn Central ... Unplugged!

We've been eagerly waiting for the new season of the Institute for Justice's podcast series, "Bound by Oath" to drop. Not only because it's a great series - produced by John Ross, it is more like an audio documentary than a typical podcast - but also because John was kind enough to ask us to participate again (our last appearance was in Season 1, where we guested on the episode about the origins of the "incorporation" doctrine).

This season is all about property rights, and episode 2 is all about regulatory takings. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, and Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, to be exact.

So just over a year ago, John and I headed up to anthracite coal country in Pennsylvania. We wanted to be on site on the exact 100th anniversary of the Supreme Court issuing the Mahon decision. Why? It just seemed appropriate. And as true takings nerds, we couldn't resist the chance to be in the room where it happened. Kind of a "John and Robert's Excellent (Takings) Adventure."

And as you dirt lawyers know, nothing substitutes for a site visit. 

In addition to John, me, and two Pittston lawyers who now own and used to own the former Mahon property, also weighing in is Professor William Fischel, who shares the insights about the Mahon case he learned while researching his book "Regulatory Takings" (1995)

And not content to cover the case that is seen as the first modern regulatory takings decision (the case is often wrongly assumed to be where the regulatory takings doctrine got its start), this episode also gives an in-depth treatment to the other well-known takings case with "Penn" in its name: Penn Central.

For that one, John goes to the source, Professor Gideon Kanner in what might be his final interview. Professor Kanner, of course, authored the seminal law journal article about the case, so he was a natural for this part of the episode. See Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 679 (2005). Don't miss out on this part of the episode, or you will miss some of the classic "Kannerisms" the good Professor issues.

Professor Kanner is also responsible for the episode's title, from his reaction to the three factors the Court seemingly created from whole cloth in Penn Central:

John: The Court said, there would be quote “no settled formula” for determining when a taking requiring just compensation had occurred. But there are three factors to consider. It didn’t say how much weight courts are supposed to give each factor or what evidence litigants could use to satisfy them.

Gideon Kanner: So it was another one of these impossible-to-meet criteria. There were three factors. There's no rule, but three factors, such as the impact on the owner, the nature of the government activity. So we all looked at each other: What the hell does that mean? All it did was confuse the law. The Court was groping in a fog.

This is a not-to-be-missed episode.

Here's the description from IJ:

In 1922, Scranton, Pennsylvania was said to be on the verge of collapsing into the vast coal mines beneath the city; residents, buildings, and streets alike were being swallowed up by “suddenly yawning chasms.” State legislators responded by unanimously passing a law meant to save the region, where about a million people lived, from total desolation. But when the law reached the Supreme Court, the justices struck it down, ruling that it would be an unconstitutional “regulatory taking” to force coal companies to leave their coal in the ground. On this episode, we go to nearby Pittston, Pennsylvania to find out what happened to the house at the center of the case. Did it—or Scranton—fall into the pits? After that, we trace the major developments in regulatory takings doctrine, which protect against regulations that go “too far.” But we wind up in a bit of a fog. Plus! This episode will have an unsolved murder—and some Supreme Court trivia: did you know a future Supreme Court justice argued the case on behalf of Scranton (at least in state court)?

Click here for transcript.

In case you are aching for some visuals to go with your listening, here you go.

The (former) Mahon home on a snowy Pittston day.
No signs of subsidence at all.

 

The view from lawyer Mahon's office.

We paid our respects to Mr. and Mrs. Mahon.
The episode also has a murder mystery,
something you don't see everyday in takings cases.

Grand Central Terminal,
preserved in aspic (for free).


That airspace.

Check the episode out here, and be sure to subscribe so you don't miss future eps.

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (Dec. 11, 1922)

Professor Kanner's Final Article: "Eminent Domain Projects That Didn't Work Out," 12 Brigham-Kanner Prop. Rts. J. 171 (2023)

Here it is -- Professor Gideon Kanner's final law journal article, published shortly before his passing:

Gideon Kanner, Eminent Domain Projects That Didn't Work Out, 12 Brigham-Kanner Prop. Rts. J. 171 (2023).

Appropriately, we think, published in William and Mary Law School's Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Journal, named in part in Gideon's honor.

This isn't a typical law journal article, but an essay collecting Professor Kanner's thoughts, comments, and (best of all) opinions on, well, eminent domain (and redevelopment) projects that didn't work out.

In Gideon's own words, from the Introduction:

But whether you favor widespread use of eminent domain or not, and whether the projects created by its use are sound or not, it is deplorable that the power of eminent domain has been often deployed to the detriment of racial and politically powerless minorities. Typically, redevelopment projects tend to displace middle class and poor people from their homes and businesses but provides parsimonious compensation that falls short of indemnity. The displaced people are limited by the courts to recovery of “fair market value” of their real property, which fails to include compensation for a variety of economic losses inevitably inflicted when people are involuntarily displaced. To add insult to injury, while talking glibly about indemnity, courts do not provide it and have not explained the reasons for this state of affairs. Too often they rely on factually unsupported lamentations—“fearful guesstimates” as one commentator put it—that full, realistic  compensation would be too expensive or even cause an “embargo” on public works, as the California Supreme Court once asserted.

What follows is a sampling of cases that failed to live up to their planners’ projections, including but not limited to redevelopment projects. The latter are particularly egregious because the linchpin of their success is a process of generating private gains for the private parties chosen to participate in those projects, while undercompensating the displaced populations of the areas targeted for redevelopment. Thus, the benefits, if any, of such projects are attained, if at all, on the back of condemnees, in violation of the principle that such costs should be fairly spread on members of the society that benefits from them and disproportionally imposed on people in the path of those projects.

Thank you to the editors of the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Journal for publishing it, in its unfiltered form.

Disclosure: I helped edit the piece, and Gideon even asked if it was worthy of publication (as if!). He described it as his "last" article collecting his collective thoughts. Yes, I responded, let's work on this and get it out for everyone to read (although I was secretly hoping that was not his final work). One of our University of Hawaii Law School Land Use students, Pono Arias, even volunteered his time and efforts as Gideon's Research Assistant and tracked down citations, made helpful edits and suggestions, and got the piece ready to go. We're grateful for Pono's work on this, as was Professor Kanner.

So here it is, Professor Kanner's last publication. When you read it, I am sure that - like me - you will hear it in your head in Gideon's voice.

And that's a good thing.

Gideon Kanner, Eminent Domain Projects That Didn't Work Out, 12 Brigham-Kanner Property Rts. J. 171 (2023)...

Harvard Law Review On Tyler v. Hennepin County: Reflecting The "Diminishing" Role Of State Property Law In Takings

Check this one out, the Harvard Law Review's summary of Tyler v. Hennepin County, the "home equity theft" takings case decided unanimously by the Supreme Court.

