Hawaii Appellate Opinions

GARNER v. STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

No. 27912 (October 30, 2009)

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEONARD, J.

This interlocutory appeal and cross-appeal stem from two consolidated class-action lawsuits brought by substitute teachers (Plaintiffs or Substitute Teachers) who claimed that they were underpaid by the State of Hawai'i Department of Education (DOE). In Civil No. 03-1-0305 (Garner Action), Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees David Garner, Patricia Smith, Andrea Christie, Allan Kliternick, Karen Souza, Jo Jennifer Goldsmith, and David Hudson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (Garner Plaintiffs), sued the DOE and other unnamed defendants (Garner Defendants), seeking back pay for class members for the period from 1996 through the end of the 2003-2004 school year. In Civil No. 05-1-0031 (Kliternick Action), Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees Allan Kliternick, David Garner, Jo Jennifer Goldsmith, and David Hudson (Kliternick Plaintiffs) sued Patricia Hamamoto, in her official capacity as Superintendent of Schools, Shannon Ajifu, Mary Cochran, Maggie Cox, Breene Harimoto, Cec Heftel, Lei Ahu Isa, Karen Knudsen, Dennis Matsumoto, Shirley A. Robinson, Laura Thielen, Garrett Toguchi, Herbert Watanabe, and Randall Yee, in their official capacities as members of the State of Hawai'i Board of Education, and the DOE (Kliternick Defendants), seeking back pay from the start of the 2004-2005 school year onward (collectively, the Garner Defendants and Kliternick Defendants are referred to as the State or Defendants).

In this appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the following seven interlocutory orders certified by the Circuit Court for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 641-1 (b) (Supp. 2005):

1. Order (1) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Adjudication of Issues on Behalf of the Class for Class Claims as of November 8, 2000 to the Present, and for Related Injunctive Relief Filed July 13, 2004, and (2) Granting Defendant State of Hawai'i Department of Education's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint Filed January 29, 2004, filed on March 31, 2006 (Partial Summary Judgment Order #1);

2. Order (1) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment With Respect to Liability for Damages in Both Cases for the Period From November 8, 2000 to June 30, 2005, Filed November 10, 2005, and (2) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to All Claims and Parties, Filed November 10, 2005, filed on April 6, 2006 (Partial Summary Judgment Order #2);

3. Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Claims Arising Before January 7, 2003 Filed December 27, 2005, filed April 18, 2006 (Partial Summary Judgment Order #3);

4. Order Denying Plaintiffs Kliternick, Garner, Goldsmith, and Hudson's Motion for Award of Prejudgment Interest Filed April 12, 2006, filed on April 18, 2006 (Pre-judgment Interest Order);

5. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Third Amended and Supplemented Complaint Filed October 21, 2004, filed April 18, 2006 (Order re Third Amended Complaint);

6. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Modify the Class and Sub-Class Definitions, Filed July 23, 2004 and June 28, 2005, filed February 13, 2006, filed on April 27, 2006 (Order Denying Class Modification); and

7. Order Denying Diane Kawashima's Motion to Intervene Filed February 13, 2006, filed on April 27, 2006 in the Circuit Court (Order Denying Intervention).

(The foregoing seven orders are collectively referred to as Interlocutory Orders).

On May I, 2006, the State filed a timely notice of cross-appeal from the same Interlocutory Orders.

