A short (unpublished) one from the Federal Circuit, Albright v. United States, No. 19-2078 (Dec. 1, 2020).
This rails-to-trails takings case turned on the predicate question: do the plaintiffs own private property? That question turned on the lex loci, and whether, under Oregon law, the original right-of-way conveyance meant to grant to the railroad an easement or a fee simple interest.
Thus, the opinion naturally relies solely on Oregon's property law: if the grant was for a limited purpose ("right of way" or "railroad"), then it was an easement; if the grant did not specify the use or was otherwise unlimited, it was a conveyance of fee simple. That was enough for the federal court:
In addition, none of the deeds provide for a reverter or otherwise contain language limiting the use that the grantee could make of the land. To the contrary, each of the deeds purport to convey land to the grantee and “to its successors and assigns forever.”. . . .In sum, like the granting clause at issue in Bouche, the granting clauses in all the deeds at issue here plainly purport to convey real property. And the deeds state that the property is conveyed to the grantee and its successors and assigns “forever.” The granting clauses do not purport to convey an easement, a right of way, or something else that would indicate an intent to convey an easement, such as property for specific purposes like the deed at issue in Bernards. Nor do the deeds provide for reverter or otherwise limit the uses the grantee can make of the land. These observations strongly support the conclusion that the deeds transferred fee simple absolute title to the land. See Bouche, 293 P.2d at 209–10; Bernards, 248 P.2d at 342–44.
Slip op. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted).
The only question we really have is would an Oregon court have a different view? We're guessing that Oregon property law isn't as cut-and-dried as four federal judges (none of whom were lawyers in Oregon) believe it to be.
Albright v. United States, No. 19-2078 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 1, 2020) (unpub.)
