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Do Judges "Make" Law? The Sotomayor Nomination And The Beachfront Takings Case

We've been loosely following the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings on the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotamayor as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and reading selected testimony and commentary on the subject. We say "loosely" since confirmation hearings are more political theater and an opportunity for each side to educate the public about its vision of judicial review and constitutional law, than about actually vetting the nominee.

Here's a sampling, followed by some thoughts:

• She's Lying by Paul Campos - "Even some liberals are frustrated by Sonia Sotomayor’s carefully plotted answers this week. The Daily Beast’s Paul Campos on how she’s denying the truth about our legal system."

• Written testimony of Lawprof Ilya Somin (Geo. Mason University) - "As President  Barack Obama has written, '[o]ur Constitution places the ownership of private property at the very heart of our system of liberty.' The protection of property rights was one of the main objectives motivating the establishment of the Constitution. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has often relegated property rights to second class status, giving them far less protection than that extended to other constitutional rights. I hope that the Committee’s interest in this issue will ultimately help change that. The purpose of my testimony is to analyze Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s two most important constitutional property rights decisions: Didden v. Village of Port Chester and Krimstock v. Kelly."

• A Nominee on Display, but Not Her Views by Charlie Savage (NY Times) - "Despite some 583 questions from senators amid wall-to-wall news media coverage, her hearing may prove to be as notable for what the country did not learn about her as much as for what it did. When asked what the hearings revealed about Judge Sotomayor’s legal views, the Harvard Law School professor Laurence H. Tribe, a longtime adviser to President Obama who supports her confirmation, had a simple reply: 'Nothing.'"

The meme that "judges don't make law, they just apply the law to the facts," appears fairly ridiculous to anyone who has studied the Anglo-American common law system. Of course judges "make law," especially judges who sit on courts of last resort. But the canard's origin is not as simple as Campos argues: the result of a "campaign carried out over the last generation by conservatives to convince Americans that 'activist judges' are at the root of many of our national ills," and that the "campaign has been based on the myth that there are clear lines between, for example, 'interpreting the law' and 'legislating from the bench.'"

A clear line does not exist, but the main disagreement appears to be more on the extremes, not at the blurry middle. Not, for example, when a judge interprets the meaning of the words in a statute, attempts to determine legislative intent, or when she applies the broad requirements of the constitution to policy questions frequently presented to courts; but rather when judges rely on the "invisible constitution" and inherent or implied rights to push the law where it perhaps needs to go, but hasn't quite reached. Understandably, though, Judge Sotomayor -- like Chief Justice Roberts before her -- dutifully repeated the shibboleth: the proper role of a judge is to apply the law, not legislate from the bench.

However, we probably won't have to wait long for her real views to be revealed. In Stop the Beachfront Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection, No. 08-11 (cert. granted. June 15, 2009), the Court accepted for review a case presenting questions about the proper role of the courts, and whether they "make" law or simply "find" it and declare what it is. The first Question Presented by the cert petition asks:

The Florida Supreme Court invoked "nonexistent rules of state substantive law" to reverse 100 years of uniform holdings that littoral rights are constitutionally protected. In doing so, did the Florida Court's decision cause a "judicial taking" proscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

In the course of answering that question, the Court will likely address whether the Florida Supreme Court "made" law when it allegedly changed the legal rules applicable to the ownership of littoral accretion, or whether it was simply declaring what the law always was. The cert petition pointed out two Hawaii cases, Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985) and Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Haw. 1978) (detailed here) which addressed the question directly, recognizing that courts make law and when they change it and upset settled expectations, compensation is required and fair process is due.

If the confirmation hearings didn't satisfy, stay tuned.

The Verified Complaint In Equity: The Declaration Of Independence

We know lawyers are easy targets (we enjoy lawyer jokes as much as the next person, i.e., What's the difference between a good lawyer and a great lawyer? A good lawyer knows the law; a great lawyer knows the judge.). Still, on the day we celebrate independence, we note that author Thomas Jefferson and 23 other of the 56 signers of the Declaration of Independence were lawyers, and that the document was crafted and understood fundamentally as a legal pleading, and is the product of careful legal thinking. So lawyers can't be all that bad, right?

