We don't usually post up trial court rulings, preferring to wait until the issue percolates up through the food chain. But this one is an exception, because, well, it's darned interesting, and we wanted to get you all on board on the ground floor.
Here's the trial court's order granting the plaintiffs/property owners summary judgment in the case challenging the City of Seattle's "first in time" ordinance, under which the city established the criteria for screening tenants, and required property owners to accept the first qualified applicant as a tenant. The city acknowledged that the ordinance "affects a landlord's ability to exercise discretion when deciding between potential tenants that may be based on factors unrelated to whether a potential tenant is a member of a protected class." Slip op. at 2-3. The goal was to "eliminat[e] the role of implicit bias."
In short, because a property owner might have an impermissible motive for selecting one tenant over another, the city, not the landlord, decides who becomes a tenant.
Property owners brought a facial takings claim, which included both a public use challenge and a claim for compensation. They also raised due process and free speech claims.
The court invalidated the ordinance, concluding that under Washington precedent, one attribute of property is the right to sell or otherwise dispose of it to whom the owner chooses. Thus, the court concluded, "[c]hoosing a tenant is a fundamental attribute of property ownership." Slip op. at 4. Alienating the leasehold is no different than alienating the fee. The court held that the right of a landlord to negotiate with a tenant was extinguished by the ordinance.
Interestingly, the court also concluded that the ordinance ran afoul of the Washington Constitution's "takings for private use" prohibition. Under that provision, public benefit flowing from a taking isn't enough if it has a "design and effect" of providing a benefit to private individuals only. The ordinance violated this principle because it delegated the discretion to determine who would be tenants to the city (much like another case in which the Washington Supreme Court held that it was an impermissible private taking for a statute to give the right of first refusal on a sale of mobile home park property to a tenant, Manufactured Housing Communities of Washington v. States, 13 P.3d 183 (2000)).
The court also concluded the ordinance violated due process and speech, and you can read the court's order for the rationale.
For more details on the arguments and authorities cited, see the property owners' motion for summary judgment.
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,...