Some highlights:

Beginning with traditional principles, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that a property interest in surplus equity had English origins — King John proclaimed in the Magna Carta that when collecting debts owed to him by a deceased person, any surplus “shall be left to the executors.” Parliament endorsed this principle, giving the Crown the power to seize and sell a taxpayer’s property to satisfy a tax debt but requiring the surplus to be returned to the original owner.And according to Blackstone, the English common law required the same.

So too did historic and contemporary American laws.

...

While the Tyler Court continued the trend of a robust Takings Clause, it introduced novel evidence of a taking: a lack of internal consistency in Minnesota’s statutory regime. The majority’s discussion of analogous statutory contexts (where a property owner has an interest in surplus equity) exemplifies the longstanding concern justifying the Court’s diminishing of the role of state law in takings jurisprudence — state legislatures manipulating property interests to insulate themselves from takings liability. It also suggests that ordinary judicial review of positive state law may better identify and correct legislative gamesmanship than an evaluation of history and tradition can. Indeed, courts searching state property law for contradictory treatment will make it harder for a state to manipulate property interests. Tyler’s internal-consistency requirement permits the Court to restore state property law’s primacy and avoids the complications associated with the Court’s current approach of a “jurisdictionless” property law.

As early as Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth in 1972, the Court has recognized state law’s crucial role in articulating the “rules or understandings” defining property interests. Yet, throughout the Court’s case law, a theme persists: a fear of gamesmanship and the possibility that affirming the importance of state law incentivizes states to insulate themselves from takings liability. The worry is that, left to its own devices, a state might “transform private property into public property” via legislative enactment or define a property interest so broadly as to render regulations paltry in their interference.

Pre-Tyler, this concern appeared overstated. In one of its more prominent opinions concerned with gamesmanship, the Court failed to cite any prior examples of a state “improperly . . . fortify[ing]” itself against takings claims by passing legislation that defined land parcels strategically. In fact, Chief Justice Roberts had once emphatically argued that in most circumstances, state law should define the relevant parcel to be considered in a takings claim, and that worries surrounding state gamesmanship were unfounded.

(Footnotes omitted.)

Check it out.

Fifth Circuit Kicks Down The SWAT Takings Door (And Boots The Issue Upstairs)

Here's the latest in a case and an issue we've been following.

Recall that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas concluded that the City of McKinney, Texas was liable for the taking of Vicki Baker's home, after city police officers destroyed a large part of it while apprehending a suspect who had taken refuge therein. The court awarded just compensation and the city appealed.

Now, the other shoe drops: in Baker v. City of McKinney, No. 22-40644 (Oct. 11, 2023), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that because the invasion was necessary and a justified use of the city's police powers, it does not owe compensation.

We've been down this path before, so we won't go over it in detail (recall that the Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion and the subsequent cert petition was denied by the Supreme Court). Our thoughts about the issue are in the amicus brief we filed in that case, in which we argued that an invocation of police power or necessity isn't dispositive or outcome-determinative. 

The Fifth Circuit has now joined the Tenth:

We conclude that, as a matter of history and precedent, the Takings Clause does not require compensation for damaged or destroyed property when it was objectively necessary for officers to damage or destroy that property in an active emergency to prevent imminent harm to persons. Baker has maintained that the officers’ actions were precisely that: necessary, in light of an active emergency, to prevent imminent harm to the hostage child, to the officers who responded on the scene, and to others in her residential community. Accordingly, and despite our sympathy for Ms. Baker, on whom misfortune fell at no fault of her own, we REVERSE.

Slip op. at 2.

The Fifth Circuit takes a slightly more nuanced view, rejecting the city's invitation to hold that any substantial police power reason would be enough to avoid the obligation to provide compensation. Instead, "the mere fact that Baker's property has been damaged or destroyed pursuant to the City's police power cannot decide this case." Slip op. at 8. So the government isn't categorically exempt. (Silver linings and all that.)

But the opinion also concluded that the worm doesn't turn in the property owner's direction either: "[w]hat Baker needs, in other words, is historical or contemporary authority that involves facts closer to those at bar and where the petitioner succeeded under the Takings Clause." Slip op. at 11. And apparently, there is "historically oriented legal scholarship" that shows that the "'necessity' or 'emergency' privilege has existed in Takings Clause jurisprudence since the Founding." Slip op. at 12. [Barista's note: our own contribution to the legal scholarship was somehow overlooked by the court - the nerve!]

Read the court's journey through the history for more. See slip op. at 12-17.

The bottom line: if the invasion by Five-O was necessary, then no taking. And here, Baker acknowledges that "it was objectively necessary for officers to damage or destroy her property in an active emergency to prevent imminent harm to persons." Slip op. at 17.

But that's not the right question in these type of cases, is it? After all, the central question isn't necessity, but of cost spreading. The court acknowledged that the core vibe of takings is the Armstrong principle:

[T]he Supreme Court has often stated that “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), quoted in Tyler, 598 U.S. at 647. This statement’s relevance to Baker, who is faultless but must “alone” bear the burdens of a misfortune that might have befallen anyone, is manifest.

Slip op. at 18. In short, although it acknowledges that Baker alone is bearing the cost for a public good, the Fifth Circuit washes its hands of the most important question: is it just and fair that this is so? To the Fifth Circuit, history says yes.

And this leads to the opinion ending on what appears to be another silver lining, the Fifth Circuit seemingly inviting a cert petition asking what it views as the only court capable of making that call:

As a lower court, however, it is not for us to decide that fairness and justice trump historical precedent, particularly Supreme Court precedent, where it has long recognized a necessity exception that excludes those like Baker from the protection of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Such a decision would be for the Supreme Court alone.

Id.

Will one be forthcoming? We sure wouldn't bet against it.

Baker v. City of McKinney, No. 22-40644 (5th Cir. Oct. 11, 2023)

Just Published - IRWA's "Summary of Major Eminent Domain Cases & Legislation: Jan 1, 2023 - June 30, 2023"

Thanks to our co-authors for the latest issue of this recurring update.

The International Right of Way Association's Real Estate Law Committee produces twice-a-year reports "which contain summaries of eminent domain decisions and legislation within the United States." (This is the "international" right of way association, so that last qualifier is important.)

And what is really nice is that they make the report available.

The laboring oars on this are really Brad Kuhn and Jullian Friess Leivas (both from the Nossaman firm), but they were kind enough to include us. Brad and Jillian wrote up more at the California Eminent Domain Report:

We recently had the pleasure of collaborating with Robert Thomas and Ajay Gajaria once again for the International Right of Way Association’s (IRWA) biannual report covering numerous eminent domain cases at local, state and federal levels from January through the end of June 2023. This report is an important resource and reference point for professionals in the right-of-way industry.

In the report, we also take a brief look at pending, adopted and failed legislation across the U.S., while also providing updates on federal funding and projects associated with the recent Infrastructure Bill. The report also includes summaries of a few notable cases in Canada.

The report is short, and doesn't have a lot of fluff. Just what you wanted.

Check it out.

