We had to read the facts of the Tennessee Court of Appeals' opinion in City of Pigeon Forge v. RLR Investments, LLC, No. E2023-01802-COA-R3-DV (Apr. 20, 2025) a couple of times over, just to make sure we were understanding what was going on. But the effort was worth it, just because of the unusual arguments presented. Check it out.
RLR owned two adjacent properties, the first used for a hotel, the second for a duplex, parking area, and open green space. So far so good. The city took portions of each for a greenway. It also took temporary construction easements on each parcel. Check. The city sought immediate possession. Got it. The owner objected to public use and the quick take, but the trial court agreed with the city, and entered an order of possession. Understood.
Here's where it gets squirrelly. RLR, the property owner, sought to enforce the order of possession:
RLR filed a motion to enforce the terms of the Order of Possession. RLR asserted that in accordance with the Order of Possession, the City had demolished RLR’s six parking spaces on the Hotel Property to make way for the greenway. However, the City had not commenced construction of replacement parking spaces on the Duplex Property, which RLR claimed was required by the temporary construction easement granted over that tract in the Order of Possession. RLR alleged that the City was disregarding this portion of the order.
Slip op. at 4.
The city, naturally, didn't see it that way. It said that in response to RLR's earlier claims that the takings and construction of replacement parking were damaging the duplex parcel, it was standing down from the part of the project seeking temporary construction easements and replacement parking. The "C" part of the TCEs were apparently done, so the city said we don't need the TCEs any longer.
The trial court agreed with the city, concluding the order of possession did not order the city to build the replacement parking (which is not a public use or purpose), and that the public purpose of the project was to build a greenway, not to construct replacement parking. The court ordered the TCEs terminated.
Next, RLR sought summary judgment that the city had abandoned the TCE portion of the takings, and that the project lacked a public use or purpose because it was, at least in part, to take property for replacement parking, which the court -- as just noted -- concluded was not a public use. You follow so far? That's right, the owner seemed to be asserting that either the city abandoned, or alternatively that that the city's no-longer-desired taking of TCE's on its property was not a public use because it was for a private benefit: to replace the parking lost on the owner's other parcel:
RLR filed a reply, asserting that new facts had arisen since entry of the Order of Possession because during the July 2018 hearing, the City had admitted that the temporary construction easements were not for a public purpose because the replacement parking would have privately benefited RLR.
Slip op. at 5.
The court did not agree with RLR even though, in the court's words, "I don't think anybody's arguing that it [the taking for replacement parking] was proper," apparently because the city had stood down on the TCE's and the greenway project was already built. Thus, it would be "draconian" to do something. Slip op. at 5-6. (Why, we are not sure because the court never says so.)
Once more, RLR sought summary judgment, this time submitting new evidence, which it argued shed new light on the private benefit argument. This evidence:
supported the position that it was an improper use of eminent domain power to take private property to create parking spaces that would benefit other private property. RLR posited that Mr. Goodwin’s testimony indicated that the City had included replacement parking within its grant submission materials to obtain funds for the greenway project and then had not constructed the replacement parking.
Slip op. at 6.
Once again, the court's reaction was no. The taking for a greenway was a public use and purpose, and even though the city had not abandoned the TCE taking, the order of possession did not compel it to take the TCEs. This is one of those sections of the opinion that we had to read multiple times to make sure we were getting it accurately.
After the compensation phase and adjudication of the just compensation owed for the greenway takings, RLR appealed. Is posed two issues: (1) was the city's plan to take RLR's property to benefit RLR a public use or purpose; and (2) should the city be on the hook to pay statutory fees and costs because the city abandoned the TCE takings?
Skip forward to page 16 of the slip opinion for the appellate court's analysis of the public use issue. The city argued that if the order of possession required it to take RLR's other property to build replacement parking, any private benefit to RLR was "incidental to the overarching public purpose of the greenway project." Slip op. at 16.
In the end, the court agreed with the city. The greenway overall vibe of the project is what matters, not whether the city was taking RLR's property for RLR's private benefit. First, the trial court's order of possession did not, contrary to RLR's argument, require the city to build replacement parking. Accordingly, the city's only stated public use or purpose supporting the TCEs was the greenway.
The court seemed to agree that taking RLR's property for replacement parking would have been for a private and not public use. But in the end, the court concluded that the actual purpose of the taking of the TCEs was not for replacement parking. It might have been the city's intent to do so, but after RLR objected that taking its property for parking would damage the duplex parcel, the city reconsidered and modified its plans. See slip op. at 20.
The court also rejected RLR's abandonment argument for similar reasons. The city was neither attempting to, or otherwise obligated to, take the duplex property TCEs for replacement parking. In the court's view, you can't abandon something you were never doing.
City of Pigeon Forge v. RLR Investments, LLC, No. E2023-01802-COA-R3-DV (Tenn. App. 30, 2025)
