Hawaii Appellate Opinions

KAPUWAI v. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION

No. 27915 (July 16, 2009)

Opinion pdf

OPINION BY MOON, C.J., ANNOUNCING THE DECISION OF THE COURT

On March 3, 2009, this court accepted a timely application for a writ of certiorari, filed by petitioner/employer-appellee City and County of Honolulu, Department of Parks and Recreation (the City) on January 23, 2009, requesting that this court review the Intermediate Court of Appeals' (ICA) December 8, 2008 judgment on appeal, entered pursuant to its November 12, 2008 published opinion in Kapuwai v. Citv &. County of Honolulu, 119 Hawai'i 304, 196 P.3d 306 {App. 2008). Therein, the ICA vacated the February 6, 2006 decision and order of the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB), which, in turn, had modified the decision of the director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (director).

Briefly stated, respondent/employee-appellant Darrell N. Kapuwai — who was employed by the City as a mason -- sustained a work-related injury to his right great toe. The City eventually accepted liability for Kapuwai's injury, and the director awarded Kapuwai, inter alia, benefits for 96 percent permanent partial disability {PPD) of his right great toe. The City appealed to the LIRAB, and the LIRAB modified the director's decision, concluding that Kapuwai was entitled
to 4 percent PPD on the whole person. Additionally, the LIRAB denied Kapuwai's request for attorney's fees and costs, made pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statues (HRS) § 386-93(b) (1993), quoted infra. Kapuwai appealed the LIRAB's decision to the ICA, arguing that the LIRAB should have converted the "whole person" rating to a PPD rating of the great toe, pursuant to HRS § 386-32(a) (Supp. 2001), quoted infra, and should have granted his request for attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the ICA held that Kapuwai was entitled to a PPD award based on the impairment of his great toe as opposed to a whole person rating if the award for the former exceeded the award for the latter; thus, the ICA remanded the case to the LIRAB for such determination. Based upon its remand of the case to the LIRAB, the ICA recognized that it could not decide the attorney's fees issue but, nevertheless, provided "guidance" to the LIRAB regarding the application of HRS § 386-93(b) on remand.

On application, the City essentially contends that the ICA erred: (1) by remanding Kapuwai's case to the LIRAB for a "determination of a [PPD] award based on an impairment of [Kapuwai's] great toe"; and (2) in its interpretation of HRS § 386-93(b). We agree with the ICA's rationale and ultimate disposition remanding the case to the LIRAB for a determination of a PPD award based on the impairment of Kapuwai's great toe and, therefore, affirm that portion of the ICA's opinion. However, as discussed more fully infra, we hold that the ICA erred in delving into the interpretation of HRS § 386-93(b) because, based on the ICA's remand of the case to the LIRAB, the issue of attorney's fees and costs was not ripe for decision. Accordingly, we vacate section II of the ICA's opinion relating to attorney's fees and costs.

Concurring opinion by Acoba, J., in which Duffy, J., joins pdf. Dissenting opinion by Nakayama, J. pdf.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TAX APPEAL OF SPIRENT HOLDING CORP. & SUBSIDIARIES

No. 29199 (July 14, 2009)

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY WATANABE, ACTING C.J.

In this appeal, the Director of Taxation, State of Hawai'i (Director or State) challenges the final judgment entered by the Tax Appeal Court of the State of Hawai'i (tax appeal court) on July 14, 2008 (final judgment) and two orders entered by the tax appeal court on March 7, 2008 (collectively, summary judgment orders), the first of which denied the Director's December 11, 2007 motion for summary judgment and the second of which granted the October 24, 2007 motion for summary judgment filed by Taxpayer Appellant-Appellee Spirent Holding Corp. & Subsidiaries (Spirent or taxpayer).

The sole issue presented is whether, for the 2001 taxable year, Spirent timely filed its amended claim for a research-activities corporate-income-tax credit (research activities tax credit) pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 235-110.91 (2001) (amended claim).

We conclude that Spirent's amended claim was not timely filed, and, accordingly, we reverse the final judgment and the summary judgment orders entered by the tax appeal court.

SAVE DIAMOND HEAD WATERS LLC v. HANS HEDEMANN SURF, INC.

No. 27804 (July 13, 2009)

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.

Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellees Save Diamond Head Waters, LLC; Kapiolani Park Preservation Society, LLC; Mike Beason; and Richard K. Quinn (collectively SDHW) filed a timely Application for Writ of Certiorari (Application) urging this court to review the January 9, 2009 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) based on its Opinion in Save Diamond Head Waters, LLC. V. Hans Hedemann Surf. Inc. (SDHW). No. 27804, 119 Hawai'i 452, 198 P.3d 715 (App. 2008). The ICA's Opinion reversed the circuit court of the first circuit's (circuit court) April 19, 2006 Amended Final Judgment on Administrative Appeal, Vacating and Modifying Decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals Matter Number 2004/ZBA-04.

In its Application, SDHW presented the following questions:

1. Must a reviewing court use the de novo standard of review to ascertain the scope of authority granted to an administrative agency by a legislative body?

2. Does an administrative agency (here the [Department of Permitting and Planning ("DPP")]} have the power to craft and interpret administrative rules in a fashion contrary to the plain language of the governing ordinances?

3. Must an administrative agency apply existing statutory standards when exercising its quasi-judicial function or may it ignore such standards and craft new "reasonable" standards?

4. Must the reviewing courts consider and apply the statutorily imposed standards in reviewing the quasi-judicial determinations of the agency?

5. Docs an administrative agency exceed its power by conditioning a zoning variance on the applicant undertaking to fulfill a public police function, such as maintaining order on a seawall hundreds of yards from the applicant's premises?

We accepted SDHW's Application on March 16, 2009, and oral argument was held on May 7, 2009.

For the following reasons, we (1) vacate the ICA's Opinion and (2) affirm the circuit court's amended final judgment on the grounds that the Director's mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law that the Hans Hedemann Surf, Inc.'s (Surf School) use of the New Otani Kaimana Beach Hotel's (Hotel) premises was a permissible change in nonconforming use was clearly erroneous as it is not supported in the record. [footnote omitted]