"YIMBY Martial Law" - More On Hawaii Gov's Gordian Knot Cutting

Here's an excellent report on a situation we've been following, the Hawaii governor's proclamation of a housing emergency. In "To Tackle Highest Housing Costs in the Country, Hawaii's Governor Declares YIMBY Martial Law," Christian Britschgi at Reason writes:

Developers with a [Beyond Barriers] working group [what we cheekily referred to as the "Privy Council"]–certified project wouldn't have to comply with normal zoning restrictions. They wouldn't have to go through Hawaii's cumbersome environmental review process (which can add months or years to a project's approval). They could avoid historic preservation regulations, and get relief from normal impact fees and taxes. They could also skip the need to get approval from the state's Land Use Commission—a duplicative zoning body.

The story is an excellent summary of the substance of the emergency proclamation, the support and objections it has received, and some prognostication (including ours):

Thomas says that Hawaii courts have generally been unwilling to second-guess the governor's use of emergency powers. Numerous lawsuits challenging emergency proclamations during the pandemic all failed. "COVID taught us that [the state's emergency statute] is extremely robust," he tells Reason. "It is essentially a political question is how the Hawaii Supreme Court has treated it."

At the same time, Thomas does suggest that a court might look differently on the use of emergency powers to address something like Hawaii's housing shortage. "Maybe it's an emergency but it's one that's been festering for 50 years. It's been on the longest fuse one can imagine," he says.

A legal colleague of ours has a less sanguine view (or maybe we should say "a rather blunt assessment"):

Lawsuits challenging the order are almost inevitable, said one Maui land use attorney to Civil Beat. "There's no disagreement that we need more affordable housing. But using the state constitution as toilet paper isn't the right approach," he told the publication.

Strong letter to follow.

The Governor issued this emergency proclamation before the big wildfire on Maui. The Governor subsequently announced that for the next 60 days, the housing emergency proclamation efforts will be directed at Maui disaster recovery.

The big picture question we have is whether the Governor's declare-an-emergency-and- bypass-the-laws approach to Hawaii's housing shortage will spread to other jurisdictions. Co-19 taught a whole lot of government officials that emergency orders are the shortcut to getting what they want done.

Stay tuned.

New Article - "Necessity Exceptions to Takings" (Shelley Ross Saxer)

Worth checking out: a new article from Pepperdine Law School's Shelley Ross Saxer, published in the University of Hawaii Law Review, "Necessity Exceptions to Takings," 44 U. Haw. L. Rev. 60 (2022). [Disclosure: as noted in the author's note, we reviewed an earlier draft of the piece and provided some thoughts.]

Here's the Abstract:

The doctrine of necessity has strong roots in the common law of tort and property going back hundreds of years. In the United States the doctrine has been applied in various situations to negate judicial review of constitutional challenges to government action, most recently in some of the wildfire and flood claims resulting from disasters. But now, the states’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have brought one of these necessity doctrines—the public health necessity relying on Jacobson v. Massachusetts—to the forefront as courts across the country review constitutional challenges to state public health measures. With such intense review of Jacobson’s public health necessity in a short timeframe, it appears that the courts, including the Supreme Court, are recognizing that common law emergency exceptions cannot be applied to prevent constitutional review. This development supports the goal of this Article, which is to discourage the use of the necessity doctrine to bypass constitutional scrutiny of asserted rights, particularly as to takings claims under the Fifth Amendment. This Article examines the historical development of the diverse categorical exceptions to takings claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and addresses the continued viability of these exceptions following the decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon. After reviewing four categories of necessity exceptions that include: 1) the doctrine of destruction (general, military, and law enforcement); 2) the public health exception; 3) the nuisance and background principles of property law exception; and 4) the police power exception, this Article concludes that the only doctrinally acceptable categorical defenses to a regulatory taking are the nuisance and background principles of property law exceptions. Nuisance and background principles of state law will determine whether the property owner has a property interest subject to a government taking. If the property owner never had a right to use their property in a manner that constitutes a nuisance or interferes with a public resource, it cannot be taken and does not deserve compensation. Government actions that constitute a taking, but benefit the public as a whole whether by conferring a benefit or preventing a harm, should not burden individual property owners when, under the Armstrong principle, in all fairness and justice, we the public should share in paying for the benefits received.

Download the piece on SSRN here.

New Article: Application of the Penn Central Test

Here's a recently-published article (ALI-CLE's The Practical Real Estate Lawyer) on a subject that we know you will want to read about: Jon Houghton, Hertha Lund, and Ben Stormes, Application of the Penn Central Test, 7 Prac. Real Estate Lawyer 7 (May 2023).

Check it out. It's short, practical (naturally), and worth your time.

Jon Houghton, Hertha Lund, and Ben Stormes, Application of the Penn Central Test, Prac. Real Estate Lawyer...

New Article: "UFOs and Eminent Domain"

A big thanks to friend and colleague Paul Henry for bringing to our attention this article by Andrew Stuttaford, UFOs and Eminent Domain.

No, it (unfortunately) is not the latest tenure-making scholarly law journal article (but we can dream, can't we?), but a piece in National Review.

It details a proposal to release federal documents relating to UFOs. Nice. But buried in the measure is this (according to Reuters):

Under the measure, records must be publicly disclosed in full no later than 25 years after they were created unless the U.S. president certifies that continued postponement is necessary because of a direct harm to national security.

It also establishes that the federal government would have "eminent domain" over any recovered technologies of unknown origin and any biological evidence of "non-human intelligence" that may be controlled by private individuals or entities.

Who among us is going to be the first in line to scoop an alien client/property owner? There's precedent for that, after all.

We're in.

New Scholarship: "Property as Service Streams" (Prof. Lee Anne Fennell)

New noteworthy dirt law scholarship, from U. Chicago's Prof. Lee Anne Fennell, "Property as Service Streams." Here's the Abstract:

Property’s job is to help people derive benefits from resources. But often it cannot do this work well. A core problem is an outmoded model of benefit production that treats the individually owned parcel or “thing” as the relevant unit of analysis. In this paper, I argue for a conceptual shift from a property-as-thing-ownership (PATO) paradigm to a property-as-service-streams (PASS) model. I start with the simple point that resources are only valued for the streams of beneficial services that they can provide. Further, owned items can only stream services to their users when combined with other resources and entitlements, many of which are controlled by other parties. Keeping discrete owned assets at center stage misdirects energy towards allocating and protecting things, when we should be examining how to nurture and sustain streams.

The analysis proceeds in three parts. I start with what the PATO to PASS move entails as a conceptual matter. I then examine the role of complements and substitutes in the PASS reformulation. Finally, I consider what PASS enables us to see and perceive about property, with implications for future innovation. This revised understanding of benefit production changes how we view property—how it works, what it needs to do, and what strategies it should employ.

Download here from SSRN.

Eminent domain lawyers certainly are already very familiar with the concept (think income capitalization, discounted cash flow, and the like).

