For many years, a tenant had a month-to-month lease from Baltimore for a space in one of the city's public markets. One day, the market sent the tenant an email informing it that it no longer "fit in the [redevelopment] plans," and that it should "pursue other options." The tenant took that as "get out." And instead of digging its heels in, the tenant did what the city instructed and sought "other options." It left.
The tenant then sued, claiming a taking. It also sought relocation benefits under Maryland's version of the Relocation Act, which requires "[w]henever a program or project undertaken by a displacing agency will result in the displacement of any person, the displacing agency shall make a payment to the displaced person" for things like moving expenses and the cost of locating a replacement business.
The question the Maryland Court of Appeals determined in Wireless One, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, No. 18-71 (Aug. 23, 2019), was whether the tenant was a "displaced person" as defined by the statute. The court held no, even though the statute defines a displaced person as someone who moves from land "[a]s a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or the acquisition of such real property" by the agency. Wireless One left on its own, concluded the court, and was not displaced. It "voluntarily terminated its lease and abandoned its stall at the Market before" the city did anything to actually terminate the lease, and before the city did anything to start the redevelopment project. It didn't tell Wireless One that it had to leave by a certain date. All the city did was tell the tenant that it didn't fit with the city's plans and to move on.
In other words, when the city emailed and told Wireless One to "pursue other options," the tenant should have shrugged its shoulders and done nothing. Isn't sending an email and telling the tenant to, in effect, "get out," an action to terminate the lease, and the first step in the redevelopment process? Guess not. What this means, tenants, is dig your heels in. Don't be a chump and take the city at its word and go quietly in the night. Ignore these notices. Fight. Only then, apparently, will you have a claim for relocation benefits.
And here's the even better part. The term "displaced person" also does not include someone who enters into a lease after the agency acquires the property. And guess what, the City of Baltimore has owned and operated the public market for more than 150 years, since 1847. Talk about being "after." And there's no question Wireless One had entered into its lease in 2004. Yeah, you've been there 13 years, but the city has owned it a lot longer, even though an outfit called CSM managed the Market for the city:
Here, it is undisputed that the Market was established by the City in 1847, and that it has been owned and operated by the City since its establishment. It was not until 2004, well after the City took title to the Market, that Wireless One entered into its lease. Put simply, it is undisputed that Wireless One acquired its lease after the City acquired title to the Market. Nothing in the management agreement between Respondents and CSM transferred title to the Market; rather, the management agreement simply authorized CSM to operate, manage, and redevelop the Market. As such, it is readily apparent that Wireless One leased its stall in the Market from the City after the City had taken title to the Market, and, therefore, the plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) applies, and Wireless One is< not a “displaced person.”
Slip op. at 27. In other words, pretty much every tenant of the city's market has no claim. At least not unless a tenant was there before 1847. And because the takings claim was tied to the relocation claim (see slip op. at 47 n.12), there was no taking either.
Two justices dissented, arguing that "'Plain meaning,' like beauty, may be in the eye of the beholder." That's because the two dissenters didn't see it as obvious this result was what the relocation statute was intended to accomplish. "This case provides an example where a focus on one possible 'plain meaning' of a statute, together with a blind eye to the statute's history, leads to an interpretation that would undoubtedly astonish those who promoted and passed the statute." Dissent at 1.
The dissent's objection to the "get out" = voluntary rationale was procedural. The court affirmed a motion to dismiss, yet the tenant had submitted testimony that it viewed this as an order to leave now. So summary judgment was not merited, and the case should have gone on to the trier of fact.
The "city has owned since 1847" argument also didn't fly with the dissenters. They agreed with the State of Maryland's amicus brief, which argued that the Maryland Relocation Act was meant to mirror the benefits which would be available to the tenant had federal funds been involved (and the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policy Act been triggered). And everyone here admitted that if the URA applied, the tenant would get benefits. The dissenters noted that the focus should not be on when the city acquired the market, but on when it became a "displacing agency."
Under this reading, Baltimore City did not become a “displacing agency” until it commenced the effort to rehabilitate the Market – a time at which Wireless One was already a tenant. In other words, a displaced cellphone business need not have had a market stall in 1847 to even be eligible for relocation assistance.The Majority Opinion argues that such an interpretation reads words into the statute that do not exist, claiming “nothing in the plain language of RP § 12-201(f) includes a temporal element.” Majority slip op. at 33. This is true only if one ignores the repeated use of the present participle in the sentence (“displacing agency” and “carrying out”). It is theoretically possible, on the face of the statute, that the Majority Opinion’s interpretation could be correct and that an agency that acquired its property decades ago would never be liable for relocation assistance. But this is not unambiguously clear from the text of the statute.
Dissent at 9.
Wireless One, Inc. v. Mayor and City of Council of Baltimore, No. 18-70 (Md. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2019)