As convincingly argued by historian Peter Charles Hoffer in his book The Law's Conscience: Equitable Constitutionalism in America (1990), the structure and style of the Declaration follows a form familiar to most modern lawyers: a complaint initiating a lawsuit. There's the introduction and "whereas" section (why we're doing this); the bill of particulars (28 specific factual charges against George III); the Prayer for Relief (severing the colonies' political bonds to Great Britain); and finally, the verification (John Hancock and others signing and "mutually pledg[ing] to each other our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor."). And you thought Rule 11 was a tough standard.

As Professor Hoffer notes, Jefferson was an equity lawyer and the Declaration advances a familiar equitable breach of trust theory, asserting that George III was a trustee for the colonies and therefore owed them fiduciary duties, and that his failure to protect them from the capriciousness of Parliament was a breach of the trust for which equity provided the remedy of independence. However, since equity derived its power from an appeal to the King's fairness, it seemed inconsistent for the colonists to seek relief from the King for a breach of the King's fiduciary duties, so Jefferson and his fellow lawyers crafted the radical legal theory that equitable power derived from the people, and that the Continental Congress, as representatives of the people, could impose the remedy of independence.

Thus, the Declaration is much more than stirring political prose, and may not have been possible without the work and deep thinking by a bunch of lawyers. So while while you're enjoying today's hot dogs, fireworks and sunshine, please thank a lawyer. We can happily return to lawyer jokes tomorrow.

PropertyProf's Summary Of The SCOTUS Beachfront Takings Case

In What's At Stake in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Lawprof D. Benjamin Barros posts a comprehensive summary of "judicial takings" case accepted for review by the US Supreme Court, Stop the Beachfront Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection, No. 08-11 (cert. granted. June 15, 2009). Raises several interesting points and worth a read.

On Judicial Takings, And The Hawaii Water Rights Backstory In Stop The Beach Renourishment

The U.S. Supreme Court last week agreed to review the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102 (Fla. Sep. 29, 2008), which held that a state statute prohibiting "beach renourishment" without a permit did not effect a taking of littoral (beachfront) property, even though it altered the long-standing rights of the owners to accretion on their land and direct access to the ocean. See Stop the Beachfront Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection, No. 08-11 (cert. granted. June 15, 2009). More background on the case at our resource page.

The Court accepted three questions for review, and the cert petition relied on two rather notorious cases with Hawaii origins to support the conclusion that a decision by a state court which unexpectedly changes established state common law rules of property is a compensable taking. See Pet. at 31-32 (citing Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985); Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Haw. 1978)).  The first Question Presented accepted for review is:

The Florida Supreme Court invoked "nonexistent rules of state substantive law" to reverse 100 years of uniform holdings that littoral rights are constitutionally protected. In doing so, did the Florida Court's decision cause a "judicial taking" proscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

In this post, we explore the background to the esoteric issue of "judicial takings" presented by the two Hawaii cases.

Robinson v. Ariyoshi — The Never Ending (Water Rights) Story

The Robinson litigation is one that holds a special place in our hearts, as it is a tale interwoven with the recent history of Hawaii, taking us from the time before jet travel when sugar and pineapple -- not tourism -- were the economic engines driving politics and the economy of the Territory of Hawaii, through the salad days of the openly activist Hawaii Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice William S. Richardson, and finally sputtering out (sort of) after the U.S. Supreme Court's ripeness ruling in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).