New(er) Articles: Texas A & M Journal of Property Law - Natural Property Rights Symposium

The Texas A & M Journal of Property Law is always a good read, with many articles worthy of your time. But the Journal's latest, Volume 9, No. 4 (2023) stands out because it includes the papers for the Symposium on Natural Property Rights.

Check out these titles and authors:

• Natural Property Rights: An Introduction - Eric R. Claeys

• Too Simple Rules for a Complex World? Prior Appropriation Water Rights as Natural Rights - Vanessa Casado-Pérez

• Balancing the Inequities in Applying Natural Property Rights to Rights in Real or Intellectual Property - Lolita Darden

• Business Organizations as Natural Objects of Ownership - Kevin Douglas

• How Far Does Natural Law Protect Private Property? - James W. Ely Jr.

• Comparing & Contrasting Economic and Natural Law Approaches to Policymaking - Eric Kades

• Oil, Trees, and Water: Evaluating the Transition from Natural Property Rights to Property Conventions - John A. Lovett

• Opus as the Core of Property - Adam MacLeod

• Natural Law, Assumptions, and Humility - Ezra Rosser

• The Natural Right of Property - Timothy Sandefur

• Ad Coelum and the Design of Property Rights - Joseph A. Schremmer

• The Future of Natural Property Law: Comments on Eric Claeys’s Natural Property Rights - Christopher Serkin

• Property and Moral Responsibilities: Some Reflections on Modern Catholic Social Theory - Lucia A. Silecchia

• Natural Property Rights: A Reply - Eric R. Claeys

That should keep you busy for a while.

New Article: 2023 National Eminent Domain Update

Thanks to the editors at ALI-CLE's The Practical Real Estate Lawyer for publishing my friend and colleague Amy Boulris and my summary of what we think were the most interesting -- if not the most important -- eminent domain cases over the past year.

And more thanks for allowing us to post it here, ALI-CLE. Full citation: Amy Brigham Boulris & Robert H. Thomas, "2023 National Eminent Domain Update" July 2023 ALI-CLE Prac. Real. Estate Lawyer.

Amy Brigham Boulris & Robert H. Thomas, 2023 National Eminent Domain Update, July 2023 ALI-CLE Prac. Real E...

Tuesday Round-Up: Sackett, Tyler, Defending Zoning, Canada Property Rights ... And More

Here's what we're reading this Tuesday:

• Tiffany Lashmet's Ag Law in the Field podcast: "Episode #155: Jesse Richardson and Anthony Schutz (Sackett v. EPA)"
• Lawprof Ilya Somin, Brennan Center for Justice: "Supreme Court Strengthens Federal Protection for Property Rights"
• Also from Prof Somin, Volokh Conspiracy: "A Flawed Attempt at a Libertarian Defense of Exclusionary Zoning"
• Here's the piece Prof Somin is responding to - Robert Poole, "A Brief History of Single-Family Zoning"
• Professor Malcolm Lavoie, SSRN, "Property Rights, Takings, and the Rule of Law: Assessing Annapolis Group v. Halifax Regional Municipality" (assessing the Supreme Court of Canada's latest ruling on property rights)
• Note, "The Contract Clause: Reawakened in the Age of COVID-19," 136 Harv. L. Rev. 2130 (2023)
• Lawprof Ilan Wurman, "Reconstructing Reconstruction-Era Rights," 109 Va. L. Rev. 885 (2023)

Worth checking out.

Rethinking Penn Central: A Call For Symposium Papers

If you know, you know.

Pacific Legal Foundation (that's us) has put out a call for papers about "Rethinking Penn Central." Here's the details (pdf).

Here's some of the suggested topics:

• Can Penn Central be salvaged or does it need to be fully replaced?
• If it is to be replaced, what should the new test be?
• Alternatively, what improvements can be made to Penn Central that would address problems raised by critics without uprooting the test entirely?
• Is economic loss primarily relevant to compensation owed rather than the threshold question of whether a taking has occurred?
• Can a more categorical approach, like those taken in cases including Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, Hodel v. Irving, or Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, adequately address regulatory takings?
• What insights does the original meaning of the Takings Clause offer regarding how to fix or replace Penn Central?
• Do colonial or English practices or precedents offer insights into a better approach to regulatory takings?
• How did courts during the ratification and reconstruction periods address regulatory takings prior to Oliver Wendell Holmes’s infamous "too far" statement, and what lessons do those precedents hold for how to fix or replace Penn Central?
• What are the pitfalls that a new test must be careful to avoid?

More details here.

July 1, 2023 deadline to submit proposals. Accepted papers even get a $2,500 honorarium, and travel to the October research roundtable.

Check it out, and submit!

Rethinking Penn Central Symposium Call for Papers

In Which We Have A Conversation With A Colleague About Property Law, Public Interest Lawyering, And How To Pronounce "Schedule" (May Be TMI)

Thank you to to good folks at ALI-CLE's The Practical Lawyer, for putting me together with Rajiv Khanna, and memorializing our recent conversation in this piece to be published in next month's issue: "Conversation With a Colleague: Robert Thomas," The Practical Lawyer (ALI-CLE June 2023).

Rajiv and I chatted about property law (including the Rule Against Perpetuities, even!), the difference between public interest lawyering and private practice, online vs in-person, a national practice vs a local practice, pathways to professional contentment, and considering yourself as a general practitioner in the age of legal specialization:

You still consider yourself to be a general practitioner. You have focused on property in private practice. You teach property in law school, and you also are doing public interest litigation. Out of all of these careers, what do you think you find the most satisfying?

That is truly a tough question. I loved private practice. I loved being able to help people solve their problems. I liked both large and small cases, cases that were money makers. Unfortunately, there were a lot of cases that were not money-makers but I still treasure the associations I have with those clients or cases where we couldn’t win. I love the people I worked with. I remain friends with them to this day.

I also love teaching law because you’re not bound by what the client can afford. Should I be looking at that issue? How about that side issue? Can I go there? In the academic world, that is actually encouraged. And secondly, I love working with soon-to-be lawyers and watching as the lights turn on in their eyes and they open their minds to the possibilities. A lot of them, I think, were like I was in law school and thinking, “This class on land use is at a good place and fits in my schedule.” And then they find out that property is not a static subject. It’s right on the cutting edge of things, and they really enjoy it.

And then the last two years I’ve been a lawyer with the nonprofit Pacific Legal Foundation and I really am enamored of that. In private practice, there were a few days here and there when you have to get your bills out or you have to call a client who’s late in paying, or you have to get into a fight with the other side. And you think, when is this day going to end? But I have yet to have any of those days at PLF. I wake up every day eager to get back to work. It’s a great freedom being able to tell clients, don’t worry, we will cover all of your legal fees and all of the costs. We’re here to help you, and to help shape the law to benefit everyone. When you can tell clients that, they view you as someone who is coming in solely to help them, as opposed to someone coming in to help them and maybe make some money. It really changes the dynamic of the relationship. The colleagues that I work with are the best and the brightest in our field—really dynamite advocates—so I feel incredibly lucky to have come into this position.

