Like a lot of us, Ball State University student Keller Mellowitz didn't care for "remote" or "Zoom" virtual classrooms which were imposed on us in varying degrees during the Co-19 thing.
But he didn't take it lying down. Believing that remote learning wasn't what was promised to him in return for his tuition dollars, he sued the University for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. He was fighting the fight for not just himself: he brought the claim as a class action on behalf of his fellow students similarly deprived.
Not to allow that sort of thing, the Indiana legislature adopted a statute -- applicable retroactively -- that prohibits class actions against "postsecondary educational institutions for contract or unjust enrichment claims to recover losses stemming from COVID-19." In response, the trial court limited Mellowitz's claims to those only on his own behalf, and not on behalf of the class (ha, we get that joke).
Mellowitz appealed, interlocutorily (is that even a word?), and lo, the Court of Appeals agreed with him that the mid-stream revocation of his ability to bring a class action violated his constitutional rights.
The Indiana Supreme Court took up the case, and in Mellowitz v Ball State University, No. 23S-PL-60 (Nov. 21, 2023), the court affirmed the dismissal of Mellowitz's class action contract and unjust enrichment claims, and held that the legislature could retroactively take those away those claims without violating the constitution:
First, we conclude the law does not violate the constitutional separation of powers because its limited scope (applying only to a narrow category of claims arising from COVID‐19 against a defined group of defendants during a narrow period of time) reflects that it predominantly furthers a public policy objective—reducing postsecondary educational institutions’ litigation exposure for their emergency responses to the pandemic—rather than a judicial administration objective. Second, the law does not unconstitutionally take Mellowitz’s property without just compensation because he has no property right to sue on behalf of others through a class action. And finally, the law does not unconstitutionally impair Mellowitz’s contract with Ball State because the General Assembly did not relieve Ball State of any of its contractual obligations to Mellowitz, which is why the trial court is permitting him to pursue his individual claims against the university.
Slip op. at 2.
Most of the opinion was devoted to the first issue -- whether the legislature stepped too far into the judiciary's area of operations -- so if you aren't into that sort of thing, you can fast forward to page 17, where the court picks up the takings argument. Taking away an accrued cause of action midstream might seem to raise such problems.
But not so fast, held the court. It's not like the later legislation took away Mellowitz's ability to sue for breach and unjust enrichment, only his ability to do so on behalf of others similarly situated. Go chase your claims, Sir, you just can't do it for others. With that we have no problem (said the court). A class action "is just one potential means of pursuing [Mellowitz's] cause of action. A class action is not itself a cause of action[.]" Slip op. at 18.
The court also rejected Mellowitz's responsive argument that taking away the class action format effectively took away his underlying individual claims, because it isn't economically practical to bring an individual claim. Sorry, held the court, there's no factual record to support that assertion, and besides, "our state courts routinely handle individual claims for amounts in this ballpark." Id. Go to small claims court, dude!
The court also didn't care for Mellowitz's other argument that this was like when the court held that the legislature's alteration of a statute of limitations could only be applied prospectively, and not to claims already underway. To apply the law to already-filed claims would be a taking of a vested right. The court might have agreed this was a taking were the legislation here have retrospectively wiped out Mellowitz's individual claims. But it didn't so that's that. "Just the opposite, the General Assembly preserved Mellowitz's right to sue Ball State on his own behalf, which trial court is permitting him to do." Slip op. at 19. That's mighty kind of them, thanks.
Finally, the court held that the retroactive wipeout of class actions was not an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations under either the Indiana Constitution (yes, it has a Contracts Clause), or the U.S. Constitution. The law didn't impair Mellowitz's rights at all, and the statute "only prohibits [him] from seeking to enforce other students' alleged contracts[.]" Slip op. at 20.
[W]e cannot accept the invitation to simply assume Mellowitz is without an effective contract remedy because Section 7 is presumed constitutional unless Mellowitz demonstrates otherwise, and he has not demonstrated that his suit against Ball State to recover his own tuition and fees is an inadequate means for enforcing his alleged contract rights.
Slip op. at 22.
Mellowitz v Ball State University, No. 23S-PL-60 (Ind. Nov. 21, 2023)