Here's the short summary, repeated from memory (the litigation, which is still pending, has been going on for 50 years now, so please forgive us if a few of the details are off). The case started out in 1959 in a Kauai county trial court as a dispute between several sugar plantations over which of them possessed the rights to surplus water in a Kauai stream, among other things. Nine years later, the trial court issued a 65-page decision based on long-standing Kingdom, Territory, and State water law, and declared who owned what. So far, it was just another in a long line of water disputes between private parties. The losing parties took the case to the Hawaii Supreme Court (in those days, there was no Intermediate Court of Appeals and all appeals by right went directly to the Supreme Court), where no party, including the State, argued that the controlling water law was anything but as established by long-standing Hawaii cases.

The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, "sua sponte overruled all territorial cases to the contrary and adopted the English common law doctrine of riparian rights." Robinson, 753 F.2d at 1470 (citing McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973)). The court "also held sua sponte that there was no such legal category as 'normal daily surplus water' and declared that the state, as sovereign, owned and had the exclusive right to control the flow," and "that because the flow of the Hanapepe [stream] was the sovereign property of the State of Hawaii, McBryde's claim of a prescriptive right to divert water could not be sustained against the state." Robinson, 753 F.2d at 1470. In other words, in a dispute between "A" and "B" over which of them possessed water rights, the Supreme Court simply said "neither of you do, the State owns it all."

The private parties who thought they had owned something for over a hundred years were understandably a bit miffed that their property had seemingly morphed into public property by the stroke of a Justice's pen, and, to add insult to injury, without even the chance to brief the Supreme Court before it announced the new rule. But after a rehearing on a narrow issue of state law, during which the court rebuffed an attempt by the private parties to raise federal constitutional issues, the Hawaii Supreme Court reaffrimed the McBryde ruling, with two Justices dissenting. See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 55 Haw. 260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973) (per curiam). Justice Bernard Levinson switched his vote from the first opinion, concluding that it was a "radical departure" from established law, and was a taking:

Although I voted with the majority of this court in McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as McBryde I], I am constrained to recant that position in view of my current understanding of the problems of this case.  In light of the arguments adduced on rehearing, historical evidence discovered upon further research subsequent to the court's previous decision in this case, and a reappraisal of the reasoning supporting that decision, it is my opinion that the court committed error in holding that all surplus water belongs to the State and that private water rights, however acquired, may not be transferred to nonappurtenant land.  Because of the importance of this case to the development of the law on the subject of Hawaii's water resources, I have undertaken to present a detailed analysis explaining why McBryde I is not in keeping with long established and unique principles of Hawaiian water law.  Precisely because McBryde I is such a radical departure from these principles as they have been heretofore understood, moreover, I have concluded that McBryde I effectuates an unconstitutional taking of the appellant's and cross-appellants' property without just compensation and should be reversed on this ground as well.

McBryde, 55 Haw. at 262-63, 517 P.2d at 27 (Levinson, J., dissenting). The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari meaning the Hawaii Supreme Court's McBryde decision was final.

But it was not the last word. The sugar companies sued the state (Governor Ariyoshi, actually, since under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a state official can be sued in federal court to enjoin unconstitutional conduct despite the 11th Amendment) in federal district court under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district judge -- the inimitable Martin Pence -- held that the Hawaii Supreme Court's McBryde decision took property without just compensation, and enjoined the state from enforcing the decision. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F.Supp. 559 (D.Haw. 1977).

Up to the Ninth Circuit the parties went, which noted the tortured procedural path the case next took, including a detour back to the Hawaii Supreme Court on certified questions when the Ninth Circuit asked the court whether it really meant what it said in McBryde:

The leisurely pace of this litigation has produced three oral arguments in this court, two of which were followed by referral of certified questions to the Supreme Court of Hawaii. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Hawaii 641, 658 P.2d 287 (1982) (Robinson II). Following the publication of the state court's answers to the certified questions, the parties briefed the remaining issues that had been narrowed by the earlier proceedings and reargued the case. A number of complex questions remain, but to expedite the matter we will discuss only those essential to a resolution of the main question: Can the state, by a judicial decision which creates a major change in property law, divest property interests?