But if I had to choose between private practice, teaching, and public interest law, I think I have to go with public interest practice. Just because there hasn't been a day yet that I haven't thought, Today is going to be fun. I’m going to learn some stuff. I don't have to worry about billable hours. I don›t have to worry about chasing clients for overdue invoices. I don’t really have to worry too much about the drudgery of litigation. I’ve also somehow avoided many of the big drawbacks that you might hear about in typical civil litigation. I don’t know whether that’s because I’m dealing with mostly government lawyers on the other side who are very professional. It would pain me to have to let go of my academic and scholarly work, but if I had to, I would choose public interest law. It’s fantastic.

Check it out if you are inclined, and don't mind TMI. 

Conversation With a Colleague: Robert Thomas, The Practical Lawyer (ALI-CLE June 2023)

New L Rev Article: "Property and the Right to Enter" (Bethany Berger)

Here's an article for your Monday reading, Bethany R. Berger, Property and the Right to Enter, 80 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 71 (2023).

Here's the abstract:

On June 23, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, holding that laws that authorize entry to land are takings without regard to duration, impact, or the public interest. The decision runs roughshod over precedent, but it does something more. It undermines the important place of rights to enter in preserving the virtues of property itself. This Article examines rights to enter as a matter of theory, tradition, and constitutional law, arguing that the law has always recognized their essential role. Throughout history, moreover, expansions of legal exclusion have often reflected unjust domination antithetical to property norms. The legal advocacy that led to Cedar Point continues this trend, both undermining protections for vulnerable immigrant workers in this case and succeeding in a decades-long effort to use exclusion as a constitutional shield against regulation.

Download the pdf here.

New L Rev Article: "Property against Legality: Takings after Cedar Point (Huq)

Check this out, a recently-published article in the Virginia Law Review, Aziz Z. Huq, "Property against Legality: Takings after Cedar Point," 109 Va. L. Rev. 233 (Apr. 10, 2023).

Here's the abstract:

In the American constitutional tradition, a zealous judicial defense of property is closely aligned with the idea of “the rule of law.” Conventional wisdom holds that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment vindicates both property rights and the rule of law by foreclosing arbitrary, lawless state action. But the standard story linking property rights, legality, and a constraint on arbitrary governance is more commonly stipulated than analyzed. This Article uses an apparent sharp break in takings jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court’s June 2021 decision in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, to closely scrutinize the relationship between legality and property rights. To that end, it offers first a careful analysis of the sharp rupture that Cedar Point makes in takings jurisprudence. Not only is the Court’s result difficult to explain in terms of precedent or traditional legal methods, it also destabilizes a previously settled and reasonably predictable litigation landscape. As a result, it seeds profound uncertainty on the legal ground because it signals a dissolution of the constraining effect formerly realized by standard tools of legal reasoning. There is, further, no obvious way for the Court to restore stability and predictability to the doctrine without drawing new, arbitrary lines. In consequence, takings law will likely abide in confusion, not certainty, for the foreseeable future. Cedar Point’s vindication of property rights hence comes at the paradoxical cost of dramatically increasing the space for decisions unguided by law by one group of officials in the judiciary.

A close reading of Cedar Point invites a more general and abstract analysis of the complex, nuanced relationship between the rule of law and property rights. Drawing on the general jurisprudential theories of H.L.A. Hart and other legal positivists, I use the decision as a launching point for a larger exploration of ways in which the rule of law can be incompletely realized to paradoxical and even socially harmful effect. Placing property at the center of the rule of law, I suggest, can be consistent with, or even an incitement to, serious derogation of the rule of law. Doing so can undermine rule-of-law goals, such as constraining arbitrary rule. This suggests a need to decenter property rights in accounts of the rule of law, and to explore, in more nuanced and grounded fashion, how the practice of judicial review mediates systemic values of legality and predictability. In short, if we value the rule of law, it may in general be appropriate to take a more skeptical, and so more contingent, view of both property as a legal institution, and also the courts as a source of legality and stability.

Download the pdf here.

New Article: Alex Boone, "The Tide's Coming In: A New Case for Beachfront Property Rights in South Carolina" (Wm & Mary Envt' L & Pol'y Rev)

Check this out, a new student-authored note from William and Mary third-year law student Alex Boone, "The Tide's Coming In: A New Case for Beachfront Property Rights in South Carolina," 47 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 383 (2023).

Here's the Abstract:

Part I of this Note explores the scientific data as it relates to the impending consequences of climate change on South Carolina’s coast and will introduce the disastrous scenarios that are predicted to arise as a result of rising sea levels and the accelerating strength and severity of extreme weather events. Part II compares the effectiveness of various coastal resiliency tools and highlights the regulatory framework that prohibits their use by beachfront property owners. Part III explores the topic of regulatory takings and their indirect prophylactic nature of protecting citizens from regulatory overreach and offers a case for a South Carolina court to find that the state’s regulations create an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation. Lastly, Part IV recommends a policy change designed to mitigate the consequences of the CTWA [Coastal Tidelands and Wetlands Act] on South Carolinians in the absence of a judicial finding that the CTWA constitutes a regulatory taking.

It's really rewarding to see this kind of writing and analysis from a law student. Yes, we appreciate the subject-matter and the conclusion (naturally), but that aside, it is a good day when a soon-to-be colleague does this kind of work and lays it all out there for the world to see. Congratulations to the ELPR editors, and especially to Mr. Boone!

New Article: "Toward Principled Background Principles in Takings Law" (Strahilevitz & Hansen)

Check this out, a new article co-authored by a federal judge's law clerk and lawprof Lior Strahilevitz (Chicago). With the title, "Toward Principled Background Principles in Takings Law" are we going to read it? You bet. (Unlike a lot of new scholarship that we post here, we read this one immediately.)

Here's the Abstract:

Blunders made by lawyers, judges, and scholars have caused the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid to be deeply misunderstood. In Cedar Point, the Court re-wrote takings law by treating temporary and part-time entries onto private property as per se takings. Prior to Cedar Point these sorts of government-authorized physical entries would have been evaluated under a balancing framework that almost invariably enabled the government to prevail. As it happens, there were two well-established rules of black letter law that California’s lawyers and amici mistakenly failed to invoke in defending the Cedar Point union organizer access regulation. First, a physical takings claim accrues when a regulation authorizing third parties to enter private property is promulgated, not when the third party actually enters the land. Second, only the party that owned the land at the time the physical taking cause of action accrued can prevail. Under these doctrines, Cedar Point Nursery’s lawsuit was filed decades too late. By the wrong plaintiff. California’s oversights were probably outcome determinative.

