Check this out, a recently-published article in the Virginia Law Review, Aziz Z. Huq, "Property against Legality: Takings after Cedar Point," 109 Va. L. Rev. 233 (Apr. 10, 2023).
Here's the abstract:
In the American constitutional tradition, a zealous judicial defense of property is closely aligned with the idea of “the rule of law.” Conventional wisdom holds that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment vindicates both property rights and the rule of law by foreclosing arbitrary, lawless state action. But the standard story linking property rights, legality, and a constraint on arbitrary governance is more commonly stipulated than analyzed. This Article uses an apparent sharp break in takings jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court’s June 2021 decision in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, to closely scrutinize the relationship between legality and property rights. To that end, it offers first a careful analysis of the sharp rupture that Cedar Point makes in takings jurisprudence. Not only is the Court’s result difficult to explain in terms of precedent or traditional legal methods, it also destabilizes a previously settled and reasonably predictable litigation landscape. As a result, it seeds profound uncertainty on the legal ground because it signals a dissolution of the constraining effect formerly realized by standard tools of legal reasoning. There is, further, no obvious way for the Court to restore stability and predictability to the doctrine without drawing new, arbitrary lines. In consequence, takings law will likely abide in confusion, not certainty, for the foreseeable future. Cedar Point’s vindication of property rights hence comes at the paradoxical cost of dramatically increasing the space for decisions unguided by law by one group of officials in the judiciary.A close reading of Cedar Point invites a more general and abstract analysis of the complex, nuanced relationship between the rule of law and property rights. Drawing on the general jurisprudential theories of H.L.A. Hart and other legal positivists, I use the decision as a launching point for a larger exploration of ways in which the rule of law can be incompletely realized to paradoxical and even socially harmful effect. Placing property at the center of the rule of law, I suggest, can be consistent with, or even an incitement to, serious derogation of the rule of law. Doing so can undermine rule-of-law goals, such as constraining arbitrary rule. This suggests a need to decenter property rights in accounts of the rule of law, and to explore, in more nuanced and grounded fashion, how the practice of judicial review mediates systemic values of legality and predictability. In short, if we value the rule of law, it may in general be appropriate to take a more skeptical, and so more contingent, view of both property as a legal institution, and also the courts as a source of legality and stability.
Download the pdf here.