It's been a couple of weeks, but we're still trying to wrap our head around the Iowa Supreme Court's opinion in Singer v. City of Orange City, No. 23-1600 (Dec. 20, 2024).
The court rejected a facial challenge under the Iowa Constitution's search-and-seizure clause to a city ordinance requiring the owner of rental units to have a rental permit and to submit to "regular inspections" of those properties. The ordinance purports to create a "right of entry" for a "code official," and if the owner refuses to voluntarily allow inspection, the inspector may obtain an "administrative search warrant" to enter and search. An owner can exempt itself from inspection by a city inspector if a unit is "inspected by a certified third-party inspection organization[.]" And the ordinance says nothing about probable cause.
Several owners sued, and after discovery, the court granted the plaintiff-owners summary judgment. It declared the ordinance facially unconstitutional, and enjoined the city from seeking administrative warrants. The city appealed.
The court considered the owners' argument that the Iowa Constitution requires evidence of an actual violation before issuance of an administrative warrant. The Fourth Amendment, by contrast, allows administrative warrants even if there's no specific knowledge of a violation in a particular property. No, our Iowa standards are the same, held the court.
Also considered was the owners' argument that the city's ordinance does not require any showing of probable cause. This is a facial challenge, reminded the court, and we know how hard those are. A "facial" challenge means that the ordinance is "incapable of any valid application." Slip op. at 10. So let's make up some situations where the ordinance might be applied in an ok way. Could there be a set of facts in which the ordinance could be applied in a constitutional fashion? Court court imagined three examples.
First, there may be some circumstances where a city inspector gets an administrative warrant based on probable cause. You never know, an inspector may be willing to do more work than the ordinance requires. Second, the ordinance allows the city to pursue other "remedies provided by law" and not just an administrative search warrant. The court doesn't say what those other remedies might be, but hey, those remedies might accord with the constitution, you never know!
And finally (and this is the part where we really have trouble), an owner might have a rental unit exempt from city inspection, where a certified "private party" conduct the inspection. Who or what is a "private party" inspector? Heck if we know (and apparently neither does the court, which explicates no further on the notion). For what it is worth, we're not quite seeing this one as clearly as the court apparently did. Would not an inspection by a government-certified inspector -- even an inspector employed privately -- entering under the authority of the ordinance be treated pretty much the same as a government inspector? And if the court were to consider opting into the private-inspector exemption a voluntary act, would that not raise unconstitutional conditions problems?
Likely next up? An as-applied challenge, perhaps.
Singer v. City of Orange City, No. 23-1600 (Iowa Dec. 20, 2024)