We hold that: (1) the Circuit Court did not err in summarily ruling that HRS § 661-5 (1993) bars the Substitute Teachers' claims against the State for back pay prior to November 8, 2000; (2) the Circuit Court did not err in concluding that, pursuant to HRS § 661-1 (1993), the Substitute Teachers' claim for breach-of-contract damages is not barred by sovereign immunity; (3) HRS § 302A-624 (e) (Supp. 2004), as a pay-mandating statute, provided an alternative basis for invoking the court's jurisdiction under the "founded upon any statute" language in HRS § 661-1; (4) the Substitute Teachers' claim for pre-judgment interest is barred by HRS § 661-8 (1993); (5) the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' request to modify class and sub-class definitions to include part-time employees; (6) the Circuit Court did not err in entering the Order Denying Intervention; (7) the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when it entered the Order re Third Amended Complaint; (8) the Circuit Court did not err in concluding that, although claims prior to November 8, 2000 were barred, Plaintiffs' claims for pay due from November 8, 2000 through June 30, 2005 were not barred by the statute of limitation because,
inter alia, the statute of limitations applicable to these periodic pay claims began to run on each paycheck as it became due; and (9) the Circuit Court did not err when it concluded that the State violated its obligation to pay the per diem rate prescribed by HRS § 302A-624(e) during the period from November 8, 2000 to June 30, 2005. [footnote omitted]

OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS v. HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORP. OF HAWAII

No. 25570 (October 27, 2009)

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

On July 15, 2009, defendants-appellees State of Hawai'i (State), the Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawai'i (HCDCH) and its executive director and board of directors, as well as Linda Lingle, in her capacity as Governor of the State [hereinafter, collectively, the State] filed a motion to dismiss the claims of plaintiff-appellant Jonathon Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio (who is the only remaining plaintiff-appellant in the above-captioned case, which was remanded from the United States Supreme Court on May 4, 2009), contending, inter alia, that Osorio's claims "are not justiciable" inasmuch as: (1) he lacks standing to pursue the instant case; (2) the case is no longer ripe for adjudication; and (3) Osorio seeks an impermissible advisory opinion. At the outset, we observe that the State's arguments set forth in its motion, discussed more fully infra, focus on the justiciability of Osorio's claims, not merely his appeal. However, were we to grant the State's requested relief, i.e., grant its motion to dismiss, we would effectively be dismissing Osorio's appeal and, thereby divest this court of jurisdiction to address the substance of the arguments presented therein, i.e., the justiciability of Osorio's claims -- a result that the State presumably could not have intended. We, therefore, deny the State's motion to dismiss Osorio's appeal and retain jurisdiction over this case. In so doing, we are mindful of our duty to consider, sua sponte, jurisdictional issues such as standing and ripeness. Akinaka v. Disciplinary Bd. of Hawai'i Supreme Court, 91 Hawai'i 51, 55, 979 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1999) (holding that "although neither the parties nor the trial court considered the question of standing, this court has a duty, sua sponte," to determine whether the plaintiff has standing (citations omitted)); see also Kapuwai v. City & County of Honolulu, 121 Hawai'i 33, 39, 211 P.3d 750, 756 (2009 (holding that "[i]t is axiomatic that ripeness is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction"). Accordingly, inasmuch as the parties have "briefed" the issues of standing and ripeness in their memoranda in support of, and in opposition to, the motion, we address the justiciability of Osorio's claims, i.e., whether (1) Osorio has standing to prosecute his complaint against the  State, (2) the case remains ripe for adjudication; and/or (3) Osorio seeks an impermissible advisory opinion.

In his memorandum in opposition to the State's motion, filed August 5, 2009, Osorio argues, inter alia, that he: (1) "has standing to proceed in this matter as a Hawaiian"; (2) raises claims and issues that are ripe; and (3) does not seek an impermissible advisory opinion. On August 14, 2009, the State, with the permission of this court, filed a reply to Osorio's memorandum in opposition, essentially providing further support for the threshold issues of justiciabilty that it had raised originally in its motion.

Based on the discussion below, we hold that (1) Osorio has standing in this case, but (2) his asserted claims are not ripe for adjudication. Thus, we vacate the circuit court's January 31, 2003 judgment and remand the case for entry of a judgment dismissing Osorio's claims against the State without prejudice. [footnotes omitted]

DUPREE v. HIRAGA

No. 29646 (October 20, 2009)

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKENWALD, J.