Robinson, 753 F.2d at 1471. [Barista's note: are you keeping score yet? There's McBryde. McBryde II. McBryde III. Robinson I. Robinson II. Robinson III. Still to come: Robinson IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII, and then back to McBryde IV.]  After addressing jurisdictional issues, res judicata, and the Rooker/Feldman doctrine, the Ninth Circuit addressed the merits:

The state conceded at oral argument that the Fourteenth Amendment would require it to pay just compensation if it attempted to take vested property rights. The substantive question, therefore, is whether the state can declare, by court decision, that the water rights in this case have not vested. The short answer is no.

Robinson, 753 F.2d at 1473.The court determined that the water rights claimed by the private parties were vested rights, and that the state legislature or the state supreme court cannot alter those rights without condemnation and payment of just compensation.

By the time Robinson IV rolled around, the U.S. Supreme Court had issued its ruling in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) that certain regulatory takings case were not ripe, and it granted cert and summarily vacated the Ninth Circuit's Robinson decision, ordering it to consider the decision again in light of Williamson County's new ripeness rules. See Ariyoshi v. Robinson, 477 U.S. 902 (1986) (Robinson IV). The Ninth Circuit vacated its earlier order (Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 796 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.1986) (Robinson V) and sent the case back to Judge Pence in the District Court.

Not to be deterred, Judge Pence found the case ripe under Williamson County. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F.Supp. 1002, 1020-21 (D.Haw. 1987) (Robinson VI). Back up to the Ninth Circuit they went, and in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 854 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1988) (Robinson VII), the Ninth Circuit ordered further briefing on the issue.  In Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1990) (Robinson VIII), the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's decision and sent it back with instructions to dismiss the case because it was not ripe under Williamson County.

A thirty-one year old case was not ripe, you say?  How so?

As noted, we previously certified six questions to the Supreme Court of Hawaii. In response, the Hawaii court stated that the decision in McBryde II did not constitute the final disposition of the case. See Robinson II, 658 P.2d at 295-97. The court explained that the McBryde litigation began and was treated throughout by the trial court as an action to determine the rights of the parties to the waters of the Hanapepe. The trial court had attempted to identify the exact quantity of water to which each party was entitled. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed the award of appurtenant rights and reversed the award of prescriptive and surplus rights. No specific instruction was imparted to the trial court, and the Supreme Court did not utilize its power to render a final judgment. Further, no further proceedings are of record in the trial court. The court explained that the partial reversal without instruction merely rendered that portion of the judgment void. Id. at 296-97. Thus the only portion of the judgment which could be considered final after appeal was the partial quantification of the parties' water rights, namely the award of appurtenant rights.

Robinson VIII, 887 F.2d at 218 (footnote omitted). Unbelievably, a third cert petition was not sought, and the litigation (per the Hawaii Supreme Court's edict as noted above) went back to the Kauai trial court where it all began in 1959, where, as far as anyone in these parts is aware, the case remains on the docket. The state certainly has no interest in moving it forward and ripening the case, and the private parties who originated the litigation are long since out of the sugar business. [See one note of correction in the comments.] Kauai is now a place of tax revolts, zoning fights, and quiet beaches, and the sugar industry is but a distant memory.

County of Hawaii v. Sotomura — Shifting The Line in the Sand

If you have managed to come along this far, congratulations -- there's more, but thankfully it's a shorter tale and one which follows the same general plot.

McBryde/Robinson was not a unique case, and the Hawaii Supreme Court regularly accomplished similar changes in established law in other areas. In County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55 Haw. 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973), the court redefined the seaward boundary of a littoral parcel in a condemnation action from the high water mark to the "upper reaches of the wash of the waves," holding that no compensation was owed for the land seaward of the new line because it was owned by the state. The trial court had awarded nominal compensation of one dollar to the property owner for the condemnation of this property, but the Supreme Court declared that was error and took the dollar away. [Disclosure: my late law partner and name partner of our firm, Charlie Key, represented the property owners in the Hawaii Supreme Court.]

