Hawaii Appellate Opinions

SMALLWOOD v. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

No. 27875 (March 14, 2008)

Opinion [pdf]

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEONARD, J.

Plaintiff-Appellant Craig Smallwood (Smallwood) appeals from a Judgment filed on February 25, 2005 in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court) in Civil No. 04-1-2315-12.  The Circuit Court entered Judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee City and County of Honolulu (City) upon the Circuit Court's February 23, 2005 Order Granting City's Motion to Dismiss Smallwood's Complaint (Order Granting Dismissal).  The Circuit Court based its dismissal of the Complaint on two findings: (1) that the claims set forth in the Complaint were previously adjudicated in Smallwood v. City, Civil No. 04-1-0974-05 (Prior Litigation) and, therefore, the Complaint constituted an impermissible "collateral attack" on the prior judgment; and (2) that the Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over certain claims set forth in the Complaint because Smallwood failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to those claims.

On appeal, Smallwood argues that the Circuit Court erred in finding that the Complaint constituted a collateral attack on the judgment in the Prior Litigation.  Smallwood does not challenge on appeal the Circuit Court's second finding that it lacked jurisdiction over certain claim in the Complaint based on Smallwood's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The judgment in the Prior Litigation: (1) dismissed without prejudice a prior complaint by Smallwood against City; and (2) dismissed with prejudice certain claims for injunctive relief that were actually adjudicated on the merits in that case.  Smallwood's Complaint herein does not seek to indirectly set aside, invalidate, avoid, or impeach the judgment in the Prior Litigation through an independent action seeking an alternative form of relief or result.  Therefore, we hold that the filing of the Complaint did not constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the prior judgment.  The Circuit Court's ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over certain of Smallwood's claims was not an adjudication on the merits and, accordingly, the Circuit Court's dismissal with prejudice must have been based on the erroneous application of the collateral attack doctrine.  We vacate the Judgment and Order Granting Dismissal and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. [footnote omitted]

STATE OF HAWAI'I v. MAINAAUPO

No. 27764 (March 5, 2008)

Opinion [pdf]

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

On December 7, 2007, the defendant-appellant-petitioner Mark K. Lopez filed an application for a writ of certiorari, urging us to review the memorandum opinion (mem. op.) of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in State v. Lopez, No. 27969 [hereinafter, "ICA's Lopez mem. op."], and, on December 11, 2007, the defendant-appellant-petitioner William Mainaaupo, Jr., filed an application for a writ of certiorari, asking us to review the ICA's memorandum opinion in State v. Mainaaupo, No. 27764 [hereinafter, "ICA's Mainaaupo mem. op."].  Although these cases are factually unrelated, they share a common legal question:  Whether the ICA erred in concluding that the circuit court of the first circuit correctly declines to instruct the jury on the mistake-of-fact defense, as provided by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 702-218 (1993), in relation to charges of the offense of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS § 708-836 (Supp. 2001), where the defendant claims a mistaken belief that the person who authorized his use of the vehicle was the registered owner of the vehicle.  Beyond this shared issue, Mainaaupo argues that the ICA gravely erred in concluding that the circuit court correctly instructed the jury that, under HRS § 708-836, the defendant had a legal duty to obtain consent to operate the vehicle directly from the registered owner of the vehicle.  And Lopez contends that the ICA gravely erred in concluding that the remarks made during closing argument by the plaintiff-appellee-respondent State of Hawai'i [hereinafter, "the prosecution"] regarded Lopez's post-arrest silence and his failure to produce a critical defense witness to corroborate his testimony were legitimate comment on the evidence and not misconduct.  We accepted Lopez's and Mainaaupo's applications on January 18, 2008 and consolidated the cases for disposition the same day.

. . . .

Accordingly, we vacate the judgments against Lopez and Mainaaupo and remand their cases for new trials.  [footnotes omitted]

Concurring and dissenting opinion by Acoba, J. [pdf]

LIKI v. FIRST FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE OF HAWAI'I, INC.

No. 28076 (February 29, 2008)

Opinion [pdf]

OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.

Plaintiff-Appellant Lilivau Liki (Liki) was injured when he was struck by an uninsured motor vehicle at a gas station.  At the time of the accident, Liki was an employee of Defendant-Appellee M. Nakai Repair Service, Ltd. (M. Nakai), and he was cleaning a sump at the gas station as part of his job duties.  M. Nakai had assigned a company truck to Liki, which Liki drove to the gas station on the morning of the accident.  Liki parked the truck at the station, and was cleaning the sump using tool that he had transported in the truck when the uninsured motorist backed into him.

The truck was covered by a Business Auto Policy issued by Defendant-Appellee First Fire & Casualty Insurance of Hawaii, Inc. (First Insurance).  The policy had an uninsured motorist (UM) endorsement, and Liki sought coverage under the endorsement.  After First Insurance denied coverage, Liki filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit court).  First Insurance and M. Nakai (collectively Defendants) filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted on the ground that Liki had an insufficient connection with the M. Nakai truck at the time of the accident to bring him within the scope of the policy's UM coverage.  Liki now appeals from: (1) the final judgment entered on July 11, 2006 by the circuit court in favor of Defendants (Final Judgment), and (2) the order filed on July 11, 2006 granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Order).