Moving beyond Monday-morning quarterbacking, we argue that the statute of limitations arguments available to governments in future cases help provide the essential limiting principles that went unmentioned in Cedar Point. In the aftermath of Cedar Point prominent scholars denounced the opinion as a vehicle for gutting antidiscrimination law, labor law, environmental law, rent control, and other parts of the regulatory state. Our analysis reveals that these concerns are likely exaggerated because defenders of those long-standing limits on the right to exclude can invoke the statute of limitations arguments that California’s lawyers failed to raise. On the other hand, new restrictions on owners’ rights to exclude are vulnerable to legal challenge. Properly understood, contemporary takings law grandfathers in many longstanding limits on the right to exclude while constraining governments that wish to tackle collective action problems by restricting property rights in new ways. Moreover, statutes of limitations and related doctrines can provide courts with something that has been elusive since the Supreme Court’s 1992 takings decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: a principled and coherent account of what restrictions on owners’ rights are impervious to takings claims because they qualify as background principles of state property law.

Read it at SSRN.

[Before we go on, Disclosure 1: my law firm represented the property owner in Cedar Point Nursery, so yes, I have a dog in the hunt.]

What do you think of the article's premise and conclusion that a regulation alleged to allow a physical invasion must be brought when the regulation is adopted, and not when property is actually invaded?

Government lawyers need not and should not repeat the mistake that California’s lawyers made, a goof that evidently went unnoticed by all three dissenting justices, all thirteen amici, and every scholar who has written about Cedar Point. By correcting Cedar Point’s litigation strategy blunder, governments may avoid having to compensate landlords who want to refuse to rent to members of a protected class, landlords whose ability to evict is constrained by rent control laws, employers who wish to fire workers involved in unionization efforts, and business owners who want to bill governments for the inconvenience of having to endure entry by health and safety inspectors. Most of these claims brought by property owners should fail if defended by competent government counsel who can learn from California’s error.

Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).

In other words, the allegedly unconstitutional act is the enactment of the regulation, and not also the failure to provide compensation when an invitee subsequently exercises the rights granted by the regulation to enter the plaintiff's property against the owner's wishes.

And what of the article's other premise, that regulations allowing physical invasions and occupations of property over time become "background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance" and disappear upon conveyance of the property?

Understandably, many observers were unnerved by Chief Justice Roberts’ decision to brush aside the notion that the California regulation – just seven years younger than the Fair Housing Act – was a background principle of state property law, unnerved many observers. If the 1975 California statute and regulation do not count by 2021 as background principles that inhere in title why shouldn’t the 1968 Fair Housing Act suffer the same fate? The response to Cedar Point from the least alarmed property scholars fell back on the idea that the Court would nonetheless treat the Fair Housing Act as a background principle. But no one has a good theory – other than a realist reading of the justices’ relative hostility to the goals of labor law – for why something magical happened between 1968 and 1975. After Cedar Point it is quite challenging to conclude that there are any principles at all underlying the Supreme Court’s conception of background principles. Our goals in this article include articulating coherent principles that are grounded in existing law and consistent with what the Court decided in Cedar Point.

Id. at 17 (footnotes omitted). 

Some preliminary impressions:

Are all physical invasion challenges facial claims? The article's premise seems to eviscerate the longstanding distinction in constitutional law generally -- and takings law specifically -- between a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge. The window opens on a facial challenge on behalf of everyone when a regulation is adopted, but we thought it was settled that individual property owners had to wait -- upon pain of being tossed out on ripeness grounds --  for the challenged regulation to actually be applied to their facts and circumstances. But the article does not mention the facial vs as-applied distinction.

Standing before incurring a concrete injury? The argument also seems a variation of the Federal Circuit's rationale in Campbell v. United States, 932 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019), where the court held "[i]n the case of a regulatory taking, however, the taking may occur before the effect of the regulatory action is felt and the actual damage to the property interest is entirely determinable." Disclosure 2: we thought the Federal Circuit's reasoning in that case was faulty (that a property owner has an obligation to sue even before she is actually injured seems very strange), and petitioned for certiorari (denied). But it does seem like a weird rule, and very much at odds with injury-in-fact and Article III standing requirements.

Whither Kirby Forest? The rule also seems at odds with Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984), where the Court upheld all sorts of government actions that muck around with an owner's property rights prior to an actual judgment and tender of compensation in eminent domain cases. No, the Court concluded, the "taking" takes place in straight takings when there's been an adjudication of compensation and a tender of actual payment. And all those things which happened before that interfere with the owner's use -- like instituting an eminent domain action, filing a lis pendens and clouding title, drying up the market for the property, and similar -- do not interfere sufficiently with property interests because "petitioner was free to make whatever use it pleased of its property." Id. at 15-16. The California provision seems similar: until the union organizers actually entered Cedar Point property under color of the statute, the owner could exclude whom it wanted.

Too early and too late: You just know that if property owners had challenged the California statute as a taking upon enactment, but before anyone had actually attempted to enter under the authority of the statute, that the claim would not have been that they filed too late, but rather too early. Property owners are used to these type of inconsistent arguments and being whipsawed between being accused of filing too early, or too late (or, in many cases, both too early and too late at the same time). We don't think that the line the courts are going to enforce between ripeness and staleness is as clear as the authors make it out to be.

Get ready for more takings claims, federal courts. Unless the article is arguing for abandoning the remaining takings ripeness requirement (something we're down for, but so far the courts are not), we're not sure that a rule that will force prudent property owners to sue upon adoption of new regulations is one that the courts will enthusiastically embrace (even if they should).

Zombie takings, or zombie statutes? The article describes Cedar Point as a "zombie takings claim" (p. 33) because it challenged a statute originally adopted decades ago. It argues that after about 40 years, regulation ossifies into a background principle, immune from challenge. Even though we'd use the "zombie" label to describe the California statute and others like it that are there on the books but are pretty obscure, let's go with the zombie takings label. That brings up an intriguing tradeoff: would we surrender Cedar Point and the ability to challenge 40 year old regulations in return for eliminating the ripeness hurdle and opening up courts to immediate challenges of newly-adopted regulations as we think the piece is advocating for? Hmmmmm... we gotta think about that one.

Cringe. No matter what, we think that calling the Cedar Point outcome the result of "blunders" by lawyers, judges, and scholars (p. 1), the government's strategy a "goof" (p. 5) and "bad lawyering" (p. 48), its lawyers "bone-headed" (id. at 49 & n.314), and accusing government counsel of committing "a colossal strategic blunder" (id. at 2), and saying that the government's lawyers in Cedar Point and Lucas committed "legal malpractice" (id.), is unnecessary and uncharitable in the extreme. We get that the authors don't care for the outcome in Cedar Point and wish their "Monday-morning quarterbacking" strategy (their words not ours, see p.1) would have been raised and tested. But in our view, these type of accusations should not be thrown about lightly, especially by those who didn't enter the amici arena themselves, and by those who don't appear to have been there, done that because their collective time actually practicing law and making strategic litigation decisions in real time in real cases appears to be, let's say, very limited. We hope there can be even vehement disagreement about the issues without slinging accusations of malfeasance, incompetence, and especially malpractice -- claims the practicing bar takes very, very seriously. We respectfully urge the authors and the law journal editors to reconsider these characterizations prior to print publication. 