The property owners followed the Robinson script and sued in federal district court (for due process violations, not under a takings theory). The court determined "[j]udicial transfers of title to private lands to the State which do not permit the owner an opportunity to be heard or to present evidence is not constitutionally valid. Whenever a party is to be deprived of property, he is entitled to a meaningful hearing before the fact." Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473, 478 (D. Haw. 1978). The district court concluded:

This Court fails to find any legal, historical, factual or other precedent or basis for the conclusions of the Hawaii Supreme Court that, following erosion, the monument by which the seaward boundary of seashore land in Hawaii is to be fixed is the upper reaches of the wash of the waves. To the contrary, the evidence introduced in this case firmly establishes that the common law, followed by both legal precedent and historical practice, fixes the high water mark and seaward boundaries with reference to the tides, as opposed to the run or reach of waves on the shore. For example, on the Island of Hawaii, the seaweed line was used to indicate the level of the high tides and high water mark. The decision in Sotomura was contrary to established practice, history and precedent and, apparently, was intended to implement the court's conclusion that public policy favors extension of public use and ownership of the shoreline. A desire to promote public policy, however, does not constitute justification for a state taking private property without compensation.

Id. at 480-81. The state's appeal to the Ninth Circuit was dismissed as untimely.

Just think of the possibilities if the deadline had not been missed -- this case might still be going on today.

Feds Likely To Seek Cert In Casitas (Water Rights Taking Case)

It looks like the federal government will likely seek U.S. Supreme Court review of Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). As noted here, the SG's office has sought and received two extensions of time and the cert petition is now due by July 17, 2009.

In Casitas, the Federal Circuit held that contractual water rights were taken when the federal government required the landowner to construct a fish ladder and divert water in order to protect endangered steelhead trout. The court held that the requirement resulted in a physical diversion of water for public use, and that "Casitas will never, at the end of any period of time, be able to get the water back. The character of the government action was a physical diversion for public use -- the protection of an endangered species." The Federal Circuit's opinion is posted here, and the court's denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc -- which generated concurring and dissenting opinions, see 556 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) -- is available here.

The briefs in the court of appeals are not available via PACER, unfortunately, but the mp3 of the oral arguments is posted here. More background from the local paper.

Thanks to New Jersey Eminent Domain Law blog for reminding us of this case.

We predicted this was a case to watch, and we will be following any developments.

Materials And Links From Today's Water Law Seminar

To those who attended today's seminar "Integrating Water Law and Land Use Planning," thank you.  The materials from my session on "Water Rights, Property Rights and the Law of Settled Expectations" are below. 

• Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) - the Hawaii Kai Marina case - physical invasions, regulatory takings, and interference with settled expectations.

• Haw. Const. art. XI, § 7  (the declaration of public trust).

• Hawaii's Takings Clause.

• U.S. Constitution, amend. V (federal takings clause).

• U.S Constitution amend. XIV (federal due process clause).

• 42 U.S.C § 1983 (federal civil rights statute).

• 42 U.S.C § 1988 (prevailing party attorney's fees statute).

• Maui Tomorrow v. State of Hawaii, 110 Haw. 234, 131 P.3d 517 (2006) - Hawaii water law is not a federal case.  Summary of the decision here.
  

• The State zoning law, Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 205.

• The Hawaii State Planning Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 226.

• The Hawaii Water Code, Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 174C.

• Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the case in which the U.S. Supreme Court first upheld the segregation of land uses in an Ohio suburban town into districts against a substantive due process challenge. Law students study the case, land use lawyers and planners know it intimately, and "Euclidean" zoning has become the shorthand for district-based single use zoning.

• Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) - the government's police powers can be used to protect against nuisances.

• Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970).  Copy available here.  

• In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole), 94 Haw. 97, 9 P.3d 409 (2000) (the mother of all Hawaii water law cases -- the decision so vast it required its own table of contents)

• In re Waiola O Molokai, Inc., 103 Haw. 401, 83 P.2d 664 (2004) (burdens of proof).