This appeal requires us to apply the "chain of events" test adopted by the Hawai'i Supreme Court in Dawes v. First Ins. Co., of Hawai'i, Ltd., 77 Hawai'i 117, 132-33, 883 P.2d 38, 53-54 (1994).  Applying that test here, we conclude that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants.  Accordingly, we vacate the Final Judgment and Order, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [footnotes omitted]

BANK OF HAWAI'I v. SHINN

No. 27832 (February 29, 2008)

Opinion [pdf]

OPINION OF THE COURT BY FOLEY, J.

Defendant-Appellant Michael J. Shinn (Shinn) appeals from the "Order Denying Defendant Michael L. Shinn's rule 60(b) Motion on Statutory and Due Process Grounds (1) to Set Aside this Court's December 18, 2003, 'Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Deficiency Judgment Against Defendants Michael J. Shinn and Kahala Ventures Entered on 12/21/93,' and (2) to Expunge this Court's December 21, 1993, 'Plaintiff Bank of Hawaii's Joint and Several Judgment Against Defendants Michael L. Shinn, Donald T. Eovino, and Kahala Ventures,' Recorded at the State of Hawaii Bureau of Conveyances on 12/21/93, as Document No. 93-211815, filed on January 17, 2006," filed on March 7, 2006, in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit court).

. . . .

On appeal, Shinn argues that he "was simultaneously deprived of (1) his State [Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)] Section 657-5 statutory procedural rights, (2) his Article 1 of Section 5 State Constitutional procedural rights, and (3) his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Federal Constitutional procedural rights when the [circuit] court without notice to him extended [BOH's] 1993 judgment against him, rendering that extension null and void, as a result of which [Shinn's] rule 60(b) Motion to set aside that judgment should have been granted."

. . . .

The "Order Denying Defendant Michael L. Shinn's rule 60(b) Motion on Statutory and Due Process Grounds (1) to Set Aside this Court's December 18, 2003, 'Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Deficiency Judgment Against Defendants Michael J. Shinn and Kahala Ventures Entered on 12/21/93,' and (2) to Expunge this Court's December 21, 1993, 'Plaintiff Bank of Hawaii's Joint and Several Judgment Against Defendants Michael L. Shinn, Donald T. Eovino, and Kahala Ventures,' Recorded at the State of Hawaii Bureau of Conveyances on 12/21/93, as Document No. 93-211815, filed on January 17, 2006," filed on March 7, 2006, in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit is affirmed. [footnotes omitted]

ASSOCIATION OF HOME OWNERS OF KAI NUI COURT v. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

February 28, 2008 (No. 27408)

Opinion [pdf]

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEONARD, J.

Defendant-Appellant City and County of Honolulu (City) appeals from a Judgment filed on June 21, 2005 in the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu District (District Court).  The District Court entered Judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Association of Home Owners of Kai Nui Court (Association) and against City in the amount of $11,417.03 and costs in the amount of $147.00.  The money damages were awarded to Association for property damage, i.e., damage to Association's entry/exit gate that occurred when City's refuse truck came into contact with Association's gate.

On appeal, City argues that the District Court abused its discretion by granting Association's Motion for Reconsideration of the District Court's prior ruling, which granted City's oral District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 41(b) Motion to Dismiss.  For the reasons set forth below, we hold that: (1) it is not an abuse of discretion for a court to reconsider its ruling upon an oral motion when the court, upon review of persuasive legal authorities, determines that it made a mistake in its oral ruling; and (2) the District Court did not err in granting Association's Motion for Reconsideration.  Accordingly, we affirm. [footnotes omitted]

CARLISLE v. ONE (1) BOAT

February 27, 2007 (No. 26995)

Opinion [pdf]

OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.

Petitioner-Appellant Peter B. Carlisle, in his official capacity as the Prosecuting Attorney of the City and County of Honolulu, on behalf of the State of Hawai‘i (the State), filed a Verified Petition for Forfeiture seeking to forfeit property including a boat. That property was allegedly used to commit intentional violations of Hawai‘i Administrative Rules (HAR) §§ 13-95-70, entitled Stony corals, and 13-95-71, entitled Live rocks.

Claimants/Interested Persons-Appellees Dang Van Tran (Dang) and Sang Tran (Sang) (collectively, Claimants) filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit court) lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In an order entered on February 1, 2002 (February 1, 2002 Order), the circuit court granted the motion. The circuit court found that the offenses that were allegedly committed in connection with the use of the property were not "covered offenses" within the meaning of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712A-4 (1999), and thus could not provide the basis for forfeiture.