We're going to meditate on the article and its arguments more. But whatever you may think of the authors' analysis and conclusions, this piece is well worth reading.

IRWA's Summary Of Major Eminent Domain Cases & Legislation (June-Dec 2022)

The International Right of Way Association's Real Estate Law Committee produces twice-a-year reports "which contain summaries of eminent domain decisions and legislation within the United States."

And what is really nice is that they make the report available.

Here's the latest.

We're posting it here because we're one of the co-authors. Hat tip to our co-authors Brad Kuhn, Jillian Friess Leivas, and Ajay Gajaria.

The report is short, and doesn't contain a lot of fluff. Just what you wanted.

New Article: Maureeen Brady, "The Illusory Promise of General Property Law"

Check this out, a new piece by lawprof Molly Brady, "The Illusory Promise of General Property Law," 132 Yale. L.J.F. (2023 forthcoming).

If the title alone isn't enough to grab you, here's the abstract:

In The Fourth Amendment and General Law, Danielle D’Onfro and Daniel Epps endorse an approach to the Fourth Amendment that defines the scope of protection largely by reference to "general property law"—uniform principles of trespass, abandonment, and so forth—discerned from and informed by the customs and rules of multiple jurisdictions. While their approach attractively reasons from useful common-law and private-law concepts, the specific general-law model they outline has both unresolved internal puzzles and unaddressed external effects.

In this Response, I probe this vision of “general law,” which has the potential to be more open-ended and unconstrained than the general law as it has previously been understood. Even if it did more closely resemble traditional general law, a court’s resort to making general law in a particular context is typically justified by some federal interest or power meriting the application of uniform rules. The authors do not satisfactorily explain that need here, especially given traditional deference to positive state law—and the desirability of some variation reflecting local conditions and expertise—in matters involving property questions in other areas of constitutional law. Further, in justifying reliance on the general law, the authors over-sell its determinacy and stability vis-à-vis existing Fourth Amendment law, which assesses whether an individual’s “reasonable expectations of privacy” have been violated. Given the vagaries of some common-law standards and the breadth of the sources of general law, courts will still be faced with unclear choices within and among them. The general-law approach does not offer guidance on resolving these conflicts and uncertainties, dooming it to the same indeterminacy.

To illustrate with specific examples, I turn to a doctrinal area where the pitfalls of general law—and specifically, general property law—can already be observed: in recent decisions under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Decisions interpreting the Takings Clause traditionally “emphasiz[ed] the role of nonconstitutional state property law in defining both what counts as constitutional property and in measuring whether a taking has occurred.” The presumption of deference to state-specific property principles was grounded in a belief that property is an inherently local matter and that different states might opt to recognize and regulate property interests differently. However, two Supreme Court decisions within the last five years—Murr v. Wisconsin and Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid—have unsettled that longstanding tradition with troubling effects. Takings law also teaches that decisions by courts in federal constitutional cases can influence the direction of nonconstitutional state private law, even though that result is not compelled.

There is an approach that would carry some of the benefits of the general-law model while leaving most of the development of property law to the states. In articles covering the Due Process and Takings clauses, Thomas Merrill has advocated for a “patterning definition” of constitutional property—a set of federal criteria that are met (or not) by the characteristics an interest has under nonconstitutional state law. The idea behind patterning is to provide a baseline, uniform constitutional standard across the states—one of the key purported advantages of the general-law model over the positive-law one—without having courts make a confusing national law of property specific for federal purposes. While private law can helpfully frame and elucidate Fourth Amendment problems, the general-law model offers limited promise for the development of Fourth Amendment doctrine while posing unwarranted risks for the viability of variable state property law.

Get it from SSRN here.

New Article: "Before Property: A Prehistory of Property Rights in Land"

We can't claim to fully understand it (it's full of words and phrases that frighten and confuse us), but we nonetheless commend to you a recent piece by lawprof Amanda Byer (University College Dublin), "Before Property: A Prehistory of Property Rights in Land."

Here's the Abstract:

This paper traces the origins of land as property in the common law and is excerpted from a larger work on the legal geography of property. Unlike previous genealogies of property, this research uses a landscape lens to examine property’s roots, predating its origins not in Lockean notions of individual ownership, but in the pre-feudal era. Property diverged from landscape, a term signifying a locally distinct polity or place, in which ‘land’ represented a complex web of diverse non-proprietary relationships and interests. This divergence was facilitated by a legal system that prioritised (placeless) abstract rights in land that could be owned, as exemplified by John Locke’s property theory of value. Revealing property’s early origins in place reframes property’s ascendance, not as a linear evolution from primitive collectivism, but as a retreat from grounded perspectives in land. A landscape lens may allow us to reimagine property’s potential, by re-infusing place into the property discourse.

Check it out (it's not terribly lengthy, so it won't set you back too far time-wise).

New Article: "Theft, Extortion, and the Constitution: Land Use Practice Needs an Ethical Infusion" (Michael Berger)

Here's your must-read for today, the latest journal article from Michael Berger, "Theft, Extortion, and the Constitution: Land Use Practice Needs an Ethical Infusion," 38 Touro L. Rev. 755 (2022).

Here's the Abstract:

There are many ways in which property owners/developers interact with regulators. To the extent that texts and articles deal with the ethical duties of the regulators, they tend to focus on things like conflicts of interest. But there is more. This article will examine numerous other ways in which regulators may run afoul of ethical practice in dealing with those whom they regulate.

And if that isn't enough to grab you, there's this:

There may be more to the issue than how to act in narrow circumstances. For one thing, there is the idea that government and the governed need to deal with each other on a level playing field. As one court put it:

It has been aptly said: “If we say with Mr. Justice Holmes, ‘Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government,’ it is hard to see why the government should not be held to a like standard of rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens.”

Moreover, there are some peculiarly land use related questions that have a core of ethical content and that receive too little attention as ethical issues. For example, as the U.S. Supreme Court once put it, in explaining the need for just compensation when private property is taken for public use:

[t]he political ethics reflected in the Fifth Amendment reject confiscation as a measure of justice.

So, there is at least one parameter: ethics is a part of the Fifth Amendment, and it prohibits “confiscation” of private property. That seems a good place to start. This article will highlight a few of the larger ethical issues stemming from that beginning.

Id. at 756-757 (footnotes omitted).

Be sure to check it out.

Law Of The Lava - Who Owns New "Accreted" Land? (And Other Questions)

Due to our 808 roots, we've been fielding a lot of questions related to the ongoing eruption of Mauna Loa on the Big Island.

It's big, it's spectacular (see video above), and (for us) it's law.