• State and local government agencies have public trust duties - Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 111 Haw. 205, 140 P.3d 985 (2006).

• A counterpoint to Waihole: David L. Callies & Calvert G. Chipchase, Water Regulation, Land Use and the Environment, 30 U. Haw. L. Rev. 49 (2007).  Copy posted here.

• Hawaii vested rights: Arrow of Time - Vested Rights, Zoning Estoppel, and Development Agreements in Hawaii - 2006 U. Hawaii Law Review article. Drop me an email, and I will email you a pdf, or send you a hard copy (tell me which).

• Upsetting settled expectations in shoreline law - accretion and erosion: Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State of Hawaii, No. 28175 (Haw. ICA) - here's the brief we filed which illustrates the principle that the legislature (or a court) cannot simply change the settled law without raising takings concerns. The issue in that case is whether the state or littoral landowners are entitled to ownership of accreted land. In "Act 73," the legislature declared that shoreline land naturally accreted belongs to the State of Hawaii and is public property.  The act overturned the age-old rule of shoreline accretion and erosion, which held that beachfront owners lose ownership of land when it erodes, but gain it when it accretes.  Instead of these balanced rules, Act 73 made the erosion/accretion equation one-sided: the State wins every time. 

• Compensation for regulatory taking of water rights - Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, No. 2007-5153 (Mar. 3, 2009).

Upcoming Water Law Seminar - Integrating Water Law and Land Use Planning

There's still time to register for the upcoming seminar "Integrating Water Law and Land Use Planning," being held in Honolulu at the Ala Moana Hotel on Thursday, May 14, 2009 from 9am - 4:30pm.  I'll be leading the session on "Water Rights, Property Rights and the Law of Settled Expectations," and my Damon Key colleage Christi-Anne Kudo Chock is handling "Hawaiian Water Rights - Where Culture and the Law Merge."

Also on the faculty are Lenore Nakama Ohye, a hydrologic planning program manager for the State of Hawaii Commission on Water Resource Management; Lawrence E. Beck, P.E., from the County of Hawaii Department of Water Supply; and Lawrence Miike, M.D., a Commissioner on the Water Commission.  Seminar details, including a complete agenda and registration information, are posted here.

Monday Round-Up

Several diverse items, for your consideration:

• Columnist George Will opines about the Empress Casino Joliet case -- the one where the Illinois Supreme Court held that a regulation imposing a 3% "surcharge" on Illinois casinos with gross receipts over $200 million per year, and then gives the money to horse racing tracks is not a taking of property.  The U.S. Supreme Court has been asked to review the case. We discussed it here and here (cert petition and amicus briefs included).
  

• The ABA Journal writes about George Will opining on the Empress Casino Joliet case.

• The Wall Street Journal Law Blog asks "Maryland's Run for the Preakness: Would it Be Constitutional?" 

• From the New York Zoning and Municipal Law Blog: "Road Improvement Serving Primarily Commercial Vehicles Does not Defeat Eminent Domain."

• From the Maui News: "Plan could rejuvinate waters of Na Wai Eha" - a dispatch from the trenches of Hawaii's water wars.

Federal Circuit Denies En Banc Review In Casitas

The U.S. Court of Appeals has denied a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc in Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, No. 2007-5153 (Sep. 25, 2008), a decision we noted here.  In September 2008, a panel held that contractual water rights were taken when the federal government required the landowner to construct a fish ladder and divert water in order to protect endangered steelhead trout.  The court held that the requirement resulted in a physical diversion of water for public use, and that "Casitas will never, at the end of any period of time, be able to get the water back.  The character of the government action was a physical diversion for public use -- the protection of an endangered species." Slip op. at 30.

The per curiam order denying rehearing is available here.  Three Federal Circuit judges dissented, arguing that no physical taking occurred because the federal government did not appropriate water from Casitas, it only restricted its right to divert water, "a burden on Casitas' usufructuary right."