On December 6, 2004, the circuit court reduced the February 1, 2002 Order to a judgment entered in favor of Claimants and against the State (Judgment). On December 9, 2004, the State filed a notice of appeal from the Judgment. On January 20, 2005, the circuit court entered an order nunc pro tunc to February 1, 2002, granting in part and denying in part Claimants' motion to strike the judgment, or in the alternative, to amend the Judgment (January 20, 2005 Nunc Pro Tunc Order Amending Judgment).  The State filed a second notice of appeal on January 24, 2005.

Claimants contend that the State's "right to prosecute this appeal is time barred" because the State did not file its notice of appeal until two years and nine months after the February 1, 2002 Order, which Claimants maintain was an appealable final order. The State contends that this court has jurisdiction and that the circuit court erred in granting Claimants' motion to dismiss the petition because Claimants' property was forfeitable under HRS Chapter 712A and HRS § 199-7 (1993 & Supp. 1999).

We conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction and that the circuit court erred in dismissing the petition. Accordingly, we vacate the February 1, 2002 Order, the December 6, 2004 Judgment, and the January 20, 2005 Nunc Pro Tunc Order Amending Judgment, and remand for further proceedings.  [footnotes omitted]

STATE OF HAWAI'I v. GOMES

No. 27906 (February 20, 2008)

Opinion [pdf]

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Keith Daniels Gomes (Petitioner) filed an application for writ of certiorari on October 31, 2007, seeking review of the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) filed on August 2, 2007, pursuant to its Summary Disposition Order (SDO) filed on July 11, 2007, affirming the March 28, 2006 judgment of the first circuit court (the court) in Cr. No. 05-1-1181, convicting Petitioner of bribery of a Witness, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)  § 710-1070 (1993), and sentencing him to five years' imprisonment.  We hold that the ICA erred in affirming the court's denial of Petitioner's motions for judgment of acquittal of the charge of bribery under HRS §  710-1070(1)(b) because even in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, substantial evidence did not exist to support the jury's finding that Petitioner offered money to a potential witness with the intent to induce her to avoid service of process. [footnotes omitted]

Dissenting opinion by by Nakamura, J. [pdf]

FLORES v. THE RAWLINGS COMPANY, LLC

February 1, 2008 (No. 28124)

Opinion [pdf]

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.

Defendant-Appellant The Rawlings Co., LLC [hereinafter, Rawlings], appeals from the August 1, 2006 interlocutory order of the circuit court of the first circuit, denying Rawlings's motion for summary judgment in this action initiated by Plaintiffs-Appellees Albert Flores and Donald Rapoza [hereinafter, collectively, Plaintiffs] against Rawlings. The case was subsequently transferred to this court pursuant to Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-58(b)(1) (Supp. 2006).

Although the heart of Plaintiffs' claim is that Rawlings violated the registration requirement for collection agencies under HRS § 443B-3(a) (1993), this appeal also concerns two threshold issues regarding whether Plaintiffs may bring this claim: (1) whether Plaintiffs have established injury within the meaning of HRS § 480-13 (Supp. 2004), and (2) whether Plaintiffs are "consumers" within the meaning of HRS § 480-13. The circuit court, in denying Rawlings's motion for summary judgment, found that these prerequisites for bringing suit had been met and that Rawlings was subject to the registration requirement of HRS § 443B-3(a).

On appeal, Rawlings argues that: (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs' respective payments of what Rawlings terms "valid obligations" constituted "actual injury" sufficient to give them standing to bring suit; (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs were "consumers" under HRS chapter 480, because the transaction involving Rawlings was a recovery of subrogation/reimbursement claims arising from tort rather than a consumer transaction concerning the delivery of medical services; and (3) the circuit court erred in ruling that Rawlings was recovering "debts" within the meaning of HRS chapter 443B, such that it was a "collection agency" subject to that chapter.

Based on the following, we vacate the circuit court's interlocutory order and remand to the circuit court to enter an order granting summary judgment in favor of Rawlings. [footnote omitted]

INOUE v. INOUE

January 31, 2008 (No. 28028)

Opinion [pdf]

OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.

Defendant-Appellant Gina L. Inoue, now known as Gina L. Khouw (Gina), appeals from the Divorce Decree filed on June 9, 2006 (Divorce Decree), as well as several related orders entered by the Family Court of the First Circuit (family court). 

. . . .

We conclude that the family court was correct in holding that Gina was equitably estopped in the circumstances of this case.  Since we find that Gina's points of error are without merit, we affirm.

STATE OF HAWAI'I v. FETELEE

January 31, 2008 (No. 27482)

Opinion [pdf]

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

On August 29, 2007, this court accepted a timely application for a writ of certiorari, filed by petitioner/defendant-appellant Faa P. Fetelee on July 17, 2007, requesting that this court review the May 17, 2007 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), entered pursuant to its April 18, 2007 published opinion in State v. Fetelee, 114 Hawai'i 151, 157 P.3d 590 (App. 2007).

. . . .

In light of our pronouncement today, we are compelled to vacate the ICA's May 17, 2007 judgment on appeal and the trial court's August 3, 2005 judgment of conviction and sentence, and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

Concurring opinion by Nakamura, J. [pdf]