The questions (who owns "accreted" lava?, how does the NPS let the public out to see this?, what uses can be made of property covered by lava?) made us realize that we had addressed some of those issues in prior posts. So we're reposting:

• Visitors At The Volcano: Is The NPS Nuts?
• "Accretion," Hawaii Style
• What Constitutes a Loss? - Bridge Aina Lea and takings

Hope you find useful these things that make Hawaii property law pretty interesting at times.

New Article: "Warranted Exclusion: A Case for a Fouth Amendment Built on the Right to Exclude"

Check this out: a new article from lawprof Mailyn Fidler (U Nebraska SOL), "Warranted Exclusion: A Case for a Fourth Amendment Built on the Right to Exclude," 76 SMU L. Rev. ___ (2023) (forthcoming).

The Abstract:

Searches intrude; fundamentally, they infringe on a right to exclude. So that right should form the basis of Fourth Amendment protections. Current Fourth Amendment doctrine—the reasonable expectation of privacy test—struggles with conceptual clarity and predictability. And the leading competitor, what I call the “maximalist” property approach, risks troublingly narrow results. This Article provides a new alternative: Fourth Amendment protection should be anchored in a flexible conception of property rights—what this Article terms a “situational right to exclude.” When a searchee has a right to exclude some law-abiding person from the thing to be searched, in some circumstance, the government must obtain a warrant before gathering information about that item. Keeping the government out is warranted when an individual has a situational right to exclude; it is exactly then that the government must get a warrant.

Download the draft here (SSRN).

Are we reading this one? Because this is one of the areas that we're digging into in the courts, you bet we are.

New Symposium: Northwestern L. Rev.'s Property Issue

Be sure to check out Northwestern Law Review's symposium issue on "Reimagining Property Rights in the Era of Inequality." which brought together "scholars of legal history, property, tax, land use, fair housing, environmental law, natural resources and water rights, family law, education, and constitutional law, to highlight new scholarship at the intersection of these fields."

We found the essay by Professor Fennell ("Streamlining Property," and the essay by Timothy Mulvaney ("Compulsory Terms in Property") to be of particular interest. Full list of essays above, or here.

New Must-Read Article: "Cedar Point Nursery and the End of the New Deal Settlement" - Property Rights Are Civil And Human Rights

Here's your must-read for today, a new article from U. Va. lawprof Julia D. Mahoney, "Cedar Point Nursery and the End of the New Deal Settlement."

Disclosure: we show up in footnote * along with others for offering "comments and conversations" about the piece. 

Here's the Abstract:

In Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a California state regulation granting labor organizations a limited “right to take access” to agricultural employers’ property constitutes a per se physical taking. Cedar Point has sparked intense criticism, with critics arguing that the decision threatens to transform the law of property rights so as to “hobble” government land use regulation and even undermine democracy. This Article explains why the objections of Cedar Point’s detractors are misplaced. Far from disabling government regulation or fomenting stasis by favoring the “already haves,” Cedar Point is best understood as another step in the normalization of property rights. In this, Cedar Point is in accord with other recent Court decisions, including Horne v. Department of Agriculture, and Knick v Township of Scott. These cases illustrate how constitutional recognition of property interests, duly enforced by the judiciary, protect the interests of the working and middle classes. That is no small thing, particularly at a time of well-justified concerns about the outsize influence of elites on the legislative and executive branches of government, with its attendant worries that those who lack power to defend themselves in the political and administrative arenas are vulnerable to “redistribution up.”

It is true that this normalization of property rights amounts to a retreat from the “New Deal Settlement,” under which courts declined to subject legislative and administrative actions affecting property rights to significant oversight. But for anyone who cares about the economically vulnerable, the passing of the New Deal Settlement should be cause for celebration rather than alarm. Eighty years on, it is evident that the costs to many poor communities of judicial abdication in the area of property rights were very high. The careful readjustment now underway does nothing more than recognize property’s status as a civil and human right, one that needs serious constitutional protection if people are to flourish as citizens, family members, and workers.

Check it out. Get the pdf here.

IRWA's Summary Of Major Eminent Domain Cases & Legislation (Jan-May 2022)

The International Right of Way Association's Real Estate Law Committee produces twice-a-year reports "which contain summaries of eminent domain decisions and legislation within the United States."

And what is really nice is that they make the report available. 

We're posting it here because we're one of the co-authors. Hat tip to our co-authors Brad Kuhn, Jillian Friess Leivas, and Ajay Gajaria.

The report is short, and doesn't contain a lot of fluff. Just what you wanted.

Lawprof Saxer On Jotwell: "The Impact of Knick on Regulatory Takings and Those Pesky Lucas Exceptions"

Check this out: Pepperdine lawprof Shelley Saxer has a piece in Jotwell, "The Impact of Knick on Regulatory Takings and Those Pesky Lucas Exceptions," a review of U. Hawaii lawprof David Callies' book, "Regulatory Takings After Knick."

The review is short and to the point, so we suggest you read it. But here's a teaser:

This small but mighty book offers a concise history and understanding of takings jurisprudence as it stood before and after the Knick decision. It brings clarity to a convoluted chronicle of takings litigation and presents specific situations where litigants have asserted a total taking claim and the defense has relied on the various exceptions to Lucas.

Don't miss it.

New Article: Woolhandler & Mahoney, Federal Courts and Takings Litigation, 97 Notre Dame L. Rev. 679 (2022)

A new article on takings from U. Virginia Law School profs Ann Woolhandler and Julia Mahoney in the Notre Dame Law Review, "Federal Courts and Takings Litigation." Get the pdf here.

Rather than try and summarize the piece, we're just going to cut-and-paste the highlights from the article's Introduction:

While Knick clearly expands the lower federal court role in takings claims, many questions remain. We do not know how federal courts will respond to the increase in claims—whether they will embrace a robust federal role in land use cases, or use various abstention doctrines to rein them in. While pro-regulatory and pro-property rights scholars have predictably taken sharply contrasting positions as to the appropriate federal court role post-Knick, this Article will recommend a middle-of-the-road approach, based partly on history and partly on an assessment of where the lower federal courts may most usefully contribute to the fair determination of takings claims.

...

Going forward after Knick’s overturning Williamson County, we ask: What role should the federal courts play? The demise of Williamson suggests that the federal courts may significantly increase their role in land use decisions, but it may also suggest that they will more actively use abstention doctrines to reduce Knick’s impact. We evaluate the use of Pullman and Burford abstention doctrines in takings claims, and find them inapt. We suggest an abstention doctrine specially for takings cases that would sort out cases where the federal courts are most likely to contribute to fair applications of the law. Finally, we suggest that constitutionally-based actions brought under § 1331 may be better homes for takings cases than § 1983 actions.

...

[The Article] outlines categories of claims for which lower federal court jurisdiction may be more and less warranted. Finally, it suggests that constitutional claims under the federal question statute rather than § 1983 may be a better vehicle for federal courts takings claims, Knick notwithstanding.

(footnotes omitted).

Highly recommended. [Disclosure: as noted in footnote ** of the piece, we offered our thoughts to the authors on a draft of the article.]