Roy T. Hiraga and Solomon P. Kaho'ohalahala appeal from the November 1, 2008 decision of the Board of Registration for Maui County (Board) which determined that Kaho'ohalahala was not a resident of Lana'i "[f]or purposes of [the November 2008] election [ . ]"

The case began in September 2008, when appellee Michael P. Dupree and eleven other registered voters from Lana'i sent letters to Hiraga, the Clerk of the County of Maui, which alleged that Kaho'ohalahala was not a Lana'i resident. Hiraga subsequently found, inter alia, that Kaho'ohalahala was a Lana'i resident when he registered to vote there in July 2008. Dupree appealed that determination to the Board, which concluded that Kaho'ohalahala was in fact a resident of Lahaina rather than Lana'i.

The questions on appeal include whether: (1) the Board lacked jurisdiction because Dupree's complaint was an untimely challenge to Kaho'ohalahala's eligibility to be a candidate for the Lana'i seat on the Maui County Council, rather than to his voter registration, (2) the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by addressing issues beyond Kaho'ohalahala's voter registration, and (3) the Board erred in concluding that Kaho'ohalahala was not a Lana'i resident.

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Board had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction by addressing issues beyond Kaho'ohalahala's voter registration status, and the Board did not err in concluding that Kaho'ohalahala did not have the right to remain a registered voter of Lana'i. Accordingly, we affirm the Board's November 1, 2008 decision.

WEINBERG v. WEINBERG

No. 27984 (October 14, 2009)

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY WATANABE, J.

In this appeal, Defendant-Appellant Brenda Irene Dickson-Weinberg (Wife or Defendant) challenges (1) the divorce decree entered by the Family Court of the First Circuit (family court) on May 18, 2006 (Divorce Decree), which ended her marriage to Plaintiff-Appellee Jan Michael Weinberg (Husband or Plaintiff) and divided their marital estate; and (2) various orders of the family court that led up to or followed the entry of the Divorce Decree.

Wife raises the following points on appeal:

(1) The family court's 86-page "omnibus" findings of fact (FsOF) and conclusions of law (CsOL), which was signed by three judges without any indication of which judge adopted which finding or conclusion, did not comply with Hawai'i Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rule 52 (2000);

(2) The family court erred when it refused to enforce (a) an agreement incident to divorce (AITD) entered into between Husband and Wife (collectively, the parties or the couple) in a prior divorce action that was dismissed, (b) an agreement to designate Wife as a beneficiary of Husband's individual retirement accounts (IRAs) (IRA Agreement), and (c) a quitclaim deed conveying the parties' home in Nu'uanu, Hawai'i (Nu'uanu property) to Wife;

(3) The family court denied Wife her due-process rights when it refused to relax pretrial deadlines, denied her requests for a trial continuance, and barred her from introducing experts, exhibits, and documentary evidence because she missed discovery and other deadlines imposed by the family court after her second counsel withdrew from representing her;

(4) The family court did not comply with Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 580-47 (2006) or partnership principles when it denied Wife credit for Category l assets and valued Husband's law practice without considering Husband's earnings or the unliquidated contingency-fee cases pending at the date of the completion of the evidentiary part of trial (DOCOEPOT); and

(5) The family court failed to consider all the factors enumerated in HRS § 580-47 (a) and abused its discretion when it denied Wife, who was unemployed throughout the marriage, any alimony.

We conclude that (1) Wife's first point on appeal is without merit; (2) the family court did not err in refusing to enforce the AITD and the quitclaim deed for the Nu'uanu property, but did err in disregarding the IRA Agreement in dividing the property of the parties; (3) the family court abused its discretion when it refused to extend pretrial deadlines and thereafter sanctioned Wife for missing pretrial deadlines by precluding her from introducing evidence that she did not produce by pretrial deadlines; and (4) the family court incorrectly valued Husband's law practice. Our disposition of this appeal renders it unnecessary to address Wife's remaining points on appeal. [footnote omitted]