Despite Loretto's recognition that regulations on the use of property, even those imposing affirmative obligations on property owners, do not constitute physical takings, the panel majority reached a novel conclusion—a requirement under the Endangered Species Act to leave in a river a minimum amount of water that is not itself privately owned must be analyzed as a physical taking of a party’s use of that water.

The dissent argued instead that Penn Central's ad hoc analysis should apply.

Three judges concurred separately, emphasizing that the case "as it was presented to [the court] on appeal" involved a physical, not a regulatory, taking, because the government conceded that Casitas had a property right in the water, and the requirement of building a fish ladder resulted in a permanent appropriation of that water. The appropriation was "sending it down the fish ladder where Casitas could not recover it."

The Federal Circuit has 12 active circuit judges, and a highly fractured court means this is a case to watch.

Materials From Hawaii Land Use Law Conference

To those who attended Thursday's and Friday's conference, thank you.  Here are the cases and other materials I mentioned in my portion:

• Shoreline setbacks and equitable estoppel - Brescia v. North Shore Ohana 115 Haw. 477, 168 P.3d 929 (2007) 

• State shoreline setback - Haw. Rev. Stat. § 205A-43

• Counties have authority to enact their own setbacks - Haw. Rev. Stat. § 205A-45

• No private right of action to enforce zoning - The Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals, in Pono v. Molokai Ranch, Ltd., 119 Haw. 163, 194 P.3d 1126 (2008), held that a private party had no standing to enforce the state's land use laws. The Hawaii Supreme Court rejected certiorari review of the case.  Disclosure: we represent the landowner. More here.

• Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State of Hawaii, the appeal now pending in the Intermediate Court of Appeals.  The issue in that case is whether the state or littoral landowners are entitled to ownership of accreted land. In "Act 73," the legislature declared that shoreline land naturally accreted belongs to the State of Hawaii and is public property.  The act overturned the age-old rule of shoreline accretion and erosion, which held that beachfront owners lose ownership of land when it erodes, but gain it when it accretes.  Instead of these balanced rules, Act 73 made the erosion/accretion equation one-sided: the State wins every time.  We filed an amicus brief in the appeal, a copy of which is available here.

• Substantive due process in the Ninth Circuit after Lingle - The Ninth Circuit Rediscovers Substantive Due Process in Land Use Cases

• County of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family Limited Partnership, No. 28882 (Dec. 24, 2008) - public use, pretext, and damages for failed taking

The majority opinion by Justice Acoba, joined by Justices Nakayama and Duffy is posted here:

We hold that (1) a landowner in a condemnation action is entitled to damages under HRS § 101-27 where the property at issue is not finally taken in the context of a particular condemnation proceeding, irrespective of whether the government attempts to take the land through subsequent condemnation proceedings; (2) abatement does not apply where the relief sought in two concurrent actions is not the same; and (3) although our courts afford substantial deference to the government's asserted public purpose for a taking in a condemnation proceeding, where there is evidence that the asserted purpose is pretextual, courts should consider a landowner's defense of pretext.  Therefore, (1) automatic denial of statutory damages under HRS §101-27 in Condemnation 1 is vacated and the case remanded for a determination of damages, (2) the court's conclusion that Condemnation 2 was not abated by Condemnation 2 is vacated and the case remanded for a determination of whether the public purpose asserted in Condemnation 2 was pretextual.

Slip op. at 5. Here's the concurring and dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Moon joined by Justice Levinson. The briefs in the case are available here:  Opening Brief, Answering Brief of the County of Hawaii, Reply Brief. Disclosure: we represent the property owner.

• "Arrow of Time, Vested Rights, Zoning Estoppel, and Development Agreements in Hawaii' (published by the U. Hawaii Law Review in Feb. 2006). Drop me an email, and I will email you a pdf, or send you a hard copy (tell me which).